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This study considers a group of distinctly modernist philosophers for whom aesthetic and 
reflective practices represented a way out of the paralysis of a culture dominated by narrowly 
conceived philosophical values.  These modernist philosophers, I argue, helped to give birth to 
mode of experimental writing that Robert Musil called “essayism.”  I begin in Chapter One with an 
account  of Walter Benjamin’s  experimental  concept  of melancholy  and  its  intersection with  the 
avant-garde practices of French Surrealism.  Chapter One begins to contrast Benjamin’s concept 
of  melancholy  with  Friedrich  Nietzsche’s  therapeutic  efforts to transform and overcome 
melancholy on both a personal and a cultural level.  Chapter Two changes course to pursue a 
comparative study of Nietzsche and his contemporary, William James.  I treat them as proto-
modernist philosophers whose efforts to overcome philosophy and replace it with experimental 
writing are intimately connected with their experimental concepts of melancholy.  The efforts of 
James and Nietzsche represent what I see as an important bridge between Ralph Waldo 
Emerson’s  radical  re-conceptualizing of melancholy and later modernist experimental writing. 
Before turning to Emerson, I read (in Chapter Three) Freud’s  1915  essay  “On  Transience” 
alongside Virginia Woolf’s essay “On Being Ill” and James’s “Will to Believe.”  Chapter Four then 
focuses on Emerson’s  essay  “Experience”  as  an anticipation  of  Nietzsche’s  concept  of 
experimental writing, as well as a watershed moment in the long history of thinking about 
melancholy. Chapter  Five  reads  Nietzsche’s  Ecce Homo as (in many respects) the ultimate 
Emersonian text, as well as something of a failed experiment. The study concludes with a series 
of close readings of Swiss writer Robert Walser, who inspired Max Brod to write: “After Nietzsche, 
there  had  to  be  Walser.”    I  examine  the  ways  in  which Walser pursues the implications of 
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Nietzsche’s thought at the same time he explores quite different alternatives. Walser, I argue, is 
an example of a melancholy modernist who successfully converts philosophy into a form of 
experimental writing.  By the end of the study, I hope my account of a modernist melancholy 
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INTRODUCTION:    On  Ariadne’s  Thread  and  the  Angel  of  History 
(Along with a Brief Disquisition on Ash) 
 
Of the Edriophthalma: 
Crustaceans with fixed eyes, that is to say, without stalks and immobile. Very sad by nature, these crustaceans live, withdrawn from 
the world, in holes dug out of the cliff. 
 




Reader, do you ever feel sea-sad, loamishly sad, like Tennyson, with that sadness too deep for words?  Though of course nothing is 
too deep for words for a poet like him and me. 
 




I absolutely adore notes. I’d run a thousand paces just to hear one.  
 
Robert Walser, Fritz Kocher’s Essays (1902) 
 
 
This project began with my discovery of the Swiss writer Robert Walser and a few kindred spirits 
– Stevie Smith, Henri Michaux, and Francis Ponge, among others – who all shared a voice that was 
distinctly modernist and whose work seemed to reflect an experimental way of thinking about melancholy 
– what I was tempted to call their “avant-garde melancholy.”  The question for me was not how a shared 
temperament found expression in a common style, or how a commonly used adjective could be made to 
serve as a theoretical concept.  What fascinated me, rather, was how an experimental approach toward 
melancholy allowed these writers to open up a new affective space and create a new kind of writing 
whose complex movements and rapid modulations defied all generic labels – including  “melancholy.”  
These writers redefined what melancholy meant; while inviting this clichéd and facile label, they had 
somehow made it necessary to replace an adjective with an adverb that did not exist in the language.  As 
a student of modernist literature, I wanted to understand how this project – transformative in effect, if not 
always by conscious intent – nevertheless made it possible to gather a set of writers and to describe them 
as  “melancholy modernists.”    I  thus  began with  a  couple  of  promising  paradoxes,  a  somewhat  offbeat 
selection of writers, and a conventional plan to devote a chapter of close reading to each.  That was the 
plan in the beginning.  After a series of delays and detours more scholarly than saturnine in nature, I have 
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produced a study that follows another course – one that now ends with Walser and gathers around him 
an entirely different cast of characters.  I want to explain how the study in its present form gradually and 
unexpectedly took shape.  
Like many readers in the English-speaking world, I was first introduced to Walser by the reprinted 
edition of the Selected Stories translated by Christopher Middleton and with a brief introduction by Susan 
Sontag. Walser is a miniaturist in spirit, even in his longer pieces.  It is also easy to identify passages in 
Walser’s writing that are dense with local activity and yet trip along lightly and seem to have no weight  at 
all.  Sontag draws our attention to a passage at the very end of “Kleist in Thun,” a short piece from 1913 
that imagines the nineteenth-century poet Heinrich von Kleist in the final weeks leading up to his mental 
collapse, a period spent in solitude as a visitor to the Swiss alpine town of Thun.  The story ends with 
Kleist being transported back home in a stagecoach accompanied by his sister, now his permanent 
caretaker.1  The final paragraph of the story serves as a brief coda: 
 
But finally one has to let it go, this stagecoach, and last of all one can permit oneself the 
observation that on the front of the villa where Kleist lived there hangs a marble plaque 
which indicates who lived and worked there.  Travelers who intend to tour the Alps can 
read it, children can read it and spell it out, letter by letter, and then look questioningly in 
each other’s eyes.  A Jew can read it, a Christian too, if he has the time and if his train is 
not leaving that very instant, a Turk, a swallow, insofar as he is interested, I also, I can 
read it again if I like.  Thun stands at the entrance to the Bernese Oberland and is visited 
every year by thousands of foreigners.  I know the region a little perhaps, because I 
worked as a clerk in a brewery there.  The region is considerably more beautiful than I 
have been able to describe here, the lake is twice as blue, the sky three times as 
beautiful.  Thun had a trade fair, I cannot say exactly but I think four years ago. (25-26) 
 
I had never read language quite like this before.  Sontag calls the story and this passage in particular “an 
account of mental decline as grand as any I know of in literature.”  There are certainly generic precedents 
                                                   
1 Ironically, it was Lisa Walser who escorted her brother to the mental hospital in Waldau, Switzerland in 
1929 upon learning (from Walser’s landladies) of the deterioration of his mental state. 
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for  imaginative  reconstructions  like Walser’s  – in Georg Büchner’s  remarkable story Lenz, for example, 
which Walser almost certainly had in mind as he wrote “Kleist in Thun.” On a more superficial level, the 
language seemed to be engaged in something quite different from realist literature and its relatively 
simple tasks of rendering and recounting experience (or recreating in the manner of historical fiction or 
“creative non-fiction”).  Walser’s prose, it seemed to me, read much like an essay. 
If  Walser’s  is  an  account  of  mental  decline,  I  wondered,  then  whose decline?  Is this a little 
parable  of  the  necessity  and  ultimate wisdom of  “letting  go,”  a melancholy  (and  conventionally  poetic) 
sigh of  resignation?   What, exactly, sets  this apart?   The narrator’s own  voice becomes audible  in  this 
final passage, and this first-person “I” offers poignant evidence of a mind warding off its own demons and 
dealing with its own instability.  But the language does not seem to mirror the narrator’s own decline or 
disintegration.  These are the complex modulations of a mind testing out possible affective orientations – 
ways of “letting go.”  In Walser, everything important happens in the language and the way it moves and 
models a consciousness in the process of testing out different ways of being in the world.  Far from a 
letting go of the reins, I also saw (on the level of craft) a highly self-reflexive attention to the shifts of 
consciousness in its subtly responsive dialogue with the world.  “One can permit oneself...”  is a gesture 
one finds often in Walser, but it has a curious function that makes it more than a stylistic mannerism.  An 
observation is not something one makes, but something that one permits oneself to make only at a 
precise and carefully prepared-for moment in the spiritual unfolding of the narrative, when and only when 
the affective orientation achieves the proper angle relative to the scene for that observation to be made. 
The thought that he might do something (a thought which he reiterates, as if to re-assure himself), his 
ability to articulate and therefore imagine his own possible agency, creates what we might call the “sound 
of  reality”2 even more compelling than the contemplation of the material reality of the memorial plaque 
itself.  There is a momentary triumph of identity achieved, and asserted, in the course of navigating and 
articulating  these  facts.  (The  sentence  is  not  in  the  form:    “I,  also,  I  can  read  it  if  I  want  to,  as  can  a 
swallow, a Turk, a Jew...”;  nor is it something Melville’s Bartleby might say: “I can read it, but I prefer not 
to...”)  The  reality  of  the  narrator’s  relationship to fact replaces (or at least accompanies) what might 
otherwise be a contemplative fixation on the facts of the world.  The swallow and the pre-literate child can 
                                                   
2 This phrase is one I have picked up from William James, of whom we will hear much more later. 
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“read”  it  (letter  by  letter)  without  knowing  or  worrying  over  the meaning  of  it.3  And that second-order 
power of attending to something, if he chooses to, seems to suffice for this voice.  
 
Sontag  describes Walser  as  an  example  of  a  general  “depressive  type,”  and  there  is  ample 
evidence of a biographical kind to support this claim (viii).  I was much more interested, however, in the 
experimental role that melancholy played in the modeling of a consciousness, in the peculiar distancing 
effect that I saw in “Kleist in Thun” and elsewhere.  Walser’s writing seemed to combine two recognizably 
modernist features: a fluid and mobile consciousness along with an abstract impersonality, an essay-like 
intimacy that was made possible through abstraction.   At the same time, Walser also challenged my 
notion of what modernist experimental writing looked like.  In her introduction to the Selected Stories, 
Sontag observes that the effort to introduce Walser to new readers is made easy by “a whole arsenal of 
glorious comparisons” (vii).  Walser is a “Paul Klee in prose,” a cross between Stevie Smith and Beckett, 
the  “missing  link”  between  Kleist  and  Kafka.    We  can  easily  compile  a  second  list  of  modernist 
contemporaries – Herman Hesse, Walter Benjamin, Franz Kafka, and many others – who are all on 
record as having recognized in Walser a new and special literary voice.  Kafka was an early fan; we can 
even trace a thematic influence on Kafka in the comical figure of the kommis or lowly clerk. What struck 
me was the difference between the voices of Kafka and Walser, in spite of the influence and the shared 
thematic concerns (which extends beyond the kommis figure).  Walser did not “sound” at all like Kafka; he 
did, however, share something with the British writer Stevie Smith and the painter Paul Klee – two 
modernists  who  were  probably  not  aware  of  Walser’s  existence.  I was dissatisfied, however, with 
Sontag’s casual attempt to place Walser more generally as a “missing link” within some more continuous 
line of development in European literature.  I wanted to read Walser as a modernist, in relation to other 
experimental writing that emerged at a particular time and place.  If I were to make an argument for 
reading Walser as a singular but not an isolated figure, then I had to find some non-arbitrary basis for 
these “glorious comparisons” so that I could present them as a distinctly modernist constellation. 
 
                                                   
3 I will  devote  special  attention  to  the  historical  significance  of  Albrecht Dürer’s  etching Melancolie I in 
Chapter One, but an equally iconic image in the history of melancholy is Poussin’s painting of shepherds 
in a pastoral setting gathered around a tombstone, looking puzzled over the meaning of the words in Latin 
inscribed on the stone: “Et in Arcadia ego” (“Even in Arcadia, there am I.”) 
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1.  Melancholy Made Cheerful: Walter Benjamin and Robert Walser 
Not long after my first encounter with Walser, I revisited another essay by Susan Sontag written 
around the same time as her introduction to Walser’s Selected Stories:  the essay titled “Under the Sign 
of  Saturn,”  her  profile  of  Walter  Benjamin,  perhaps  the  most  iconic  melancholy  modernist.    I  knew, 
however,  that  Benjamin’s  iconic  status  and  his  importance  for  my  project  were  not  due  simply  to  his 
saturnine  temperament.    Sontag’s  profile  simply  elaborated  on  what Benjamin  himself  had  done.   His 
remarkable  essay  titled  “Aegesilaus Santander,”  unpublished  during  his  lifetime,  is  an  anatomy  of 
melancholy in the form of a self-portrait.  Even more remarkable  was  Benjamin’s  profile  of  a  specific 
historical manifestation of melancholy in his study of the German Baroque sub-genre of the Trauerspiel 
(“mourning-play”).   Die Ursprung des Deutschen Trauerspiel (The Origin of the German Tragic Drama) 
offered theoretical insights into melancholy that were entirely different from Freud’s and far more radical.  
Benjamin’s interest in melancholy, moreover, dovetailed with his involvement in the Surrealist movement 
and was both the stimulus and the foundation for his own avant-garde endeavors.  On of the most 
intriguing  parts  of  Sontag’s  profile  of  Benjamin  was,  in  fact,  a  cryptic  comment on Surrealism, whose 
“chief contribution to sensibility,” she wrote, “was to make melancholy cheerful.”   
The constellation metaphor that appealed to me was one I had picked up from Benjamin.  The 
constellation  method  was  Benjamin’s  name  for  a  peculiar  inductive  approach,  one  that  attempted  to 
combine  the  melancholic’s  brooding  upon  fragments  (the  allegorical  vision  of  the  world  in  ruins that 
Benjamin had studied in the Trauerspiel) with collage and other decontextualizing techniques developed 
by the early twentieth-century avant garde.4  It  was  the  unorthodox  method  behind  Benjamin’s 
experimental Arcades project.  The aim of arranging data into constellations was to make the researcher 
more responsive to the singularity of the individual datum – an artifact, a voice, a cultural meme – and at 
the same permit the discovery of patterns and associations that emerged from the material itself.  The 
constellation method, or at least the aspiration behind it, was just what I wanted: an alternative to the 
synthetic, top-down approach – the self-perpetuating game of subverting canons and categories and 
doxa, only to exchange them for new ones – that I had come to associate with the conventional academic 
                                                   
4 In his study of Benjamin and the Frankfurt School, Martin Jay defines a “constellation” as “a juxtaposed 
rather than integrated cluster of changing elements that resist reduction to a common denominator, 
essential core, or generative first principle” (14-15). 
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argument.    The  thought  of  invoking  any  theory  at  all  as  the  chosen  “lens”  for  my  reading  of Walser 
seemed faintly absurd.  But if I were going to place Walser in some theoretical context, then Benjamin’s 
theoretical account of melancholy seemed made to order. Benjamin’s  major  projects,  Sontag 
emphasized,  “cannot  be  fully  understood  unless  one  grasps  how  much  they  rely  on  a  theory  of 
melancholy” (111).  This theory of melancholy (if it could be described as a “theory”) was as idiosyncratic 
one, to say the least, but it appeared fully legible within a longer history of thinking about melancholy.  
Benjamin also gave a certain ethical charge and sense of urgency to his critical project of recovery.  “The 
only writer of history with the gift of setting alight the sparks of hope in the past,” Benjamin wrote, “is the 
one who is convinced of this: that not even the dead will be safe from the enemy, if he is victorious. And 
this enemy has not ceased to be victorious” (Illuminations 255).  This warning appeared in the series of 
textual  fragments known as the “Theses on the Philosophy of History,”5 which also contains Benjamin’s 
famous interpretation of Paul Klee’s image of the Angelus Novus (which Benjamin reads as the “Angel of 
History”).   A  “hope  in  the past,” which had an ambiguous  redemptive and  revolutionary sound, gave  to 
this endeavor  the  feel of a dramatic mission and a purpose  that went beyond Walser’s  (merely)  literary 
fascination with the small, the marginal, and the insignificant.  Benjamin seemed to give a modernist seal 
of approval to the kind of critical project I envisioned, now pursued in the spirit of a melancholy modernist 
who also occupied a place within a constellation of figures that also included Walser. 
It helped, of course, that Benjamin had written a brief but perceptive essay on Walser. 6  At one 
point  in  his  essay,  Benjamin  observed  that  each  of Walser’s  sentences  was  an  attempt  to make  the 
reader forget the preceding sentence.  This is actually quite close to a general observation Sontag had 
made about Benjamin’s sentences and their self-contained and fragmentary quality, what she described 
as  his  “freeze-frame  Baroque”  style  (129).    I  became  intrigued  by  further  temperamental  and  stylistic 
similarities.    Many  of  the  features  of  Benjamin’s  thought  and  sensibility  that  Sontag  attributed  to  a 
melancholy temperament were qualities that were on display in Walser.  Benjamin’s fascination with the 
miniature,  for  example,  reminded me  of W.G. Sebald’s  description  of Walser  as  a  “clairvoyant  of  the 
small.”    I  could  also  recognize  a  shared  interest  in  the  “creaturely”  and,  closely  related  to  that,  a 
                                                   
5 The line appears in Thesis VI.  
6 An English translation  of  Benjamin’s  essay  is  reprinted  as  an  appendix  in  the  edition  of  Walser’s 
Microscripts edited by Susan Bernofsky. 
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fascination with the ambiguous intentionality of non-living matter.  Many passages in Walser came to 
mind.  I remembered Walser’s whimsical disquisition on the material properties of ash:  
 
If, for example, one blows on ash it displays not the least reluctance to fly off instantly in 
all directions.  Ash is submissiveness, worthlessness, irrelevance itself, and best of all, it 
is itself pervaded by the belief that it  is fit  for nothing … Ash has no notion of character 
and is further from any kind of wood than dejection is from exhiliration.  Where there is 
ash there is actually nothing at all.  Tread on ash, and you will barely notice that your foot 
has stepped on something.  (qtd. in Sebald 19) 
 
Walser seems  to  “take  the side  of  things,” as Francis Ponge does  in Le parti pris de choses.  Walser 
takes it even one step further: he prefers ash to the presumptuous materiality of wood.  But while it was 
tempting to parlay Walser’s characteristic fascination into an ethical identification, in this case an exercise 
in “empathizing” with dead matter, I had to acknowledge that what actually happens in Walser is far more 
complex and provisional.  The projections of agency that carry forward the meditation on ash invite us to 
identify with the submissiveness and insignificance of a substance, even take masochistic delight in that 
identification (“and best of all…”).   At the same time, however, we have a speaking voice that takes an 
active role in denigrating and having its way with the substance it muses upon.  This mobile 
consciousness, moreover, seems to be testing out different orientations under some pressure, perhaps 
an underlying animus or sense of frustration.  Ash is so submissive, exhibits so little reluctance, that it 
thwarts even  the satisfaction  the sadist might take  in contemplating  it.  We may  “barely notice”  that we 
have stepped on this something that is, after all, not much of anything at all.  But the potential energy that 
finds its location in the sense of a power over is exactly what puts us in a position to take notice of our 
own casual and habitual step, and to identify with an activity that has come to seem as disembodied and 
as passive as the substance upon which we tread.   Rather than fantasize over the possible pleasure to 
be had  in exercising power  over something or being under someone else’s power  – both of which are 
easy enough to imagine – the passage seems more interested in exploring sources of power that are 
realized in forms of pleasure, in the satisfactions afforded by the orientations themselves.   
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The celebration of insignificance, of being a “complete and utter zero,”7 is a running theme found 
throughout Walser’s work.  I found it nearly impossible, though, to equate this fascination (often facetious 
and comical) with a fidelity to the marginal that I could generalize into an ethical stance.  The essay on 
ash invites us to test out a range of possible identifications, without committing to any one of them.  The 
“power” we gain  from  identifying with  the  “powerlessness” of ash  is primarily  orientational  in nature.    It 
seemed possible, at least in theory, to talk of Walser’s destabilizing language in dialectical terms, but at 
the  same  time  philosophical  abstraction  of  any  kind  seemed  entirely  out  of  place.    In  Walser’s 
experiments, it is just as difficult to distinguish between what are normally thought of as the opposite 
affective poles of “dejection” and “exhiliration” as it is to draw a sharp line between the properties of ash 
and the purposiveness we attribute to the behavior of living creatures.  Walser dissolved such binary 
distinctions by discovering new affective complexes and orientations, and he did so by replacing 
philosophical concerns with a play of sensibility that eluded all concepts and defied all efforts at 
paraphrase.  
This passage (and many others like it) reminded me of what Benjamin had written about the 
fascinations that characterized the melancholy Baroque allegorist, whose contemplative brooding upon 
dead matter  allowed  the  brooding  subject  to  “dissolve”  into  the world  of  things. Benjamin’s  analysis  of 
Albrecht Dürer’s famous image Melancolie I in the Trauerspiel study draws special attention to the motif of 
the stone.  But apart from these thematic parallels, I began to notice important differences between 
Benjamin and Walser – the fact, for example, that Benjamin had a methodological interest in melancholy 
that Walser did not share (or at least I found no evidence of it in his writing).  Benjamin shared the 
Baroque allegorist’s fascination with inorganic matter and material objects, with the mute “fallenness” of 
nature and the abandoned and outdated objects of commodity culture, a fascination with the cipher-like 
quality of things that had been removed from their original context like pictures divorced from their 
captions. “Allegories are,  in  the  realm of  thoughts,” Benjamin observed,  “what  ruins are  in  the  realm of 
things” (Origin 177-78).   For Benjamin, there is thus a parallel between the radical alterity of the material 
world and allegorical mode of apprehension that foregrounds the arbitrary relationship between objects 
and the meaning we attribute to those objects.  Unlike the symbol, the signifying act of allegory does not 
                                                   
7 The phrase appears  in Walser’s short piece,  “Helbling’s Story”  (1914), which appears  in  the Selected 
Stories. 
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“partake of  the  reality which  it  renders  it  intelligible”  (to borrow Coleridge’s  famous dictum).    It was  the 
Baroque  Trauerspiel’s  allegorical  language  that  was  expressive  precisely  by  virtue  of  its  failure to 
express.    Benjamin’s  version  of  Surrealism  sought  to  transform melancholy  into  a  critical method  that 
would short-circuit the intentionality of the meaning-making subject and allow for something like a 
Surrealist encounter with the material object and the objective (non-atmospheric) reality of a image or 
scene.    These  encounters were moments of discovery  and  recognition, what Benjamin called  “profane 
illuminations.”    “Truth,”  Benjamin  wrote,  “is  the  death  of  subjective  intention”  (Origins 36). In Eugène 
Atget’s  photographs  of  depopulated  Paris  streets,  for  example,  Benjamin  noted  how  these  proto-
Surrealist  images  “disinfect”  the  scenes  they  capture  by  “drain[ing]  the  aura  out  of  reality”  (One-Way 
Street 184).  This defamiliarizing technique was the basis of a recovery project.  Benjamin wrote of Atget 
that he sought out “the mislaid, the abandoned” in photographic images that “usher in the liberation of the 
object from aura” (ibid).   This language, by the way, is nowhere to be found in Atget’s own accounts of 
what he was seeking out or of what he was trying to do in his work of documentation.  Benjamin was not 
interested  in  the  customary  critical  tasks  of  writing  an  “appreciation”  of  Atget  or  promoting  his 
documentary work; what Benjamin sought was a defamiliarizing technique that would liberate and redeem 
objects.  It is the language of discovery and recognition, which is not to be confused with the conventional 
critic’s sympathetic recognition of the artist’s actual intentions.  For Benjamin, Atget was not an artist so 
much  as  the  producer  of  images  exemplifying  the  power  of  a  technique.    Benjamin’s  image-obsessed 
Arcades project is one attempt to apply this defamiliarizing technique to the study of cultural and historical 
artifacts.   
Much has already been written about the often esoteric and obscure basis for this method, as 
Benjamin conceived it, and about the central role that melancholy and allegory play in the long gestation 
period of the Arcades project (the same period in which Benjamin was also drawn to Surrealism).   I soon 
noticed  that  much  of  the  best  scholarly  work  on  Benjamin’s  thinking  about  melancholy  and  the 
relationship of that thinking to Surrealism, tended to come not from literary critics but rather from those 
working in the fields of history and philosophy.  But the exegetical clarity of this work also made clear a 
fundamental problem  faced by any critic who wanted  to appeal  to Benjamin’s  thought  in the  reading of 




to the medium of truth – and thereby to redeem it.”  Here is a particularly clear (and very early) description 
of Benjamin’s method by Siegfried Kracauer, in a 1930 review of Theodor Adorno’s study of Kierkegaard 
(an  attempt  to  apply  the method  of  Benjamin’s  Trauerspiel study to a different period, testifying to its 
broad applicability as a method): 
 
In the view of these studies [by Adorno and Benjamin] the truth-content of a work reveals 
itself only in its collapse … The work’s claim to totality, its systematic structure, as well as 
its superficial intentions share the fate of everything transient: but as they pass away with 
time the work brings characteristics and configurations to the fore that are actually 
images of truth.8 
 
As  Kracauer’s  perceptive  account  makes  clear, this critical method treats all systematic structures – 
myths, theories, meta-narratives, as well as organically meaningful works of art – as if they were on the 
same ontological plane.  The method aims to translate the work of art from the realm of meaning (not to 
mention beauty) into the realm of the thing-like, so that it could “share the fate of everything transient” and 
somehow  offer  up  “images  of  truth”  (what  Benjamin  liked  to  call  the  “truth  content”)  as  if  it  were  a 
radioactive substance with a half-life. As one extreme manifestation of this paradoxical interest in the way 
language can be expressive in a non-intentional way, through its failure to express, Benjamin once wrote 
of his aim to “deduce” the properties of the Trauerspiel genre based on his theory of allegory.  Benjamin’s 
Baroque Trauerspiel suddenly seemed the wrong model for thinking about Walser, as did this general 
concept of an allegorical mode of an expressively non-expressive language.  Here is where the 
convergence of philosophical interests and avant-garde anti-art began to seem problematic.  It is one 
thing to talk of a fascination with the material and the thing-like as a theme of a work of art; but it is 
another to treat the work itself as having the status of a ruin.  Almost needless to say, I saw nothing in 
                                                   
8 Quoted in Hullot-Kentor’s Foreword to English edition of Adorno’s Kierkegaard (xv). 
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Walser’s  language  that  could  be  “deduced”  from,  or  explained  by,  any  kind  of  theory  – however 
fascinating or distinctly modernist that theory was.     
 
2.  “Melancholy Writes Itself”: Surrealist Simulations and the Outsider Artist 
An early English-language  edition  of  Walser’s  stories  (issued  under  the  title  Masquerade) 
reproduces on its front cover a painting by Adolf Wölfli, the famous Outsider Artist who (like Walser) spent 
much of his life in a Swiss asylum for the mentally ill located not far from where Walser would eventually 
be hospitalized.9 Wölfli’s  work  makes  a  striking  and  attractive  cover  image;  but  how  accurate  is  the 
implied comparison with Walser?  At  first glance, Walser’s  life and writing do  indeed have many of the 
earmarks of Outsider Art.  Walser ended his life in a mental hospital (where he stopped writing after 
193310), and his late pencil writings crammed into the empty space on fragments of paper – receipts, 
rejection slips, the backs of old calendars – sometimes  bear  a  striking  resemblance  to  Adolf Wölfli’s 
intricately filled spaces, a stylistic testament to a horror vacui.11  Benjamin’s  1929  essay  on Walser, 
written before Walser entered the hospital, also treated Walser as something of an Outsider Artist.  It was 
easy  to  characterize  melancholy  writing  in  the  same  way,  a  “motoric”  expressiveness  that  is  a  non-
intentional mode of expression.  Benjamin was fond of quoting a line from the seventeenth-century 
Baroque  writer  Andreas  Tscherning:  “Melancholy  writes  itself”  (melancolie redet sich selber).  What I 
                                                   
9 By  coincidence,  it  was  Walter  Morgenthau,  Adolf  Wölfli’s  doctor,  who  diagnosed  Walser  as 
schizophrenic when he first entered the Waldau Clinic. Morgenthau would publish a brief account of his 
relationship with Wölfli, his most famous patient. Here is the complete text of Walter Morgenthaler's 
"Medical Report on Robert Walser, Author" dated January 26, 1929 (translated in Robert Walser 
Rediscovered): 
I found Herr Walser markedly depressed and severely inhibited. He had insight into his 
illness, complained about the impossibility of being able to work, about occasional fear, 
etc. He responded evasively about being sick of life. He would like to be helped, but 
would not like to enter an institution, would rather go to his sister in Bellelay. Since on 
external grounds this was not indicated, and, moreover, since after a short while I 
became convinced that in his present condition Mr. Walser needs the confines of the 
institution urgently, as quickly as possible, he is committed to Waldau. 
 
10 A hospital orderly has testified, however, that he saw Walser writing much later during his stay at 
Herisau.  No remains of those efforts have been discovered (to date).     
11 The texts from the so-called “Bleistiftgebiet” of the 1920s (the “pencil period,” also known as the period 
of the “Microscripts”) were all written in tiny script, with an unsharpened pencil, on numerous slips of re-
used paper (filling up the empty space on old receipts, tickets, etc.).  For many years, it was assumed 
they were written in an undecipherable private language. 
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found problematic, however, in even some of the best criticism on Walser, was the tendency to focus 
attention on figurative gestures and language and the activity of writing as expressive in a compulsive and 
quasi-symptomatic way.12  Susan Sontag,  for  example, wrote  that Walser’s  narratives  are  attempts  to 
“convert  time  into  space”  (Selected Stories viii).  W.G.  Sebald  observed  that  Walser’s  prose  is  a 
continuous attempt to  “defy gravity”  (35). And Walter Benjamin, in addition to commenting that each of 
Walser’s sentences was an attempt to erase the memory of the preceding sentence, was attracted by the 
rumor that Walser never revised a sentence (which is probably untrue and, at any rate, impossible to 
verify).  
All of these readings, including Benjamin’s, owe something to the Surrealist paradigm of Outsider 
Art (known also as Art Brut, which may be translated as “raw art”).  I will have more to say in Chapter One 
regarding Benjamin’s concept of melancholy and its relation to the Surrealist movement.  The Surrealist 
Outsider Art represents what is in some ways the culmination of the avant garde anti-art aesthetic, and it 
suggested  another  possible  perspective  from which  to  read Walser’s  experimental melancholy writing.  
Surrealist Outsider Art (or Art Brut) represented a break from earlier ways of thinking about mental illness 
and the artist who saw farther, and in a radically different way, than his contemporaries.  Emblematic of 
this earlier view, and of the pathological  ambiguity of melancholy  and depression,  is William Hogarth’s 
eighteenth-century image of “Bedlam” from the Rake’s Progress series, which shows a melancholic figure 
sitting in Hamlet-like contemplation apart from the other genuinely insane patients in the asylum.  
Although it retained some of the pastoral idealizing of the outsider as romantic visionary (something 
particularly true of Jean Dubuffet), Surrealist Outsider Art was far more interested in what these artists 
did, in the patterns underlying compulsive behavior, in the looking-glass logic and reconstructive energies 
exhibited in fantasies of an alternate reality.  And in order to qualify as an outsider artist in the Surrealist 
sense, the artist had to operate entirely outside convention not being aware of his or her status as a 
transgressive artist flouting those conventions.  He also had to stand outside the shock industry of 
Dadaist epatier le bourgouisie.  Above all, the Surrealist Outsider Artist stayed busy with the activity of 
making things; he did not sit apart and brood upon his own outsider status.  The key text for Surrealism 
                                                   
12 Prinzhorn’s scientific interpretation of symptomatic expressive features of the kunstlerei of the mentally 
ill has some kinship to Aby Warburg’s study of what he called Pathosformeln, or emotional states of mind 
that manifest themselves in formulaic and figural expressive gestures.   
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was Hans Prinzhorn’s  Bildnerei der Geisteskranken, or The Artistry [literally, Image-Making] of the 
Mentally Ill (1923).  Prinzhorn, a trained psychiatrist who had first-hand experience working with mentally 
ill patients in clinics throughout Europe, brought together and analyzed the work of artist-patients.13  Adolf 
Wölffli was among the artists profiled, and his inclusion helped to propel him to something like celebrity 
status (only one example of the many paradoxes that attach to the Outsider Art paradigm).  The book’s 
impact on Surrealism in the 1920s was significant.14 Prinzhorn emphasized the therapeutic and 
symptomatic status of the work that he brought together – its kunstlerei, or “artistry,”  in contrast with its 
status as “art”  (kunst).  It was a perspective perfectly suited to the interests of an anti-art avant-garde 
movement. 
“Melancholy  writes  itself”  sounded  like  the  formula  for  generating  a  certain type of automatic 
writing – a central practice of early Surrealism about which Benjamin, strangely, had little to say.  One 
problem was how to connect the artistry of visual and plastic art with practices in the medium of the 
written word.15  Prinzhorn’s  pseudo-diagnostic method of attending to figural motifs and patterns was 
somewhat akin to handwriting analysis.  But how does the study of images from Outsider Artists translate 
into the study of writing?  In the 1933 manifesto titled “The Automatic Message,” and in the slightly earlier 
Immaculate Conception co-written  by  Breton  and  Paul  Eluard  with  its  famous  section  titled  “The 
Possessions,” the Surrealist account of automatic writing merges with an interest in the exemplary status 
of Outsider Art.  The simulations in The Immaculate Conception signify, in the brief history of Surrealism, 
a new development in the concept of automatic writing.16 The idea of simulating mental disorders, in fact, 
may have begun partly in response to Dali, who reportedly felt that automatic writing – in which the 
practitioner had to submit himself to, allow himself to be “violated” by, forces over which he had control  – 
was far too “passive” and “feminine.”17  The Surrealist simulations of the late 1920s sought to capture and 
                                                   
13 Prinzhorn’s collection of works by  these artists eventually  ended up  in  the collection of  the Warburg 
Institute. (In Chapter One, I will  touch  on  the  parallel  between  Benjamin’s  Arcades project and the 
(earlier) work of Aby Warburg.  
14 Paul Klee is reported to have kept a copy of Prinzhorn in his studio in the 1920s. 
15 Hal Foster notes that the romantic view of the art of the mentally ill focused on the verbal rather than 
the visual. 
16 The  1997  Atlas  Press  edition  makes  the  connection  clear:  It  reprints  “The  Automatic  Message” 
alongside The Immaculate Conception (1930) and The Magnetic Fields, the first book of Surrealist 
automatic writing published a decade earlier (in 1920). 
17 See Dali’s La Femme Visible (1930) and André Breton’s account of Dali’s “paranoaic-critical method” in 
“Surrealism  and  Painting.”  For  discussions  of  automatic  writing  and  its  ambiguous  idealizing  of  the 
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render patterns of thinking that tapped into new states of consciousness and (as Breton and Eluard 
further claimed) would  lead  to new  forms and genres of writing  that would  “replace  the sonnet.” Breton 
even included an “endorsement” from a clinical psychologist as to the “authenticity” of the simulations, all 
of them composed by Breton and Eluard rather than by individuals diagnosed with these disorders.  The 
point, however, was not to reproduce accurately; the point was to come up with a method that would 
allow for the discovery of new ways of structuring one’s experience of the world. The result is something 
more like a theory about how to read certain texts as exemplary (whereas automatic writing demonstrated 
a practice that one could emulate on one’s own). 
Once again, though, the paradigm and the method seemed fundamentally inadequate in my 
reading of Robert Walser and what I took to be his melancholy writing.  I was simply struck, first of all, by 
the  obvious  difference  between Walser’s  language  and  the  language of the simulations.18  Walser, of 
course, was not writing a simulation of a generic state or a representation of the world as it might appear 
through that lens; he was modeling a reflexive relation to the  experiences he described, modeling a 
consciousness subtly attuned to its own acts of articulation and description. How could one simulate 
second-order reflexive processes?  There was one other significant feature of the Surrealist concept of 
outsider writing as it manifested itself in the method of simulation.  Perhaps also under the influence of 
Salvador Dali,  who  coined  the  term  “paranoiac-critical method,”  Surrealists  took  dissociative disorders 
(like schizophrenia) as their central model. Surrealism naturally had more of an interest in  cognitive 
                                                                                                                                                                    
feminine, see Conley’s Automatic Woman and the essays in the collection edited by Caws, Kuenzli, and 
Raaberg. 
18 In their prefatory comment on the “Attempted Simulation of General Paralysis,” Breton and Eluard write 
(quoting from their consulted expert):  
 




And here is the opening of the simulation itself (which might be compared with the very different 
language in the address to the imagined lost love in the closing pages of Walser’s “The Walk,” a 
story that I will examine in a later chapter): 
 
My great adorable woman beautiful as everything on the earth and in the most beautiful 
stars of the earth that I adore my great woman adored by all the powers of the stars 
beautiful with the beauty of the billions of queens that adorn the earth the adoration I 
have for your beauty brings me to me knees to beg you to think of me my adorable 
beauty my great beauty whom I adore I roll diamonds in the moss taller than the forests 
where your tallest hair thinks of me... 
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dissociative disorders (schizophrenia, for example) than in affective disorders such as melancholia or 
hysteria.  Schizophrenia, in fact, was a relatively new concept; as late as 1930, Breton and Eluard still 
used Emil Kraepelin’s term dementia praecox. Melancholia is conspicuously absent from early studies of 
Outsider Art, and it is not one of the mental disorders that Breton and Eluard choose to simulate in “The 
Possessions.” 
And  that  led  me  to  realize  another,  even more  fundamental  problem  with  Surrealists’ narrow 
focus on paranoia and schizophrenia. Hal  Foster’s  persuasive  critique  of  the  Outsider  Art  paradigm19 
challenged the heroic model of the outsider artist as an unconsciously transgressive visionary.  As Foster 
points out, the dissociative disorders of “overproximity” (feeling that one has lost all  identity and agency, 
and is being controlled by external forces and violated by the threat) generate system-building efforts that, 
reconstruct a private Symbolic Order.  Rather than representing a fundamental challenge to that order, 
these reconstructive efforts reproduce the system in the realm of private fantasy, and often in a more 
totalizing manner.  As Theodor Adorno observed of Surrealist constructions more generally, “something 
that is supposed to be a mere dream always leaves reality untouched, whatever damage is done to its 
image  ...  there  is  a  shattering  and  a  regrouping,  but  no  dissolution”  (“Looking  Back”  87).    The 
schizophrenic Outsider Artist, in response to the shattering of her sense of the real world, is engaged in a 
compulsive “regrouping” that mimics – often in a more totalizing fashion – the social order that has been 
shattered.  There is a reason why paranoia exists in hyphenated relation to schizophrenia.   
Elias Canetti had made essentially the same point in his extended discussion20 of Daniel Paul 
Schreber, a famous example of schizophrenic writing, and an important example among early 
modernists.  Schreber, whose work was published at the turn of the century under the title Memoirs of My 
Nervous Illness, was interesting in part because he was an “insider” who became an outsider following a 
mental collapse late in life.  Prior to his mental collapse and decade-long hospitalization, Schreber served 
as a former high-ranking court justice in Germany.  He had internalized the discourse and logic of legal 
argumentation, and this mastery was on full display in the obsessive precision of his wildly delusional 
“paranoid  style”  of  writing,  an  extended  apologia largely devoted to elaborating a conspiracy theory in 
                                                   
19 In his  2001  essay  “Blinded  Insights: On  the Modernist Reception  of the Art  of  the Mentally  Ill”  later 
reprinted as a chapter in Prosthetic Gods. 
20 The discussion of Schreber forms the conclusion of his study Crowds and Power. 
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which he played a central role as hero and unwitting victim. In the place of totalizing and space-filling 
patterns,  we  see  in  Schreber’s  writing  the  elaboration  of  a  more  or  less  internally  coherent  theory, 
complete with fantasies of being controlled by daemonic forces who controlled his “nerves” at a distance 
(through  “divine  rays”).     Schreber did not contemplate  the submissiveness of ash, but he did  fantasize 
about being transformed into a woman and sexually violated by these unseen forces who were controlling 
him from a distance.   And so the Schreber case was also of interest as an example of Outsider Art on 
account of the fact that his rigorous logic that had run of the rails (so to speak) seemed to say something 
important about deep contradictions  within  the  social  order  of  the  “administered  society”  (to  borrow 
Theodor Adorno’s term) in whose structure which he played a central administrative role.  Based solely 
on the evidence of his writing, Freud published a brief early analysis of the Schreber case and concluded 
that he was a heroic outsider engaged in a reconstructive effort.21 But where Freud saw a noble 
reconstructive effort on the part of a fractured psyche, Canetti saw an alarming presage of the madness 
to come in the following century: sadistic fantasies of control and mastery, a profile of a bunker mentality, 
and what Canetti highlighted as the quintessential proto-fascist fantasy of being the sole survivor in the 
wake of an apocalyptic Götterdammerung.  
For a brief moment, I thought this pointed the way to a somewhat different argument that would 
contrast,  in  a  much  more  dramatic  way,  the  affective  “disorder”  of  melancholy  with  paranoid-
schizophrenia as two possible responses to a dissociative sense of crisis in the culture of modernity.  
Walser’s  melancholy  writing,  his  clairvoyance  of  the  small,  would  make  a  dramatic  juxtaposition  with 
Schreber’s grandiose and totalizing obsessive-compulsive fantasies.  It had seemed important, at first, to 
read Walser’s  writing  as  something  other than a compulsive or therapeutic activity.  Now it seemed 
important to show that it was not an attempt to retreat from the world and reconstruct an alternate reality 
closed off from the outside (perceived as a threat).  What I saw instead was an open, even joyous, 
modeling of intentional states and a compositional intelligence testing out new orientations toward the 
world.  Walser’s writing was creative, not compulsively reconstructive.  The real challenge was not to find 
some basis for distinguishing melancholy writing from schizophrenic writing; the problem had more to do 
                                                   
21 Freud, it seems, felt it was important to appreciate the distinction between schizophrenia and paranoia, 
the former a hallucinatory sense of chaos within and without, the latter a reconstructive response to that 
disorder. Freud preferred the term paraphrenia (“para”  obviously  suggesting  “outside”)  to  the  term 
schizophrenia. 
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with the essential passivity of activity that could be simulated, as opposed to the active play of the 
intelligence that I saw being modeled in what I (still) vaguely identified as melancholy writing.  All of this, 
however, still required “diagnosing” generic states and disorders, and it meant reading specific passages 
as merely symptomatic of features that were defined ahead of time.  The real problem was one of 
agency, not the experimental merits of one disorder in comparison with another or some opposition 
between passive and active, the intentional and the compulsive.  The central question about Outsider Art, 
for me, was whether the work of Outsider Artists simply registered problems in their culture, or whether it 
could in some sense (or in any sense) represent a real challenge to the values of that culture.   
For all its problems, the Outsider Art paradigm did succeed in registering what I saw as an 
important feature of modernist period.  Like modernist artists’ fascination with primitive art, the Outsider 
Art paradigm was motivated by a sense that there was something deeply wrong in post-enlightenment 
thinking.  It conceived of modernist experimentation as a heroic endeavor in response to a perceived 
cultural crisis.22 Daniel Paul Schreber may or may not have pointed a way out of the crisis of his culture; 
but his vividly documented mental collapse seemed to many a symptomatic response to a deeper crisis.  I 
thought of Nietzsche, who experienced a mental collapse himself, but who is perhaps most responsible 
for giving modernists a dissociation of sensibility narrative and a sense of the world-historical urgency of 
finding alternatives to the values that had come to dominate Western culture. Even Surrealism’s aim of 
overcoming a cultural dissociation of sensibility to achieve an alternate Surreality, beyond rational logic 
and beyond good and evil,  is clear evidence of Nietzsche’s influence.   The figure of Nietzsche raised a 
new set of questions, though.  My assumption, as well as my underlying motivation, was to treat Walser 
and Benjamin (in spite of the divergent interests I have noted) as representing an attractive alternative to 
versions of modernism that I associated with a Nietzschean will to power and the entrepreneurial ambition 
                                                   
22 One of the more striking examples of this sense of crisis, and the Nietzschean tension between order 
and chaos, comes from Aby Warburg, who understood the challenge of creating distance on a personal 
and cultural level: 
 
The conscious creation of distance between oneself and the external world can probably be 
designated as the founding act of human civilization. When this interval becomes the basis of 
artistic production, the conditions have been fulfilled for this consciousness of distance to achieve 
an enduring social function which, in its rhythmical change between absorption in its object or 
detached restraint, signifies the oscillation between a cosmology of images and one of signs; its 




of Walser as the opposite of Nietzsche’s Overman – as the “anti-Nietzsche.”  Max Brod, a close friend of 
Kafka  and  another  early  reader  of  Walser,  succinctly  captured  this  sentiment  in  his  claim  that  “after 
Nietzsche, there had to be Walser.”  But was this opposition the right way of understanding the crisis and 
the options available?  In what sense did Nietzsche make Walser seem “necessary”? 
 
 
3.  Modernism, Avant-garde Anti-art, and How to Stop Doing Philosophy 
 At this point I experienced something of an epiphany that set my project on an entirely different 
path. It was Nietzsche, I found, who offered the most compelling account of the crisis that modernists like 
Walser were  trying  to  overcome and  which Schreber’s  collapse  seemed  to  exemplify.    At  this  point,  I 
began  to  entertain  a  new  set  of  questions.    In  what  sense  can  Walser’s  work  be  thought  of  as 
philosophical writing? What does it mean to say that after Nietzsche there had to be Walser? Does 
Walser overcome philosophy, as Nietzsche envisioned, and replace philosophy with aesthetic articulation 
as value?  In other words, is he in some way the fulfillment  of  Nietzsche’s  effort?    Walser critic 
Christopher Middleton23 makes some tantalizing comments on Walser that suggest how (and why) we 
might  read  him  in  a  philosophical  context.   Middleton writes,  for  example,  of Walser’s  “non-conceptual 
apprehension of the world.” and his “uncanny power of seeing things without the interference of a limiting 
concept.”   And perhaps the comment that stood out the most:  “Because he is gay, critics who care only 
to confront works whose discursiveness springs from profound ennui and melancholy should not call him 
irresponsible; for his gaiety is a conquest of the vacuum.  A conquest which could not have been made 
were not the healing of doubt the sign that doubt  has  been  understood”  (117).  This sounded like a 
therapeutic and philosophical project – a demonstrated power of seeing things, moreover, that had 
nothing  to  do  with  a  Will  to  Truth.    It  made  Benjamin’s  comment  that  Walser  sounds  like  a  post-
convalescent  (viewing  the  world  as  a  “perpetual  miracle”  as  Christian  Morgenstern put it) sound like 
                                                   
23 Middleton is not only one of the best translators of Walser, but also among his most perceptive readers.  
Middleton’s earliest work on Walser  from  the 1950s, some of  it written while he was still alive,  remains 
arguably the finest criticism on Walser.   
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Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. The question is how Walser goes about it differently, perhaps with even 
greater success than Nietzsche imagined.   
And that is how I finally arrived at the basic outline of the following study, which begins with 
Benjamin and Surrealism in Chapter One but then takes a sharp turn to consider Nietzsche, James, and 
Emerson – three philosophers whose efforts to overcome philosophy and replace it with experimental 
writing are intimately connected with their experimental concepts of melancholy. Walser became a “test 
case”  for what  these philosophers were  envisioning.   Chapter One concludes with Adorno’s critique of 
Benjamin’s Surrealism  and  his  implicit  call  for  an  aesthetics  of  Surrealism  not  bound  to  philosophical 
interests or explanations; and I take this impasse and this call as my point of departure for exploring how 
Nietzsche and James, anti-philosophers who imagined alternatives to philosophical values, arrive at 
something like to alternative to Benjamin and an answer that might have satisfied Adorno.  
William James, along with Nietzsche, is the most important early modernist philosopher to 
diagnose and attempt to overcome the crisis of value of an epistemic culture.  I also came to realize that 
Emerson plays a pivotal role in James’s concept of melancholy, which does not seem (at first) as radical 
as Emerson’s or Nietzsche’s. I was intrigued by how difficult it is to connect James with the modernist 
experiments he is so often connected with. James is the ideal abnormal psychologist.  But he is much 
more than that, as I hope to show by the end of this study. He offers, among other things, what I see as a 
radically different model for reading Outsider Art, one based on modeling states as opposed to simulating 
them.   With James, I faced a similar challenge as I did with Walser: How to make a case for him as 
“radical”  in  the  same way  that Nietzsche  or Emerson  or  even Benjamin may  be  thought  of  as  radical 
thinkers.  The more I read James alongside Nietzsche, the more I relished the prospect of making that 
case for James. 
Perhaps the most unusual detour is a full chapter on Ralph Waldo Emerson and a reading of his 
essay “Experience.”  The status of Emerson as a philosopher and his influence on Nietzsche are taken 
for granted today in a way they were not a generation ago (thanks largely to the efforts of Stanley Cavell).  
Critic  Quentin Anderson  puts  it  bluntly:  “Emerson  comes  before  Nietzsche.”  (169).    The  revolution  in 
thinking that we associate with Nietzsche begins in America, not Europe – although the proper context for 
this revolution is European and involves the conceptual history of melancholy as well as post-Cartesian 
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philosophy.    I  see Nietzsche  as  a  “missing  link”  between Emerson  and modernist  experimental writing 
(such as Walser’s).  For Nietzsche, on the other side of the Atlantic, Emerson offered a model of how to 
convert philosophical skepticism into a method.  “I think well of all skepticism to which I may reply: ‘Let us 
try  it,’”  Nietzsche  writes  in  one of the aphorisms of The Gay Science. “But  I  no  longer  want  to  hear 
anything  of  all  those  questions which  do  not permit  experiments:  for  there  courage  has  lost  its  rights” 
(Basic Writings 236).   Strangely, though, the case still needs to be made for Emerson’s significance for 
modernist experimental writing (via Nietzsche), as well as his important place in the European discourse 
on melancholy.24  In Chapter Four, I will devote special attention to Emerson’s essay “Experience” as an 
anticipation of Nietzsche as well as a watershed moment in the thinking about melancholy.  
Nietzsche and James (preceded by Emerson) represent a generation of philosophers who 
recognized philosophy itself as the problem to overcome, and who recognized the need for new practices 
to replace philosophical values.  As an instructive example of recent philosophical reading that retains 
these  philosophical  values,  I  could  point  to  Simon  Critchley’s  reading  of Wallace  Stevens,  that  most 
philosophical of modernist American poets, in his recent book-length study Things Merely Are: Philosophy 
in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens.  Critchley argues that Stevens’s later poetry develops a new realism in 
which “poetry can be brought closer to the plain sense of things, to things in their remoteness from us and 
our  intentions”  (84).    Stevens’  poetry  thus  becomes  a  poetic  vehicle  for  a  philosophical  thought 
experiment imagining the way the world might look without us.  In its philosophical search for the Real 
and for what Stevens calls “the something wholly other,” Stevens’ poetry also articulates what Critchley 
calls  as  “the  desire  to  be  cured  of  the  need  for  poetry”  (83).  I was struck by the difference between 
                                                   
24 In spite of the fact that much good work has been done on Emerson in relation to Nietzsche, I have 
fundamental reservations about what I am tempted call (borrowing a term from William James) the 
orthodoxy of “healthy-minded” Emersonian criticism.  My chief antagonist is the late Richard Rorty, neo-
pragmatist philosopher-provocateur.    In  Rorty’s  reading  of  Nietzsche  in  connection  with  Emerson,  he 
picks  up  on  Emerson’s  “way  of  life  by  abandonment”  which  is  “wonderful”  and  Emerson‘s  pursuit of  
“romance”  (in  the  famous closing  line  of  “Experience”).   Rorty, however, has  little   sense of what  is at 
stake.  As Schreber and Walser and many others have appreciated, the way of life by abandonment is 
not so wonderful unless there is a game plan for embracing nihilism and  living  one’s  life with a  viable 
model for creating new value.  To come after Nietzsche is to find a way to deal with what Nietzsche called 
“the  most  terrible  demand  ever  made  of  humanity.”    I  think  Rorty  misreads  not  inly  Nietzsche, but 
Emerson as well.  It was Emerson – anticipating Nietzsche’s sense of what was at stake in the response 
to nihilism, on both a personal and a cultural level – who once observed that the dissolution of personality 
could  lead  to  “feel[ing]  oneself  God  in  the  world  or  a  weed  by  the  road.”  (Emerson,  of  course,  wrote 
elsewhere – in an –oft-quoted line – that a weed is a plant “whose virtues have not yet been discovered.”) 
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Critchley’s  philosophical  point  of  view  on  Stevens’s  melancholy  modernism  and  what  I  saw  as the 
interests that motivated the modernist philosophers I wanted to study.25  Critchley imagines the desire to 
stop doing poetry from a philosophical vantage point; Nietzsche and James, in their different ways, look 
for a path to what Wittgenstein called “the real discovery ... the one which enables me to stop doing 
philosophy when I want to—the  one  that  gives  philosophy  peace,  so  that  it  is  no  longer  tormented.”  
These sounded like diametrically opposed projects. The most concise expression of the difference in 
perspectives that I am aware of comes from critic Charles Altieri, who (in his recent book on Stevens) 
writes of the quantum shift that occurs when we replace the question of  “what does it take to know the 
world” with  the question  “what difference does it make for our sense of the world to be concerned with 
knowing it in particular ways?”26  James and Nietzsche were the first to reframe the question in this way. 
In the case of Nietzsche, moreover, the answer to the second question involves replacing philosophical 
concerns with aesthetic practices.27  While conventional philosophy all too often aligns itself with an anti-
                                                   
25 Critchley does stand apart from a number of past philosophical readings of Stevens that have tended to 
emphasize a thematic existential response to nihilism.  David Bromwich’s essay on Stevens in relation to 
models of heroism in Nietzsche and William James is one early example of this tendency.  In Stevens and 
the Interpersonal, Mark Halliday connects Stevens’s personal loneliness with an ontological and cosmic 
aloneness: “[Stevens] was comforted by the implication that a man physically alone and emotionally alone 
is really just an obvious illustration or literalization of the constant reality of man’s ontological and cosmic 
aloneness, and  that a person’s wishes  for  relationships with other persons are  thus misguided and not 
susceptible of fufillment by any act of the will” (68).  Taking issue with Halliday’s reading, George Lensing 
(in Wallace Stevens and the Seasons, which ranks among the best philosophical criticism of Stevens) 
argues rather that “the aloneness of Stevens’ winter poems is an act of the will; it does have a purpose.  It 
is much more than a morbid surrender to a personal existential angst” (130). 
26 In  response  to Critchley’s  study, Altieri makes  the  astute  observation  that Stevens’s  poems  “do  not 
want us to escape poetry but to test its power to build modes of response adequate to the stripped down 
world  the  poems  confront” (22).    I  fully  concur with  this  statement,  although  this  notion  of  “testing  the 
power of poetry” to build “[adequate] modes of  response” sounds more like William James’s concept of 
“power” than Nietzsche’s.  I believe Altieri gives rather short shrift to William James in comparison with his 
sometimes uncritical discussions of Nietzsche.  I imagine myself in dialogue with Altieri in an effort to 
argue for James’s significance in a way that he might find persuasive.  
In general, however, I sympathize with most of what Altieri has to say about modernism, and any 
reader of his work will recognize how indebted I am to Altieri’s decades-long work and his admirable effort 
to combine the study of literature with philosophy without making aesthetic values subordinate to 
philosophical interests. In his early writings on Emerson and Nietzsche, Stanley Cavell called for a 
“philosophical poetry.”  But it is Altieri  who, in his study of Wallace Stevens, gives what I think is the best 
critical account of what that philosophical poetry might look like as literature (and not just as the subject 
matter for literature or in a way that makes literature a vehicle for philosophy).  Poems qualify as 
“philosophical poetry,” Altieri writes, “not because of their content but because we recognize in their work 
a certain kind of ambition to take philosophy seriously as a discipline and so as a constraint on the 
imagination, which also becomes a stimulus for the imagination” (2).  
27 I would also say that replacing these concerns entails a switch from Breton’s question “Who am I?” (the 
question that opens his novel-essay Nadja) with Emerson’s “Where do we find ourselves?” (the question 
which opens his essay “Experience”). 
 22 
art aesthetics, adopting an imperialist stance that seeks to make art subordinate to its own interests, 
Nietzsche wants to replace philosophy with a transformed concept of art. 
It  therefore  seemed  important  to  get  this  narrative  right,  to  tell  the  story  of  modernism’s 
overcoming of philosophy as part of the story of modernism itself.  My challenge in this study is to study 
melancholy within a philosophical context, but not from a limited philosophical point of view.  Walser 
became a test case for what these philosophers were aiming for, philosophers for whom overcoming 
epistemology and transforming melancholy were linked projects.  I am also attracted by the idea of 
making a case for the philosophical significance of Walser in something like Nietzschean terms – not as 
an allegorical anti-hero, not by dealing with philosophical themes, but by modeling acts of value creation 
that are incommensurable with (but at the same time a challenge to) epistemic values. I found philosophy 
a congenial (though challenging) discipline for a student of modernist literature.  Some of the most 
perceptive accounts of modernism that I knew were from philosophers.  In addition to what Benjamin and 
Adorno had to say about the melancholia of Proust and Baudelaire, one of the best accounts of the 
complex relationship between experimental art and mental disorder is Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s essay on 
Cezanne and what he calls  his  “schizothymia.”      More  than  that:  They  were  so  good  on  modernism 
because they fully appreciated the cultural crisis and the problems these artists were seeking to 
overcome.  As philosophers, they had a keen sense for what it meant to want to escape philosophical 
problems, which they understood (moreover) as cultural problems.  This suggested that there was a 
parallel crisis among a generation of philosophers and artists; they were reacting to manifestations of the 
same underlying problem (however it was identified).  I came to realize that many of the major figures 
developing this experimental modernism were philosophers, or at least have philosophical significance by 
virtue of their attempt to move beyond philosophical problems and (in some sense) beyond traditional 
philosophy altogether:  Emerson, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, James.  They are also fascinating 
experimental writers, producing works that should rank high in the canon of world literature: Ecce Homo, 
James’s  Varieties of Religious Experience,  Emerson’s  essays,  Wittgenstein’s  works,  and  of  course 
Benjamin’s  writing  (whom  Adorno  made  a  point  of  calling  a  “great  essayist”)  – all are landmarks in 
experimental writing every bit as important as Un Coup de Dés or Tender Buttons.  In this case, there was 
little basis for distinguishing between primary and secondary texts.  It was all experimental literature; and 
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the more it seemed to address philosophical concerns, as well as the desire to stop doing philosophy, the 
more exciting it seemed as literature. 
 
4.  Essayism and Melancholy Writing  
 Modernist philosophy had done a good job of establishing a narrative of the disenchantment of 
modernity that I believe is important for understanding the pressures that gave birth to modernist art and 
literature.  Philosophy also helped me to appreciate another early modern response to disenchantment, 
an alternative  to Benjamin’s Trauerspiel  as well  as a  later model  for  experimental/philosophical writing: 
the essay.  Ilit Ferber exemplifies a recent interest among philosophers in melancholy within the history of 
philosophical thought.  Ferber notes two paradoxical qualities that have made melancholy attractive to 
philosophers:  its detachment and its self absorption.  These, of course, are not only some of the qualities 
I wanted to account for in Walser; they are also the paradoxical features, or parameters, that define the 
essay as Montaigne first conceived it.  Virtually all of the texts I consider in the following are essays or at 
least essay-like. Walser was a feuilletonist, an essayist who wrote ephemeral pieces for newspapers that 
were prototypes of the New Yorker’s  anonymous  “Talk  of  the  Town”  piece. His  early  novel  Jakob von 
Gunten more is written in the essayistic genre of the Tagebuch (“Daybook”).  The modernist writer Robert 
Musil (yet another early fan of Walser) had coined the term “essayism” to describe a philosophical mode 
of modernist experimental writing – a way of writing “without the interference of a limiting concept.”  But 
the most important modernist  account  of  the  essay  comes  from Adorno,  and  I will  read  his  “Essay  as 
Form”  in Chapter One  alongside  the  essay  “Looking Back  on Surrealism,”  his  simultaneous  critique  of 
Benjamin’s  avant-garde concept of melancholy as method and the philosophical premises underlying 
Surrealist anti-art.    
I want  to  take  seriously Montaigne’s  essay  as  a model  for modernist  experimental writing,  as 
seriously as Emerson and Nietzsche did, not only because we can cast Montaigne in a narrative of 
disenchantment as an alternative to  the Trauerspiel, but (more importantly) because he outlines a role for 
writing and self-reflexive articulation as a means of realizing these values.  The advent of the modern 
essay, for which Montaigne is largely responsible, is also intimately connected historically with the early 
modern history of melancholy, and we need to understand why that is so.  Montaigne famously wrote that 
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to philosophize is to learn how to die.  His entire philosophical project, moreover, his inwardly reflexive 
investigation of  himself, was inspired by the loss of a close  friend, who (as Montaigne writes) “took me 
with him.”28  But rather than necessitate a process of mourning, this personal loss inaugurated an open-
ended investigative endeavor in which melancholy plays a central role.  Montaigne wrote candidly about 
many things, so we should not be surprised to find in his essays themselves a statement of the genesis 
behind his experimental project. Here  is another  testament,  from Montaigne’s  letter  to Mme. D’Estissac 
(later included in the Essais): 
 
It was a melancholy humor, and consequently a humor very hostile to my natural 
disposition, produced by the gloom of the solitude into which I had cast myself some 
years ago, that first put into my head this daydream of meddling with writing. And then, 
finding myself entirely destitute and void of any other matter, I presented myself to myself 
for argument and subject. (278) 
 
The self-reflexive  playfulness  of  this  passage,  entirely  characteristic  of  Montaigne’s  voice,  should  not 
obscure the movements of a highly complex sense of agency – a complexity that reminded me, in fact, of 
Walser’s voice.   The melancholy humor is produced by a state that “he cast himself into” was at the same 
time visited upon him.  This make me think of Walser’s Jakob von Gunten, who at the beginning of the 
novel  announces  that  “he  has  contrived  to  become  a  mystery  to  myself.”    And  we  see more  of  this 
language in this remarkable passage:29 
 
Lately when I retired to my home, determined so far as possible to bother about nothing 
except spending the little time I have left in rest and seclusion, it seemed to me I could do 
my mind no greater favor than to let it entertain itself in full idleness and stay and settle in 
itself, which I hoped it might do more easily now, having become weightier and riper with 
                                                   
28 That friend was the poet Étienne de La Boétie, who died in 1563.  For more on this experience and its 
significance  for  Montaigne’s  writing,  see  Donald  Frame’s  introduction  to  his  translated  edition  of  the 
Essais. Frame suggests that the Essais were his "means of communication" following the loss and that 
"the reader takes the place of the dead friend” (v). 
29 Jean Starobinski also draws special attention to this passage in his classic study of Montaigne. 
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time.  But I find – Ever idle hours breed wandering thoughts (Lucan) – that, on the 
contrary, like a runaway horse, it gives a hundred times more trouble than it took for 
others, and gives birth to so many chimeras and fantastic monsters, one after another, 
without order or purpose, that in order to contemplate their ineptitude and strangeness at 
my pleasure, I have begun to put them in writing, hoping in time to make my mind 
ashamed of itself.  (278) 
 
There are at least three impersonal agents at play here in this intensely self-reflexive writing: the I, the 
mind, and the writing.   Montaigne wants to let his mind entertain itself in its idleness.  But that is not what 
happens.  The mind runs away from him, like a wild horse (perhaps an allusion to Plato’s parable of the 
horse-drawn chariot).  Finally, one must let it go.  The project takes an oddly masochistic turn, in an effort 
to make his own mind ”ashamed of itself.”30  All of this gives birth to the “filigree work of articulation” (as 
Nietzsche phrased it), which can establish new forms of agency and new forms of power as the mind 
feels itself in motion, actively contemplating its own strangeness, assaying (trying out) new orientations 
and simultaneously taking command while letting go.   
This is close to the kind of serious play I see in Walser – “serious” in the sense of philosophically 
significant.  The passages quoted above also sound remarkably Nietzchean in spirit.  Many years ago, 
Hugo Friedrich made  the  connection much more  explicitly:  “Rather  than  a  will  to  power,”  he  claimed, 
“Montaigne developed a will to powerlessness.”  But we need to be careful about how we read this kind of 
aphoristic generalization.  I would suggest that Montaigne’s will to play is far from passive, and it is not 
opposed to Nietzschean power; it simply another form of power in relation to the world.  And rather than a 
conventional genre or a fixed form, the essay is best thought of as a literary mode, which one critic31 
defines in the most general but also most Nietzschean terms as the space of articulation that establishes 
a “power in relation to the world.”  “Que sçay-je?” Montaigne famously asked: “what do I know?”  Taking 
their cue from this causal and ambiguously worded question, Nietzsche and Emerson and James take us 
through a process of mourning that goes beyond good and evil, beyond questions of what we know and 
what can be known, literally beyond belief. 
                                                   
30 Friedrich calls this the method of “self-abasement.” 




So much for the long process which led me to my final constellation of experimental writers and 
thinkers.  Now for a brief word on my chosen title, which I have taken from an (appropriately) obscure 
piano piece,  “Désespoir Agréable,” written as an academic exercise32 by someone who was neither an 
essayist nor a writer at all, but – as he preferred to call himself – a  “phonometrician”  (“measurer  of 
sounds”).33  Like Walser and the painter Henri Rousseau, Erik Satie both anticipates and stands outside 
the major avant-garde developments of the early twentieth century.34  Satie initiated many of the main 
movements and currents of modernism, and not just in music: Dada, Surrealism, impressionism, 
neoclassicism, the techniques of collage and pastiche.  And yet, Satie stands in an odd relation to the 
avant-garde innovations with which he is associated; his work was a “provocation from the periphery” by 
someone who remained perpetually on the periphery and refused to belong to any group that would have 
him as a member (or dare to adopt him as their patron saint).35  Satie is as much an archetype of the 
                                                   
32 At the age of 40, Satie had decided to go back to school at the Schola Cantorum in Paris.  He was 
studying there, doing simple assignments among students half his age, at around the time Walser was 
writing about the Benjamenta Institute in Jakob von Gunten. 
33 The epigraph from Robert Walser that appears at the head of this introduction is thus very close to 
Satie’s brand of absurdist humor.  The parallels extend further.  Walking, sometimes long distances, was 
the preferred mode of  travel  for both Satie and Walser.   Roger Shattuck speculated  that  “the source of 
Satie’s sense of musical beat–the possibility of variation within repetition, the effect of boredom on the 
organism–may be this endless walking back and forth across the same landscape day after day . . . the 
total observation of a very limited and narrow environment” (in Orledge 69).  
34 The term “Surrealism,” for example, was  first coined by Apollinaire in his review of Satie’s 1917 ballet 
Parade.  The role of Satie in the transition from Dada to Surrealism tends to be underappreciated, in part 
because Breton had as little interest in music as he did in the theater.  Satie participated in a mock trial 
and condemnation of Breton in 1922; Breton returned the favor two years later when he organized a 
booing and catcalling response at the premiere of Satie’s experimental ballet Relache (which was also a 
pioneering film soundtrack, to add one more item to Satie’s avant-garde resume).  Such incidents indicate 
how strangely self-reflexive and insular these scandals and provocations had become in the post-Dada 
years of the 1920s.   
35 Maurice  Ravel  credited  Satie’s  importance  and  captured  his  paradoxical  role  as  an  avant-garde 
outsider in a 1928 public lecture given while on tour in America (three years after Satie’s death):  
 
Another significant influence, somewhat unique ... is that of Erik Satie, which has had 
appreciable effect upon Debussy, myself, and indeed most of the modern French 
composers. Satie was possessed of an extremely keen intelligence. His was the 
inventor's mind par excellence. He was a great experimenter [and] these experiments 
have been of inestimable value. Simply and ingeneously, Satie pointed the way, but as 
soon as another musician took to the trail he had indicated, Satie would immediately 
change his own orientation and without hesitation open up still another path to new fields 
of experimentation. He thus became the inspiration of countless progressive tendencies. 
(in Orenstein 45) 
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modernist Outsider Artist as Walser or Wölfli.  “I came into the world very young, in an age that was very 
old.” Satie wrote.  Around the same time Nietzsche was celebrating Bizet’s Carmen as a life-affirming and 
vigorous alternative  to  the  symptomatic  decadence  of Wagnerian music  and  “The Case  of Wagner,”36 
Satie was composing brief piano pieces that represent a quite different response to Wagner, while urging 
his friend, Claude Debussy, to write music with “less sauerkraut.”37  I sometimes wonder how Nietzsche 
would have  responded,  for example,  to hearing Satie’s Socrate.  I wonder also how James might have 
responded to the odd variety of religious experience that is the ultimate resolution to James’s distinction 
between organized religion  and  the  religious  experience  of  the  individual:  Satie’s  church  with  one 
member,  himself, which  he  named  “The Metropolitan Church  of  Jesus  the Conductor.”    Like much  of 
Satie’s work, this has the appearance of being either a contrived joke or the very epitome of Outsider Art 
– or both.  In his eccentric behavior as well as in his work, Satie invites the label of Outsider Artist to an 
even greater extent that Walser.  Satie’s music, moreover, along with his occasional dandy-ish quips on 
the aesthetics of boredom, have encouraged later music critics to describe his experiments as if they 
were simulations of mental states – the musical analogue of Surrealist simulations, but composed by an 
authentic outsider artist.38   At the top of the one-page score to his paino work Vexations (which, like a 
good deal of Walser’s work, was unpublished during his lifetime), Satie notoriously laid out pre-conditions 
for the performer that are eccentric, to say the least: "In  order  to  play  this  motif  840  times,”  Satie 
instructed,  “one would have  to  prepare  oneself  in  advance,  and  in  the utmost  silence,  through  serious 
immobilities."    Conveniently  ignoring  the  ambiguous  hypothetical  phrase  “would  have  to,”  many 
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
36 In the collection published as Nietzsche contra Wagner, Nietzsche referred to Wagner as “our greatest 
melancholic in music.” 
37 Debussy himself once told Jean Cocteau that Satie's ideas were a decisive influence on the aesthetic 
of Pelleas and Melisande [1893-95].  Satie is reported to have said: “There is no need for the orchestra to 
grimace when a character comes on the stage. Do the trees in the scenery grimace? What we have to do 
is to create a musical scenery, a musical atmosphere in which the characters move and talk”  (in Myers 
32-33).   And so, in spite of the lingering Wagnerian style in Pelleas, we might say that Debussy’s opera 
benefited  from a melancholic  vantage point quite different  from Wagner’s  transcendental  idealism, and 
closer to the allegorist’s mortifying apprehension of the thing-like and what Benjamin called “mute, fallen 
nature.”   
38 Writing of Vexations, music historian Robert Orledge claims that “in retrospect the piece now seems as 
important to the development of twentieth-century music as Schoenberg's Erwartung or the minutely 
crafted serial works of Webern. Indeed, it was not until after World War II that audiences were really in a 
position to appreciate the true audacity of Vexations, which lay in its concept of 'anti-art' and in the way 
that the deliberate boredom induced by its multiple repetitions made listeners increasingly aware of the 
sounds of their surrounding environment.”  Orledge is referring to composer John Cage’s notorious 1952 
piece 4’33, inspired by Vexations (which Cage had rediscovered).   
 28 
performers  (in  the  wake  of  John  Cage’s  re-discovery of the piece) have read these as literal (even 
practical) instructions for both the performer and audience, something between a Buddhist mantra and 
installation art.  Some have even interpreted the title Vexations as a play on the word “variations” (in the 
musical sense); at least one critic has read Satie’s extended, though not quite eternal, recurrence of the 
same as a parody of Wagner’s grandiose Ring cycle and the Wagnerian ideal of an “endless melody.”   
I am convinced that, at his best, Satie is not a joke, or at least not in any simple way, and that his 
musical language takes us far beyond the conventional opposition between the serious and the frivolous.   
I am also convinced that the critical paradigm of simulating moods or mental states, like boredom or 
melancholia, is fundamentally inadequate for understanding Satie, in much the same way it fails to tell us 
much about Walser’s writing. (I will try to envision an adequate alternative in the course of this study.)  But 
a deeper kinship exists between them beyond their joint resistance to a critical paradigm.  If there are any 
modernists who “made melancholy cheerful,” it is Walser and Satie.  In arguing for Walser’s significance, I 
feel that I am also arguing implicitly for the image of modernism that Satie represents.  It was no surprise 
to me, then, when I read Christopher Middleton’s description of Walser as “touching fingertips” with Satie.  
In his fictional meditation on Walser, Guy Davenport imagines an encounter between Satie, Walser, and 
William James.  Such coincidences, giving a sort of uncanny validation after the fact, strongly appealed to 
my own Surrealist sensibility.  These chance associations do not constitute an argument, of course; but 
they can make one’s question-driven argument seem, in retrospect, an instance of what André Breton 
called “objective chance” or an example of what William James called our response to the questions that 




I have spent the better part of a decade working on this project.  Only now, in retrospect, do I fully 
appreciate the personal risk of placing myself, for an extended period of time, in the company of thinkers 
who were all born under the sign of Saturn.  They are all fascinating melancholics, each in a different 
way. But they are also the worst possible role models for someone trying to finish a dissertation and enter 
a profession.  Nietzsche was awarded a professorship, only to retire from it after five years; Walter 
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Benjamin may have intentionally sabotaged his own doctoral defense so as to hold open the possibility a 
freelance existence; and William James had deep reservations about his status as an academic and 
spent several years in Hamlet-like indecision over whether and at what point he should seize the 
opportunity to make his exit.39 It took James more than a decade to deliver the manuscript for Principles 
of Psychology that he was contracted to write.  The final manuscript amounted to well over a thousand 
pages in published form.  In order to find use as a textbook, his publisher had to bring out an abridged 
version  of  the  book  (affectionately  known  as  “Little  Jimmy”).    At  least  James  finished what he was 
commissioned to write: Benjamin’s Arcades project remained a mass of notes. 
Nietzsche, James, and Benjamin all voiced a sometimes belligerent contempt for scholarly 
endeavors  and what Nietzsche  called  the  professional  coterie  of  “scholarly  oxen.”   This is surely one 
manifestation of their own melancholy temperament and the familiar complex of the self-loathing scholar 
(also known to afflict the graduate student) and the variant of melancholy that Nietzsche famously 
anatomized as ressentiment.  Four centuries ago, at the dawn of European modernity, Francis Bacon 
compared  scholastic  thinkers  and  humanist  scholars  to  spiders  who  “make  webs  out of their own 
substance,” and he contrasted the inwardness of the scholar with the vigorously engaged activity of the 
empirical scientist.  Much like “melancholy writes itself,” the  Baconian motto for the Royal Society – Nullis 
in verbum, or  “nothing  in words”  – might also serve as a slogan for any anti-art aesthetic.  It may be 
impossible to share, let alone argue for, the quaint faith that modernists had in art and its power to 
change the world, and it is just as difficult to defend the role of the scholar in the society in which he 
belongs and from which he is supposed to stand apart (often not very convincingly).  I do, however, see 
an attractive model for both experimental art and scholarly work in the melancholy writing of early modern 
essayists like Robert Burton and Thomas Browne (both of whom were scholars by profession).  I see in 
the work of William James, for example, the same essay-like freedom and the same speculative spirit and 
sense of play; Principles of Psychology has much in common with Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy and 
Browne’s Musaeum Clausum (“Sealed Museum”).  Walser’s disquisition on ash has a distant cousin  in 
                                                   
39 In an inadvertently confessional moment, James once wrote that “there is no more miserable human 
being  than one  in whom nothing  is habitual but  indecision.”   A series of diary entries between October 
and December  of  1905    record  James’s  own misery  over  his inability to decide whether to resign his 
professorhsip at Harvard: “ Nov. 3: Resign!   Nov 4: Resign?   Nov. 6: Doubtful about resigning.   Nov. 7: 
Resign!  Nov. 8: Don’t  resign!   Nov. 9: Resign!”  (Richardson  Maelstrom 464)  The drama of 
indecisiveness recorded here would drag on for another six weeks.  
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Burton’s  “Digression  of  Air.”    Theodor Adorno  once  observed  that  essayists  are  driven  by  a  “childlike 
fascination that catches fire on what others have done.”  Burton and Browne and Montaigne were among 
the first to respond to what was becoming the dominant Baconian paradigm, a cultural turn that Max 
Weber (and Adorno) would later call the “disenchantment of modernity.”  I do think a convincing case can 
be made for recognizing that the cultural crisis Montaigne faced is the same context in which to 
understand modernism, and that this context allows us to more fully appreciate the urgency with which 
modernists sought new sources of value in response. “Que sçay-je?”   Modernists  revived  this question 
and gave it the revolutionary ring it once had.  Writing with a sense of historical urgency, but making no 
claim or demand for moral accountability, Nietzsche viewed the essays of Montaigne and Emerson as 
examples of a value-creating mode of skepticism, as a viable alternative – an active alternative – to the 
industrious nihilism of Baconian instrumental reason.  In the end, my most surprising discovery of all was 
that the ultimate anti-Nietzsche was Nietzsche himself, that the cheerful fatalist and epitome of the anti-
philosopher was as  “full of skepsis and possibilities” as was his mentor, Emerson  (Basic Writings 795).  
Among those imagined and implied possibilities, I am especially drawn to Nietzsche’s interpretation of the 
story of Ariadne and Dionysus as a counter-myth to the heroic mountain-climbing of Zarathustra. The 
image of patient hands feeling their way along a thread which leads through a dark labyrinth (leading 
somewhere, though one knows not where) seems also a fitting metaphor for the essay and its searching, 
experimental play of the intelligence.40  The end of a melody is not necessarily its goal, as Nietzsche once 
                                                   
40 “Has  anyone  else understood Ariadne as  I  have?” Nietzsche writes in Ecce Homo.  One modernist 
artist who certainly did understand the Ariadne myth was Giorgio De Chirico.  Images of Ariadne appear 
no less than eight times in his paintings between 1910 and 1920.  Of all early modernist artists, De 
Chirico is the most obsessively (and ambivalently) Nietzschean.  Melancholy, moreover, is a constant 
theme in his early work.  Here is Paolo Baldacci on the significance of the myth of Ariadne’s thread and 
the labyrinth for the modernist aesthetic of De Chirico’s Metaphysical paintings: 
 
The Ariadne of Nietzsche and de Chirico is the Ariadne abandoned by Theseus, awaiting 
the arrival of Dionysus. She is the soul prepared to face the Labyrinth, exemplary symbol, 
philosophically speaking, of the rejection of the traditional notions of knowledge. The 
desire to know and understand the world, as defined by Cartesian logic, grows out of a 
need for security which Nietzsche labels as cowardice. Security demands stability and 
order, and excludes all that is variable and confusing. As such, the desire for knowledge 
holds as its goal the defeat of Chaos and of Time, represented by the Labyrinth and the 
Minotaur. But, Nietzsche asks himself, are there any true realities beyond Chaos and 
Time, or are they mere fictions, born of the fear of seeing the world as it really is – which 
is to say contradictory and unstable? [...] In our need for security and our lack of courage, 
most of us avoid the Labyrinth, while Nietzsche urges following Ariadne's thread back to 
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wrote and as Erik Satie demonstrated many times. Last of all, I hope I can permit myself the observation 
that the following study, a happy account of where my walks with Robert Walser have led me, succeeds 
in its ultimate aim of capturing both the sense of purpose as well as the sense of play that I see in the 
work of these melancholy modernists.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
its heart, back to the corporeal soul and its silent discourse, even if such a voyage risks 
ending in a shipwreck of the mind. (138) 
 
Most analyses of De Chirico naturally focus on his paintings.  But De Chirico’s interest in Nietzsche and 
the myth of Ariadne extends beyond his paintings.  Here is the remarkable concluding passage from De 
Chirico’s one and only experimental novel, Hebdomeros, which John Ashbery (in his brief introduction to 
the English translation) called perhaps the finest Surrealist narrative, and which reads as an extended 
meditation on Nietzschean themes from a Surrealist perspective, as well as a spiritual allegory of the way 
that art (like the union of Ariadne  and  Dionysis)  can  “give  philosophy  peace”  (note  also  the  passing 
allusion to Dürer’s winged melancholy): 
 
And once more it was desert and the night. Once again all slept in immobility and silence. 
Suddenly Hebdomeros saw that this woman had the eyes of his father; and he 
understood. She spoke of immortality in the great starless night.   
'Oh, Hebdomeros,' she said. 'I am Immortality. Nouns have their gender, or rather 
their sex, as you once said with much finesse, and the verbs, alas, decline. Have you 
ever thought of my death? Have you ever thought of the death of my death? Have you 
thought of my life? One day, O brother....' 
But she spoke no further. Seated on the trunk of a broken column, she placed a 
hand gently on his shoulder, and with the other clasped the hand of the hero. 
Hebdomeros, his elbow on the ruin and his chin in his hand, pondered no longer ... His 
thoughts, in the pure breath of that voice that he had heard, yielded slowly and ended by 
abandoning him altogether. They surrendered to the caressing waves of unforgettable 
words, and on these waves they floated toward strange and unknown shores. They 
floated in the warmth of the setting sun, smiling in its descent toward the cerulean skies 
... 
Meanwhile, between the sky and the vast stretch of the seas, green islands, 
marvelous islands, passed slowly, as pass the ships of a squadron before the admiral, 
while a long sacred procession of heavenly birds, of an immaculate whiteness, flew by 
singing. 
 32 
Chapter One: Walter Benjamin, Surrealism and Melancholy as Method 
 
Hebdomeros distrusted originality, and likewise imagination: One should not gallop too fast in the saddle of fantasy, - he 
used to say - What one must do instead is discover, for in discovering, life is rendered possible only insofar as it is 
reconciled with its mother, Eternity; in discovering, one pays tribute to that minotaur known to men as Time.  
 
 Giorgio de Chirico, Hebdomeros (240) 
 
Forgetfulness, by rolling my memories along in its tide, has done more than merely wear them down or consign them to 
oblivion.  The profound structure it has created out of the fragments allows me to achieve a more stable equilibrium, and 
to see a clearer pattern.  One order has been replaced by another.  Between these two cliffs, which preserve the distance 
between my gaze and its object, time, the destroyer, has begun to pile up rubble.  Sharp edges have been blunted and 
whole sections have collapsed: periods and places collide, are juxtaposed or are inverted, like strata displaced by the 
tremors on the crust of an aging planet.  Some insignificant detail belonging to the distant past may stand out like a peak, 
while whole layers of my past have disappeared without trace.  Events without any apparent connection, and originating 
from incongruous periods and places, slide one over the other and suddenly crystallize into a sort of edifice which seems 
to have been conceived by an architect wider than my personal history. 
 
Claude Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques (36-37) 
 
 
In his critical study examining the work of Walter Benjamin, Rilke, W.G. Sebald, and other 
twentieth-century writers, Eric Santner gives the following account of two “competing” concepts of 
melancholy that have emerged at the end of the century.  “On the one hand,” Santner writes,   
 
there is the ethical claim [that] melancholy is the only affective posture that can 
maintain fidelity to those losses that the reigning ideological formation would like 
to disavow. Whereas mourning, which culminates in a reattachment of libido to 
new objects of desire (or idealization) proves to be an ultimately adaptive 
strategy  to  the  governing  reality  principle  and  the demand  to  “get  on with  life,” 
melancholy retards adaptation and attaches itself to loss; it says no! to life 
without the object (or ideal) and thereby – so it is claimed – holds open the 
possibility of alternative frameworks of what counts as reality (i.e., the possibility 
of a reality that does not require such losses or require that they be forgotten or 
ignored in the interests of moving on with life). And no doubt it is this view of 
melancholy that has attracted so many intellectuals to the work of Benjamin, who 
is often seen as the ultimate embodiment of such a stance. (Creaturely Life 89) 
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The ethical stance that Santner outlines here, one which he attributes to Walter Benjamin, might also be 
described as a  “visionary” or  “redemptive”  view  of melancholy.   These adjectives capture  the  important 
theological dimension  of  Benjamin’s  utopian  thinking,  and  they  foreground  a  set  of  paradoxes  and 
dialectical inversions that do not attach to this way of thinking so much as define it.  There is something 
odd,  after  all,  in  speaking  of  an  “affective  posture”  as  a  strategy.  And the visionary-sounding act of 
“hold[ing] open the possibility of alternative frameworks for what counts as reality” might obscure the fact 
that “holding open” a possibility is not the same as actually replacing one framework with another.  The 
paradoxes do not stop  there.   Benjamin’s  “visionary memory”  takes what might seem  the  formula  for  a 
reactionary stance and transforms it into a means of revolutionary resistance (if not a strategy for an 
actual revolution).  Although Santner does not mention him here by name, this view of melancholy as 
resistance to the “reigning ideological formation” relies on a theoretical opposition associated with Freud, 
whose primary interest in melancholy was neither ethical nor political.  Mourning is a forward-looking, 
adaptive strategy; melancholy is a way of resisting ideologies of progress and change that demand 
conformity to the logic of what Benjamin called the “eternal recurrence of the new.”41   And if we think of 
Freud as endorsing the healthy strategy of mourning loss in the interest of maintaining fidelity to a “reality 
principle,” then we might say that Santner frames Benjamin’s concept of melancholy in Freudian terms so 
as to oppose Benjamin to Freud.  
Benjamin’s model of  resistance, as  it  is  laid out here, has an understandable appeal.  We can 
easily imagine, moreover, why this way of thinking about melancholy would come to seem an especially 
attractive option at those melancholy moments in history when the options are few and hopes for active 
revolution seem dim.  One such moment would have been the period in 1939-40 between the Nazi-Soviet 
non-aggression pact and the invasion of France – the dark months when Benjamin wrote his “Theses on 
the Philosophy of History” with  its  famous  reading of Paul Klee’s painting Angelus Novus as the iconic 
“angel  of  history”  blown  along  by  the  storm  of  progress  and  bearing  witness  to  the  unfolding 
catastrophe.42  There are many other such moments in history, of course, when the loss of hope in 
                                                   
41 The phrase appears in the Arcades project, Konvolut D: “[Boredom, Eternal Return]”. 
42 Here is the well-known passage from thesis IX:   
 
A Klee painting named ‘Angelus Novus’ shows an angel looking as though he is about to 
move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is 
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effecting revolutionary change serves to intensify a sense of history as catastrophe and produces an 
intense fascination with the singularity and alterity of objects as seen through their loss, and moments 
when these modes of attention also seem to offer new and much-needed ways of thinking about 
revolutionary change and the strategic value of adopting a stance.  Much of the recent theoretical interest 
in Benjamin that Santner notes above may, in fact, reflect a longing for new models of ethical and political 
resistance that marks our own period. 
There is a quite different assessment of melancholy that has also emerged from the twentieth 
century, a  view  that Santner contrasts with Benjamin’s, according  to which melancholy  is  essentially  a 
“mode of defense, a conflation of loss and absence, for which the basis is not an originating loss but the 
withdrawal of libido itself.  It is an attempt to make an unattainable object appear as if it were a loss by 
means of a simulation … and one persuasive means of simulation is through art”  (89-90).  This is what 
we might call the “critical,” or perhaps “diagnostic” view of melancholy.  It represents a sharp critique of 
the first stance, and it brings into view some quite different paradoxes.  The philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben, for example, observes that melancholy  “offers  the  paradox  of  an  intention  to  mourn  that 
precedes and anticipates the loss of the object” (20).  Freud himself, in theoretical attempt to distinguish 
melancholia  from mourning, was puzzled by  this phenomenon of  “premature” mourning.  For Freud  the 
scientist, this was an unresolved problem calling for further research and a newly revised theory that 
would  account  for,  among  other  things,  the  problematic  yet  paradigmatic  case  of  Shakespeare’s 
melancholy Dane.    In  “Mourning  and Melancholia,”  Freud  even  held  open  the  possibility  that Hamlet’s 
view of  the world as  “an unweeded garden  that grows  to seed”  – a belief unsupported by the available 
evidence, and a stance hard to account for as a response to a particular loss – might in fact, for all we 
know, be a correct view of the world.  Science cannot rule out any possibility prematurely; the only thing 
                                                                                                                                                                    
open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is 
turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single 
catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would 
like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is 
blowing in from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such a violence that the 
angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which 
his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what 
we call progress. (Illuminations, 257-58) 
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of which the scientist can be sure, as Freud was well aware, is that all our theories are destined to fall to 
ruin as they are superseded by better theories. 
Although Santner does not name any one person as the embodiment of this second view, the 
figure who perhaps best represents the critical-diagnostic approach is not Freud but Jacques Lacan and 
his later version of Freudian psychoanalysis.43  For Lacan, the question is not whether Hamlet’s view of 
world is a “correct” one.  The real question is how the positing of such a view constitutes a world, and how 
this coherent image of the world at the same time rewards us with a coherent image of the self in relation 
to that world – a Hamlet-type of outsider, for example, with a lucid vision of things as they really are.  
What Hamlet gains from his strategy of conflating loss and lack, in other words, is that he gets to become 
Hamlet.  This attractive model of selfhood gained some cultural currency  in Shakespeare’s  time, as an 
example  of  what  was  popularly  known  as  the  “Elizabethan Malady.”44  Melancholy is defined by the 
strategy of constructing a rationale (and a world) that would sustain such images for the self.  
For Lacan, melancholy is not a maladaptive response to loss; it is the ultimate adaptive strategy, 
a self-deluding strategy of identifying with culturally produced images for the self.  Melancholy falls 
entirely within the realm of what Lacan designates as the “Imaginary,” in sharp contrast to the Real and 
the Symbolic.  Lacan, moreover, theorizes this imaginary projection of lack (and its conflation with loss) as 
a necessary and unavoidable move.  The problem comes when the Imaginary realm is confused with the 
Real, when a constitutive lack is posited as a real loss. The melancholic’s vision of the world in terms of 
what is lacking is a textbook example of the object–petit-a, or the object-cause of our desire, which not 




built around the optical illusion of a lack projected onto that world.  Lacan appeals to art for its illustrations 
and examples just as Freud does.  But Lacan’s rather bleak view of art as the chief means of “simulating 
                                                   
43 For a recent expression of this highly critical view from a Lacanian perspective, see Slavoj Žižek 
(2000).  
44 See Lawrence Babb’s Elizabethan Malady for an account of this period. 
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loss”  seems  to  conflate  imaginative  vision  with  imaginary  self-delusion, and it leaves little room for 
experimental art as a means of reconfiguring our relation to the real world. 
These  are  what  Santner  calls  the  two  “competing”  claims  that  govern  two  different  ways  of 
theorizing melancholy.  Different as these concepts of melancholy are from each other, they nevertheless 
seem to be guided by some shared interests.   The visionary and the critical concepts of melancholy can 
both be formulated (as Santner does) in the binary terms established by Freud in his classic 1917 essay 
“Mourning and Melancholia.”  Melancholy is a strategic response either to a real or to an imagined loss – 
which means that melancholy may be thought of as escapist and regressive, just as easily as we might 
equate mourning with a conformity to the status quo.  This shared framework attests to the continuing 
importance  of  Freud’s  theory  and  to  the  way it continues to shape the way we understand even the 
differences between competing claims.  In all versions, including a third version represented by Freud, we 
see also a shared epistemic concern with access to the real.  For Freud, melancholy is a maladaptive 
failure to conform to a reality principle; in Benjamin, there is fidelity to real loss as an awakening from the 
dream-time of reigning ideologies of progress; and finally, we have melancholy as a projective mode of 
defense that Lacan relegates to the realm of the unreal – the Imaginary, as distinguished from the Real or 
the Symbolic (the realm of language).  
Santner juxtaposes these conceptual frames with the aim of steering a middle course to arrive at 
a new way of thinking about melancholy in ethical and political terms (and more specifically, for Santner, 
bio-political terms).  My interests here are quite different.  This is a study of modernism and melancholy, 
and I want to ask what it might mean to think of Benjamin as the embodiment of a distinctly modernist 
way of thinking about melancholy, of a conceptual transformation made in response to pressures and 
needs that can be fully understood only in the context of a specific period.  Benjamin was not alone 
among his generation in pursuing such a transformation.  Modernist artists and thinkers in the early 
decades of the century saw in melancholy not a mode of passive resistance; rather, they saw an 
untapped resource for artistic experiment and revolutionary activity (and they often made a point of 
conflating these projects).  A purely theoretical approach tends to obscure these period-specific 
motivations.  It also bypasses a central paradox that will be a central one for me, as it was a motivating 
ideal for Benjamin: the idea of an avant-garde melancholy, itself a revolutionary – or at least unusual – 
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development in the long history of thinking about melancholy.  For modernist artists in the early twentieth 
century, and for thinkers like Benjamin who aligned themselves with the artistic avant-garde, the search 
for new ways of “being” melancholy meant finding ways out of what they identified as a pressing cultural  
crisis.  And one of the problems to which modernists were responding was a specific manifestation of 
melancholy itself – an affective stance that Kierkegaard, in the preceding century, called “the ailment of 
the age.”   
The contextual study I will attempt here is premised on the belief that modernist experiments in 
melancholy must be seen as constructive attempts to envision alternatives, and not simply efforts to 
diagnose (or evade) realities, and that these envisioned alternatives get their light, their purpose,45 from 
what modernist artists recognized as problems and pressures and limitations within their culture.  Rather 
than steer a middle course, as Santner does, I will argue that part of what makes Benjamin distinctively 
modernist is that he embodies both the  “visionary” and  the  “critical” concepts of melancholy.    I want  to 
keep both interests in view, because I think they reflect two important aspects of a distinctly modernist 
thinking about melancholy – a duality of interest that is captured by Jürgen Habermas in his description of 
Benjamin’s “redemptive criticism.” If we want to understand what is distinctly modernist about Benjamin’s 
concept of melancholy, then we need to bracket and set aside our own ethical and political notion of 
“resistance”  so  that  we  can  begin  to  account  for  what  Benjamin  and  other  modernists  saw  as  their 
experimental and revolutionary aims.  
Benjamin, in fact, engaged in a psychological and cultural critique of given forms of melancholy 
that is actually quite compatible with what Lacan elaborated several decades later.  Benjamin, however, is 
motivated by a sense of historical precedent and historical crisis that we do not find in Lacan, but which 
almost defines early twentieth-century modernism. Benjamin sees melancholy as a historically contingent 
stance, and he sees in the history of the concept a series of attempted transformations and adaptations.  
The historical range of his critique is astonishing: from Aristotle to the Baroque Trauerspiel, from 
Baudelaire to the Surrealists and the once-popular 1920s movement known as Neue Sachlichkeit (“New 
                                                   
45 Here I borrow from the language of Wittgenstein in section 109 of his Philosophical Investigations, 
where he famously writes of descriptive practices as a means of seeking alternatives to, or ways out of 




Objectivity”).  And the targets of Benjamin’s critique encompass not only ideologies of progress, but also 
affective postures of  resigned passivity  that  imagine  themselves as modes of  “resistance.”    In his 1931 
polemic  “Linke Melancolie”  (“Leftist Melancholy”)  for example, Benjamin attacked  the Neue Sachlichkeit  
movement as  the  contemporary  embodiment  of  “tortured  stupidity  …  the  latest  of  two  millenia  of 
metamorphoses of melancholy” (Selected Writings vol. 2.2 426).  The great appeal of the movement to its 
followers, Benjamin wrote, was that it functioned  to “reconcile this type of person to himself.”  Benjamin’s 
critique is characteristically modernist: Lacanian in its sharp diagnosis of cultural problems and self-
deluding psychological strategies, and at the same time Nietzschean in the polemical clarity with which it 
identifies the problems it seeks to overcome.  We could even cast Nietzsche’s own psychological critique 
of the Will to Truth largely in terms of Lacan’s concept of the Imaginary.  What distinguishes modernists 
like Nietzsche and Benjamin from Lacan, however, is their search for radical alternatives to the 
psychological and cultural problems they diagnosed.   
On one level, this move to contextualize seeks to acknowledge – and, hopefully, address – a 
rather obvious question.  The foundational texts in question were both written in the early decades of the 
century, and only a few years apart: Benjamin’s Trauerspiel study in the early 1920s, and Freud’s essay 
“Mourning  and Melancholia”  in  1917.    Should  we  think  of  this  conceptual  framework  as  a  modernist 
inheritance?   Is there some reason these concepts emerged at this particular moment in history?  And 
one of the less obvious questions I want to address is why Freud’s concept of melancholy is so difficult to 
connect with the revolutionary interests of the contemporary avant garde, in contrast with (say) the 
concept of the Uncanny. Writing to Breton in 1930, Freud confessed with some irritation that he had no 
understanding of Surrealism and its aims.46  Indeed, the revolutionary concept of melancholy, and the 
notion of an “avant-garde melancholy,” could not have been farther from Freud’s interests.  By contrast, 
the  development  of  Benjamin’s  concept  of  melancholy  is  virtually  inseparable  from  his  discovery  of 
Surrealism in the 1920s.  I want to begin, then, with Surrealism as an important context for understanding 
how Benjamin’s thinking about melancholy (and even his personal melancholy temperament) intersected 
with an avant-garde movement most often associated with Louis Aragon and André Breton. 
 
                                                   
46 The correspondence between Freud and Breton is reprinted as an appendix to the English edition of 
The Communicating Vessels translated by Mary Ann Caws and Geoffrey Harris. 
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1.  Benjamin, Surrealism, and Melancholy Made Cheerful 
“Surrealism’s  chief  contribution  to  sensibility,”  Susan  Sontag  observed  in  her  essay-profile of 
Walter Benjamin,  “was  to make melancholy cheerful”  (124).  What sort achievement  is this exactly  – to  
make melancholy cheerful?  Sontag makes no specific mention of a Surrealist text, but her ready-made 
aphorism might  shed  some  light  on  a  brief  but  important  passage  in  one  of  the movement’s  founding 
documents: Louis Aragon’s 1926 experimental novel Paysan de Paris (Paris Peasant).   
The scene in question, which reads like a manifesto in the form of a miniature allegory, contains a 
striking  phenomenological  account  of  melancholy  presented  from  the  point  of  view  of  Aragon’s  first-
person narrator.  The brief drama unfolds against the backdrop of the soon-to-be-demolished Paris 
Arcades and the often shady businesses that remain in operation.  The narrator, a Parisian flaneur who 
has been wandering through these modern-day urban ruins, and who (at this point) is inebriated after 
waiting in a bar for a friend who never shows up, exits the arranged meeting place and descends a flight 
of steps that lead from the artificially enclosed environment of the arcades to the mid-day bustle of the 
street outside.  He pauses on the steps, where he  feels  himself  suspended  between  “two  kinds  of 
daylight”:  the  blooming,  buzzing  world  before  him  and  the  gas-lit, grotto-like space from which he 
emerges as if from a dream.  “For a moment,” Aragon’s narrator observes, 
 
the scales dip towards the weird gulf of appearances.  Strange lure of these arbitrary 
arrangements: here is someone crossing a street, and the space around him is solid, and 
here is a piano on the pavement, and motorcars squatting under their drivers. (47) 
 
The shock of transition thus has a defamiliarizing effect.  All things swim and glitter.47  The narrator is 
made responsive to, is confronted by, a phantasmagorical world of objects and images that seem to 
arrange themselves arbitrarily.  There are no sewing machines,48 but we do come across umbrellas and 
walking sticks on display in a shop window that suddenly begin swim and sway as if they were aquatic 
                                                   
47 This line alludes to Emerson’s essay “Experience,” which will be the subject of Chapter 4. 




plants  deep  underwater,  made  visible  by  the  phosphoresence  of  a  “submarine  light”  whose  source  is 
unknown.  The entire Passage de l’Opéra becomes an underwater playground in which the subject sways 
in tandem with the objects in view.  The subject’s vantage point, from which all objects are illuminated and 
brought into view, becomes as diffuse as the play of sub-aquatic light and as indeterminate as its source.  
The passage above presents what we would now recognize as a familiar – even typical – Surrealist 
recontre, or  encounter.    But  the  narrator’s  responsiveness  is  not  the  result  of  a  willing  and  cheerful 
surrender to a world of images set free; it is linked with a paralysis verging on what we might also now 
recognize (and diagnose) as a dissociative episode.  The scales can – and do – tip the other way, and the 
fantasic but vaguely threatening chaos of this world soon plunges the narrator into a state of despair: 
 
From this sentimental crossroads, as I regard alternately this land of disorder and the 
great arcade illuminated by my instincts, at one or another of these trompe-l’oeil, I 
perceive  not  even  the  tiniest moment  of  hope …  I  feel  the ground tremble, and I find 
myself suddenly like a sailor on board of a ruined chateau.  Everything signifies 
devastation.  Under my contemplative gaze, everything falls into ruin. (48) 
 
If we choose to read this miniature allegory as a manifesto, then it is not difficult to see how melancholy, 
thus conceived, might have had interest for Surrealism. This scene demonstrates that infinite sensitivity – 
what  André Breton  called  (in  the  first  Surrealist  Manifesto)  “the  spark  of  the  image,  to  which  we  are 
infinitely sensitive” – may have some connection with the loss of hope.  Melancholy contemplation, with 
its alienating effect, is thus one possible route to the Uncanny, one possible mode of defamiliarization 
(along with dream states and narcotic drugs) explored by Surrealists as a means of short-circuiting 
habitual and rational thought and inducing a kind of responsiveness.  The self, as one Surrealist put it, is 
the ultimate drug.  Seeing everything in ruins (or rather, as ruins) allows the subject to experience the 
world as an array of liberated images.  Everything “falls to ruin” under the narrator’s contemplative gaze, 
and  contemplation  is  itself  the  mechanism  that  makes  possible  this  alienated  vision.    The  subject’s 
awareness  of  a  “gulf”  between  the  object  and its meaning, between the world of appearance and the 
world, has the effect of further widening the gulf.  But it has also the paradoxical effect of liberating 
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objects  and  images  from  the  realm  of  meaning  altogether.    It  is  the  subject’s  awareness  of  the gap 
between surface and meaning that simultaneously liberates and paralyzes.   
What happens next  to Aragon’s  narrator,  in  the  second  half  of  the  passage,  is  an  even more 
direct invitation to read the entire episode as a manifesto dealing specifically with the defamiliarizing 
effects of melancholy (which is never mentioned by name in this passage).  At the moment when the 
scales have tipped fully the other way for the narrator, sending the narrator into a spiral of alienated 
despair, he looks down and sees another figure sitting beside him on the steps.  It is his alter-ego, a 
personification of the “sense of uselessness”: 
 
The sense of uselessness is squatting beside me on the first step.  He is dressed like me, 
but with an added touch of nobility.  He does not carry a handkerchief.  The infinite is 
reflected in his face, and he holds extended between his hands a blue accordion which 
he never plays, and upon which one can read: PESSIMISM. (48) 
 
The narrator then suddenly morphs into this projected figure, picks up the unplayed blue accordion, and 
begins to play it on the edge of the water. (The scenery has also, apparently, undergone a literal “sea-
change”: we are now on the waterfront or on a boat dock – or perhaps on the deck of a “ruined chateau” 
out at sea.)  With every squeeze of the bellows, keeping time with the crashing and receding of the 
waves,  the  word  “pessimism”  literally  falls  apart  into  the  ruins  its  constituent  letters.    The  word  finally 




PSSIMISM   
followed by the E: 
PESSIMISM  
And the whole thing starts wailing from left to right [...] 
The wave reaches this shore with a barbaric explosion. And starts to recede again.   
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PESSIMISM – PESSIMIS – PESSIMI 
PESSIM – PESSI – PESS  
PES – PE – P – p ..., nothing more. (49) 
 
The spell has been broken, the paralysis of despair overcome.  There is no meaning to interpret, nothing 
more to reconstruct, no fragments upon which to brood; there are only arbitrary signs and concatenations 
of signs to dissolve and re-arrange in new and surprising juxtapositions. The narrator, it seems, has 
learned to stop worrying over meaning and correspondences between mind and world and learned to 
love the spectacle of the free play among meaningless signs.  He learns to live among surfaces and 
immerse himself in the spectacle without being haunted by any illusion of depth.   We return, finally, to the 
top of the steps leading out to the street, to the place where the narrator (meanwhile) remains standing: 
 
Standing on one leg, the other foot cupped in his hand, a bit theatrical, a bit common, 
clay pipe, cap tilted over one eye, and singing I do believe: Ah, if only you knew the 
details of the life of Burgundy snails... at the top of the steps, in the dust and the fag 
ends, why if it isn’t that charming boy: the Sense of the useless. (49) 
 
And so this bizarre scene comes to an abrupt end, with an asterisk winking at us to signify a shift to a new 
section and a new episode, the text cheerfully aware of its own playful and experimental discontinuities in 
tone and form.  But no amount of irony can quite dispel our urge to interpret the “moral” of the play that 
has been staged for us.  And with interpretation comes skepticism and doubt.  Questions come to the 
surface.  Is this a demonstration of the uncanny power of objects and images, or merely the power of 
irony to distract and simply put a spin on things?  Is Aragon’s narrator (and it is, all weirdness aside, the 
voice of a narrator) simply a twentieth-century spin on Baudelaire’s  flaneur, liberated from the mystical 
notion that correspondences exist between the mind and the cryptic “forests of symbols” through which 
the subject wanders and which emit “sometimes confused words”?49  By the end of Aragon’s scene, the 
                                                   
49 Here is the opening of Baudelaire’s poem “Correspondances”: 
 
La nature est un temple où de vivants piliers 
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“sense  of  uselessness”  is  subtly  transformed  into  the more  subjectively  colored  feeling  of  futility  – the 
“sense of the useless,” which suggests a consciousness of, or a taste for.  But one’s taste for nonsense 
and for the objectively random and arbitrary, however cheerful, remain as tenuously private and subject-
centered as one’s sense of  futility. The narrator will sober up by morning, the charm will wear off.  The 
world illuminated by his instincts will likely be replaced by the leaden sense of the world produced by an 
all-too-predictable hangover.  In its effort to engineer a pure receptivity, Surrealism must somehow make 
use  of  the  melancholic’s  acute  sense  of  a  gulf  between  the  object-world  “outside”  and  “the  world 
illuminated by [his] instincts,” but it must do so without this despair over the chaos and futility of images 
set free leading the subject to recoil (instinctively) and seek refuge in a consoling form of idealism 
(thereby abandoning the object).  The challenge of “making use” of melancholy is thus analogous to the 
problem of how to tap into the dissociative power of dream while, at the same time, waking oneself from 
the dream state into a Surreality that overcomes and erases the boundary between object and subject, 
reality and dream.  It is a delicate balancing act, to say the least. 
Sontag’s quip about Surrealism and melancholy, then, raises a more general question about the 
revolutionary gesture of reconceptualizing melancholy so as to make it new. We might wonder, for 
example, if there is anything special about this interest in the defamiliarizing power of melancholy, as 
opposed  to  Surrealists’  well-known interest in semi-conscious states of mind, hallucinatory drugs, 
schizophrenia and various other means of bypassing the subjective ego to tap into the revolutionary 
potential of the unwilled and arbitrary.  Why, for example, would Surrealists feel a need to transform 
melancholy and make it into something new?  Why not simply regard melancholy as one other mode of 
apprehending the world whose latent subversive potential lies ready and waiting to be exploited?  This 
further complicates our understanding of Surrealists’ revolutionizing of the concept of melancholy.  There 
is an overcoming of melancholy, and at the same time a transformation.  There is something to be 
transformed as well as overcome.  For Aragon, moreover, the image has the power not only to wake the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Laissent parfois sortir de confuses paroles 
L'homme y passe à travers des forêts de symboles 
Qui l'observent avec des regards familiers. 
 
(Nature is a temple where living pillars 
Let escape sometimes confused words; 
Man traverses it through forests of symbols 
That observe him with familiar glances.) 
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subject from the commodified dream-world of capitalist modernity; the spark produced by these unwilled 
juxtapositions  also  has  the  capacity  of  “annihilating  the  entire  Universe,”  as  we  read  in  a  rhapsodic 
passage not long after the narrated scene in the Paris Arcades (66).  It is the objects and images that 
have explosive  and  revolutionary  potential,  not  the  subject’s  imaginative  visions  or  rational  utopian 
plans.50  Just  how  it  is  that  an  image  can  “annihilate  the  universe”  is  a  question  about  Surrealist 
revolutionary praxis – or, at least that would have been the chief concern in the mid 1920s, when the 
movement still harbored unqualified hopes of putting its experiments in the uncanny to direct political use.  
It is, at the very least, counter-intuitive to identify revolutionary potential in melancholy – a state 
traditionally associated with passive inwardness, political resignation, and withdrawal from the world. The 
effect of everything falling to ruin is the experience of a myth being exploded from the dialectical instability 
of the subject-object relationship (the dream-world of capitalism).   It is an intriguing political revolutionary 
vision, what one critic (Margaret Cohen) has given the name “Gothic Marxism.”   
So much for the political revolution.  But just how are we supposed to read this scene as an 
allegory of melancholy made cheerful?  This is a more fundamental question, one that requires paying 
close  attention  not  only  to  political  praxis  and  utopian  visions  of  the  future, but also  to  the Surrealists’ 
keen sense of historical precedent and their sense of what existing models of melancholy needed to be 
revolutionized and transformed.  We can begin by taking stock of some of the allusions and possible 
allusions. The most obvious allusion is to one of the most iconic (and thoroughly interpreted) images in 
the history of the discourse surrounding melancholy: Albrecht Dürer’s etching Melancolia I with its figure 
of “winged melancholy” seated and lost in contemplation.  The blue accordion that sits unplayed has its 
counterpart  in Dürer’s etching  in  the array of unused implements and other randomly scattered objects 
that surround  the seated  figure.   By Dürer’s  time, each of  these  objects  – the stone, the compass, the 
globe, the dog – had acquired its own allegorical and iconic significance. Dürer’s image, in fact, can be 
read as a summation of what was already a long history of thinking about melancholy.  At the very least, 
the unambiguous allusion to Dürer confirms that Aragon’s mini-allegory deals with the age-old concept of 
                                                   
50 The key text, which marks a turning point in Surrealist concept of art “in the service of the revolution,” is 
André  Breton’s  1932  book  The Communicating Vessels (predating  by  several  years  Leon  Trotsky’s 
defense of the autonomy of imaginative literature in response to Communist Party aesthetics).  Breton’s 
defense of the imagination, however, is made more complicated by the fact that the Surrealist concept of 
the imagination remained premised on an anti-art aesthetic “exempt from any aesthetic or moral concern” 
(as Breton put it in the first Surrealist Manifesto of 1924).   
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melancholy, and not with some generic notion of pessimism or with the nineteenth-century discourse on 
nihilism.  Reading it simply as a parody of a given model of melancholy does not tell us much about the 
model of thinking about melancholy that Surrealism is attempting to transform.  The revolutionary gesture, 
in other words, must be located in the juxtaposition and not in the parody.  
This fleeting allusion to Dürer, however, may have a special place in the cultural context from 
which  Surrealism  emerged.    By  the  early  twentieth  century,  Dürer’s image had become virtually 
inseparable from a dominant interpretation that had gained currency outside the narrow discipline of art 
history.   Dürer’s  representation of melancholia was  recognizably modern, a portrait of melancholia  that 
stood out from the medieval allegorical Temperamentsbild (a generic representation of a temperament).  
It represented a revolution in the visual arts, as well as a triumphant awakening in the way people related 
to themselves and to the world.  In the nineteenth century, the century of Jacob Burckhardt and John 
Ruskin, Melancolia I came to signify a revolution in the concept of melancholy that coincided with the birth 
of modernity.   Dürer helped to inspire a post-enlightenment historicism, which – in turn – gave birth to 
Dürer as the prototype of the heroic genius of the Renaissance whose expressive art was read as a 
personal triumph over the conventional iconography of medieval pre-history.  Perhaps the most influential 
reading of Dürer along these lines, a summing up and crystallization of this interpretive tendency, comes 
from art historian Erwin Panofsky’s early book-length study Saturn and Melancholy, which was published 
in German in 1922 (only a few years prior to the publication of Paysan de Paris).   For Panofsky, Dürer’s 
etching allegorizes the creative triumph over allegory  itself.   Panofsky claimed  that  “Dürer was  the  first 
artist north of the Alps [i.e., the first to spread the ideas of Marsilio Ficino and the modern aesthetic of 
Italian Renaissance] to raise the portrayal of melancholy to the dignity of a symbol, in which there 
appears  a  powerfully  compelling  concordance  between  the  abstract  notion  and  the  concrete  image” 
(306). Contrasting  the  expressiveness  of  Dürer’s  image  with  earlier  allegorical  representations of 
melancholia  whose  meaning  required  an  appeal  to  the  exegetical  apparatus  of  “legends,”    Panofsky 




This historical allusion, referring to an interpretation of the image as much as to the image itself, 
further complicates our reading of Aragon’s  already  complicated  and  perhaps wholly  parodic  passage.  
As Dürer’s image and Ficino’s revival of Aristotle demonstrate, the history of melancholy can be read as a 
series of attempts to re-interpret the concept within a model designed to exploit what was seen as its 
visionary  or  revolutionary  potential.  In  order  to  understand Surrealism’s  revolutionary  transformation  of 
melancholy (conceived more broadly than its use for political revolution), we need to understand that it 
was a transformation of a concept of melancholy that Panofsky characterizes as already an historical 
revolution.  But  here  we  run  the  risk  of  anachronism  ourselves,  of  conflating  Burckhardt’s  narrative  of 
heroic  individualism  with  Ficino’s  – in  which  case  Panofsky’s  interpretation merely attests to the 
dominance of this way of reading, and nothing more.  There is no evidence, after all, that Aragon had 
read Panofsky’s book or that he intended for us to dwell at length upon a facetious and fleeting allusion.  
So how seriously should we take these few pages in Paysan de Paris?  And how important is the context 
of Panofsky’s reading of Dürer’s image?    
Aragon’s passage, if read as a manifesto, is the closest thing we have to a Surrealist manifesto 
on melancholy.  But it is Walter Benjamin, an attentive reader of both Panofsky and Aragon in the 1920s, 
who  gives  us  perhaps  the  best  reason  to  pause  over  Aragon’s  allusion.  Benjamin,  as  we  shall  see, 
developed what is by far the most important theory of melancholy among modernists, and he recognized 
very early on the connection between the revolutionary aims of Surrealism and the aim of transforming 
the concept of melancholy.  Sontag’s comment on Surrealism, in fact, appears in her essay on Benjamin, 
at a time when he was just becoming known in the English-speaking world.  Benjamin had just finished 
his  study  of  the  Baroque  Trauerspiel,  which  included  his  response  to  Panofsky’s  recently  published 
interpretation of Dürer.51 (He came across Saturn and Melancholia while completing his study).  The 
timing was perfect, almost uncanny.  Benjamin explicitly took issue with the transfer of an enlightenment 
progress narrative into the arts, the overcoming of superstition, the triumph of light over darkness and 
fear,  of  Panofsky  and  the  “powerfully  compelling concordance between the abstract notion and the 
concrete image” which in typical historicist fashion projects a progress narrative onto Dürer that privileges 
                                                   
51 For fuller accounts of Benjamin’s relation to the iconographic methodology of the Warburg Institute, and 
particularly  the  methodological  kinship  between  Aby  Warburg’s  Mnemosyne Atlas and  Benjamin’s 
Arcades project, see Beatrice Hanssen (1999); Matthew Rampley (2000); and Bock (2000). 
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the organic unity of Romantic symbol over allegory.52  In this Enlightenment narrative, the symbol 
triumphs over allegory, just as instrumental reason triumphs over fear of the unknown.  And we see the 
historical emergence of Ficino’s heroic melancholy as it manifests itself in the ideal of the artist-hero: the 
solitary creative genius whose works of art testify to the realization of his personal vision, to his effort to 
overcome his despair and create meaning out of the raw materials of a fallen world.  The triumph of the 
symbol over allegory, like the sense of the tragic that overshadows and historically displaces Trauer,53 is 
a  central  theme  throughout  Benjamin’s  Trauerspiel study.  And as one graphic example of the way 
progress  narratives  (like  Panofsky’s)  marginalize  and  erase  from  memory,  Benjamin  draws  special 
attention to the stone motif in Dürer’s image – the one motif whose significance Panofsky fails to consider 
in  his  otherwise  thorough  analysis  of  melancholy  iconography.    Benjamin’s  account  of  the  Baroque 
Trauerspiel thus represents an important counter-narrative  to  Panofsky’s  historicist account. For 
Benjamin, the Baroque Trauerspiel was diametrically opposed early modern response to (and at the 
same time a historically specific manifestation of) the disenchantment of modernity.  Benjamin interpreted 
the Trauerspiel as a last-ditch embrace of an allegorical vision of the world, a mute and powerless protest 
against the forces of modernity by writers who left a record of their melancholy fixations, and their historic 
failure, at a moment when the Enlightenment was closing in on their darkness. 
*** 
 
Looking back from a distance of nearly fifteen years, Benjamin described his reading of Paysan 
de Paris as a transformative event in his life and gave it credit as the source and inspiration for what 
would become his Arcades project.  Benjamin also recalled his first experience of reading Paysan de 
Paris, of nights in bed when he could not read more than two or three pages “before my heart started to 
                                                   
52 Benjamin opens his chapter “Allegory and Trauerspiel” with a sweeping claim: “For a hundred years the 
philosophy of art has been subject to the tyranny of a usurper who came to power in the chaos which 
followed  in  the  wake  of  romanticism.”  Benjamin  reviews  a  wide  range  of  theoretical  sources  for  the 
romantic symbol/allegory distinction, all of them prefiguring Baudelaire’s correspondances.  In the symbol, 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe wrote, the particular represents “the universal, not as a dream or shadow, but 
as a living and momentary revelation of the inscrutable [lebendig-augenblickliche Offenbarung des 
Unerforschlichen].” Coleridge, who owed much to German romanticism, famously distinguished between 
the mere artifice of allegory and the symbol, which “partakes of the reality which it renders intelligible.” 
53 For Benjamin’s comments on the historical neglect of Trauer (mournfulness) as opposed to the tragic – 
Benjamin’s  own      dissociation  of  sensibility  narrative,  and  his  answer  to  Nietzsche’s  focus  on  tragic 
intensity – see Origin, 118f.   
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beat so strongly that I had to lay the book aside” (Adorno-Benjamin Correspondence 88).  Apart from the 
episode alluding to Dürer, it was passages like the following that probably caught Benjamin’s attention in 
the mid 1920s: 
 
The vice named Surrealism is the immoderate and impassioned use of the stupefacient 
[stupéfiant] image, or rather the uncontrolled provocation of the image for its sake and for 
the element of unpredictable perturbation and of metamorphosis which it introduces into 
the domain of representation: for each image on each occasion forces you to revise the 
entire Universe.  And for each man there awaits discovery a particular image capable of 
annihilating the entire Universe.  (Aragon 66) 
 
Benjamin would also express reservations about the “nebulous philosophemes” he saw in Aragon (some 
evidence of which may be found above), and he took ear ly  notice  of  “alarming  deficiencies”  in  the 
movement’s  philosophical  premises.    But what Benjamin  responded  to  in  exuberant  passages  like  the 
one above was not a theoretical articulation of melancholy so much as the idea of a revolutionary 
melancholy.   
This revolutionary potential of seeing everything in ruins was recognized in Benjamin’s perceptive 
early assessment of the movement in his 1928 essay, “Surrealism: The Last54 Snapshot of the European 
Intelligentsia,” written only two years after the appearance of Paris Peasant and four years after the first 
Surrealist manifesto:  
 
[Breton] was the first to perceive the revolutionary energies that appear in the 
“outmoded”, in the first iron constructions, the first factory buildings, the earliest photos, 
the objects that have begun to be extinct, grand pianos, the dresses of five years ago, 
fashionable restaurants when the vogue has begun to ebb from them. The relation of 
these things to revolution—no one can have a more exact concept of it than these 
                                                   
54 The  original German  subtitle  reads:  “Die  letzte Momentaufnahme der  europäischen  Intelligenz,”  and 
“Die  letzte”  – most  often  translated  as  “The  Last”  – should be understood in the  sense  of  “the  most 
recent” or “latest.” 
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authors.  No one before these visionaries and augurs perceived how destitution — not 
only social but architectonic, the poverty of interiors/enslaved and enslaving objects — 
can be suddenly transformed into revolutionary nihilism. Leaving aside Aragon’s Passage 
de I’Opéra,  Breton  and  Nadja  are  the  lovers  who  convert  everything  that  we  have 
experienced on mournful railway journeys (railways are beginning to age), on 
Godforsaken Sunday afternoons in the proletarian quarters of the great cities, in the first 
glance through the rain-blurred window of a new apartment, into revolutionary 
experience, if not action. (210) 
 
While this passage celebrates what was unique in Surrealism and what was revolutionary about its 
concept of the revolutionary, we also begin to see evidence of Benjamin’s reservations about what was 
(and remains) the standard version of Surrealism.  Aragon and Breton may have been the first to 
recognize  how  the  apprehension  of  “enslaved  and  enslaving  objects,”  the  contemplative  gaze  under 
which everything falls  to  ruin  and  spectacle  of  “destitution,”  can  be  transformed  into  a  “revolutionary 
nihilism.”  But the experimental narratives of Surrealism, staging what Breton called “lyric behavior,” give 
us a “revolutionary experience” that should not (Benjamin suggests) be equated with “action” in the literal 
sense.  Those who thought of themselves as committed to political revolution in the 1920s were 
interested in action in the literal sense, in collective behavior that literally broke windows and overturned 
systems.    Such  readers  might  have  delighted  at  Benjamin’s  scathing  attack  on  ineffectual  bourgeois 
“leftist melancholy,” and there was a side of Benjamin that could sound the stridently polemical tone his 
friend Bertolt Brecht.  Apart from a select few readers, though, the idea that melancholy itself could have 
some revolutionary potential would have been aseemed to the average Communist party member just as 
incomprehensible as the aims of Surrealism seemed to Freud.  If the mainstream Communist party had 
such little patience with Breton’s talk of “objective chance” and the “marvelous,” then is hard to imagine 
anything like a charitable response to Benjamin’s esotericism.  And so we must, in some sense, approach 
Benjamin’s  revolutionary  and  utopian  version  of  Surrealism as a movement that consisted of a single 
member, a solitary radical who was more likely to be found seated at a table in the Bibliothèque National 
than in an open-air Paris café. 
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Benjamin recognized in Surrealism a twentieth-century attempt to transform the ideal of a 
“religious illumination” into the secular and materialist practice of “profane illumination” – Benjamin’s name 
for the Surrealist recontre (encounter) between a subject and the “uncontrolled provocation of the image.” 
The profane illumination, as conceived by Benjamin and the Surrealists, was the avant-garde antithesis of 
the modernist epiphany: neither a religious intimation of what lies beyond, nor a consubstantive meeting 
half-way between the imagination and the world.  The encounter with the “stupefacient” image required a 
stupefied subject whose rational and imaginative faculties had been suppressed or short-circuited.  
“Dream loosens individuality like a bad tooth,” Benjamin wrote in his 1928 essay  (208).  But dream was 
not the only means of inducing in the subject a passive responsiveness to the uncanny alterity of the 
object and to the provocative power of the image.   
In his chance encounter with Surrealism, we see a dramatic intersection of Benjamin’s critical and 
visionary interests in melancholy.  There are other passages in Paysan de Paris that Benjamin may have 
read with the shock of recognition.  The passage quoted above, for example, appears not long after a 
curious  allusion  to  Albrecht  Dürer’s  iconic  early  Renaissance  image of winged melancholy, in a brief 
episode that reads like a manifesto in the form of an allegory of overcoming.  When Benjamin first read 
Aragon in 1925, he had only recently finished his extended study of the historical genre of the German 
Baroque Trauerspiel, or “mourning-play,” a genre characterized by its morbid fixation on the fragment and 
its allegorical fascination with the arbitrary and severed relationship between sign and object.  The 
Trauerspiel was in some respects a stylistic anticipation of Expressionism, but Benjamin was most 
interested  in  its allegorical vision as offering one model of what a  “profane  illumination” might  look  like.  
Allegory, Benjamin noted, is a characteristically melancholy mode of expression.55  The Trauerspiel 
represented an alternative to a Renaissance model of religious illumination and to a religious concept of 
melancholy, both of which found their clearest articulation in the immensely influential sixteenth-century 
                                                   
55 Here is the text of the passage: 
 
When, as is the case in the Trauerspiel, history becomes part of the setting, it does so as 
script.  The word ‘history’ stands written on the countenance of nature in the characters of 
transience.  The allegorical physiognomy of the nature-history, which is put on stage in 
the Trauerspiel, is present in reality in the form of the ruin.  In the ruin history has 
physically merged into the setting.  And in this guise history does not assume the form of 
the process of an eternal life so much as that of irresistible decay.  Allegory thereby 
declares itself to be beyond beauty.  Allegories are, in the realm of thoughts, what ruins 
are in the realm of things.  This explains the baroque cult of the ruin. (Origin 177-78) 
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treatise by Marsilio Ficino titled De Vita Triplici (a passage which Erwin Panofsky singles out in his 
interpretation of Dürer’s etching): 
 
As long as we are representatives of God on Earth, we are continually troubled by 
nostalgia for the celestial fatherland, even if we are unaware of it, and in this exile no 
earthly pleasure can comfort the human mind, since it is eager for better things. (qtd. in 
Kristeller 211) 
 
Ficino’s  concept  of  “heroic  melancholy”  was  itself  an  important  metamorphosis  in  the  concept  of 
melancholy.  It was an attempt to re-conceive what  medieval  theologians  called  “accedia,”  the 
ambiguously  sinful  strategy  of  brooding  upon  the  fallennes  of  the  world  so  as  to  intensify  one’s 
imaginative  “eagerness  for  better  things”  (and  a  desire  for  closeness  to  God made more  intense  by 
contemplation of His absence).  Ficino effected this transformation by combining Christian neo-Platonism 
with Aristotle’s  “great man”  theory of melancholy  that explained  the melancholic’s sense of  isolation as 
the price one pays for seeing farther than others.  The concept of heroic melancholy, emerging in the 
Renaissance from the marriage of secular and Christian thought, was rapidly re-translated into a secular 
idealism that would become the basis of the Renaissance concept of the artistic genius, of the Romantic 
concept of the symbol, and the tendency of philosophical idealism in its various manifestations to give 
priority to the power of the creative imagination and privilege the subject over the object.56   
Benjamin saw in the Baroque Trauerspiel an early and fleeting attempt to reverse this historical 
tendency, one that would privilege the object instead.  The Trauerspiel took the otherworldly gaze of 
Ficino’s  Neoplatonic  idealism,  its  longing  premised  on  the  fallenness  of  nature,  and  re-directed the 
intensity of that gaze upon the forlorn fragments and arbitrary images of the fallen world itself.  
“Trauerspiel”  is  often  translated  in English  as  “mourning  play”;  but  the  Trauerspielen  are  nihilistic  and 
obsessively brooding, not elegiac in an atmospheric sense or ritualistic in the sense of enacting the 
                                                   
56 Or what Adorno – developing Benjamin’s thought with specific reference to the idealism that manifests 
itself in the subsumptive and imperialist logic of instrumental reason – would  later  call  “identarian”  or 




healthy process of mourning.  Benjamin defined Trauer as  a  sensibility  that  alters  one’s  vision  of  the 
world: 
 
Trauer is the sensibility in which feeling revives the empty world in the form of a mask, in 
order to take a puzzling [rätselhafte] pleasure in its sight … Trauer, as it emerges as the 
pendant to the theory of tragedy, can only be developed in the description of the world 
which  emerges  under  the  gaze  of  the  melancholic.  …  If,  for  Trauerspiel, the 
representation of these laws are to be found, partly developed, partly undeveloped, in the 
heart of Trauer, the representation of these laws has nothing to do with the state of 
feelings of the poet or the audience, but rather with a feeling which is released from an 
empirical subject and bound to the fullness of an object. (qtd. in Pensky Melancholy 
Dialectics 90) 
 
Trauer,  then,  becomes  a  property  of  objects  that  is  “released”  under  the  melancholic’s  gaze,  a  non-
subjective feeling that expresses and makes visible what the Japanese have aptly termed the “sadness of 
things” (mono no aware).  This is one of many passages in the Trauerspiel study that convey, with barely 
concealed enthusiasm, the discovery of a mode of expression (allegory) that could also function as 
experimental method.  In Surrealism, Benjamin discovered a further development of what had been only 
“partly developed” in the Trauerspiel.   
The challenge for Surrealism, as Benjamin conceived it, was to retain a brooding fascination with 
fragments without the brooding melancholy subject, to effect the necessary “release” from the subject that 
would allow the object and the image to flash forth.  It was a delicate and complex project, and Benjamin 
did not always find Breton and Aragon up to the task.  Paysan de Paris contained patches of vague 
philosophizing, but it was also marred by passages that Benjamin felt were too impressionistic and hinted 
at  a  conflict  between  Benjamin’s materialist  redemptive  criticism  and  the  ideal  of  “lyric  behavior”  that 
would continue to guide the Surrealism of Aragon and Breton.  Benjamin’s aims would diverge from the 
movement in other ways.  There were many techniques for “loosening individuality like a bad tooth,” and 
Surrealists had already explored some of them by 1925 – hashish, dream, automatic writing, impersonal 
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desire.  Benjamin, however, had limited interest in narcotics, and no interest at all in automatic writing.  
“The  true  creative  overcoming  of  religious  illumination,”  he  wrote  in  his  1928  essay  on  Surrealism, 
“certainly  does not lie in narcotics. It resides in a profane illumination,  a materialistic, anthropological 
inspiration, to which hashish, opium, or whatever else can give an introductory lesson”  (One-Way Street 
157).  It was Benjamin who would develop an experimental version of Surrealism in which melancholy 
played a central role in facilitating the encounter with the object.  The most powerful drug of all, Benjamin 
claimed, was the self (ibid). 
Benjamin mostly kept his distance from Breton and the evolving Surrealist orthodoxy throughout 
the 1920s and 1930s,57 and so it is easy to read his relationship to the movement as illuminating but 
merely incidental to the development of his thought.  Much of the best critical work on Benjamin and his 
relation to Surrealism has been done by philosophers, and not by literary critics who want to contextualize 
Benjamin as a modernist.58  But any philosophical study  that  tries  to  redeem Benjamin’s  ideas  through 
paraphrase, as forming a coherent or at least a semi-coherent philosophy, will tend to run aground when 
it comes  to defining  (with even a modicum of clarity) what Benjamin called  the  “dialectical  image,”  the 
conceptual lynchpin in his methodological formulation of the Surrealist recontre.59  Benjamin had criticized 
Aragon for his “nebulous philosophemes.” But  the  ideas  that Benjamin came up with as  the  theoretical 
basis for his project do not fare much better from a philosophical point of view.  In the end, it is probably 
more  accurate  to  speak  of  Benjamin’s  peculiar  version of Surrealism and his Surrealist concept of 
melancholy, rather than invoke his connection with Surrealism as a way of illuminating a theory that might 
not, in fact, stand up as a theory. The Arcades project  is  the  product  of  what  I  will  call  Benjamin’s 
“melancholy as method”; in spite of its belated and ambiguous canonical status within the movement, it is 
also in many ways the ultimate Surrealist text.   
                                                   
57 Benjamin did, however, attend the meetings of the short-lived and informal group known as the 
“Collège de Sociologie” in Paris between 1937 and 1939, where he likely engaged in discussions with 
former Surrealists and regular attendees, including George Bataille, Michel Leiris, Jean Paulhan, and 
Roger Callois.  The group invited Benjamin to give a series of talks, but nothing came of it. For a history 
of the group and a collection of texts, see Denis Hollier. 
58 See, for example, Max Pensky’s Melancholy Dialectics and Margaret Cohen’s Profane Illumination. 
59 Rolf Tiedemann, for example, notes that the concept “never achieved any terminological consistency” 
in  Benjamin’s  work.    Many  other  Benjamin  critics  (Susan  Buck-Morss among them) have come to a 
similar conclusion. The lack of philosophical rigor was recognized early on by Theodor Adorno, one of 
Benjamin’s most  perceptive  and  sympathetic  critics.    Later  in  this  chapter,  I  will  take  a  closer  look  at 
Adorno’s critical response to Benjamin and to Surrealism. 
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Benjamin described his Surrealism essay as a pendant to his essay on Proust (written three 
years later, in 1931).  The juxtaposition of Benjamin’s concept of melancholy, his “hope in the past,” and 
Proust’s  concept  of memoire involuntaire is an interesting one.60  Proust, as Peter Szondi observes, 
“listens  attentively  for  the  echo  of  the  past;  Benjamin  listens  for  the  first  notes  of  a  future”  (19).  
Benjamin’s ideal of redemption as “the recognizability of now” is not the same as Proust’s recovery of lost 
time (Le Temps retrouvé suggests an investigative, empirical project of recovery).  Proust celebrates the 




toward the function of art.  Like Nietzsche, Benjamin wanted to transform the concept of art itself; it was 
the anti-art aesthetic of the avant garde that fascinated him.  Avant-garde techniques would replace 
Proust’s experimental aestheticism (and his melancholy subjectivity) with an exoteric, objective method.  
As I hope to show, what Benjamin does with his concept melancholy is an answer not only to Proust, but 
to Nietzschean aestheticism as well.  
  
2.  Nietzsche and the Ailment of the Age 
The scene from Paysan de Paris contains another quiet allusion, more obscure than the 
reference of Dürer’s  image but no  less  interesting.    Max Pensky, one of  the  few critics who have paid 
close attention  to  the passage,  identifies an allusion  to Nietzsche  in  the  figure of  the  “riddling, mocking 
dwarf  who  squats  upon  Zarathustra’s  shoulders  as  he  struggles up  his  mountain  path”  (185).    This 
indicates, for Pensky, a contrasting model of overcoming melancholy that he distinguishes from the 
Surrealism of Benjamin and Aragon.   “The dominion of melancholy,” Pensky writes “is broken not by a 
Nietzschean act of assertion  of  will  so  much  as  [in  Aragon’s  Surrealism]  a  magical  transmutation  of 
melancholia  itself”  (186).   Although he oversimplifies Nietzsche somewhat, as I will try show in a later 
chapter, Pensky is right to suggest that the Nietzsche-inspired active nihilism of the early avant-garde 
                                                   
60 See also Svetlana Boym’s reflections on nostalgia as a mode, and her distinction between “reflective 
nostalgia”  (Proust,  for  example)  and  what  she  calls  Benjamin’s  “restorative  nostalgia.”   The former 
involves taking pleasure in the distance between past and present, a kind of homesickness that produces 
wandering, making possible a fluid apprehension of possible associations. 
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stands (or, rather, strives) in sharp contrast with Benjamin’s and Surrealism’s object-oriented interest in 
melancholy.  Surrealism, as Peter Nicholls observes, is the only major avant garde movement that 
“rejects the trope of mastery”61 (289).  However, Pensky fails to mention another possible allusion here, of 
possible significance, which also involves Nietzsche and which raises a different set of questions about 
Surrealism in relation to Nietzsche’s “cheerful” avant-garde.  The letters on the blue accordion that spell 
out  “pessimism”  may  allude  to  Apollinaire’s  essay  review  of  a  reprinted  edition  of  the  poems  of 
Baudelaire.  In his review, written from an early twentieth-century vantage point, Apollinaire took issue 
with Baudelaire’s decadent “pessimism.”  This is criticism written under the influence of Nietzsche, who 
repeatedly writes of nineteenth-century  “pessimism”  as  an  attitude  and  a  pose  just  as  decadent  as 
optimism (and contrasts both attitudes with “fatalism” and  “instinct”).  The allusion, intended or not, also 
establishes  an  important  connection  between Nietzsche’s  overcoming melancholy  and  the  early  avant 
garde, all within the context of a fin de siècle discourse  on  decadence  and  a  “healthy-minded”  avant-
garde rejection of what it saw as decadent Symbolist aesthetics. 
It is Nietzsche who, perhaps more than any other major philosopher, seeks to transform 
philosophy itself into a therapeutic and aesthetic practice with the aim of producing a charge and 
transforming a life.  Rilke’s “Du muss dein Leben anderen!” (“You must change your life!”)62 could serve 
as a one-line distillation of Nietzsche’s entire philosophy  – as  long as we acknowledge  that Rilke’s  line 
occurs as the climax and culmination of a poem that articulates and realizes a power, rather than the 
rallying cry that appears on the final page of a self-help guide.  Nietzsche conceives of art as having the 
power to transform a life as well as having a force within the world – and this is not to be confused with 
the  imperative  to  live  one’s  life  as  if  it  were  a  work  of  art.    There  is  a ministerial  thrust  to Nietzsche’s 
thought and writing, however, that does indeed sound at times like direct and practical advice for how to 
                                                   
61 There  is  another  way  of  identifying  the  versions  of  “avant-garde  melancholy”  that  Nietzsche  and 
Benjamin represent.  In his book Homo Aestheticus, Luc Ferry identifies two  “moments”  of  the  avant-
garde  aesthetic:  “the  hyperindividualistic  iconoclasm  of  creating  something  entirely  new,  and  the 
hyperrealistic striving to achieve an extraordinary truth.”  Both may be construed as moments of the avant 
garde anti-art aesthetic, and (with some qualification) they describe the two very different versions of, and 
impulses behind, avant-garde anti-art  that  are  represented  by  Nietzsche’s  “hyperindividualistic 
iconoclasm”  and Benjamin’s  interest  in  recovering what  he  called  “images  of truth.”    For  a  fascinating 
meditation on the tension between creation and discovery, written from a Surrealist perspective, see 
Giorgio de Chirico’s Nietzsche-inspired experimental novel Hebdomeros (from which I quote at the head 




live  one’s  life.    And Nietzsche’s  often poetically charged writing and explosive aphorisms aim to work 
upon the reader in the manner of a personal intervention, aiming to quicken the pulse and to make the 
heart race, to have something like the life-changing effect that Benjamin describes in his first experience 
of reading Paysan de Paris.  In his study of Nietzsche’s philosophy, David Allison also captures both the 
critical and therapeutic dimensions of Nietzsche’s modernism.  Nietzsche, Allison notes, addresses each 
of his readers as a friend.  What Nietzsche offers us is not wisdom or knowledge, but what often sounds 
like a “self-help” plan for changing our lives: 
 
No great revelations, no absolute knowledge. No timeless, leaden certainties – but things 
do look a bit different now, and one gets a better perspective on things, new 
perspectives,  a  nuanced  appreciation.  […]  And  things  take  on  a  patina  in  turn,  a 
sensuous immediacy, the way one feels after a long illness, when rediscovering the 
simple fact that sunlight is itself a medium of pleasure, or when warm voices and laughter 
once again drift up from the evening boulevard below. (vii) 
 
Nietzsche wants us, each of us,  to overcome our  “illness” by converting  it  into a new source of vitality, 
even a new source of pleasure; only then, and not by conscious force of will, can one achieve what 
Allison describes as “a new perspective on things.”  And Nietzsche himself repeatedly celebrates the fact 
of his own illness, embracing it as a fate and as an opportunity for renewed contact with the energies of 
life.  
If  we  are  looking  to  read  Nietzsche’s  interest  in  melancholy  within  a  discursive  context,  the 
thematic clues are not difficult to find.  As we shall see, Nietzsche’s writing is a virtual catalog of historical 
allusions and motifs that place him (along with Benjamin) within a long history of attempts to redefine 
melancholy that also create new ways of being melancholy.  What I want to begin to draw attention to is 
the  distinctly  modernist  critical  and  visionary  dimensions  that  mark  both  Benjamin’s  and  Nietzsche’s 
thinking about melancholy, even if their visionary projects pursue different paths.  Like Benjamin, 
Nietzsche treats melancholy as a culturally constructed and historically contingent affective posture.  At 
the same time, however, both see in melancholy  itself a means of  “opening up alternative  frameworks” 
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(as Eric Santner phrases it in the passage quoted earlier).  And although Nietzsche’s visionary project is 
an attempt (through art) to inspire individual readers to change their lives, it is important to appreciate 
what Nietzsche always emphasized as the world-historical significance of overcoming a given form of 
melancholy (associated with a certain form of nihilism) by transforming it  from  within.    Nietzsche’s 
alternative to passive nihilism was an active nihilism.  In his famous lectures in the 1930s, Heidegger 
suggested  that Nietzsche’s Will  to Power  represents both the  transcendence  and the consummation of 
nihilism.  
The critical and polemical side of Nietzsche’s “philosophizing with a hammer” is also hard to miss.  
Nietzsche speaks to us as friend and confidant, but he is also notoriously contemptuous toward those 
who represent cultural decadence and every tendency that is opposed to strength and health.  The 
question  is  how Nietzsche’s thinking about melancholy figures into that diagnostic and critical project.  
Nietzsche envisions the Will to Power as an alternative to the Will to Truth, and active nihilism as 
overcoming one paradigm by transforming it; that much is certainly clear.  But if we want to make a 
connection  between  the  cultural  challenge  of  nihilism  and melancholy  as  the  “ailment  of  the  age”  (as 
Kierkegaard once called it), then one way to bring out this connection is to read Nietzsche as anticipating 
Lacan’s critique of melancholy in terms of imaginary projections.  The “illness” Nietzsche writes of is not 
his or ours alone; it is the illness of our time, an illness we succumb to when we find ourselves trapped 
within the psychic economy of our culture and identify with one of the images for the self that it offers.  
That is why the personal project of overcoming illness through transforming it has world-historical 
significance and we might note (for example) the closely interwoven private/public language employed in  
Nietzsche’s preface  to The Gay Science (which may be  the closest  thing to a distillation of Nietzsche’s 
entire anti-philosophical project, and not least by virtue of its characteristic pose of waiting for a future 
transformation): 
 
I am still waiting for a philosophical physician in the exceptional sense of that word—one 
who has to pursue the problem of the total health of a people, time, race or of humanity—
to muster the courage to push my suspicion to its limits and to risk the proposition: what 
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was at stake in all philosophizing hitherto was not at all "truth" but something else—let us 
say, health, future, growth, power, life.  (Gay Science 35) 
 
For Nietzsche, there is a connection between Kierkegaard’s “ailment of the age” and the values sustained 
by an epistemic culture that was the dominant culture in Nietzsche’s time (and arguably remains so) – a 
culture based on a Will to Truth, on the opposition between appearance and reality, and one that defined 
knowledge as accurate representation.63  In Chapter Three, I will read Freud’s theory of melancholy itself 
as illustrating a form of melancholy associated with the epistemic values that Nietzsche and many other 
modernists found problematic.  
It  is  important  to  recognize  how  Nietzsche’s  cultural  and  psychological  critique puts immense 
pressure on his visionary model for overcoming the epistemic form of melancholy he diagnoses.   
Nietzsche’s ideal hero – and that means, ideally, the individual reader whose life is transformed – must 
find some way to avoid identifying with that most powerful image for the self that any culture has to offer: 
the figure of the outsider to culture, the one who (along with his friend and confidant, Nietzsche) has seen 
farther than everyone else, whose sense of isolation and even suffering (like Zarathustra’s) can serve to 
validate and reinforce a powerful image of the self-as-hero with which the average individual is all to 
eager  to  identify.    It  is no wonder  that Nietzsche’s mode  of  address has  found a  perennially  receptive 
audience among future generations of adolescent readers.   Nietzsche’s solution is to replace images of 
the self with a model of a self as perpetually in flux – what Henry Staten  calls Nietzsche’s  “exploding 
hero.”    This  heroic  activity  of  remaking  of  the  self  demands  a  constant unmaking and erasure of prior 
selves. In order to see farther than others and also avoid the imaginary seductions of a static self-image, 
Nietzsche’s Overman must  overcome  himself.  Melancholy has an important function in this project of 
self-transformation and self-overcoming; for if the melancholic can feel a sense of alienation from the 
world so extreme  that  it also  “loosens  individuality  like a bad  tooth,”  then melancholy can  function as a 
solvent that facilitates the experimental project of making and remaking the self.  
                                                   
63 As Heidegger observed in his lectures of the 1930s: “For Nietzsche, nihilism is not in any way simply a 
phenomenon of decay; rather nihilism is, as the fundamental event of Western history, simultaneously 
and above all the intrinsic law of that history” (qtd. in Bull Nietzsche’s Negative Ecologies 36).  Perhaps 
the most direct influence of Nietzsche’s account of nihilism may be seen in Max Weber’s concept of the 
disenchantment of modernity, and not the more conventional pessimism that finds expression in Freud’s 
Civilization and Its Discontents. 
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Nietzsche gives art and a self-reflexive articulation a central role in this visionary project of 
overcoming melancholy.  But Nietzsche’s transformation of melancholy also calls for a new concept of the 
aesthetic itself, so that art is no longer thought of as a consolation for the pain and the shortcomings of 
existence (as Schopenhauer defined the function of art) or as a narcotic “cure for boredom” (as Nietzsche 
himself, under the spell of Richard Wagner, had once described most art).  For Nietzsche the post-
Romantic and proto-modernist, art becomes an activity, the exemplary means of creating new value. 
Nietzsche, unlike Lacan, does not simply allude to art; he adopts art as a way of doing philosophy, and he 
envisions art as an alternative to epistemic values. The Gay Science (1882), for example, reflects even in 
its title the critical and visionary dimensions of Nietzsche’s transvaluation of values.64  Nietzsche identified 
The Gay Science (1882) as his most personal work, and as a “medial” work that helped him transition to 
the next phase of his life and thinking.  We can now read The Gay Science as the first in a series of 
experimental works culminating in Ecce Homo (1888), which can all be read as attempts to transform the 
mode of confessional writing (traditionally aimed at self-representation and self-interpretation) into an 
avant-garde performative mode  in which the  “I”  is  forced at every step  to become an other.  “The noble 
type of man,” Nietzsche writes,  “experiences  itself  as determining values; it does not need approval; it 
judges ...  it  is value creating”  (Geneaology 39).  Notoriously, these artist-heroes who create new value 
must also develop – in parallel, so to speak, with their “experience” of self-becoming – a sharp awareness 
of their difference from the “herd” and the values by which they live their lives.  In order to be exemplary, 
one  must  be  an  exceptional  and  superior  “type.”  Just  how  it  is  that  one  can  experience  oneself  as 
determining values without at the same time succumbing to the imaginary allure of heroic self-
identification – or what Nietzsche called the image of the “counterfeit great man” – is a challenge and a 
paradox that we will look at more closely in a later chapter.   
 
3.  Benjamin, Nietzsche, and the Image of Modernism 
Benjamin and Nietzsche thus represent two experimental ways of thinking about melancholy that 
are radically different from each other, even incompatible, and yet both recognizably modernist.  The 
                                                   
64 “Gay science” alludes to the techniques of the early troubadours (gai saber) as representing a model of 
art  as  performance,  and  at  the  same  time  inverts  Carlyle’s  famous  nineteenth-century description of 
economics as the “dismal science.” 
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iconography of melancholy allows us to associate their visions with vividly contrasting images.  While 
Benjamin drew attention to the stone motif  in Dürer’s image of winged melancholy, one of the scattered 
objects depicted.  Nietzsche is what Surrealist critic Gaston Bachelard characterized as an “ascensional 
poet,” whose imagination takes flight in defiance of the  force of gravity and in contempt of (aversion to) 
inert and lifeless matter65 (104).  “It was  from  this aversion,” Nietzsche writes  in Ecce Homo, describing 
himself in the third-person,  “that he  grew  wings  to  ‘soar  off  into  distant  futures’”  (Basic Writings 787).   
Nietzsche, Bachelard notes,  is not a  “poet of matter.”   For Nietzsche,  the material  imagination gives us 
only “sleep and dreams and unformulated will.”   Inert matter is a provocation, a necessary obstacle and a 
stimulus for the gravity-defying will to power: 
 
A path that ascended defiantly through stones, malicious, lonely ... a mountain path 
crunched under the defiance of my foot66 ... Upward – defying the spirit that drew it 
                                                   
65 I am referring to Chapter 5 of Bachelard’s Air and Dreams: “Nietzsche and the Ascensional Psyche.”  
This brilliantly idiosyncratic reading of Nietzsche is one of the underappreciated gems of Nietzschean 
criticism; I also believe it is the closest thing to a reading of Nietzsche that we might have gotten from 
William James.  One of my melancholy regrets, as I completed this study, is that I had to sacrifice a 
chapter-length discussion of Bachelard and James as an unwarranted digression from the main line of my 
argument.  Bachelard’s 1939 study of Lautreamont, incidentally, to which the chapter on Nietzsche reads  
as  something  of  a  sequel,  joins  the  company  of  Jean Paulhan’s  The Flowers of Tarbes as one of the 
finest works of Surrealist criticism, as well as (I would argue) one of the most important texts of late 
modernism. 
         There is much more critical work to be done on Bachelard’s version of Surrealism.  Although I do 
not have space here to elaborate on the juxtaposition, Bachelard is to my mind the most Jamesian of 
French modernist thinkers.  If we want a compelling philosophical case for aesthetic practices and for the 
imagination more generally, an adequate response to Adorno’s call  in “Looking Back on Surrealism” that 
is  Jamesian  in  spirit,  then Bachelard’s work  beginning  in  the  1930s gives  us  something  close  to  that.  
Consider also, for example, the uncanny resemblance between James’s account of the epileptic patient 
and this passage from Bachelard’s Poetics of Space, which gives us the latter’s version of “total reaction 
upon life”: 
 
In quoting this fragment [from Lithuanian poet Oscar Milosz], I have sought to present an 
unusually complete experience of a gloomy daydream, the daydream of a human being 
who sits motionless in his corner, where he finds a world grown old and worn. 
Incidentally, I should like to point out the power that an adjective acquires, as soon as it is 
applied to life.  A gloomy life, or a gloomy person, marks an entire universe with more 
than just a pervading coloration.  Even things become crystalllizations of sadness, regret, 
or nostalgia.  And when a philosopher looks to poets … for lessons in how to individualize 
the world, he soon becomes convinced that the world is not so much a noun as an 
adjective.  Indeed, to those who want to find the essence of a world philosophy, one 
could give the following advice – look for its adjective. (43-44) 
 
66 It is very tempting to juxtapose this passage with Walser’s meditation on ash (which we looked at in the 
introduction).    This  is  one  of  the  many  juxtapositions  that  tempt  us  to  think  of  Walser  as  the  “anti-
 61 
downward toward the abyss, the spirit of gravity, my devil and archenemy.  Upward – 
although he sat on me, half dwarf, half mole, lame, making lame, dripping lead into my 
ear, leaden thoughts into my brain.  (Portable Nietzsche 268) 
 
Here we see the source of Aragon’s  allusion  to  the  dwarf  figure,  sounding no  less  odd  in  the  original 
context.  In spite of the scenic backdrop, there is also a rigorously non-atmospheric anthropomorphizing 
of nature that attributes agency to natural forces – the “lonely path that ascended defiantly” is analogous 
to  the defiance with which he  “crunches”  the path under his  foot.    The defining  feature of  a Dionysian 
philosophy – what Nietzsche  calls  its  “decisive”  [entscheidend] feature – is  “the  affirmation  of  passing 
away and destroying” (729).  
Nietzsche’s programmatic aversion would become, in the not-too-distant future, the driving spirit 
behind the transgressive activities of the modernist avant garde. Nietzsche is the prophet of modernism 
and of a certain strain of anti-art aestheticism; he predicted that his greatest impact would come only after 
1900, and he was right.  Benjamin was born into the revolution that Nietzsche helped to bring about.  This 
belatedness gave Benjamin a vantage point from which he could assess the first wave of creative-
transgressive  activity  as  it  had  already  played  itself  out.  Benjamin’s modernism was  retrospective  and 
ambivalent.  At the same time, Benjamin aligned himself with a late avant-garde movement that attracted 
him in no small part because of its distance from earlier Nietzsche-inspired movements such as Dada and 
Futurism.  Nietzsche’s ideal of the visionary, iconoclastic outsider was an inspiration for such movements 
and for the artists associated with them.  On occasion, in certain moods, Benjamin could fantasize about 
the  Nietzschean  “destructive  character.”  But  he  also  had  deep  reservations  about  the  avant  garde’s 
embrace of disruptive innovation as an end in itself, its commitment to an active nihilism that, to 
Benjamin, seemed little more than an accelerated version of earlier myths of progress.  While Nietzsche’s 
impact on modernism is hard to ignore, the revolutionary import of Benjamin’s modernism is more difficult 
to assess.  He spent most of his life as an émigre, a solitary outsider known only to a select few readers.  
He was a Surrealist who did not participate in the movement, a radical thinker who refused membership 
in any political party and whose revolutionary activity did not extend much beyond association with Bertolt 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Nietzsche.”  But the relationship is a bit more complicated, and far more interesting (as I will try to show 
later). 
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Brecht.  He rejected theory and systematic thinking, but his alternative was anything but practical or 
pragmatic.   
What  is most  radical  in Benjamin’s  thought, moreover,  tends  to  be what  is most  idiosyncratic, 
even  esoteric.    While  Benjamin’s  peculiar  brand  of  Surrealism borrowed from avant-garde aesthetic 
practices, it culminated in something entirely different: an attempt to replace the interpretive methods of 
conventional  historiography  with  a  highly  unorthodox  “constellation” method.    The  theoretical  basis  for 
that method, as I indicated earlier, is underdeveloped and at times opaque.  At one point, Benjamin 
defined  the  central  concept  of  the  “dialectical  image”  as  “that  in  which  the  Then  and  the  Now  come 
together into a constellation like a flash of lightning [and] enter into legibility at a specific time.”  Benjamin 
wanted to replace top-down theory with a method that would allow historical data  to “enter into legibility” 
and speak for itself.  But in spite of the patient and earnest efforts of later critics, nobody has yet been 
able  to  translate Benjamin’s  provocative  language  into  the  legibility  required  for  a  practical  and usable 
method.  As Max Pensky notes, it remains far from clear whether the concept of the dialectical image, the 
central concept of Benjamin’s project,  represents  “the guarantee of Benjamin’s continuing  relevance, or 
the limits of his relevance” (“Method and Time” 179).   
This failure does not make the Arcades project any less fascinating or important as a modernist 
text, but it does cast the work in a somewhat different light.  The question, then, is what we are to make of 
Benjamin’s modernist melancholy  if  the  experimental method,  and  the  theory  on which  that method  is 
based, resist all attempts to treat them in methodological or theoretical terms.  One option would be 
abandon our demand for theoretical clarity and instead try to understand Benjamin’s significance within a 
longer history of thinking about melancholy. We can treat that history on the “paradigm shift” model, as a 
succession of theories and definitions displacing or building upon one another.  But we can also read 
these attempts to define and redefine melancholy as a history of projected ideals and models of heroism, 
a history made legible in a series of iconic images. This is the geneaological approach taken by Benjamin 





that transformed an obscure image into an icon of modernist melancholy.   
And then there is the image of Benjamin himself.  In her 1979 profile of Benjamin, Susan Sontag 
analyzes a series of photographs taken over the course of two decades as aspects of one portrait – the 
portrait of a saturnine temperament.  Benjamin is often looking downward, with what Sontag describes as 
the “soft, daydreamer’s gaze of the myopic” (109).  In one of the photographs, taken in the 1930s, he is 
sitting at a table in a library bent over a book and taking notes (perhaps gathering material for the 
Arcades project).  His photographic pose corresponds almost exactly to that of the seated figure in 
Dürer’s etching.  The image of Benjamin as a melancholy “type,” which becomes legible within a broader 
iconography, also captures some of the  paradoxes  that  distinguish  Benjamin’s  specifically  modernist 
melancholy: a forward-looking, visionary project captured in a myopic but intense downward gaze; a 
special mode of empathy that somehow derives from a fixation on the inorganic and creaturely; a radical 
materialism that locates the potential for revolutionary change in lifeless and inert objects.  
Photographs of Nietzsche capture a similar downward gaze.  What matters, of course, is not so 
much the fact that Benjamin or Nietzsche suffered from bouts  of  depression  or  “were” melancholy  by 
temperament.  The biographical evidence is fairly clear in both cases,67 and their writing attests to an 
uncanny degree of self-awareness. One  could  even make  the  case  that Benjamin’s  engagement with 
Surrealism (and his later association with Bertolt Brecht) was motivated in part by a self-willed, 
therapeutic effort to overcome his own saturnine penchant for the esoteric by transforming the intensity of 
a melancholy gaze into an exoteric and revolutionary project.   Benjamin’s alignment with the avant garde 
then  begins  to  resemble  Nietzsche’s  self-help program.  There is no need, however, for a Freudian 
biographical reading of their private struggles to overcome paralysis and despair.  If we want to 
understand the visionary and heroic dimensions of their modernist melancholy, then the important 
question to ask is how Benjamin and Nietzsche succeeded in transforming a temperamental limitation 
into modes of fascination that had revolutionary and world-historical significance. And new forms of 
                                                   
67 In  Nietzsche’s  case,  these  experiences  were  accompanied  by  (or,  as  Nietzsche  would  have  put, 
inseparable from) some excruciating physical symptoms.  Nietzsche reports suffering from intense 
migraine headaches that lasted as long as a week.  When Nietzsche writes about being attentive to one’s 
body, an almost obsessive theme in his work, we should remember that he is writing from the perspective 
of a post-convalescent sufferer of migraines – an uncanny state of mind familiar to anyone who suffers 
from migraines.   
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heroism, envisioned as alternatives to the myopia and paralysis of an entire culture, demand neither 
psychological explanation nor philosophical justification. 
The differences between the visionary modernism of Nietzsche and Benjamin are as striking as 
the similarities and have a different kind of historical resonance.  It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to 
speak  of Nietzsche’s  concept  of melancholy  as  corresponding  to  any  ethical  or  political  stance  in  the 
same way Surrealism aligned itself in the 1920s with the revolutionary aspirations of the Communist 
party.  This does not mean, of course, that Nietzsche would escape from the ironies of history.  One of 
the earliest movements to take its inspiration from Nietzsche was Futurism.  In the rhetoric of the early 
Futurist manifestos, we often hear a voice that picks up on Nietzsche’s:  
 
Literature has up to now magnified pensive immobility, ecstasy and slumber.  We want to 
exalt movements of aggression, feverish sleeplessness, the double march, the perilous 
leap, the slap and the blow with the fist.  (in Marinetti 49) 
 
More than a century has passed since the publication of the first Futurist manifesto, and it is now difficult 
to imagine the impact that such language might have had upon readers in 1909.  Nietzsche’s hyperbolic 
calls for a heroic, warlike age would soon come to pass in the century he anticipated; his lonely path to 
victory would become congested with processions of people moving in double march.68  The paradoxes 
that Nietzsche embraced (including the idea of overcoming melancholy through transforming it) now 
seem, in retrospect, more like a preparation for the well-known contradictions that would define 
                                                   
68 In the section of the Arcades projects on “Boredom, Eternal Return,” we find this remark from Benjamin 
on  Nietzsche:  “There  is  a  handwritten  draft  in  which  Caesar  instead of Zarathustra is the bearer of 
Nietzsche’s tidings.  That is of little moment.  It underscores the fact that Nietzsche had an inkling of his 
doctrine’s  complicity  with  imperialism”  (117).    Throughout  this  section  (known  as  “Convolute  D”), 
Benjamin’s treatment of Nietzsche relies heavily on Karl Löwith’s 1935 study Nietzsche’s Philosophy and 
the Eternal Recurrence of the Same, one of the more notable scholarly attempts to reclaim Nietzsche 
from political misreadings. Löwith neverthless places Nietzsche in a Hegelian tradition of thinking, which 
also aligns Nietzsche with the Hegelian thinking on history and progress that were the objects of 
Benjamin’s critique.  
Löwith would find a receptive reader in Walter Benjamin. But most intellectuals in 1930s Europe 
had more immediate concerns. The time for correcting misreadings had already passed. Löwith himself, 
who was part Jewish, was forced to leave Germany for Japan, where he was once again forced to leave, 
eventually ending up in New York City (where he joined the company his fellow refugee, Theodor Adorno, 
at the New School for Social Research).  André Breton was also on his way to New York City by boat, 
passing the time in conversation with another passenger and fellow refugee, Claude Levi Strauss. 
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modernism itself: the compatibility of a reactionary politics and a revolutionary aesthetic, a critique of the 
perceived decadence of modernity that could easily dovetail with a revolutionary nostalgia for an 
imagined heroic past.  Nietzsche’s own politics are ambiguous at best.  The Italian Futurists, on the other 
hand, were far more decisive in their world-historical commitments when they allied themselves with a 
political movement in the 1920s whose charismatic leader once declared, in an interview, that the two 
most important influences for his own revolutionary philosophy of fascism were the writings of Nietzsche 
and the American pragmatist William James.69 
Our  challenge  today  is  to  read  Nietzsche’s  visionary  project  outside the historical context of 
modernism – or at least to recognize those aspects of Nietzsche’s thought that transcend what now seem 
dangerous tendencies within modernism. Nietzsche was fond of addressing his future readers.  We are 
those future readers, and as his “friends,” we always find ourselves in the awkward position of having to 
defend Nietzsche from possible and actual misreadings.  We do so by brooding over his texts and giving 
more careful  interpretations of their “actual” meaning  – in other words, reading him exactly the way he 
asked us not to.  Nietzsche the visionary modernist is burdened by the weight of history that he sought to 
overcome through the creatively necessary acts of self-abandonment and forgetting.  When Apollinaire 
asked “who are the great forgetters?” (in his poem “Toujours”), he was channeling Nietzsche’s voice into 
the language of the avant-garde manifesto.  
Benjamin’s criticism of Nietzsche in the Trauerspiel study would find an echo a decade later in the 
1936  essay  “The  Work  of  Art  in  an  Age  of  Mechanical  Reproduction.”    In  its  well-known climax, 
Benjamin’s essay characterizes Futurism and the avant-garde as the culmination of a nihilist art-for-art’s-
sake aestheticism that allowed people a self-alienated, disengaged vantage point from which to 
contemplate  the spectacle of  their  own annihilation as  “an aesthetic pleasure of  the  first order.”   When 
Heidegger argued in his lectures on Nietzsche that overcoming nihilism involved its transformation, he 
was  offering  this  partly  as  a  defense  of  Nietzsche’s  ideas  at  a  historical moment when  the  discourse 
about health and illness and talk of overcoming cultural problems had reached its culmination in the 
category of Entartete Kunst (“decadent  art”)  in  which  Paul  Klee’s  work  was  placed  along  with  the 
experimental work of many other modernists.  While Heidegger was giving his talks in Germany, one 




stray work of Klee’s – the “Angelus Novus” – was hidden away in a Paris library along with other papers 
left behind by their owner, Walter Benjamin, who was at that moment literally in flight from the forces of 
history, making his arduous ascent over the Pyrenees on a lonely mountain path worn down by a 
procession of refugees who were on their way to a port town in Spain. 
At the risk of sounding tendentious, I argue that what is at stake in these different images of 
modernist melancholy is no less than the image of modernism itself and its ability to respond to the 
historical crisis that it diagnosed so clearly. These versions of heroic melancholy we have been looking at 
correspond to fundamentally different visions of modernism as a visionary endeavor, aspiring to 
something more than critical power and a keen but essentially powerless (and paralysis-inducing) sense 
of history.   Benjamin’s heroic melancholy  remains  relevant,  if only because  it offers us a much-needed 
alternative to what we, along with Benjamin,  find  ethically  and  ideologically  unpalatable  in Nietzsche’s 
concept of power and ideal of heroism.  Nietzsche urges us to forget the past as a precondition for 
creating our own future; Benjamin invokes the past in a revolutionary attempt to redeem both the present 
moment and a possible future from the dream time of progress-obsessed modernity. Nietzsche’s idealizes 
heroic individualism, a will to power that is responsive the “not-I” and seeks to exploit that otherness, as a 
means to an end, in an unending project of creating new selves. Benjamin’s Angel of History – an image 
of fragility and ephemerality, of bearing witness to catastrophe – idealizes heroism and responsiveness of 
an entirely different kind.  Benjamin’s  personal  fate  only  reinforces  his  image  as  the  “anti-Nietzsche,” 
which in turn invites us to mythologize modernism retrospectively, through the catastrophe of its failed 
ambitions, while at the same time we idealize the act of recognition and bearing witness (which does not 
even count as a “revolutionary experience”).  But if we want to appeal to modernism as a “live option” and 
see  in  it what Benjamin  called  the  “recognizability  of  Now”  – in other words, to see it as offering real 
alternatives to the problems of modernity that remain with us, rather than exemplifying those problems in 
an extreme form – then we need to emphasize what is forward-looking and visionary in the modernism of 
Benjamin and Nietzsche, and recognize their efforts to develop a responsiveness to what is genuinely 
new. 
 
4.  Adorno, Looking Back on Surrealism 
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Of the many critiques of Surrealist orthodoxy by Surrealism’s “enemies from within” (as George 
Bataille referred to himself), the most philosophically acute and devastating critique would come from 
Benjamin’s close friend, Theodor Adorno, in his 1956 essay  “Looking Back on Surrealism,” written after 
the war and more than a decade after Benjamin’s suicide.70  Adorno’s critique is all the more devastating 
because so much of his own philosophy was subsequently derived from the Trauerspiel study and from 
Benjamin’s thinking on melancholy as method.71  No-one could accuse Adorno of a gross misreading or a 
misunderstanding;  he  understood  better  than  anyone  else  the  significance  of  Benjamin’s  theory  of 
melancholy as well as its connection with Surrealism.72  
Adorno’s  assessment  of  Surrealism  is  anything  but  cheerful.  The  first  challenge  faced  by  the 
reader is to read it on two distinct levels, as simultaneously a response to both Breton’s and Benjamin’s 
not altogether compatible versions of Surrealism. This dual critique makes an interpretation of the essay 
an even more complicated task; indeed, the presence of this subtext may puzzle readers for whom 
Surrealism means French Surrealism and the standard account publicized and documented  in Breton’s 
first and second manifestos.  We find, for one thing, a somewhat confusing blend of terms found in these 
two versions of Surrealism, some of the language we associate with Benjamin – the terms “truth content” 
and “dialectical image,” for example – mixed in with Breton’s standard and much better-promoted version.  
The reason Adorno does not mention Benjamin by name is simple: In 1956, few people knew Benjamin’s 
name, let alone his work, and Adorno was still in the process of editing the first collected edition of his 
work.  Benjamin was not widely known as an important figure in European thought, let alone in 
connection with Surrealism.  
Adorno’s first order of business is Surrealists’ appeal to Freud’s dream theory.  Freud is a fairly 
easy target  for Adorno, and there no effort made here to distinguish between Benjamin’s interest in the 
                                                   
70 For another assessment of Adorno’s essay on Surrealism, see Wolin 1997. 
71 Adorno’s 1931 study of Kierkegaard was inspired by the Trauerspiel study to the extent that it may be 
read as a sequel or companion work. Adorno was also the first to teach the Trauerspiel study in a 
university seminar (in the early 1930s) – at a time when Benjamin’s book was not widely read and known 
to many of the people who had read it as a failed (and mostly unreadable) doctoral project. In 
Kierkegaard study, Adorno’s first published book, we see nearly all of the main themes and concerns that 
Adorno would elaborate upon, with remarkable consistency, in the remaining decades of his life.   
72 It was Adorno,  in  fact, who  first  recommended Breton’s Communicating Vessels to Benjamin when it 
first appeared in 1933. 
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Freudian concept unconscious73 and Breton’s or Dali’s interest in dream as a “superior realm” of authentic 
associations.  The problem, for Adorno, is not Freud’s theory or the validity of the science behind it; he 
draws  attention,  rather  to  the more  fundamental  problem of Surrealism’s  reliance upon theory and its 
appeal to scientific explanations as the basis for its methods and technique: 
 
What is deadly about the interpretation of art, moreover, even philosophically responsible 
interpretation, is that in the process of conceptualizing it is forced to express what is 
strange and surprising in terms of what is already familiar ... To the extent to which works 
of art insist on explanation, every one of them, even if against its own intentions, 
perpetrates a piece of betrayal to conformity. (86) 
 
As a scientific account, moreover, Freud’s theory “does not do justice to the matter.  That is not the way 
people dream; no one dreams that way.  Surrealist constructions are merely analogous to dreams, no 
more” (87). 
After dispensing with Freud and Surrealism’s dependence on a problematic account of the dream 
state, Adorno then moves on to more serious matters and his critique of the ontological status of the 
Surrealist image – the  “spark  of  the  image”  that  is  supposed  to  be  the  byproduct  of  Surrealist 
constructions and the dream-logic of their uncanny juxtapositions.  Here it is Benjamin who (in retrospect) 
seems more clearly the target.  What Adorno has in mind is Benjamin’s related concept of the dialectical 
image, or what he called “dialectics at a standstill,” which represented a means of recovering the image 
unmediated  by  the  role  of  the  subject,  an  “image  of  truth”  attained  through  what  Benjamin  called  the 
“death  of  subjective  intention.”  As  Adorno  realized  as  early  as  the  1930s,  these  were  large  claims, 
ambiguously philosophical and theological.  Adorno’s critique of the claims made for Surrealist techniques 
apply as well to Benjamin’s notion of the dialectical image.  Adorno felt that the melancholy subject had 
not been transformed and overcome in Surrealism – it  had merely been cancelled.  What Benjamin had 
called “the death of subjective intention” does not allow for unmediated access to an “image of truth.”  In 
its undialectical concept of the image and the material object, Adorno claims, Surrealist materialism 
                                                   
73 Benjamin also had a (highly qualified) interest in the Jungian notion of a collective unconscious, an 
interest which Adorno clearly did not share and for which he had little patience. 
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ironically reverts to a form of philosophical idealism.  These problems, moreover, attach to any concept of 
melancholy as a philosophical method for achieving unmediated contact with the images of the objective 
world.  In Surrealist constructions, “there is a shattering and a regrouping, but no dissolution”: 
 
The subject, which is at work much more openly and uninhibitedly in Surrealism than in 
the dream, directs its energy toward its own self-annihilation, something that requires no 
energy in the dream; but because of that everything becomes more objective, so to 
speak, than in the dream, where the subject, absent from the start, colors and permeates 
everything that happens from the wings.74  (87) 
 
What Benjamin and the Surrealists had identified as the revolutionary power of the obsolete and the out-
of-date is in fact, Adorno writes, an “expression of a subjectivity that has become estranged from itself as 
well as from the world. The tension in Surrealism that is discharged in shock is the tension between 
schizophrenia and reification.”  This tension, Adorno suggests, is not psychological in nature, but rather a 
byproduct of the disenchantment of modernity and the societal phenomena of reification and alienation.  
Adorno nevertheless gives a brief account of the subject’s  experience  of  melancholy  alienation, of 
absolute subjectivity thrown back upon itself, the experience Aragon describes in Paysan de Paris as the 
vertiginous gulf between the “land of disorder” and the sense of a world “illuminated by my instincts”:   
 
In the face of total reification, which throws it back upon itself and its protest, a subject 
that has become absolute, that has full control of itself and is free of all consideration of 
the empirical world, reveals itself to be inanimate, something virtually dead.  The 
dialectical images of Surrealism are images of a dialectic of subjective freedom in a 
situation of objective unfreedom.  (88) 
 
                                                   
74 Critic Bill Brown formulates this subject-object dialectic in perhaps its simplest possible terms: “the 




Surrealism, Adorno concludes,  “must be understood not as a  language of  immediacy but as witness  to 
abstract  freedom’s  reversion  to  the supremacy of objects.  The montages of Surrealism,” he continues,  
“are the true still lives.  In making compositions out of what is out of date, they create natur morte” (89).   
 For Adorno,  the uncanny  images of Surrealism, Aragon’s annaihilating  image  that  forces us  to 
revise the entire universe, can in fact only register the alienation of the subject in a “situation of objective 
unfreedom.”  They are “historical images in which the subject’s innermost core becomes aware that it  is 
something  external,  an  imitation  of  something  social  and  historical”  (89).    What  Benjamin called 
redemptive “images of truth” are, more strictly speaking, images of a contingent social truth.  As a final 
blow, Adorno concludes his critique with the observation that Surrealism “forms the complement” to the 
contemporary Neue Sachlichkeit, the German movement whose “leftist melancholy” Benjamin had been 
the target of Benjamin’s critique in his essay of 1931.  At the time Adorno was writing in the 1950s, few 
readers would have been in a position to appreciate the personal subtext of this reference; it is thus a 
highly personal and anguished summation of what Adorno felt was a fundamentally misguided effort and 
a closed chapter in the history of modernism.   Surrealism itself “is obsolete”: that is Adorno’s final verdict.  
Following the real catastrophe of  the war, Surrealist shocks  “had  lost all  their  force,” and  the most that 
could be said for Surrealism in retrospect, Adorno observes, was that it “save[d] Paris by preparing it for 
fear”75 (90).  
 
 
5. CODA: Adorno and Critical versus Visionary Modernisms (Revisited) 
The fact remains, nevertheless, that Benjamin’s chief contribution to Adorno’s thinking was – put 
simply – to make the entire course of his thinking possible.   In his wartime work Minima Moralia there is a 
well-known passage whose language  echoes  the  “Theses  on  the Philosophy  of History”  and  captures 
Adorno’s debt to Benjamin, as well as offers us a rather personal portrait of his thinking at the time and 
the way it had been shaped (understandably) by the context of world events and the pain he felt over 
Benjamin’s recent suicide and the fact of his own exile:  
 
                                                   
75 This sentiment was actually echoed by Breton himself in the years following the war. 
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The only philosophy that can be practiced responsibly in the face of despair is the 
attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint 
of redemption. Knowledge has no light but that shed on the world by redemption: all else 
is reconstruction, mere technique. Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and 
estrange the world, that reveal its fissures and crevices, as indigent and distorted as it will 






overstatement at the time; that school consisted mainly of two individuals, both in exile, who were in close 
correspondence throughout the 1930s.  
How, then, are we to account for this divergence, given their close methodological affinity, and 
especially  since  Adorno’s method  of  “negative  dialectics”  owes  so  much  to Benjamin’s  thinking  about 
melancholy and allegory?  Where, exactly, do they diverge in their concepts of critique?  One possible 
explanation  comes  from  Adorno’s  student,  Jürgen  Habermas,  who  contrasted  Benjamin’s  redemptive 
critique with Adorno’s  ideological  critique  as  two  fundamentally  different  conceptions  of melancholy  as 
method, both drawing their inspiration from Benjamin’s Trauerspiel study.  However, I think we can locate 
another source  for  the difference.    “Looking Back on Surrealism”  is a  lament over what Adorno saw as 
Benjamin’s misguided romance with Surrealism, and it can also be read as an epilogue to the well -known 
exchange of correspondence between Benjamin and Adorno in the late 1930s (while Adorno was living in 
America).  The so-called Adorno-Benjamin debate deals centrally with the question of whether, and how, 
avant-garde techniques (like montage) can be transposed into a research method like the one Benjamin 
was carrying out in the Arcades project.  But another issue much-discussed in the 1930s, a matter of 
contention, was the more general question of aesthetic autonomy and its conflict with the anti-art 
aesthetic  of  the  avant  garde.    Surrealist works,  Benjamin wrote, were  not  “literature.”    The  function  of 
critique  for Benjamin  is  to  “mortify”  the  work  so  as  to  “transpose  it  from  the medium of  beauty  to  the 
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medium of truth – and  thereby  to  redeem  it.”    As  a  chapter  in  the  history  of modernist  aesthetics,  the 
Benjamin-Adorno debate of the 1930s deserves all the attention  it has  received.  Adorno’s 1955 essay 
revisits  the  debate  over  aesthetic  autonomy.    Responding  to  Benjamin’s  anti-art and revolutionary 
tendencies in a letter to Benjamin written in 1937, Adorno claimed that Nietzsche is more “revolutionary” 
than Bakunin;76 at another point in their correspondence, he urges Benjamin to focus his energies on a 
study of Mallarmé (rather than waste his time, presumably, in the company of Bertolt Brecht).  One thing 
Adorno does not criticize Surrealism  for,  in  “Looking Back on Surrealism,”  is  its  status as an aesthetic 
movement.   In fact, he takes its anti-art aesthetic to task for aspiring to the condition of science, for trying 
to replace the conventional bourgeois notion of art with an equally problematic scientism.   So Adorno’s 
essay indicates one possible trajectory that their debate might have taken had it resumed in the 1950s.  
What would a Surrealist aesthetic look like, in which art does not simply “batter its own foundations” (as 
Adorno  puts  it  in  the  “Looking  Back”  essay)  and  instead  re-affirms its autonomy from disenchanted 
science and philosophy and in defiance of the realm of conceptual?   
We are given some indication of what it might look like in Adorno’s “The Essay as Form,” a short 
piece that gradually took shape between 1954 and 1958.  It was written during the same period he was 
writing “Looking Back on Surrealism,” and it stands as something of a companion piece.  “The Essay as 
Form”  outlines Adorno’s  vision  of  what  a Surrealist  aesthetic might  look  like – an aesthetic that is not 
“explained” in terms of philosophy, but which nevertheless must be understood in a philosophical context.  
Here is Adorno on essayism as an aesthetic alternative, a melancholy and “open form” alternative, to the 
bias of “identarian” thinking that has long dominated philosophy: 
 
The essay does not obey the rules of the game of organized science and theory that, 
following  Spinoza’s  principle,  the  order  of  things  is  identical  with  that  of  ideas  …  the 
essay does not strive for closed, deductive or inductive construction.  It revolts above all 
against the doctrine – deeply rooted since Plato – that the changing and ephemeral is 
unworthy of philosophy; against that ancient injustice toward the transitory.” (158) 
                                                   
76 Adorno’s  comment may  be  in  response  to  an  observation  in Benjamin’s 1928 essay  on Surrealism: 
“Since Bakunin, Europe has lacked a radical concept of  freedom.  The Surrealists have one.   They are 
the first to liquidate the sclerotic-liberal-moral-humanistic ideal of freedom.”  
 73 
 
Adorno makes a point of naming Benjamin as among the great practitioners of the essay form – with the 
implication that perhaps his true calling was not philosophy, but the experimental and artistic medium of 
the essay.  We also see in “The Essay as Form” a continuation of the dialogue with Benjamin, along with 
more traces of the same barely concealed sense of frustration that manifests itself   in “Looking Back on 
Surrealism.” Carrying on a central  theme of  “Looking Back on Surrealism,”  there  is more critique of  the 
avant-garde flirtation with scientism.   Adorno  is especially concerned with art’s aspiration  to be science 
and to makes scientific criteria its standard: 
 
When technique is made absolute in the art-work; when construction becomes total, 
eliminating what motivates it and what resists it, expression; when art claims to be 
science and makes scientific criteria its standard, it sanctions a crude preartistic 
manipulation  of  raw  material  as  devoid  of  meaning  as  all  the  talk  about  “Being”  in 
philosophical seminars. (155-56)   
 
Once more, we see a continuation of Adorno’s critique of Benjamin’s concept of melancholy as method.  
His concept of this philosophical tendency, as evidenced in this passage, here encompasses a wide 
range of targets – and it includes, perhaps surprisingly, a sharp rebuke to Benjamin in the revisited 
context of  their  earlier debate  in  the 1930s.   The allusion  to Heidegger  is unambiguous  (the  “jargon of 
authenticity”  would  become  the  title  of  Adorno’s  book-length critique of Heidegger).  Here, however, 
Adorno seems to take issue with Benjamin’s unwitting lapse into the positivism that he thought he was 
rejecting.  The reference to Benjamin becomes more clear as Adorno aligns his critique of the jargon of 
authenticity with what he identifies as the positivist impulse underlying Benjamin’s redemptive criticism: 
 
Out of the violence that image and concept do to one another in such writings springs the 
jargon of authenticity in which words tremble as though possessed, while remaining 
secretive about that which possesses them. The ambitious transcendence of language 
beyond its meaning results in a meaninglessness that can easily be seized upon by a 
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positivism to which one thinks oneself superior; and yet, one falls victim to positivism 
precisely through that meaninglessness that positivism criticizes and which one shares 
with it. (155) 
 
The  association  with  Heidegger  would  have  been  just  as  much  of  a  shock  to  Benjamin  as  Adorno’s 
equation of his Surrealism with the Neue Sachlichkeit.  One thing Adorno and Benjamin shared in the 
1930s was a deep aversion to the philosophy of Heidegger.  Benjamin is being informed, by his closest 
friend, that he was an unwitting “victim” of a tendency of thought to which he “thought himself superior.”  
However, we also see something more than a sharp critique in “The Essay as Form”; we are also 
shown a powerful alternative to disenchanted thinking in the essay, which Adorno holds up as a viable 
mode of resistance to various forms of positivism that result from disenchantment.  Adorno contrasts the 
essay as a mode of inquiry with  the  methods  sanctioned  by  disenchanted  positivism:  “Instead  of 
achieving something scientifically, or creating something artistically,” Adorno observes, “the effort of the 
essay reflects a childlike freedom that catches  fire, without scruple, on what others have already done” 
(153-54).  Here Adorno comes as close as he ever would to a Nietzschean (if not quite Dionysian) 
concept  of  aesthetic  free  play  and  joyous  embrace  of  mere  appearance.    The  “childlike  freedom,” 
moreover,  sounds  like  a  version  of  Kant’s  concept  of  the  “free  play  of  the  imagination”  in  his  earlier 
argument for aesthetic autonomy in the Critique of Judgment.  So while Adorno avoids the avant-garde 
search for unmediated experience and the reversion to positivism to which Benjamin and Surrealism fell 
victim, Adorno himself reverts to a transgressive logic that he criticizes in the avant-garde and ties his 
defense of aesthetic autonomy to the philosophical project of registering resistance to instrumental 
reason. While Adorno contrasts the “childlike freedom” of the essay with both instrumental reason and the 
“suffering  countenance”  of  the  autonomous work  of  art,  he  still  conceives  of  the  essay  in  terms  of  its 
essentially passive resistance to instrumental reason. 
While Adorno can claim that the essay “silently abandons the illusion that thought can break out 
of thesis into physis, out of culture into nature,” and that the essay as  form undermines and challenges 
the notion of unmediated experience, Adorno still requires the notion of a temporal truth revealed 
negatively in the form of a trace (159).  “If truth has in fact a temporal core, then the full historical content 
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becomes an integral moment in truth” (158).  The critical work of the essay also has the negative function 
of revealing the truth content of the “object” (and once again, the “object” of critique whose truth value is 
revealed  is  ambiguously  defined):    “The  law  of  the  innermost  form  of  the  essay  is  heresy.    By 
transgressing the orthodoxy of thought, something becomes visible  in  the object which  it  is orthodoxy’s 
secret purpose  to keep concealed”  (170).   After rejecting the transgressive logic of Surrealism, Adorno 
adopts something like this logic himself – the essay is an anti-epistemic mode of expression.  Heresy, 
however, allows  little actual  freedom for the essay other than resistance and transgression. “The Essay 
as Form”  also  indicates some of  the  limits of Adorno’s concept of essay as  a  vehicle of what he calls 
“ideology  critique.”  The essay’s  critical  function  requires  for  its  full  legibility  a  certain  kind  of  critical 
interpretation, and we are thus thrown back into philosophy – Adorno’s philosophy of “immanent criticism” 
based  on  the  practice  of  “determinate  negation.”    The  ongoing  practice of immanent criticism, or the 
“dialectical  enlightenment  of  enlightenment,”  as  Adorno  calls  it,  “discloses  each  image  as  script.  It 
teaches us to read from [the image's] features the admission of falseness which cancels its power and 
hands it over to  truth”  (Dialectic of Enlightenment 18). Adorno  essay  as  form  that  “the  essay  thinks  in 
fragments, just as reality itself is fragmentary” (25).  This reads as a version of Benjamin’s statement that 
"Allegory is in the realm of thought what ruins are in the realm of things" (Origin 178). Why, however, 
must there be a correlation? The heretical function of the essay, in the end, serves the narrow interests of 
the immanent criticism that is required for the disclosure of truth in the form of the essay (the form that, for 
Adorno, defines the essay’s function ahead of time).  In perhaps the most blunt statement of his concept 
of  the essay  in  the service of  ideological critique, Adorno writes  that  “the essay  remains what  it always 
was, the critical form par excellence; specifically, it constructs the immanent criticism of cultural artifacts, 
and it confronts that which such artifacts are with their concept; it is the critique of ideology” (166).  
There is a parallel, for Adorno, between the critical function of art more generally and the critical 
function of the essay (always in the context of disenchantment).  Why is aesthetic autonomy important for 
Adorno?   On Adorno’s account, autonomy  is necessary because  it gives art  the distance  from which  it 
can register its own embeddedness within disenchanted modernity and to become what he calls the 
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“social antithesis of society” (Aesthetic Theory 8).77  For Adorno, the autonomy of art is not absolute, but 
dialectical – and autonomy is both “necessary and illusory.”  Adorno wants Nietzschean free play, but he 
wants  it  to  serve  a  predetermined  function  in  response  to  what  he  calls  (in  “Essay  as  Form”)  “the 
reification against which it is the function of functionless art, even today, to raise its own however mute 
and objectified protest.”  This is not exactly a rallying cry for creative artists, let alone essayists, and it is 
quite far from any notion of annihilating the universe or forcing anyone to revise their universe.   In spite of 
his  appeal  to Nietzsche, Adorno’s  thinking also  lies  some  distance  from Nietzsche’s  notion  of  art  and 
aesthetic autonomy (as an alternative to the epistemic Will to Truth).78  From a Nietzschean point of view, 
perhaps  the  most  serious  problem  with  Adorno’s  account  of  the  essay  is  that  while  he  claims that 
essayism occupies a place between science and art, it is still – in the end – dedicated to the critical 
project of disclosing “truth” (albeit negatively).   The essay is defined by its dialectical obligations, which – 
being a property of its form – means the essayist cannot even feel his own efforts as the performance of a 
heroic duty (such as “raising a protest”).   
The result is a non-visionary and rather bleak image of modernism that has come to be 
associated, almost stereotypically, with the figure of Adorno.  Peter Sloterdijk, for example, writes of 
Adorno’s  “a priori pain.”   We are  left with a keen sense of  the  failure of  avant-garde aspirations and a 
lucid analysis of its ideological delusions, but without any sense at all of a visionary alternative to the 
object of critique and the situation that is supposed to inspire our protest.79  In the closing lines of Nadja, 
André  Breton  famously  declares  that  “beauty  must  be  convulsive,  or  it  will  not  be.”    Adorno,  it  often 
seems, would really prefer the latter option.  Adorno’s versions of Benjamin and Nietzsche may be more 
philosophically responsible, but they may also inspire a nostalgia for earlier efforts and their misguided 
but nevertheless liberating (and visionary) lack of rigor. 
                                                   
77 Adorno writes elsewhere, in a Kantian  vein,  that  “insofar as a social function can be predicated for 
artworks, it is their functionlessness” (Aesthetic Theory 227). 
78 See Karin Bauer (1999) for an extended treatment of the relationship between Nietzsche and Adorno.  
79 Adorno’s critique of Benjamin should be read as part of his larger critique of the avant garde anti-art 
aesthetic (from a modernist vantage point).  Adorno is a modernist critic of the avant garde and its various 
fantasies of unmediated access to the Real as well as the equation of art with life (what Surrealists called 
“lyric behavior”).  Andréas Huyssens summarizes this role perfectly: 
 [I]f  the main goal of the historical avant-garde was the reintegration of art into life, a 
heroic attempt that failed, then Adorno is not a theorist of the avant-garde, but a theorist 
of  modernism.  More  than  that,  he  is  a  theorist  of  a  construct  ‘modernism’  which  has 
already digested the failure of the historical avant-garde. (in Gibson & Rubin 39) 
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One thing Adorno does give us in “The Essay as Form,” as we have seen, is a clear and even 
inspiring profile of an alternative response to the disenchantment of modernity, something like a counter-
narrative  to Benjamin’s Trauerspiel.    It  is no accident  that  the advent of  the essay and modern English 
prose (inspired by the example of Montaigne) should have produced so many oddly experimental 
treatises on melancholy.  (Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy is the most famous, but by no means the first 
to appear.)  One historical reason for the early modern interest in the subject of melancholy was simply 
the stimulus of Ficino’s ideas as they were introduced into the rest of Europe, where they were adapted 
and secularized and took many different recognizably modern forms.  It is worth emphasizing both the 
formal aspects and the historical dimension of Adorno’s account of the essay, if only to appreciate why 
Montaigne’s  essays  represent  a  radically  different  vision  of  modernity  that  would  draw  the  notice  of 
Nietzsche and Emerson and so many others in search of something more than a forum for expressing a 
“mute  and  objectified  protest.”    I  do  think  the  essay  is  a  good  model  for  thinking  about  the  kind  of 
autonomy that interested modernist artists (i.e., a mode of expression that represents an alternative to 
epistemic interests of disenchanted modernity).  I also think the essay is a good model for thinking about 
melancholy itself as a site for artistic experimentation, a non-essentialist model requiring no theoretical a 
priori definition of “melancholy.”   In “The Essay as Form,” Adorno makes a strong case for the combined 
qualities of aesthetic autonomy, experimental discursive play, and an aesthetic abstraction that refuses to 
equate art with life.  But we need a much different concept of the aesthetic as an alternative to 
philosophical values, as well as a different argument for why we might want aesthetic autonomy – a fully 
Nietzschean, visionary concept of essay as a mode of value creation, one that does not limit the essay’s 
function to critique and the registering of contradictions and reminders of our objective unfreedom. 
Another case can, in fact, be made for the essay and for the aesthetic autonomy of essayism.  In the next 
chapter, we will change course a bit and begin to trace a different proto-modernist trajectory in James and 





Chapter Two: Revery as Experimental Writing: The Melancholy 
Modernism of William James 
 
Our normal waking consciousness is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of 
screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different.  We may go through life without suspecting their existence, but 
apply the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all their completeness. 
 
    William James, Varieties of Religious Experience (307-08) 
 
If there were such a thing as inspiration from a higher realm, it might well be that the neurotic temperament would furnish the chief 
condition of the requisite receptivity. 
 
    William James, Varieties of Religious Experience (31) 
 
If it can be done then why do it? 
Gertrude Stein, Lectures in America  
 
 
I concluded Chapter One on perhaps more of a melodramatic than a melancholy note, with a brief 
bid to restore something of an historical crisis narrative highlighting what was at stake in these versions of 
experimental melancholy as well as providing a context that I think is more closely in tune with the way 
modernists themselves understood their own period-defining moment in history (as well as their keen 
sense of what that moment demanded of them). The various modernist accounts of Panofsky, Benjamin, 
Nietzsche and others capture the many facets – philosophical, aesthetic, cultural – of what many 
modernists viewed as a single historical and cultural phenomenon. It was the historical moment they 
inherited.  Epistemic disenchantment also gives us a context for appreciating a defining aspect of 
modernism that we perhaps have the hardest time relating to: the rather quaint-sounding idea that art can 
represent a “live option” for responding to such a broad cultural crisis, and not just register one’s dissent 
or alienation or a melancholy opting out.  It is no surprise that Proust and the Surrealist movement would 
have been seen as important resources for this project of dealing with the philosophical disenchantment 
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of modernity (for Adorno, as it was in a different way for Benjamin).80 Although there is ample evidence 
that modernist artists as well as early twentieth-century philosophers viewed their historical position in this 
way, my purpose in this study is not simply to restore the drama of this narrative (or perhaps inject a little 
melodrama) as a pretext for offering yet another historical account of modernism as a heroic response to 
a crisis of value that is, in many respects, an earlier manifestation of a crisis we face in our progress-
obsessed culture.  We have made little progress in taking our response to the myth of progress beyond 
the level of lucid critique.  Modernist artists and philosophers tried to establish new ways of valuing the 
world, and that is reason enough to pay close attention to their efforts. 
The term “live option” is one that I borrow from William James, an almost exact contemporary of 
Nietzsche;  it  first  appears  in  “The Will  to  Believe,”  his  1896  essay  with  a  Nietzschean  title.   To view 
modernism in this prospective way – as a live option for us, as harboring a revolutionary potential and a 
promise as yet unrealized – is to adopt a stance that is entirely typical of James and his own brand of 
forward-looking modernism.  There are obvious reasons, and some not so obvious, for including him in 
this study alongside Nietzsche and Benjamin.  James is the author of a key modernist text on melancholy, 
the  “Sick Soul” chapter of Varieties of Religious Experience, a book  that  is  the  culmination of James’s 
lifelong interest in temperamental  types  and  what  he  called  “total  reactions  upon  life.”  James’s 
idiosyncratic approach to melancholy is as important as Freud’s theory and just as radical, in its own way, 
as Benjamin’s and Nietzsche’s.   
In Chapter One, I juxtaposed the image of Benjamin’s “angel of history” with the allegorical figure 
of  Zarathustra  as  two  emblematic  modernist  versions  of  Dürer’s  iconic  image.    So  what  “image”  of 
modernist heroism do we find in James, and how does he fit within that history?  Well, we would have to 
appeal to the image of James himself – a  representative of an experimental attitude that champions, in 
one gesture, the will to make it new, and what is powerless and lies at the margins.  And while there are 
striking similarities in their motives for reconceiving melancholy, and in the almost identical way in which 
they diagnose the illness they saw within their culture, Nietzsche and James nevertheless envision quite 
different paths to recovery and project different ideals of heroism.  Nietzsche’s  ideal of a value-creating 
                                                   
80 See Roger Foster’s Adorno: The Recovery of Experience for an exceptionally clear recent account of 
this early twentieth-century philosophical interest in experimental art against the backdrop of Weberian 
disenchantment.   
 80 
genius is the Overman, the individual who overcomes his melancholy by transforming it into a source of 
power. Nietzsche compares his ideal genius, on more than one occasion, to a bird of prey.  In Ecce 
Homo, his final experiment in writing the self by means of performative self-erasure, Nietzsche presents 
himself  as  an  exemplary  convalescent,  describing  himself  also  as  “a  destiny”  and  as  “dynamite”  in 
language that is provocative but somehow at the farthest remove from egotism.  In James, there is 
nothing remotely like this dramatic, self-performing rhetoric. James would never have described himself 
as a “destiny.”  If we want to think of James himself as an exemplary heroic figure, then he offers us the 
image of the affable and “adorable genius,” as Alfred North Whitehead described him; a genius, but one 
wholly free of predatory instincts. If Nietzsche is the hyperbolic and visionary prophet of modernism, then 
James is the benevolent patron saint who often seems engaged in a prescient and unconscious effort to 
set the entire modernist endeavor off on the right foot.   
Another reason for placing James in the company of Nietzsche and Benjamin is the fact that 
James was also born under the sign of Saturn and struggled throughout his life to overcome a 
melancholy disposition and the threat of a paralyzing despair to which he frequently succumbed. Here is 
the  iconic  passage  on  the  epileptic  patient  from  the  “Sick  Soul”  chapter  of  Varieties of Religious 
Experience, presented as the loosely paraphrased testimony of an unnamed correspondent, which we 
now know is a disguised account of James’s own personal experience:81 
 
Whilst in this state of philosophic pessimism and general depression of spirits about my 
prospects, I went one evening into a dressing-room in the twilight to procure some article 
that was there; when suddenly there fell upon me without any warning, just as if it came 
out of the darkness, a horrible fear of my own existence. Simultaneously there arose in 
my mind the image of an epileptic patient whom I had seen in the asylum, a black-haired 
youth with greenish skin, entirely idiotic, who used to sit all day on one of the benches, or 
rather shelves against the wall, with his knees drawn up against his chin, and the coarse 
gray undershirt, which was his only garment, drawn over them inclosing his entire figure. 
                                                   
81 For more on evidence for the claim that James was admitted as a patient at McClean Hospital, see 
Howard Feinstein, Becoming William James (306)  and Louis Menand’s  article  “Wiliam  James  and  the 
Case of the Epileptic Patient.” 
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He sat there like a sort of sculptured Egyptian cat or Peruvian mummy, moving nothing 
but his black eyes and looking absolutely non-human. This image and my fear entered 
into a species of combination with each other. That shape am I, I felt, potentially.  Nothing 
that I possess can defend me against that fate, if the hour for it should strike for me as it 
struck for him. There was such a horror of him, and such a perception of my own merely 
momentary discrepancy from him, that it was as if something hitherto solid within my 
breast gave way entirely, and I became a mass of quivering fear. After this the universe 
was changed for me altogether. I awoke morning after morning with a horrible dread at 
the pit of my stomach, and with a sense of the insecurity of life that I never knew before, 
and that I have never felt since. It was like a revelation; and although the immediate 
feelings passed away, the experience has made me sympathetic with the morbid feelings 
of others ever since. (149-50) 
 
The fact that this is a first-person account of James’s own experience hardly comes as a revelation given 
what we know about James, who (earlier in the same chapter) explicitly identifies himself with the “Sick 
Soul” or melancholy temperament.  This is one of many passages in James that we might invoke in order 
to form an image of James as, among other things, the ideally responsive abnormal psychologist.  It is the 
process of “entering into a species of combination” that is modeled here; we are asked to identify not with 
the patient, but with the observer who witnesses the patient.  If there is any explanatory significance to 
James’s self-identification as a melancholy or “Sick Soul” type, then it must also recognize this power to 
identify with and “enter into a species of combination” with other possible orientations – an empathy that 
is achieved, paradoxically, through a certain kind of abstraction and, in the case of the epileptic patient, 
through a Benjaminian reduction to the non-human and creaturely:  “That shape am  I.”   The passage  is 
one example of what Isabelle Stengers likely meant when she observed that James’s entire career was a 
“deliberate project of the ‘depsychologization’ of experience in the usual sense of conscious, intentional 
experience” (Stengers 202 [translation slightly modified]). 
The correspondent (who we know is James) goes on to relate how he was sustained during this 
crisis period with the aid of certain lines of religious text, which he “clings” to as isolated fragments and 
 82 
repeatable patterns of language:  “[T]he fear was so invasive and powerful that if I had not clung to 
scripture-texts like 'The eternal God is my refuge,' etc., 'Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy-
laden,' etc., 'I am the resurrection and the life,' etc., I think I should have grown really insane" (151).   But 
the crisis James experienced at this stage in his life (and continued to experience later in life) was more 
philosophical than theological, as James himself acknowledged.82  The philosophical problems of his time 
represented, for James, existential crises in the most personal sense, potential causes of despair.  There 
is  a  connection  between  James’s  search  for  what  he  called  a  “less  objectionable  empiricism”  and  his 
battle against the nihilistic despair that he saw as the logical result of contemporary naturalism and 
determinism, what he called  the  “sadness  that  lies at  the heart of every merely positivistic, agnostic, or 
naturalistic scheme of philosophy”  (132).  Taking James’s cue  that every philosophy  is a  “total  reaction 
upon life,” we might also say that James’s personal lifelong struggle to convert melancholy into a powerful 
mode of attention to the fragmentary and the particular has some connection with what Whitehead called 
James’s lifelong “protest against the dismissal of experience in the interest of system” (a protest in which 
Benjamin and Nietzsche were also engaged)83 (Whitehead 3).  While this creaturely empathy and 
identification with the weak and the powerless may tempt us to read James as more akin to Benjamin, 
perhaps  even  go  so  far  as  to  idealize  James  as  the  “anti-Nietzsche,”  it  is  more  accurate  to  say  that 
James’s  experimental  concept  of  melancholy  has  the  virtue  of  combining  what is most radical in 
                                                   
82 “I had a crisis ... which was more philosophical than theological....  Why God waits on our cooperation 
is not to be fathomed—but as a fact of experience I believe it”  (Correspondence 489). 
 
83 Here is a well-known expression of this attitude, from a letter James wrote to a friend in 1899: 
 
I am against bigness and greatness in all their forms, and with the invisible molecular 
moral forces that work from individual to individual, stealing in through the crannies of the 
world like so many soft rootlets, or like the capillary oozing of water, and yet rending the 
hardest monuments of man’s pride,  if you give  them time. The bigger the unit you deal 
with, the hollower, the more brutal, the more mendacious is the life displayed. So I am 
against all big organizations as such, national ones first and foremost; against all big 
successes and big results; and in favor of the eternal forces of truth which always work in 
the individual and immediately unsuccessful way, under-dogs always, till history comes, 
after they are long dead, and puts them on top.—You need take no notice of these 
ebullitions of spleen, which are probably quite unintelligible to anyone but myself. (The 
Letters of William James vol. 2  90) 
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Nietzsche’s  therapeutic  recovery  with what  is  ethically  appealing  in Benjamin’s quite different  recovery 
project.84  
In this chapter, I will try to approach from a different angle the general question I posed in 
Chapter One, and consider what it might mean to take James and his thinking about melancholy as 
offering one image of modernism itself as an experimental endeavor.  More than any of their 
contemporaries, James and Nietzsche give us an image of modernism as a heroic response to a crisis of 
value within their culture, an image that also helps to establish the now-familiar narrative of modernism as 
a heroic recovery from illness into health.  The way James and Nietzsche conceive of melancholy is 
important, among other reasons, because it allows us to appreciate how their version of that recovery 
narrative stands apart from the emerging discourse on decadence and the pseudo-science of 
temperamental and pathological types that defined the period in a different way. (Gertrude Stein and 
Wittgenstein were  among  the many enthusiastic  readers of Otto Weininger’s notoriously  influential Sex 
and Character.) The way they treat melancholy as a cultural and philosophical concern tells us much 
about how they stand out from their contemporaries and how they offer significantly different versions of 
modernist experimentation and of modernism itself as an endeavor. What we also get from them is the 
clarity of a first-generation diagnosis of problems that give a sense of urgency and world-historical 
significance  to  modernism  itself.    Nietzsche’s  aestheticism  was  a  clarion  call  and  something  of  a 
confidence booster for artists at the turn of the century who were empowered with a new sense that their 
art could represent a deep challenge to their culture, and that artists could do something other than 
occupy a place at its margins where they were locked in a symbiotic relationship with the values they 
                                                   
84 As early as the “Dilemma of Determinism” (1884), James seems to anticipate two different “types” of 
answers to the challenge of nihilism that correspond in a rather  uncanny  way  to  Benjamin’s  and 
Nietzsche’s  experimental  concepts  of  melancholy.    Here  is  James’s  purely  hypothetical  account  of 
Nietzsche’s  amor fati and embrace of forgetting as a liberation from the past: “The  only  deterministic 
escape from pessimism is everywhere  to abandon  the  judgement of  regret  […] Thus, our deterministic 
pessimism may become a deterministic optimism at  the price of  extinguishing our  judgments of  regret” 
(Writings, 1879-1898  581).  
James,  however,  rejects  this  “ostrich-like forgetfulness.”  James’s  argument  against  reductive 
determinism and in defense of a form free will, an argument premised on the idea that we can  imagine 
things having turned out otherwise, sounds more like a Benjaminian ethics of attention that recognizes 
the “use” of regret: “Its use is to quicken our sense of what the irretrievably lost is.  When we think of it as 
that which might have been (‘the saddest words of tongue or pen’), the quality of its worth speaks to us 
with a wilder sweetness; and, conversely, the dissatisfaction wherewith we think of what seems to have 
driven it from its natural place gives us the severer pang” (Writings, 1879-1898  581). 
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opposed.  As proto-modernists James and Nietzsche define the mission of modernist art in ways that are 
historically  important  for  the  generation  that  would  follow.  Benjamin’s  reference  to  “pragmatic 
aestheticism” may not be a reference to James or to American pragmatism, but it does refer to an early 
modernist aestheticism that Nietzsche (and to some extent James) had already developed, an effort to 
challenge an epistemic culture and locate value in forms of power that are not commensurate with a Will 
to Truth.  
One thing I will not attempt to do is to argue for James’s equal or even comparable significance in 
terms of historical impact.  It is difficult, though not impossible, to conceive of early twentieth-century 
modernism  without  Nietzsche.  The  same  cannot  be  said  of  James’s  impact  outside  of  American 
modernism.  There is, however, a case to be made (and I will try make that case later) for reading James 
and Nietzsche as refracting lenses for the thought of Ralph Waldo Emerson, who was a crucial and 
formative influence for both.  When the time comes to examine that connection more closely, I will be 
interested  less  in  tracing  the  influence  of  Emerson’s  thought  than  in  taking  note  of  how  James  and 
Nietzsche develop their divergent visions of experimental writing (and their versions of modernism) in 
response to a challenge that was framed for them by Emerson.  
The striking parallels in their philosophical positions, and the surprising fact that their thinking 
developed independently in response to a common source of influence, do not make the juxtaposed 
images of James and Nietzsche seem any less odd.  In some respects, it is even more unlikely than the 
pairing of Benjamin and Nietzsche. James we like to think of as the affable iconoclast, the mediating 
temperament who explores extremes and seeks a middle way, whose role model was not only the radical 
Emerson but also the sensible moralist John Stuart Mill (a philosopher whom Nietzsche famously 
ridiculed).  Many critics have felt some need to  argue for the radical import of James’s thought by placing 
him in the company of Nietzsche and drawing attention to what they share philosophically, if not 
stylistically.  But there is also the unavoidable fact that even if we do place James in such company, most 
of the time James simply does not sound as radical.  We do not find in James anything like the dramatic 
and provocative language of Benjamin or Nietzsche:  No radical-sounding  utterances  like  Benjamin’s 
“truth is the death of subjective intention” or Nietzsche’s “it  is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that the 
universe is justified.”   Indeed, one reason I have for placing James in close company with Nietzsche (as 
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well as Benjamin and Freud) is to argue for the world-historical significance of his transformation of 
melancholy, a significance that he never proclaimed in the melodramatic language we find almost 
everywhere in Nietzsche.  It is not just that James gives us a more “agreeable” version of Nietzsche, free 
of the hyperbolic excesses and missteps, a kinder and gentler version of the Will to Power.  I want to 
argue that there are fundamental similarities that constitute a shared ground and common point of 
departure, and try to show that James envisions a viable version of modernism that represents an 
important alternative to Nietzsche’s. I have to make the case for James’s radical thought, in other words, 
while noting how he parts company with Nietzsche.  And one question I want to begin to address in this 
chapter is how a shared set of philosophical premises, and similarly conceived approaches to 
melancholy, can lead to such different visions of experimental writing.  
When we move beyond obvious differences in rhetoric to the question of what actually goes on in 
their writing and how they conceive of the task of writing itself, then we begin to recognize in James 
evidence of the same generative paradoxes that define the thinking of Nietzsche and Benjamin at its most 
radical.  Consider the epigraphs that appear at the head of this chapter.  We do not need to contemplate 
them very long in order to realize how ambiguous they sound.  The language is conditional and 
subjunctive  in mood, giving us  literally a  “feeling of  ‘if.’”85 James recognizes neurosis as furnishing the 
conditions for  “receptivity.”    We  do  not  suspect  the  existence  of  these  vaguely  defined  states  of 
consciousness; they emerge only if we apply  the  “requisite  stimulus.”    Ambiguity  also  attaches  to  the 
experimental qualities with which we associate James – the call  for a  “reinstatement of  the vague,”  for 
example, and his idealizing of the “ever not quite”86 might begin to sound like a defense of indecisiveness 
and a harboring of possibilities over choice and action, a call for vaguely suggestive ideas in place of 
clearly defined programs for taking action.  Even the term “live option” can vaguely imply an idealizing of 
options recognized only in the interest of keeping them open (not acting on them keeps them alive).  
                                                   
85 I am referring here, of course,  to  the  famous passage  in  “The Stream of Consciousness” chapter of 
Principles of Psychology on “transitive” versus “substantive” states of mind (Writings, 1878-1899 162). 
86 The  phrase  comes  from  one  of  James’s  last  published  articles,  which  appeared  under  the  title:  “A 
Pluralistic Mystic.” 
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Stein’s  well-known quip may come to sound a little more ambiguous when placed alongside these 
passages quoted from James.87 
The same paradoxes  reside at  the core of Nietzsche’s  idealizing of  individual heroism, whether 
he speaks in the first or third person.  For two philosophers so closely associated with a will to power and 
a pragmatic  “metaphysics of action,” such passages may sound more  like advertisements  for passivity.  
There is also in Nietzsche a deceptively pro-active-sounding, almost formulaic listing of specific qualities 
identified as conditions for something to happen (or, as Nietzsche writes, the preconditions):  
 
Order of rank among capacities; distance; the art of dividing without making inimical; 
mixing up nothing,  “reconciling” nothing; a  tremendous multiplicity which  is nonetheless 
the opposite of chaos – this has been the precondition, the protracted secret labor and 
artistic working of my instinct.  The magnitude of its higher protection was shown in the 
fact that I have at no time had the remotest idea what was growing within me – that all my 
abilities one day leapt forth suddenly ripe, in their final perfection … No trace of struggle 
can be discovered in my life, I am the opposite of a heroic nature.  To want something, to 
“strive”  after  something,  to  have  a  “goal,”  a  “wish”  in  view  – I know none of this from 
experience. (Basic Writings 710) 
 
Thus speaks the author of Zarathustra, presenting himself in Ecce Homo (“Behold  the  Man”)  as an 
example of the kind of heroic activity he wants us to emulate. But beyond these carefully articulated 
conditions for action, what is it that we are actually supposed to do?  Nietzsche gives us no practical 
directions to follow. The heroism idealized here  reads  something  like  an  inversion  of  Aristotle’s Great 
                                                   
87 And  Stein’s  rhetorical  question  perhaps ought to be read in light of James, and specifically in the 
original context of the essay in Lectures in America, where it appears at the close of a passage describing 
her dissatisfaction, in her years at Radcliffe College as a psychology student and a student of James, with 
the scientific approach toward cataloguing temperamental types (137-39).  John Ashbery quoted the line 
in a different context, and gave it a different meaning, in his classic 1957 review of Stanzas in Meditation 
titled “The Impossible”:  
Donald Sutherland, who has supplied the introduction for this book, has elsewhere 
quoted Miss Stein as saying, "If it can be done why do it?" Stanzas in Meditation is no 
doubt the most successful of her attempts to do what can't be done, to create a 
counterfeit of reality more real than reality. And if, on laying the book aside, we feel that it 
is still impossible to accomplish the impossible, we are also left with the conviction that it 
is the only thing worth trying to do. (254) 
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Man: Nietzsche’s hero who sees farther than others by virtue of not having a goal or wish in view.  The “I” 
who writes does not even appear as a grammatical agent.  It is his instinct that performs all the labor in 
secret, a labor that is protracted.  It is a repertoire of abilities that do (or did) the leaping forth, and there is 
a pre-emptive mixing of the metaphor with “ripeness,” so that we are not tempted to visualize the decisive 
and goal-directed action of a predator leaping toward its prey. “I know none of this from experience” is a 
running motif throughout Ecce Homo, touching on the Jamesian theme of not suspecting the existence of 
something  as  a  precondition  for  one’s  uncanny  encounter  with some new experience.   But in other 
instances,  the  testimonial  claim  that  “I  know  none  of  this  from  experience”  suggests  that  what  has 
transpired within him is not something he has experienced, but rather an inner transformation that has 
somehow altered the  way  in  which  he  experiences  the  world.    Nietzsche’s  repeated  disavowals  thus 
seem to be part of an effort to establish the limits of knowledge gained through personal experience, or at 
least through one’s personal experience to date.  Nor is the desire to transform one’s experience, wanting 
to transgress the limitations of one’s experience, something we can know from experience (or, in James’s 
terms, it is not something we can know from within the confines of a given state of consciousness, or 
what Wittgenstein called “the limits of my world”).  And then we have the  further  rhetorical paradox that 
raises questions about how a reader is supposed to experience this passage as a form of self-help 
literature, how s/he is to go about following Nietzsche’s example by not wanting to want anything (which 
would include, presumably, the goal-driven activity of working toward improving oneself).  This is 
experimental writing that consciously thematizes philosophical paradox and converts it into a rhythm, a 
texture, and a voice.  But if we try to read this as a form of self-help writing, then the effect of the 
language will likely be, at the same time, both liberating and paralyzing.  Is ripeness really all?  The 
language has the ring of practical advice, but it speaks to us in riddles.  Or we might also say that this 
writing is meant to work upon the reader like a catalyst, with a purely functional status that will not lend 
itself to any interpretation or programmatic paraphrase.  
These philosophical parallels, combined with the differences in the way their writing sounds and 
the way it works, suggest that Nietzsche and James take different approaches toward what is 
fundamentally the same project.  I will look later at passages where James sounds a bit more like 
Nietzsche, and where Nietzsche pursues his project in something like the spirit and even the voice of 
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James.  But as fascinating as these juxtapositions are, even more remarkable given that they developed 
independently of each other, the real reason for treating James and Nietzsche together is to appreciate 




2. Experimental Writing and the How to Stop Doing Philosophy88 
As philosophers, Nietzsche and James have a special significance for modernist experimental art 
that their contemporaries (even Bergson) do not have.  What is that significance, and what does it have to 
do with their role within the history of philosophy?  And if they give us a vague but compelling narrative of 
recovery from illness that is important to modernism, then how far can we press the matter and ask what 
it is, exactly, that we are we recovering from?  I want to highlight a key premise that James and Nietzsche 
share: their desire to overcome traditional philosophy itself, and specifically its preoccupation with the 
epistemic question of justified belief and appeals to what is directly experienced or to clear and distinct 
ideas.  I want to go further and argue that this significance is brought to the fore most clearly in the 
historical context of melancholy and the disenchantment of modernity; and that their significance for 
modernism is that they sought alternatives to these values in aesthetics and thereby gave art a 
revolutionary aim and a world-historical mission it did not have before. It was philosophers like Nietzsche 
and James who instilled in the following generation an idea of experimental art as an actual challenge to 
the dominance of philosophy and the epistemic concerns dominant within Western philosophy. Nietzsche 
and James usher in a generation of early twentieth century philosophers, as well as artists, who see art 
as having a mandate and a mission, and as offering a real challenge to epistemic values and who see 
philosophy as a kind of therapeutic recovery from cultural problems and from the compulsion to do 
philosophy (as Wittgenstein diagnosed it). Nietzsche is far more explicit (and hyperbolic) than James in 
his pursuit of this aim, but James also envisions an aesthetic alternative to the epistemic crisis of value.  
                                                   
88 “The real discovery is the one which enables me to stop doing philosophy when I want to. The one that 
gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself into question” 
(Philosophical Investigations section 133). 
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What then is the task of this philosophical literature that Nietzsche and James envision, a 
literature that overcomes and effects a transformation of philosophy itself?  Such a literature is charged 
with the task of doing something in the therapeutic sense; it cannot simply function as a vehicle for 
elaborating on philosophical themes or for carrying out the usual business of philosophy.  It is the writing 
itself,  and  not  the  “ideas,”  that  must provide the challenge to an idea-dominated culture. This also 
presents a challenge for us: for while we need to keep in view the philosophical context that determines 
the stakes, we also need to be able to recognize how they work their way beyond philosophical concerns 
so that we appreciate what this writing accomplishes (as well as what it fails to accomplish).  I will try to 
show that one thing it does accomplish is the conversion of philosophy into something like a modernist 
art, and experimental writing into a kind of therapeutic practice. 
 
First, though, we need some context for understanding the desire to overcome philosophy as a 
pressing need for an entire culture, outside of the narrow discipline of philosophy.  So what does it mean 
to  “overcome epistemology”?    The  desire  to  stop  doing philosophy may  be motivated  by  the  desire  to 
“give  philosophy  peace”  (as  Wittgenstein  put  it),  but  historically  it  has  also  been  motivated  by  an 
impatience and some measure of shame over its inability to move beyond the starting gates of its 
uncertainty about its own methods, so that philosophy can begin its real work and make some tangible 
progress on the model of the progressive activity of scientists and artists.   Philosophy, almost since its 
beginning, has sought to overcome the position of critical self-doubt and the basic questions which it has 
not been able to move beyond.   It is somewhat ironic that philosophers, members of a profession that is 
not so much self-loathing as constantly looking for ways to move beyond the mind-forged manacles of 
philosophical problems so that they can make some real progress like other disciplines (and get on with 
the work of philosophy on the progressive model of science!).  But that critical work has been self 
corrosive and self undermining,  and  overcoming  skepticism  means  turning  that  “nervousness”  about 
empirically justified knowledge (as James put it) into a method of inquiry – namely, into the progressive 
activity of empirical science.   Paradoxically, one of the most successful attempts to overcome philosophy 
has also been the movement most responsible for locking epistemological values in place within the 
culture.  Empiricism has long been fueled by a desire to disavow its status as a natural philosophy and 
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allow itself to become absorbed into the more progressive sciences (the “harder” the science, the better). 
Scientific empiricism, with its obsessive concern for procedural validity, offers a vivid example of how 
philosophy has held itself captive by posing questions it cannot answer.89  Philosophy has spent much of 
its energy, up until today, trying to break free of its mind-forged manacles, to free itself from an endless 
cycle of self-doubt. 
It should therefore come as no surprise that philosophers are in a special position to give some of 
the clearest accounts of overcoming epistemology as a context for modernism.  In his classic essay 
“Overcoming  Epistemology,”  philosopher  Charles  Taylor  gives  one  of  the  clearest  account  of  the 
philosophical effort to abandon and move beyond what Taylor calls “inner-outer” representational thinking 
(what  he  labels  the  “I/O”  model),  the  lingering  “mediational”  frame,  also  known  as  the  scheme/reality 
distinction (2-3).  What Taylor gives us is an account of the project of overcoming epistemology as a 
development that we can locate at a specific historical moment (Taylor does not go so far as to designate 
it a “modernist philosophy,” even though the four philosophers he mentions are contemporaries). Taylor 
singles out four early twentieth-century philosophers – Edmund Husserl, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Martin 
Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty – who “helped to break the thrall of the mediational picture; they 
didn’t just deny it; they worked their way out of it; which meant that they articulated it, and showed it to be 
wrong,  to  need  replacing  by  another  picture”90 (“Merleau-Ponty” 31). The language Taylor uses to 
describe this task of working one’s way out of the paralysis of being held captive by a picture clearly owes 
a lot to Wittgenstein in particular, and to his conception of philosophy as “showing the fly the way out of 
the fly bottle.”   As I hope to show later, this conception of philosophy as a therapeutic practice (and an 
experimental  art)  derives  in  large  part  from  Wittgenstein’s  reading  of James’s  Varieties of Religious 
Experience. 
Taylor also shows how difficult it is to overcome epistemic values, and how versions of 
antifoundational thinking (what Nietzsche called “active nihilism”) can still remain fully within the frame of 
epistemic thinking and retain and reproduce its basic structure.  Put another way, skepticism can have a 
                                                   
89 For a classic account of the psychology of philosophical skepticism from a Wittgensteinian perspective, 
see the opening chapter of Stanley Cavell’s Claim of Reason.  
90 Taylor  alludes  here  to  Wittgenstein’s  “a  picture  held  us  captive”  (Ein Bild hielt uns gefangen) 
(Philosophical Investigations, section  115).  Taylor’s  Wittgensteinian  perspective  on  the  problem  is 
reflected in the title of his essay on Merleau Ponty: “Merleau-Ponty and the Picture of Epistemology.” 
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co-dependent relationship with the picture it denies and the foundations it rejects.  Taylor emphasizes that 
the epistemological crisis was a crisis of value and a crisis of a culture, not just a problem within the 
discipline of philosophy.  This is particularly important for our understanding of modernism, because for 
modernists the cultural dominance of epistemic values was represented by nineteenth-century positivism, 
a radically nihilist form of antifoundational empiricism.  And Taylor observes that we have not fully come 
to terms with the implications of this rejection of epistemology. 
Taylor’s  claim  that  these  early  twentieth-century philosophers overcame epistemology by 
“work[ing]  their way  through”  invokes  the  therapeutic  language  of Wittgenstein, but  Taylor  is  not  clear 
about what kind of “picture” might replace the one that held us captive and what kind of “work” is required 
(and whether that process of working through comes to an end or must be repeated – whether one is 
once-born or twice born,” as James might have put it.)  Taylor suggests that we need a different account 
of belief, “another picture” – which may be true, but that does not begin to deal with the cultural problem 
of locating new values that modernist artists (not to mention Husserl et al) found most pressing.  “Worked 
their way out of it” ... to what?  Taylor emphasizes that while we may have new accounts from Merleau-
Ponty and others, we still have not found a way to deal with the cultural crisis of value.  A new account 
does not address the problem of locating new values. 
One serious limitation of Taylor’s account is that he exemplifies the limitations of a philosophical 
understanding of what the epistemological project is.  In short, Taylor assumes that there are 
philosophical solutions to philosophical problems. Apart from offering a different account than the I/O 
mediational model, of how we form our knowledge of the world interactively, Taylor recognizes the more 
immediate task of dealing with the crisis of value.  And he recognizes two possible responses to the 
question of value that are almost diametrically opposed and may be fundamentally incompatible: the 
Habermassian option (in which this new account makes clear the need for a new concept of rational 
discourse); and the Nietzschean option (in which there is a postmodern, Foucauldian “care of self” art as 
life subjectivism) (“Overcoming” 16-19).  Taylor endorses some form of the former, and in the course of 
doing so he underestimates the significance of Nietzsche. His understanding of Nietzschean aestheticism 
is a postmodern version of Nietzsche, one of many later versions of Nietzsche, but this one is significant 
because Taylor’s  attribution of a postmodern aestheticism to Nietzsche bears little resemblance to the 
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modernist Nietzsche.91 Nietzsche and James are in a real sense the fathers of the movement in 
philosophy that Taylor describes,92 but Taylor does not seem to know what to do with Nietzsche. This is a 
telling omission, because failing to appreciate Nietzsche comes close to a failure to acknowledge 
modernist art as an attempt to address the problem Taylor lays out with such clarity.  Taylor’s  telling 
failure to appreciate Nietzsche is a failure to appreciate modernist art as a response to a crisis of value – 
nihilism is about meaning, not about adequate accounts of how we form our knowledge of the world. 
Nietzsche’s  will  to  power  – though it is problematic, and may be impossible to reconcile and make 
compatible with morality – at least identifies another source of value, however vaguely conceived, as an 
alternative to the will to truth (which, of course, Nietzsche conceives as a value and one manifestation of 
that will to power). 
The story of modernist writing and the recovery from philosophy is a complicated one, but a range 
of options were clear long before the aestheticism of Foucault and the communal rationalism of 
Habermas.  The struggles of James and Nietzsche (which I hope to foreground here) do demonstrate 
how difficult it is to conceive of aesthetic alternatives to these philosophical values (as Taylor 
appreciates).  A real measure of their impact on modernism (Nietzsche’s, and to some extent James’s as 
well) is that they gave art a mission it did not have before.  What inspired artists was not so much their 
philosophy, but their notion that art could challenge the values of a culture.  This would inspire artists with 
a sense of the power of art to challenge and reform an entire culture, just as it would inspire later 
philosophers to try to pursue philosophy in a different way.  This need for alternatives was clear to artists 
who  had  very  little  interest  in  or  understanding  of  the  specifics  of  Nietzsche’s  philosophy  and  who 
understood the crisis in its cultural and psychological manifestations (rather than as a crisis in 
philosophy).  In a quieter way, then, modernist artists of Wittgenstein’s generation were engaged in the 
same task of dealing with this crisis of value by other means.   And unlike philosophers, these artists were 
not at all  interested in refuting it or in demonstrating that this account was “wrong” or in “replacing it with 
                                                   
91 We have (thankfully) moved beyond the tactic, still popular at the time  Taylor  wrote  “Overcoming 
Epistemology,” of  labeling everything congenial  to our  interests as  “postmodern” with  the  implication of 
having overcome a straw-man notion of modernism.   Taylor’s conflation of Nietzsche with one of many 
opportunistic misreadings is a way of dismissing Nietzsche along with what Taylor sees as inadequate 
and uncongenial in Foucault’s postmodern aestheticism.  
92  This is a more serious omission than in might seem, even for historical reasons: James had an 
unappreciated impact on phenomenology through Husserl, in addition to his influence on Wittgenstein.  
See Goodman, for example. 
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another picture” or new philosophical account of how we form beliefs.  What was more important  to these 
artists was the therapeutic work of philosophy in helping us to get outside the need for pictures at all 
(Wittgenstein’s method, not Merleau-Ponty’s).   The most  important philosophers  in  this  respect actually 
predate  Taylor’s  twentieth-century generation and in some respects go farther.  And James and 
Nietzsche, as I have already suggested, had a precursor in Emerson, a literary figure whose status as a 
philosopher is usefully ambiguous.  
 




but the experimental essays of Ralph Waldo Emerson.  Cavell has been largely responsible for the full 
recognition of Emerson as a major American philosopher.  In fact, Cavell’s own career as a philosopher 
can be understood as a gradual embrace of Emerson, who helps Cavell to work his way through to a new 
concept of philosophy, a new way of doing philosophy. The problem of the self-defeating, self-
perpetuating psychological complex of philosophical skepticism is one that he described so well in The 
Claim of Reason (1979), the last major work of his analytical “Wittgenstein phase” before he entered what 
we might call his now four-decade-long Emersonian phase (to which I will turn my attention in Chapter 
Four).    Emerson’s  real  significance  for Cavell  is  that  he  gives  us  a  literary  example  (a  way  of  life  by 
abandonment)  that  shows  Wittgenstein’s  fly  the  way  out  of  the  fly  bottle  of  philosophy.  Emerson 
accomplishes this task, on Cavell’s account, not by giving a better account of how we engage the world, 
but by taking the more radical step of converting philosophy into literature.  Cavell’s Emerson is the first 
anti-philosopher in the modern sense, and an important influence for Nietzsche’s thought.   
In  his  essay  “Declining  Decline,”  it  is  Cavell  who  also  takes  a  step  that  Taylor  does  not  and 
begins to read Emerson and Wittgenstein within the larger historical discourse on melancholy.  Cavell 
emphasizes that skepticism  cannot  be  refuted;  it  can  only  be  converted  into  a  method.    In  Cavell’s 
reading of Emerson’s “Experience,” melancholy plays a central role in this attempt to convert skepticism 
into a method.  In “Experience,” Cavell writes, Emerson makes the crucial move of abandoning the aim of 
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refuting skepticism.  I will argue in Chapter Five that Nietzsche goes beyond Emerson in important ways 
to make writing a problem (so that we therefore cannot simply “jump” from Emerson to modernist writing).  
But Emerson was just as important for Nietzsche as for Cavell, and one endeavor in which Cavell 
succeeds (beyond gaining recognition of Emerson as a philosopher) is to recognize and take seriously 
the significance of Emerson for Nietzsche.  Cavell understands Nietzsche better than Taylor, at least with 
respect to the aesthetic challenge of skepticism.  Cavell, however, tends to read Nietzsche as merely 
elaborating on Emersonian ideas that influenced him, ignoring the problem of writing as Nietzsche 
conceived it.  Cavell also fails to recognize where Nietzsche diverges from Emerson, and he generally 
has little interest in James, the other major heir to Emerson, who writes according to a quite different 
conception of experimental writing.  
Because he speaks of influence rather than a continued effort to deal with problems, Cavell 
raises questions about the role and function of writing as a way of doing philosophy that he does not fully 
address.93  I will read Nietzsche and James as different responses to Emerson, not simply elaborations of 
his thought, because they give us new models for experimental writing.  And that demands that close 
attention be paid to what the writing itself does, not just as a vehicle for ideas and for carrying out 
business as usual.  To put it simply, philosophical poetry has to make something happen, at least in the 
therapeutic sense.  And it must work to replace the traditional activity of philosophizing, as well as the 
compulsion to philosophize within the limited frame of epistemic concerns.  Any new way of thinking 
about the function of art and experimental writing must answer the question of what kind of agency and 
what kind of power we have gained once we  escape  the  “picture  that held us captive.”    So what is it, 
according to Cavell, that writing is supposed to do?  How do we avoid making writing into another 
Freudian compulsive activity, a way of filling up time and converting time into the filled space of page after 
page of writing? Robert Burton’s well-known confession that he “write[s] of melancholy in order to avoid 
being melancholy” can make writing sound like a compulsive activity done merely for the sake of keeping 
active, which comes close to the personal and time-honored therapeutic remedy of steady and 
uninterrupted work. 
                                                   
93 Treating Nietzsche as simply another “disciple” of Emerson also allows him to ignore modernism itself 
as a phenomenon, which is a common strategy among Emersonian critics – cf. Poirier, The Renewal of 
Literature. 
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Cavell’s  notion  of  a  “philosophical  poetry,”  then,  is  closely  connected  with  the  project  of 
converting skepticism into a method.  What would this philosophical poetry look like?  What would it have 
to do in order to successfully overcome epistemology?   The fundamental question jointly raised by Cavell 
and Taylor is: How does one convert skepticism into a method in a way that truly overcomes 
epistemology and also creates new values to replace philosophical values? One challenge we face is that 
Nietzsche’s ideal of value creation is somewhat at odds with “abandonment” as a programmatic way of 
life guided by fixed procedural values.  We cannot know what these values are ahead of time, as 
Nietzsche and James both remind us, and the via activa of writing cannot operate within a goal-directed 
framework (like elegiac mourning) whose goals are determined ahead of time.  
Cavell shows that there are many different versions of the role of writing as a means of 
establishing new values (thereby avoiding programmatic tasks assigned to writing).  This is important, 
because art-as-life aestheticism can become a programmatic, perfectionist kind of writing.  Cavell’s 
Nietzschean moral perfectionism redefines knowledge as self-knowledge: Cavell also writes of Emerson’s 
“epistemology of moods,” which suggests that it is entirely possible to translate Emerson’s radical thought 
fully within the frame of epistemic concerns.  But what is that knowledge?   Cavell’s “moral perfectionism” 
takes  its cue  from Emerson’s comment on  the  “unattained but attainable self” – so that we have moral 
perfectionism as a project of self discovery through self creation. This conflicts in important ways with 
Nietzsche’s conception of writing, as we shall see (and we have already seen in the quoted passage from 
Ecce Homo:  “no trace of struggle”).   
This model of experimental writing as self-fashioning tends toward a model of self interpretation 
as articulation that owes as much to Freud as it does to Nietzsche and to Emerson. Here is Cavell on the 
work of experimental writing as the work of mourning in the Freudian sense: 
 
It has been said that pragmatists wish their writing, like all good writing, to work – that is, 
to make a difference. […] Freud speaks of mourning as work, something Emerson quite 
explicitly declares it to be … Does the writing of Dewey or James help us understand this 
idea of work? (in Dickstein 73) 
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As this passage indicates, Freud is another model that Cavell openly embraces.  Emerson, of course, did 
not write in terms of mourning versus melancholia, but Cavell can easily translate this way of life by 
abandonment into a mandate for a repeated process of mourning. There are serious problems with the 
compatibility of Nietzsche with Freud.  For Nietzsche, one of the problems of writing was how to articulate 
oneself without identifying with any one image of heroism– or, as I will put it in Chapter 5, how to make 
one’s acts of self-articulation representative without at the same time representing oneself and projecting 
static images for the heroic self with  which  one  identifies  (a  corollary  of  Taylor’s  inner/outer 
representational problem – showing the close connection with epistemic concerns).  The work of 
mourning gives writing something to do, an experimental program to follow.  Cavell rightly questions the 
philosophical  interests  of  pragmatism  (in  his  provocatively  titled  “What’s  the Use  in Calling Emerson  a 
Pragmatist?”),  but  he  replaces  that  with  an  appeal  to  Freud’s  theory  of  mourning, which is in many 
respects a problematic theoretical framework.  Cavell does, at least, acknowledge the obvious difference 
between the voices of James and Emerson (as many pragmatist readings do not), and he asks how the 
writing itself works, which I think is the right question to ask.  I now want to bring that question to bear in a 
reading of James and Nietzsche, the two most important heirs to the Emersonian project of overcoming 
epistemology, and pay close attention to how their writing actually works.  
 
 
3.  Nietzsche’s Ascensional Philosophy and the Problem of Getting Out of Bed 
Critic  Richard  Poirier  has  noted  a  tension  in  James’s  writing  between  “his  promotions, 
compounded by self-advertisement, of will and action, and the more insinuated privileges he gives … to 
receptivity and to an Emersonian abandonment of acquired selfhood” (Poetry and Pragmatism 42).  We 
have already seen that this observation applies just as well to Nietzsche, and we have already registered 
the important Emerson connection to which Poirier alludes (much more will be said about Emerson in 
later chapters).   In fact, what Poirier says of James may be a more accurate description of Nietzsche’s 
experimental project of Selbstgestaltung (“self-fashioning,”  or  a  “giving  order  to  oneself”)  with  its 
connection between abandonment as  “a way of  life” and the project of actively acquiring and passively 
letting go in the course of fashioning and refashioning new selves.   
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Let’s  now  look  at  two  passages  in which  James  and Nietzsche  deal  in  different ways  with  the 
specific philosophical paradox involving the relationship between active and passive states.  Here is an 
early account of the active/passive paradox in Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy: 
 
In Oedipus at Colonus we encounter the same cheerfulness, but elevated into an infinite 
transgression.  The old man, struck by an excess of misery, abandoned solely to suffer 
whatever befalls him, is confronted by the supraterrestrial cheerfulness that descends 
from the divine sphere and suggests to us that the hero attains his highest activity, 
extending far beyond his life, through his purely passive posture, while his conscious 
deeds and desires, earlier in his life, merely led him into passivity. (Portable Nietzsche 
59) 
 
The exemplary tragic hero described here in The Birth of Tragedy would later become an experiment in 
the activity of self-articulation – the experiment of Ecce Homo, which elaborates on some of these themes 
that Nietzsche identifies in Greek tragedy. There is a remarkable continuity between the philosophical 
concerns that inform this passage, taken from Nietzsche’s earliest published work, and  the much  later 
and otherwise different-sounding experiment of Ecce Homo (the  “supraterrestrial  cheerfulness  that 
descends  from  the  divine  sphere,”  for  example,  anticipates  the  “magnitude  of  [a]  higher  protection”  in 
Ecce Homo).   This is an example of what Gaston Bachelard called Nietzsche’s “ascensional” philosophy, 
his heroic ideal of winged melancholy that takes flight by submitting to forces beyond its control: 
cheerfulness descends upon the hero and is elevated into an infinite transgression, leading the hero to 
attain his highest activity. The sublime heroism Nietzsche profiles here complicates the standard 
passive/active distinction by means of the relatively simple tactic of a dialectical inversion.   
 
 The next passage I want to look at comes from the chapter on “The Will” in James’s Principles of 
Psychology, originally published in 1890 as a college textbook, and surely the only major canonical work 





on the sublime intensity of the Greek tragedy: 
 
We know what it is to get out of bed on a freezing morning in a room without a fire, and 
how the very vital principle within us protests against the ordeal. Probably most persons 
have lain on certain mornings for an hour at a time unable to brace themselves to the 
resolve. We think how late we shall be, how the duties of the day will suffer; we say,  “I 
must get up,  this  is  ignominious,” etc.; but still  the warm couch  feels  too delicious,  the 
cold outside too cruel, and resolution faints away and postpones itself again and again 
just as it seemed on the verge of bursting the resistance and passing over into the 
decisive act. Now how do we ever get up under such circumstances? If I may generalize 
from my own experience, we more often than not get up without any struggle or decision 
at all. We suddenly find that we have got up. A fortunate lapse of consciousness occurs; 
we forget both the warmth and the cold; we fall into some revery connected with the day’s 
life, in the course of which the idea flashes across us, “Hollo! I must lie here no longer” – 
an idea which at that lucky instant awakens no contradictory or paralyzing suggestions, 
and consequently produces immediately its appropriate motor effects. It was our acute 
consciousness of both the warmth and the cold during the period of struggle, which 
paralyzed our activity then and kept our idea of rising in the condition of wish and not of 
will. The moment these inhibitory ideas ceased, the original idea exerted its effects.  





us here is what I cannot resist calling his myth of the eternal rising up from bed.  The quotidian nature of 
this example and the low-key rhetoric should not obscure its deep similarity with Nietzsche or its modeling 
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of  a  transvaluation  of  values  (albeit  on  a  small  scale).    This  reflects  James’s more  general interest in 
transitional “changes of heart,” and “awakenings of conscience” and that which allows us to escape more 
generally from situations in which the mind is paralyzed by habitual ways of thinking and rendered 
passive by certain kinds of activity – and that includes, perhaps especially, active deeds as well as 
desires.  James is interested in the possibility of changing our values and motives.  Getting out of bed is a 
“transvaluation of values”: we change our motives and impulses and pursue different paths that lead us to 
different goals.  These,  James  observes,  may  affect  the  “whole  scale  of  values  of  our  motives  and 
impulses” (Varieties 1140).  James, like Nietzsche, is interested in the way revery and new forms of 
reflection can form a new mode of intentionality and overcome the mind/body problem, and in the most 
concrete and practical situation imaginable. Revery can thus be a form of willing rather than wishing.  
In  this  familiar  scenario,  it  is  our  “acute  consciousness”  of  sensations  of  cold  and  hot that 
combine with our acute contemplative awareness of the many possible paths to take and our sense of 
what ought to be done (our having resolved to do something and our acute consciousness of its needing 
to be done – what  psychologists  now  call  “ironic  effects”).    The  problem  is  not  that we  are  unable  or 
unwilling to visualize our goals, but that an acute sense of what we ought to do, or what we want to do, 
that is the impediment to our action.  There are plenty of ways, plenty of reasons for pursuing our goal 
(including a sense of shame); but we are paralyzed by contemplation of these possibilities. And then, “we 
suddenly find that we have got up.”   
There is a subtle interplay here between active verbs and nominalized forms of verbs.  When we 
“brace ourselves to the resolve,” we nominalize “resolve” and locate it as a capacity within ourselves.  The 
effect here, as with Nietzsche, is not to make these verbs abstract concepts, but to regard them as 
potential energies that we can tap and into find ways of realizing in the course of navigating ourselves 
through given situations.  James does not ask us to submit passively to these forces.  The problem is that 
resolution itself (the noun-object that assumes the role of the grammatical agent) becomes an 
impediment.  The  question  is  not  where  we  get  “the resolve”—the  grammatical  subject  is  “resolution” 
(allegorical  personification,  rather  than  abstract  concept)  that  “faints  away.”    But  then  we  enter  other 
modes of grammatical agency besides “resolving” to do something.  This is a model of how to overcome 
melancholy paralysis by transforming resolution into revery – by making passivity the key to achieving a 
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goal that was not pre-determined by subjective intent.  James is less interested in the heuristic question 
of how to get to where we want to go, as he is in the question of where we find ourselves.  We need to be 
responsive to the requisite stimulus, which is the reflective power of revery to allow us an escape from 
paralysis.   
Nietzsche likewise distinguishes between the doer and the deed, the thought that does the 
thinking, the sense of command with which we can identify ourselves as the executor of the order after it 
has been executed.  James’s task here is not to explain retroactively “how we did it” or how we manage 
to do it (and trick ourselves) on a daily basis, but to offer advice on how to arrive at new motives and 
values in the course of our actions.  The question is not how do we get to where we want to go, but rather 
where do we find ourselves placed differently?  It is a reflective question: in revery we reflect, rather than 
contemplate possibilities.  So he wants to allow wish to “rise to the condition of will,” which is expressed in 
a tentatively passive form.  The problem is to remove or convert an impediment so as to allow for that flow 
to occur.  But on order for that to happen, we need to convert contemplative paralysis into a reflexive and 
mobile revery.  Revery is an intermediate mode of intentionality, neither active nor passive.94 It is the 
“postponement” that allows us space for revery, in which resolution “faints away.”   
And James’s task here is not to short-circuit subjective intention and clear the way for affect as 
“pre-subjective  force.”    As Maurice Merleau-Ponty  puts  it:  “The  relation  between my decisions and my 
body are, in movement, magic ones” (Phenomenology of Perception 108 [italics added]).  The key phrase 
is in movement – and that includes the movement of revery and the manner of articulation.  We realize 
new values through a close  attention  to  the  way  we  negotiate  and  articulate  a  position.  James’s 
“metaphysics of action” and his “by their fruits not the roots” philosophy (methods of acting over reasons 
and explanations we can give) can often be read as celebrating action over contemplation, the via activa 
over the via contemplativa, bodily agency over conscious thinking: even a “JUST DO IT!” decisionism and 
metaphysics of action.   But that is not the case.  
It  is  important  to  read  the  “lapse  of  consciousness”  as  not  necessarily  an unconscious and 
involuntary action, but a relaxation of the conscious will and means-ends thinking (which is why this 
                                                   
94 I want to highlight and borrow James’s term “revery,” which he employs only once in this passage, in 
part because  it anticipates Gaston Bachelard’s more carefully considered use of  the  term  in his crucial 
reformulation of Surrealism.  (See my earlier note on Bachelard and Nietzsche.) 
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passage is so hard to place modally – the point is not to describe or give advice, but to condense forms of 
wish into potential energy and enable a discharge of that energy through other channels..  Revery is 
neither sleep nor dream.  There are other modes of intentionality that transform our scale of values, 
motives, impulses. Therefore, this should not be understood as the primacy of bodily affect over 
conscious contemplation, or some sort of inversion of the mind-body relationship (which is easy to quote 
… but not nearly as radical as overturning the instrumental relationship itself.  “The heart has reasons of 
its own…” or “The thought does the thinking…” are  inversions of disenchanted thinking, but they do not 
really upset the instrumental relation itself.  James wants to call our attention to forms of agency that fall 
between willling and wishing.  
Is this science/philosophy as therapeutic self-help writing?  James, after all, did have a lifelong 
interest  in such  literature and  in what we would now call  the  “power of positive  thinking.”   But James’s 
“advice” on how to get out of bed is the antithesis of what we  recognize now (and what we would have 
recognized then) as self-help, motivational writing.  If it is practical recommendation, then what it 
recommends  is the opposite of optimistic  “magical  thinking”  that asks us  to visualize  and articulate our 
goals and engage in self-affirmation.  Imagine yourself out of bed, and you will make it happen.  Indeed, 
visualizing our intended goal and contemplating the various paths to achieving it and the reasons for 
doing it, is part of the problem.  Our sense of resolve and our keen visualizing of the goal are the 
obstacles, only intensifying our sense of disengagement from the situation. This is not the power of 
positive thinking in the sense of wishful thinking. This passage does not explain how something works or 
offer practical advice, but rather models a way of dealing with a situation, and the way in which the 
language moves here is part of the way it models new modes of intentionality. 
 
* * * 
Before moving on, I want to contrast my reading of the passage above with a quite different 
account of James’s  experimental  writing  from  the  philosophical  perspective  of  pragmatist  criticism.    In 
ding so, I want to emphasize why it is important to pay close attention to the manner in which this writing 
models a mode of intentionality (what I call “revery”) that eludes the categories of “active” and “passive” – 
and,  even more  importantly,  resists  any  account  in  terms  of  philosophical  abstractions  like  “transition.”  
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Jonathan Levin’s influential study the Poetics of Transition: Emerson, Pragmatism, and American Literary 
Modernism exemplifies a general  tendency among pragmatist critics  to make  “transition”  itself a vague, 
but abstract,  form  of  agency.      Here  are  two  claims  Levin  makes  for  the  power  of  “transition”  and 
specifically for what he calls James’s “metaphorics of transition”:   
 
As a figure for the agency that initiates change, transition is associated not with 
antecedent or eventual conditions, but rather with the unfolding processes that both 
suffuse and exceed any given condition. Transition, for Emerson and William James, 
figures power in its purest form [...] art is an agency of transition because, as Emerson 
suggests  in  “The  Poet  and  ‘Art’”,  it  also  challenges  familiar  forms  of  perception  and 
understanding and initiates processes that reconstitute them. (67) 
 
A proliferation of passive constructions here replaces agency and intentionality with abstract nouns 
(producing grammatical forms that are quite different from the prosopopoeia of  James’s  “resolution 
fades”).     Art  itself somehow  functions as an  “agency of  transition,”  rather  than offering a space where 
possible orientations, and new values, might be articulated and discovered through the act of articulation.  
And “power” is idealized here as an abstract concept – not vague in a suggestive and liminal sense, or 
envisioned as a alternative source of value, but abstractly posited in the philosophical sense. 
For Levin, the values that guide and determine art’s function are already established – and they 
are epistemic values.  “Art” itself somehow challenges “familiar  forms of perception and understanding,” 
only to initiate processes that reconstitute them as new forms of perception and understanding.  Process 
becomes procedure, and art becomes (presumably) the means of realizing these procedural values.95  
The ultimate value here seems to be an unending cycle of “challenging and reconstituting” familiar forms 
of perception and understanding.  Levin also makes some substantive claims about process philosophy 
and the nature of consciousness, a move that is not uncommon in pragmatist philosophical readings and 
for which there is (of course) some well-known basis in James’s own writings.  “Life is not modeled on a 
thing or a condition,” Levin reminds us, “but rather on a dynamic process. … this means that in transition, 
                                                   
95 In Levin’s readings of James, Stevens, and other (all-American) writers, the role of literature seems to 
be mainly the elaboration and illustration of philosophical themes.   
 103 
the individual is always being constituted relationally, as a function of a pluralistic heterogeneity.”96  Once 
again, we encounter a series of passive constructions, the most puzzling one perhaps being the claim 
that  “life  [is]  modeled  ...  on a  dynamic  process.”    Is  this  a  claim  about  the  way  the  mind  works  (its 
“perchings  and  flights”  as  James  put  it)  and  the way mind  analogously  (or  necessarily)  perceives  and 
understands a dynamic and changing world?  Or is it a normative statement, a piece of advice on how to 
model  one’s  life?97  In  spite  of  some  similar  language,  this  is  clearly  far  from  Nietzsche’s  ambivalent 
notion of process philosophy.  “Life” for Nietzsche was a provisional  ideal, an alternative source of value 
with which we may actively  identify, and not  in a metaphysical or vitalist sense.  (James’s  “Life  is  in the 
transitions” is much closer to Nietzsche than to Bergson).  That is perhaps why Nietzsche can take “life” 
as a vague ideal (an elan vital), but still criticize Emerson for being “too in love with life.”  Nietzsche sees 
in “life” an alternative to metaphysical and epistemic values that search for questions about the ultimate 
reality of things (being or becoming, or whatever). Nietzsche, like James, was seeking new forms of 
subjective agency, not replacements of agency by appeal to what Emerson called “the method of nature” 
as a foundation or justification of those values. (Pragmatist appeals to process philosophy often come 
uncomfortably close to the reductive language of Social Darwinism for which Nietzsche had such 
contempt). In contrast with all of this abstract philosophizing, we begin to appreciate James’s defense of 
vagueness  and  Nietzsche’s  intentionally  vague  and  non-conceptual formulations.   And we can also 
appreciate how their subtle experiments in alternative forms of agency succeed in avoiding the true 
                                                   
96 We find similarly phrased accounts in Emersonian criticism in which subjective agency is replaced with 
talk of the “I” being a function of transitional forces or as being constructed by those forces. In Emerson’s 
essays,” Sharon Cameron writes,   “contradictory propositions (along with the abstracted “I,” constructed 
at once, as if indiscriminately out of original, vital images and empty enervated ones) are the solvent that 
dissolves personality”  (“Way of Life” 18).   There  is  little  indication is given as to why we would want to 
“dissolve  personality,”  other  than  the mandate  that we  submit  to  these  natural  forces  on  which  “life  is 
modeled”  and  keep  ourselves  actively  occupied  in  the  unending  project  of  remaking  ourselves  on  the 
model of the dynamic world in which we live.   
97 Levin wants to highlight the metaphorics of transition in James’s thought, and emphasize the role that 
passivity plays within that metaphorics, partly in response to what he sees as a tendency to read James 
as a stereotypical Gilded Age  individualist, whose pluralistic  individualism  is  “couched  in  the capitalistic 
metaphors of possessive individualism, [and] masks even as it reproduces American laissez-faire market 
values, with  all  their  defining  structural  exclusions.”   But of course one feature of a system based on 
laissez faire values is that subjective agency becomes a function of market forces – that most abstract, 
and radically disruptive, force of transition (not to mention the ideal solvent for established identities and 
values).   
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passivity and sense of powerlessness that results when philosophical abstractions, however motivated by 
dynamic processes of change, come to take the place of subjective agency.  
The pragmatist appeal to process philosophy inevitably takes an evolutionary turn; the processes 
upon which pragmatism models its concept “life,” it turns out, are cultural processes as well as “natural” 
ones.   Taking his cue  from John Dewey’s pragmatist aesthetics and echoing a number of more recent 
critics,98 Levin emphasizes that aesthetic experience is no different from other kinds of experience and 
that  art must  “be  responsive  to  shifting natural,  social,  and historical  circumstances”  so  as  to  “foster  a 
deepened sense of the ways in which truths, values, and ideals emerge and evolve within the constantly 
expanding margin of material and cultural experience”  (67). It  is difficult to imagine, from a Nietzschean 
point of view, how a process aesthetics  premised  on  adaptation  and  embeddedness  within  “shifting 
natural, social, and historical circumstances” can ever establish values that separate themselves from the 
cultural logic to which it is supposed to adapt.  This is far too passive for Nietzsche, who wanted art to be 
its own force within the world, to create values through artistic articulation, not simply submit to (under the 
guise of tapping into) the transitional creative-destructive energies of the life of the marketplace and the 
optimistic values which guided it.  
Pragmatism,  it seems, can  function as a critical  “solvent”  for established values,  but  it has very 
little to say about the source of new values – unless, of course, we take the activities of transgression and 
disruption and the motives of adaptation and aversion to conformity as themselves having intrinsic and 
given  value.    Pragmatist  criticism  illustrates  what  happens when  we  “go  antifoundational”  (as  Richard 
Rorty puts it) without an alternative model of value creation or at least a means of reflecting on values like 
disruption and “unsettling all things” (Emerson’s injunction in his essay “Circles”) that allow us to give form 
to our purposive activity and thus avoid the slippage of process into procedure. One procedure that we 
might want to reflect on is the process of mourning as a strategy of repeated divestment and re-
investment of libido.  I think the juxtaposition with Nietzsche will help us, once again, to make better 
sense of James and (in particular) his unique brand of pragmatism. 
 
                                                   
98 See, for example, the work of Richard Shusterman. 
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In one of his many remarks on the primacy of temperament and affective interests in relation to 
belief, James wrote that any philosophy is "the expression of a man's intimate character, and all 
definitions of the universe are but the deliberately adopted  reactions  of  human characters  upon  it.”      I 
think we have not yet fully appreciated the full force of this observation and what this means for any 
attempt we might make to characterize James’s connection to modernist aesthetics.   One good reason 
for reading James alongside Nietzsche is to highlight just how radical their rejection of epistemic values 
is, even though Nietzsche was far more explicit than James in offering aesthetic practices as a substitute 
for  epistemic  values.  Nietzsche’s  concept  of a Will to Power was intended (among others things) to 
challenge the cultural dominance of the will to truth and epistemic values, not to redefine truth in terms of 
some practical notion of power (as pragmatism does). Nietzsche is the person to place alongside James, 
because he brings out how James also stands apart from his contemporary philosophers with whom he is 
more often associated (Bergson, Whitehead, fellow pragmatists).     
Because James did entertain various metaphysical hypotheses, there is a tendency with James, 
to a much greater extent than there is with Nietzsche, to identify him with specific philosophical positions 
– to speak of James as a radical empiricist, as a pragmatist, as a process philosopher and to make the 
case  for  his  “radical”  thinking  on  the  basis  of  some  philosophy  such  as  “radical  empiricism.”   James’s 
connection to modernism, in other words, is most often read as a philosophical connection. The problem 
is that there are far too many philosophical avenues for connecting James with modernism, and when 
James is translated into specific claims and philosophies, he can become all things to all people.    The 
question  is  complicated  by  the  fact  that  some  of  these  philosophical  “-isms”  are  ones  he  helped  to 
popularize and to which he gave a label.  The philosophical positions that James is associated with (and 
with which he associated himself) have invited others to elaborate on them and turn them into systems 
and claims in ways that James did not.   And there is typically a good deal of effort called for in order to 
make these connections and construct systems, while James himself seems largely content with labels 
and slogans whose function is more to provoke and to stimulate.  The result is not so much special 
pleading, as elaborations on and precise definitions of what James may have deliberately left vague and 
undeveloped.  
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I would like to make a strong counter-claim that any reading of James that equates him with a 
definition of the universe or a new definition of truth or fact or “pure experience” (including pragmatism or 
radical empiricism) fails to appreciate what is most radical in his thinking.  Although I will continue to insist 
on its importance, the modernist critique of epistemic values initiated by James and Nietzsche is in some 
ways too well known and taken too much for granted.  It is often said of James and Nietzsche that their 
most radical contribution to philosophy is their rejection of foundational thinking and Hegel’s well-known 
declaration  that  philosophy  “aims  at  knowing what is imperishable, eternal, and absolute."  As George 
Santayana put it in his neat formulation, pragmatism insists rather that "it’s better to pursue truth than to 
possess it.”  It is important to recognize that the rejection of foundationalism, as Taylor argues, is not the 
same as a rejection of epistemic values (nor does it necessarily imply aesthetic values, or any one 
specific notion of the aesthetic, as an alternative).  Consider, for example, the failure of pragmatism (and 
the various accounts of pragmatism) to escape from those values.  Henri Bergson, who later described 
himself  as  a  pragmatist,  identifies  in  science  and  philosophy  “a  natural  tendency  to  have  truth  look 




for Nietzsche and James was not how  to make  truth  “look  forward,” but  to  replace  the will  to  truth with 
some other value.  Pragmatists’ “power is knowledge,” moreover, is not simply an inversion of value; it is 
not  a  Nietzschean  (or  Jamesian)  transvaluation  of  values,  unless  we  define  “power”  in  broader,  non-
instrumental terms (a path that James takes).  What makes Nietzsche and James far more radical than 
Bergson, and what connects them in a special way with the interests of modernist artists, is their 
exploration of different concepts of power as they manifest themselves in orientations and articulations 
that are simply not commensurable with epistemic values.  Pragmatism offers a powerful critique of the 
will  to  truth  and  essentialist  tendencies,  for  example,  but  it  does  not  “work  its  way  beyond”  epistemic 
values (as Charles Taylor puts it). We need to do more than claim the primacy of the will to power or 
make a  reverse  claim  that  “power  is  knowledge”; we  also  need  to  define what  kind  of  “power” we  are 
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talking about.  In short, what pragmatism really needs to do, and fails to do, is address epistemic values 
as a problem and a crisis of value.   
James’s  qualified and idiosyncratic pragmatism, what I would like to call his melancholy 
pragmatism (if we must speak of pragmatism at all), does take us a step beyond this critique, just as his 
concept of “power” expands on Nietzsche in important ways.  In his late essay  “Pragmatism” from 1907, 
James makes an effort to re-define  pragmatism  in  terms  of  the  power  to  “identify  with  the  remotest 
perspectives.”   As a self-identified melancholic, James would have been the first to recognize at a deep 
level that the pragmatist claim that “theories are tools” – the emphasis on the instrumental relationship of 
the subject to the objects of his world – is the locus of melancholy despair, as is vividly illustrated by 
Dürer’s image depicting a multiplicity of unused tools strewn about. The power of James’s critique is not 
simply to claim that theories are tools and manifestations of a will to power; the power of James’s critique 
is to inquire into different forms of power and radical alternatives to theoretical and instrumental relations 
to the world and to recognize them as forms of life having a reality in the world. This power makes him the 
only major pragmatist who would  truly appreciate Chesterton’s  famous comment  that  “pragmatism  is a 
matter of human needs, and one of the first of human needs is to be something more than a 
pragmatist.”99 The power of James’s melancholy, first of all, is that it recognizes a wider range of human 
needs and treats orientations as responses to those needs.  That is why the most radical example of 
James’s brand of pragmatism may be found in his study of religions as ways of worldmaking.  Instead of 
an object-oriented philosophy of disclosure involving melancholy (much as Heidegger based his ontology 
of authentic Being on the experience of existential anxiety), James found a way to treat these “remotest 
perspectives,”  what  Husserl  would  later  call  “lifeworlds,”  as  the  primary  and  objective  given.100  This 
receptivity to possible orientations toward the world, combined with the power to identify with the remotest 
                                                   
99 Here  is  the  rest of Chesterton’s comment, which  is  less well known:  “Extreme  pragmatism  is  just as 
inhuman as the determinism it so powerfully attacks. The determinist (who, to do him justice, does not 
pretend to be a human being) makes nonsense of the human sense of actual choice. The pragmatist, 
who professes to be specially human, makes nonsense of the human sense of actual fact.” 
100 One distinguishing  feature  of  James’s  pragmatism  is  that  it more  clearly  anticipates  Husserl’s  late 
version of phenomenology, rather than the Heidegger of the tool analysis with its ontological concerns 
and what Adorno dismissivley labeled its “jargon of athenticity.”  
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and most unconventional of perspectives, distinguishes James’s melancholy pragmatism as a philosophy 
for “misfits, mystics, and geniuses” (as critic Louis Menand puts it) 101  (372). 
What we need now, I think, is not another reading of James as a pragmatist rather than a radical 
empiricist, or whatever.  What we need are some constraints and limitations on our ways of connecting 
him to the experiments of Stein and other modernist artists – to consider, for example, why we might not 
want to connect James with any specific philosophy at all.   As I suggested earlier, I want to invoke 
Nietzsche so as to bring into view some parameters and obstacles that will force me to make an indirect 
connection  with  a  modernism  that  (like  Nietzsche’s)  does not depend on any philosophical claim or 
position.  We need, in other words, a clear sense of what is being overcome.   
 
 
4. James, Nietzsche, and a (Non-)Theory of Melancholy 
Our first productive obstacle is to deal with what is conspicuously lacking in James and 
Nietzsche, and that is any definition or theory of melancholy, or any attempt to explain its psychodynamic 
origins  along  the  lines  of  Freud’s  theory.    If  we  are  looking  for  a  theory,  we  will  not  find  one.    Their 
concepts of melancholy are experimental to the extent that they are not theoretical concepts. When he 
wasn’t describing ideas as “inhibitory,” James the pragmatist was fond of saying about concepts generally 
that it  is “by their fruits, not their roots, shall ye know them.”  Theorizing and theoretical explanation are 
instances of what James calls “retrospective” thinking.  Nor is there much to be said even for the practical 
value of theories that try to explain human behavior. You do not overcome melancholy paralysis by 
explaining it pathologically, James would argue; you do it by converting it into a prospective method, into 
                                                   
101 James publicized the term “pragmatism” partly as personal favor to Pierce, who throughout his life was 
a prime example of a misfit and an outcast (he was homeless at the time). C.S. Peirce concludes his 
1908 paper  “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” by complaining generally  about what  other 
philosophers had done with pragmatism, and ends with a criticism specifically directed toward James's 
Will to Believe (it also  gives  a  new  perspective  on  James’s  “live  option”  and  to  James’s  critique  of 
philosophies in terms of temperament): 
It seems to me a pity they [pragmatists like James, F.S. Schiller] should allow a 
philosophy so instinct with life to become infected with seeds of death in such notions as 
that of the unreality of all ideas of infinity and that of the mutability of truth, and in such 
confusions of thought as that of active willing (willing to control thought, to doubt, and to 







cultivating attitudes toward the world.  In fact, receptivity requires that we break free of attitudes like 
optimism and pessimism that involve beliefs about the world and align all too comfortably with our 
preferences and imaginary satisfactions.  
Their non-theoretical approach to melancholy, a preference for method over theory that they 
share with Benjamin, must be understood within the context of their critique of the Will to Truth and the 
case they make for the primacy of temperament over philosophical system and theoretical explanation. 
What we do find in their “prospective” accounts of melancholy are frequent reminders of the necessity of 
melancholy and even its potential power as an orientation, in terms of receptivity: many statements about 
the necessity of illness and  its potential  as  power  and  defense  of  “pathological”  states  as  a  source  of 
power.   As James notes in the second epigraph at the beginning of this chapter, “the neurotic condition 
may very well furnish the ideal receptivity...”. 
James spends a good deal of time reflecting on the values and psychological strategies that 
inform various belief systems.  He makes a point throughout his career of quoting from the “philosophies” 
of figures as various as Whitman and Tolstoy, George Fox and William Clifford, treating them all as 
offering up literary documents. In their independently launched critique of the Will to Truth (or what James 
called, with deliberate provocation, the ”sentiment of  rationality”), we see some of  the clearest parallels 
between Nietzsche and James.    Nietzsche famously wrote that “The history of thinking is an unwritten 
biography.”    In  a  different  mood,  Nietzsche  would  write,  in  The Gay Science, that “thoughts  are  the 
shadows of our feelings – always darker, emptier and simpler” (203).  This is a critical starting point for 
James as well.  "The history of philosophy,” James writes, is “to a great extent, that of a certain clash of 
human temperaments" (Pragmatism and Other Essays 8).  Any particular philosophy is "the expression of 
a man's intimate character, and all definitions of the universe are but the deliberately adopted reactions of 
human characters upon  it”  (Pluralistic Universe 14).   The  “reactions” are  therefore primary,  the defining 
and conceptualizing secondary.   
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Here are two typical passages from James and Nietzsche on the status of rationally and 
empirically justified belief: 
 
The greatest empiricists among us are only empiricists on reflection: when left to their 
instincts, they dogmatize like infallible popes. When the Cliffords tell us how sinful it is to 
be Christians on such "insufficient evidence", insufficiency is really the last thing they 
have in mind. For them the evidence is absolutely sufficient, only it makes the other way. 
They believe so completely in an anti-Christian order of the universe that there is no living 
option: Christianity is a dead hypothesis from the start.  (Pragmatism and Other Essays 
206) 
 
They [philosophers] all pose as if they had discovered and reached their real opinions 
through the self-development of a cold, pure, divinely unconcerned dialectic ... ; while at 
bottom it is an assumption, a hunch, indeed, a kind of “inspiration”  -- most often a desire 
of the heart that has been filtered and made abstract – that they defend with reasons they 
have sought after the fact. (Basic Writings 202) 
 
Both passages  read  like  something  between  a  psychological  profile  and  literary  criticism.    James’s 
taxonomy of temperaments is arbitrary and facetious, and his labels and designations – which change 
many times throughout James’s career – do not claim the status of theoretical categories. Consider, for 
example, the way James deals with the concept of melancholy itself – calling it many names, and 
describing it as a temperamental disposition that takes many forms, not as a pathological condition in 
need of a definition.  Even the colorful terms James invents in his typology – “sick soul” type, the “healthy 
minded” type – are hardly attempts to capture or define the essence of temperamental types.  They are 
almost never used consistently, and are often abandoned for other labels that never designate exactly the 
same types in any categorical sense.  And temperament is central to James’s critique of epistemic values, 
as it is for Nietzsche.  James is fond of playing one “mental temper” off against another and exploring the 
tensions  between  them:    the  “tender-minded”  versus  the  “tough-minded,”  the  rationalists  and  idealists 
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(“intellectualists”) on the one side, and the fatalistic, fact-obsessed empiricists on the other. Philosophical 
idealism,  James  observes  “will  be  chosen  by  a  man  of  one  emotional  constitution,  materialism  by 
another.”  Idealism offers a sense of being at one with the universe, while materialists find  in idealism “a 
narrow, closed, sick-room air”  and  see  a  universe  that  is utterly  indifferent  to  human  interests  has  “no 
respect for our ego.” Let “the tides flow,” the materialist thinks, “even though they flow over us” (Writings 
1878-1899  950f). 
If we look again at the two passages quoted above, we see that Nietzsche attacks conventional 
philosophy, its fondness for abstraction and its pretense of having arrived at conclusions by a dialectical 
process of reasoning. James, in his critique of intellectualism (rationalism, idealism, etc.) sounds much 
the same. “Defending claims with reasons they have sought after the  fact” is one way of characterizing 
“retrospective  thinking.”    But  James was  trained  as  a  scientist  and was  also  critical  of  the  “dogma of 
empiricism”  (as  the quote above suggests)  and what he saw as perversions of  the empiricist desire  to 
maintain a respect for and a receptivity to the facts of the world.   The quote above occurs in “The Will to 
Believe,” the essay in which he coins the term “live option” in defense of the right to hold beliefs without 
sufficient evidence of an intersubjective nature.  James gives a sharp critique of positivism, which was a 
much more problematic form of epistemic value than idealism or realism (and, outside of philosophy 
departments, a world-view that had come to dominate late nineteenth-century culture.)  In fact, it is 
significant that positivism appealed at one time or another to philosophers who were seeking to reform 
and overcome traditional philosophy (Husserl, Wittgenstein, and Nietzsche himself). 
This lifelong interest in temperamental types and the way temperament frames individual 
experience  occupies  an  important  place  in  James’s  highly  idiosyncratic  brand  of  pragmatism.    The 
problem, from a pragmatic point of view, is that a temperament cannot be equated with a belief or a set of 
practical  interests  that  “produce”  truth  according  to  the  pragmatist  definition.  Beliefs  and  theories  and 
philosophies may be “deliberately adopted,” based on one’s “emotional constitution,” but a temperamental 
orientation is not something we can adopt with the same deliberation.  Debunking philosophical systems 
and  characterizing  theories  as  tools  rather  than  “solutions  to  enigmas” was  a  provocative  strategy,  an 
area in which James and Nietzsche could exercise their considerable powers of irony and incisive 
psychological interpretation.  But as a strategy for confronting the values that were the object of their 
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critique, irony and insight were simply not enough.  If we are trapped by temperament, and our view on 
the world is always filtered through temperament, then how can receptivity be a value at all?  What are 
we supposed to be receptive to?  Any descriptive account of a person’s “choice” in terms of temperament 
risks becoming a deterministic  “explanation”  of  belief  in  terms  of  temperament, unless we  allow  some 
possibility and some freedom to choose different philosophies. Otherwise, this critique risks devolving into 
a mode of explanatory debunking.  James and Nietzsche are literary equals when they hold up the mirror 
to the values involved in purportedly value-free endeavors, but their delicious sense of irony only goes so 
far in addressing the questions raised by their critique. 
The critique of philosophical reasoning and foundational thought is just as radical-sounding today 
as it was a century ago, in part because it raises questions about the procedural basis and the status of 
both science and philosophy. One important difference between James and Nietzsche is that as a 
scientist, James is an even sharper critic of positivism.  Note that there are two distinct objects of critique 
in the passages quoted above: empiricism, and what James called “intellectualism” (by which he meant 
both rationalism and idealism).  James aligns himself with empirical science over rationalist and idealist 
philosophy,  but  his  search  for  a  “less  objectionable”  empiricism  puts  him  up  against  a  formidable 
opponent.  James does, in fact, sound like Bergson when he is advertising pragmatism as a new form of 
empiricism. “Pragmatism represents a perfectly familiar attitude in philosophy, the empiricist attitude,” but 
“in a more radical and in a less objectionable form than it has ever yet assumed’ (Pragmatism and Other 
Essays 31). Pragmatism shared with other  forms  of  empiricism an  “anti-intellectualist  tendency”  (ibid).   
So why would particular forms of empiricism be thought of as “objectionable”?  Here we have an unusual 
situation, for in the positivist brand of empiricism James had a formidable opponent.  James’s  “fear of 
error is fear of truth” echoes Hegel’s observation (ironically, since James despised Hegel).  But positivist 
fear of truth is also, like pragmatism, a conversion of skepticism into a method and a compelling (if costly) 
solution to the epistemic crisis.  Positivism is already a form of nihilism; it replaces truth not with 
Nietzsche’s  “truthfulness,”  but with  intersubjective  verification  procedures  and  an  open-ended series of 
paradigm-dissolving research projects.  As a strategy and as a secular religion, positivism is a total 
reaction upon life that works. The nineteenth century, after all, was also in some sense the period in 
which science began to take the place of philosophy. Positivism offered a compelling and radical version 
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of truthfulness  as  a  substitute  for  truth.   Nietzsche,  in  fact,  had  even  entertained  positivism as  a  “live 
option.”  Positivism was a much more problematic form of epistemic value than philosophical idealism or 
realism.  The new religion was positivist science, and one of James’s great strengths as a critic was to 
treat positivist science as a secular religion.102 This is one indication of the power of James’s melancholy 
pragmatism – that he understands the needs that positivism satisfies as religious in nature. 
It is also important to see how James, as a critic of the epistemic values underlying positivist 
science, fails early on in this task at a transitional period between his two major works.  Note that the 
quoted passage  above  on  empiricists  “dogmatizing  like  infallible  popes”  occurs  in The Will to Believe, 
which is one of James’s best-known essays.  It is a transitional essay, however.  As an argument, The 
Will to Believe is  also  generally  recognized  to  be  a  tactical  failure  in  James’s  lifelong  protest  against 
dogmatic systems of thought. I will consider some of the reasons for this failure in Chapter Three.  In 
positivist empiricism, James came up against a system and a total reaction upon life that was already 
radically non-foundational and “anti-intellectualist.”   And his failure to come up with a strong objection to 
positivism on empiricist grounds is a major turning point in his career – it leads to Varieties of Religious 
Experience and to the later Wittgenstein, and to an entirely different concept of modernist aesthetics and 
radical experimentation (different from Nietzsche’s).    
Positivism was an antifoundational attempt to overcome philosophy, a radical version of 
empiricism as well as a form of what Nietzsche would call “active nihilism.”  If James and Nietzsche were 
to challenge the epistemic values that guided positivism, then they needed some non-epistemic concept 
of the objective as a challenge to the positivist’s intersubjective verifiability (which replaced the value of 
objective truth with the value of procedure).  And the way to do that was not merely to critique all beliefs 
as reflections of human interests, but rather make a case for abandoning or demoting the primacy of 
justified belief as a value.  James and Nietzsche both realized that if they wanted to effect a 
transvaluation of values in their culture, they needed to confront the sharp distinction between objective 
facts and subjective values, a hallmark of disenchanted thinking, and come up with an aesthetic 
equivalent to the notion of fact (not truth).  As Wallace Stevens put it, there is a need for “a something 
                                                   
102 “Religion, whatever it  is, is a man’s total reaction upon life,” James writes in Lecture 1 of Varieties of 
Religious Experience, “so why not say that any total reaction upon life is a religion?” 
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‘wholly other’ by which the inexpressive loneliness of thinking is broken and enriched” (237).103  The major 
criterion for a religion, as James notes, is whether it has the “sound of reality” (Varieties 151).   
Emerson’s  concept  of  mood  offered  that  substitute  notion  of  objectivity,  as  well  as  a  non-
epistemic model of value creation.  In Chapter Four, I will look at how that served as a model for both 
James and Nietzsche. I want to argue that James and Nietzsche can be understood as different 
responses to this Emersonian model, not simply as elaborations on it.  James and Nietzsche derive two 
very different models of converting melancholy into experimental writing from Emerson.  But first, I want to 
look at James’s independent grappling with the Emersonian problem, at a moment in his thinking when 
he identifies (or tries to identify) most fully with the not-so-remote perspective of the Nietzsche who 
celebrates the heroism of the exceptional individual. 
 
 
5.  James on the Will 
I am going to look, finally, at an extended passage (or rather, a block of separate passages) in 
which James’s  language sounds quite Nietzschean  in  its promotions,  if not  its self-advertisements: the 
celebrated chapter on “The Will”  that brings  the massive Principles of Psychology to a somewhat anti-
climactic conclusion.  The irony is that the place where James sounds most like Nietzsche – where 
James’s prose comes the closest it would ever come to approximating the agitated brush strokes of late 
Van Gogh and the ambivalently triumphalist and self-doubting voice that speaks to us in Ecce Homo – 
should be found at the end of his most important and substantial work as an empirical scientist and the 
book that remains, for many, his greatest work.  At the end of Principles, James expresses his 
ambivalence  about  employing  scientific  “method”  in  the  study  of  human  behavior;  at  times,  he  sounds 
deeply dissatisfied with the book he has just finished.  The extended chapter on the will shifts to a new 
topic  that demands a new mode of  inquiry, what he calls  (in his subtitle)  the  “ethical  importance of  the 
phenomenon of effort.”  This concluding chapter is an acknowledged masterpiece of American prose, and 
it  contains  some of  James’s most rousing and noble language.  In Varieties of Religious Experience, 
                                                   
103 This fragment, collected in Stevens’s Opus Posthumous, was discovered to have been a line copied 
out from another source, and not Stevens’s own line.  It no less interesting for that fact; what is of interest 
now is why Stevens might have copied out the line and what it meant to him. 
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James  praises  Emerson’s  ambiguously  literary  philosophizing,  which  “quivered  on  the  boundary  ... 
sometimes leaning one way, sometimes the other, to suit the literary rather than the philosophic need” 
(38).  The sentences in which Emerson expressed his “faith,” as James called it, “are as fine as anything 
in  literature.”    James’s  language  has  drawn  similar  praise.    But  there  is  also  something  tentative  and 
transitional in these final pages, a restless and dissatisfied quality to the language, something forced in 
the rhetoric.  As I hope to show, this chapter is also significant in that it anticipates a radical shift in 
James’s methodology in his later masterpiece, Varieties of Religious Experience. 
          The chapter on The Will begins with a meditation on the limits of psychology as an empirical 
science  and  includes  a  rather  candid  expression  of  James’s  doubts  about  his  own  attempt  at  writing 
psychology as science.104  At the end of his more than 1,000-page pioneering textbook on psychology as 
an empirical science, he declares that most of what is worth studying in human psychology cannot be 
understood or even recognized by the methods of empirical scientific method.  Science, James argues, is 
not capable of dealing with the most practical questions that are most important for understanding human 
behavior – the question of how much effort of attention is “demanded” by the world itself, which can also 
be re-phrased as the question of whether there is any objective, non-arbitrary basis in the world for our 
valuing it and for devoting our effort of attention to one part of it as opposed to any other.  Another 
question that psychology cannot address is the question of whether the world demands or justifies our 
effort to go on living (to rephrase the title of one of James’s lectures, “Is Life Worth Living?”).    
          “But whilst eliminating  the question about the amount of our efforts as one which psychology will 
never have a practical call to decide,”  James  writes,  “I  must  say  one  word  about  the  extraordinarily 
intimate and important character which the phenomenon of effort assumes in our own eyes as individual 
men.”  James continues: 
 
Of course we measure ourselves by many standards. Our strength and our intelligence, 
our wealth and even our good luck, are things which warm our heart and make us feel 
                                                   
104 James was even more blunt in a letter sent to his publisher after the submission of the final 
manuscript.  James described Principles as “a loathsome, distended, tumefied, bloated, dropsical mass, 
testifying to nothing but two facts: 1st, that there is no such thing as a science of psychology, and 2nd, 
that W. J. is an incapable” (The Letters of William James, ed. Henry James. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1926, 
pp. 393–4) 
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ourselves a match for life. But deeper than all such things, and able to suffice unto itself 
without them, is the sense of the amount of effort which we can put forth. Those are, after 
all, but effects, products, and reflections of the outer world within. But the effort seems to 
belong to an altogether different realm, as if it were the substantive thing which we are, 
and those were but externals which we carry. If the 'searching of our heart and reins' be 
the purpose of this human drama, then what is sought seems to be what effort we can 
make. (424-25) 
We know the world only through our interactions with it, indirectly, through the effort of attention that it 
demands of us.  This is not a pragmatic account of truth as something we “make” in the world, but rather 
an inquiry into our sense of the world.  That includes a sense of the effort itself as something independent 
of us, “as if it were the substantive thing which we are,” as well as the sense that our purpose in life is to 
search not for an underlying reality or a touchstone of the real, but rather to reflect on the effort we can 
make and the world that comes into view through the effort that positions us and establishes a relation of 
power to the world.  James is gradually working toward a careful formulation of a non-epistemic 
philosophy of  “as  if,”  in which  “total  reactions upon  life”  (or  “forms of  life,”  as Wittgenstein called  them) 
take the place of experience itself and form a new “myth of the given.”105 
After  this  speculation  on  the  consideration  of  “effort,”  James  then  identifies  two  categories  of 
individual, weak versus strong, as measured by the standard of how much effort they are able to make in 
response to the demands made of them: 
He who can make none is but a shadow; he who can make much is a hero. The huge 
world that girdles us about puts all sorts of questions to us, and tests us in all sorts of 
ways. Some of the tests we meet by actions that are easy, and some of the questions we 
answer in articulately formulated words. But the deepest question that is ever asked 
admits of no reply but the dumb turning of the will and tightening of our heartstrings as we 
say, "Yes, I will even have it so!" When a dreadful object is presented, or when life as a 
                                                   
105 the phrase that was made popular by American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars. 
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whole turns up its dark abysses to our view, then the worthless ones among us lose their 
hold on the situation altogether, and either escape from its difficulties by averting their 
attention, or if they cannot do that, collapse into yielding masses of plaintiveness and 
fear. The effort required for facing and consenting to such objects is beyond their power 
to make. (425) 
Here James seems to be trying out Nietzsche as a “live option,”106 entertaining a version of amor fati that 
involves  not  loving  or  embracing  one’s  fate  and  the  sublime  intensity  of  tragic  limitations, but  involves 
rather  the  conscious  “effort”  of  giving  consent  (or  non-consent) which  is  distinct  from both  “ostrich-like 
forgetfulness” and the “dumb turning of the will.”  The “heroic mind” has this power of saying “yes” to life: 
But the heroic mind does differently. To it, too, the objects are sinister and dreadful, 
unwelcome, incompatible with wished-for things. But it can face them if necessary, 
without for that losing its hold upon the rest of life. The world thus finds in the heroic man 
its worthy match and mate; and the effort which he is able to put forth to hold himself 
erect and keep his heart unshaken is the direct measure of his worth and function in the 
game of human life. He can stand this Universe. He can meet it and keep up his faith in it 
in presence of those same features which lay his weaker brethren low. He can still find a 
zest in it, not by 'ostrich-like forgetfulness,' but by pure inward willingness to face the 
world with those deterrent objects there. And hereby he becomes one of the masters and 
the lords of life.  (425) 




                                                   
106 It is unlikely that James had actually read Nietzsche at this early date (1890), so of course I am not 
suggesting that James was consciously mimicking Nietzsche or was even aware of his existence.  There 
is an uncanny dialogue that takes place between James and Nietzsche even in this early years, and I 
think that is largely due by the fact that they were developing in different directions in response to 
Emerson. 
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human  destiny”  – and note also that this is as close as James comes to the idealizing of exemplary 
genius.  The fortitude of the strong man becomes an example for us, and “his will becomes our wi ll, and 
our life is kindled at his own.”  But it sounds like a half-hearted ideal – a possibility, but one that cannot 
rise to the condition of a reality for James.  
The distinction between the powerful and the weak types of individuals is one that he elaborates 
in an earlier section of the chapter, where he describes the “deadbeats, the sentimentalists” whose life is 
“one long contradiction between knowledge and action ... No one eats of the tree of knowledge as they 
do” (410). But their “moral knowledge,” as James calls it,107 “never wholly resolves, never gets its voice 
out  of  the  minor  into  the  major  key,  or  its  speech  out  of  the  subjunctive  into  the  imperative  mood.”  
However, the stirring paean to resolve in the passage quoted above takes place almost entirely in the 
subjunctive mood, in the minor key of imagining a mode of heroism that is only one option.   The “mighty 
words of cheer” that the hero speaks sound like mere words compared to Nietzsche’s tragic hero and his 
actions, and it is permeated with the pathos of someone who is trying to cheer himself up.  He is trying 
out an orientation, as is indicated by the highly qualified language at almost every turn:  “what wonder…” 
and “the way we view ourselves…” James only entertains this as a possible ideal, but it comes close to a 
stirring “promotions of the will” (or, rather a promotion of the “effort” that must be made.)  
The “strong,” therefore, are distinguished by their ability to face reality, to give consent to its fact, 
rather than convert life’s difficulties into opportunities and thereby avoid acknowledging the hard reality of 
what either resists or falls outside our instrumental interests.  James adopts a Nietzschean reflective 
power as an alternative to truth and positivist fact, but also sees the universe as  the world of  “deterrent 
objects” that call forth our efforts of attention. The “deterrent objects” of the world do not exist merely to 
realize the practical power of genius, nor are the difficulties we encounter to be regarded simply a “test”  
for  us.    And  perhaps  “the  only  unique  and  underived  contribution  we  have  to  make  to  the  world,”  as 
James notes, is to develop a responsiveness that will make us receptive to those objects and to those 
unrealized possibilities that our conscious will to power and will to truth lead us to overlook or marginalize.  
It  is  here  that we  begin  to  see  once  again  some affinity  between  James’s  and Benjamin’s  concept  of 
melancholy.   James has an empiricist’s  respect  for  the alterity of stubborn  fact  that Nietzsche does not 
                                                   




and not just a Spartan emblem of hardiness.  James suggests that we can replace our sense of reality 
with a sense of what it demands from us and how we meet that demand: the “test” of life.  James thus 
works toward reconciling receptivity and self-reflexive responsiveness as values:  “What  wonder  that 
these dumb organs should seem our deepest organs of communication with the nature of things!”   We 
have here a responsiveness to our own sense of power that allows us to be more receptive to “the nature 
of things.”   But before he moves further in this direction, James continues in a Nietzschean vein: 
 
He must be counted with henceforth; he forms a part of human destiny. Neither in the 
theoretic nor in the practical sphere do we care for, or go for help to, those who have no 
head for risks, or sense for living on the perilous edge. Our religious life lies more, our 
practical life lies less, than it used to, on the perilous edge.108 But just as our courage is 
so often a reflex of another's courage, so our faith is apt to be, as Mas Müller somewhere 
says, a faith in some one else's faith. We draw new life from the heroic example. The 
prophet has drunk more deeply than anyone of the cup of bitterness, but his countenance 
is so unshaken and he speaks such mighty words of cheer that his will becomes our will, 
and our life is kindled at his own.  
     Thus not only our morality but our religion, so far as the latter is deliberate, depend on 
the effort which we can make. "Will you or won't you have it so?" is the most probing 
question we are ever asked; we are asked it every hour of the day, and about the largest 
as well as the smallest, the most theoretical as well as the most practical, things. We 
answer by consents or non-consents and not by words. What wonder that these dumb 
responses should seem our deepest organs of communication with the nature of things! 
What wonder if the effort demanded by them be the amount which we accord of it be the 
one strictly underived and original contribution which we make to the world!  (425-26) 
                                                   
108 “Our  religious  life  lies more, our practical  life  lies  less,  than  it used  to, on  the perilous edge...”: This 
suggests  Nietzsche’s  “last  man,”  but  the  more  generous irony  of  James’s  vision  of  the  modern  man 
suggests a figure more akin to Walter Mitty. 
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The  latter  paragraph  is  a  quiet  but crucial  turning  point  in  James’s  thought  and  career,  containing  the 
seeds of the Gifford  lectures he would give ten years later (what would become The Varieties of 
Religious Experience).   Note how this calls for a radically reflective alternative to epistemic values that is 
quieter than Nietzsche’s but every bit as radical.   The “self-help” question of how to convert the wishes 
and fears we harbor into decisive action now becomes also a question of how the effort demanded of us 
by the world becomes an indirect measure of our contact with reality, how responsiveness to that effort 
called forth becomes the only means of our knowing the objective world. How do we remain attuned to 
the “deterrent objects” and heed their demand for our attention without treating them as objects to which 
we might have unmediated access in the ontological sense?   Here James begins to consider another 
possibility,  not  just  exemplary  acts  of  “courage”  but  exemplary  faiths.   What kind of examples do we 
need? Not just examples of courageous action, but also varieties of religious faith – broadly defined, as 
ways of forming meaning – as exemplary forms of life. 
What I want to focus on here is the exemplary function of the writing itself, apart from its obvious 
rhetorical eloquence.  James seems to be advocating a particular plan for living – a way of life by 
abandonment, a heeding of the will that conflates the heeding with the willing – that has a parallel in what 
appears to be a conflation of the prescriptive and descriptive modes.  It asks us to contemplate the 




James thus gradually arrives, in awkward and provisional stages, at the formulation of a radically 
non-epistemic reflective practice as a potentially adequate method of addressing the important questions 
about human behavior that are beyond the methodological purview of psychology as an empirical 
science.  In The Will, James indicates his own concern for receptivity by way of responsiveness.  Our 
morality and our religion “depend on the effort which we can make” – i.e., they are strategies we adopt for 
coping with the world.  The scientist asks “probing questions” of the world, framing hypotheses, and the 
objective data that we gather is a response to our own questions.  Francis Bacon had argued that 
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experiments  are  important  for  science  because  they  allowed  us  to  “put  nature  to  the  question.”  
Instrumental reason is a method of inquiry, so that we only know nature through the questions we pose.  
James reverses this empirical relation, as well as the notion of what motivates our inquiry:   What is 
important is how we answer the most probing question that nature puts to us – the question of “Will you or 
won’t you have it so? -- and we do so with consents or non-consents: 
 
What wonder that these dumb responses should seem our deepest organs of 
communication with the nature of things! What wonder if the effort demanded by them  be 
the measure of our worth as men! What wonder if the amount which we accord of it were 
the one strictly underived and original contribution we make to the world! (426) 
 
This language is oddly tenuous, the sense of it falling somewhere between: What wonder that this is our 
only means of contact... and No wonder we have adopted this strategy as our practical means for dealing 
with reality.  It’s not that we make truth happen through our interests, but how reflecting on our desire for 
truth as a value (as a form of life) is “reflected” in the effort of attention demanded by, or called forth by, 
the things of the world. It is the value of attention that is primary, the longing for the thing itself as it is 
independent  of  our  questions.    James’s  solution  is  thus  to  reflect  on  our  interests  rather  than  simply 
appeal to the interests already codified in the methods of scientific inquiry where the questions to some 
extent determine answers and  the notion of  “objective” presupposes a choice of an object.  The  test of 
reality, then, is not the result of active scientific interrogation or of simply trusting our dumb responses as 
an authentic touchstone of some unmediated access.  Rather, James wants us to attend to the kinds of 
power we gain by virtue of these assents and non-assents, and how the orientations we adopt as 
“answers” (religions, theories, etc.) function to call our attention to the things of the world.  
 
 
6.  CODA 
James himself seems to have recognized the fundamental limitation to the critical idea that beliefs 
are reflections of temperament and pragmatic interests, as well as the problematic paradoxes that attach 
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to an exemplary individual heroism of the Nietzschean variety. In place of acts of courage or a will to 
trangsress mandated by an aversion to conformity, James began to consider total reactions upon life as 
ways of worldmaking.   He turned his attention increasingly toward religion as the ultimate form of a total 
reaction.   And he would also broaden the definition of religion to include the secular nihilistic faith of 
positivism.  One measure of the power of James’s melancholy pragmatism is that it allowed him to reflect 
on the human needs to which these secular faiths answered, along with those needs that went 
unanswered.   
One place where James rejects epistemic values in the clearest and most profound way is in 
Varieties of Religious Experience, which tends to receive less attention than Principles of Psychology in 
discussions of James and modernist aesthetics.  James diverges from Nietzsche and Emerson in his 
more comprehensive notion of power, and we see this change reflected in his concept of a “total reaction 
upon life” which makes it first appearance in Lecture 2 of Varieties: 
 
Total reactions are different from casual reactions, and total attitudes are different from 
usual or professional attitudes. To get at them you must go behind the foreground of 
existence and reach down to that curious sense of the whole residual cosmos as an 
everlasting presence, intimate or alien, terrible or amusing, lovable or odious, which in 
some degree every one possesses. This sense of the world’s presence, appealing as it 
does to our peculiar individual temperament, makes us either strenuous or careless, 
devout or blasphemous, gloomy or exultant, about life at large; and our reaction, 
involuntary and inarticulate and often half unconscious as it is, is the completest of all our 
answers to the question, "What is the character of this universe in which we dwell?"  (39) 
 
We can recognize some of the same themes that were addressed in the closing pages of Principles of 
Psychology, but here they are in much sharper focus.  This is a much more confident-sounding version of 
what James was still struggling to articulate a decade earlier.  It also indicates a fundamental change in 
direction.  This, I would argue, is the crucial theoretical concept in Varieties of Religious Experience, 
much more  important  than  the  better  known  designations  of  “healthy-minded”  and  “sick-souled.”    And 
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“total  reaction  upon  life,”  while  not  as  catchy  or  as  pithy  as  it might be,  is  certainly  preferrable  to  the 
awkward-sounding term “overbelief” that appears briefly in the final lecture of Varieties (a term he would 
soon  abandon  with  the  same  speed  as  the  early  term  “pragmaticism”).    The  term  “Overbelief”  still 
suggests that James is concerned with the epistemic project of assessing and justifying beliefs.  
Nevertheless,  the  link  between  concepts  of  “Overman”  and  “Oversoul”  has  the  incidental  virtue  of 
highlighting the point where James breaks from Nietzsche and Emerson in finding his own way beyond 
epistemic values.  
Ruth Anna Putnam once remarked that James “believed in belief.”  But this implies an Arnoldian 
attitude of treating religion as an edifying and “useful fiction.”  James does something far more radical in 
his definition of a total reaction.  As the passage above indicates, James actually believes in the 
complexity of human behavior and in the importance of putting belief (a philosophical concern and value) 
in its proper place among the wider repertoire of what we bring to bear when we engage with our world.  
We might notice, finally, James’s proposed aesthetic criterion  for assessing total  reactions: they are not 
most reliable or truest or most useful answer we have, but the “completest.”  This is a vague criterion, but 
a crucial one, and James has more to say about re-defining Nietzschean  “power”  in  terms  of  such 
aesthetic criteria.  I will try to show in later chapters that it makes a great difference in that it implies a 
different image of modernist experimentation, as well as a different model of experimental writing.  It gives  
us aesthetic criteria as well as a new model for experimental writing.  We might also take note of a 
second key allusion, in the span of a decade, to Emerson’s “Experience”: the “lords of life” (alluded to in 
the chapter on The Will) and now “casual reaction” in Varieties (“our relations with things are casual...”).  
Unlike moods as a solvent for personality and as things that occur to us, James treats total reactions as 
relatively stable and objective in a different way as possible orientations with a reality of their own.  These 
reactions, these possible lifeworlds, “appeal” to our temperaments, rather than being determined by them.  
But they also offer the possibility of a transvaluation of values. 
By the time James writes the Varieties of Religious Experience, the emphasis has shifted from an 
interest in temperamental types – types of individuals – to total reactions as possible orientations.  
James’s concept of a total reaction thus anticipates what Husserl would later characterize as “life-worlds” 
and Wittgenstein would call “forms of life” (Lebensformen)  Total reactions have the advantage of being 
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stable, shareable, in spite of the fact that they are not “articulable” (as Wittgenstein would put it, they can 
only be shown). James here is no longer interested in classifying temperamental types in the scientific 
sense,  but  rather  reflecting  on  possible  orientations.    What  James  calls  the  “sense  of  the  world’s 
presence” is the “completest answer” we can give to the question about the character of the universe – 
and it is also, importantly the universe in which we dwell (a characterization of embeddedness which 
anticipates Heidegger,  one  of Charles  Taylor’s  early  twentieth-century  philosophers  who  “worked  their 
way beyond” epistemic values.) 
But the most important modernist philosopher to continue in this direction was not Heidegger but 
Ludwig Wittgenstein.  And in Varieties, James sets the stage for Wittgenstein when he takes the 




later  that  James’s Varieties, as a work of philosophy and a work of literature, anticipates a distinctly 
modernist tradition of non-epistemic philosophy that aspires to the condition of literature.  First, though, I 
want to look more closely at this challenge of overcoming epistemic values by looking at Freud as a 
representative of those values and as the author of what is by far the most influential theory of 
melancholy in the twentieth century. 
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Chapter Three:  Modernism and the Power of Positivist Thinking 
 
We are not melancholy because we believe in Hell, but we believe in Hell because we are melancholy.  
Leslie Stephen109  
 




Robert Burton defined melancholia nearly  four  centuries  ago  as  “sadness  and  fear  without  a 
cause,” but  that has not stopped philosophers and scientists  in  their search  to explain the causes of a 
malady that may also be defined as something like a universal response to the human condition or a total 
reaction upon life.  The Greek word melancholy means “black bile,” after all, and the medical theory of the 
four humors is one of the earliest causal explanations for the condition.  This unending (and, in principle, 
neverending) search for an ultimate explanation should come as no surprise, given that melancholy itself, 
as philosopher Max Pensky succinctly defines it, “is a discourse about the necessity and impossibility of 
the discovery and possession of ‘objective’ meaning by the subjective investigator” (Melancholy Dialectics 
22).  Astrology is another classic example of a pseudo-scientific causal explanation; it is a theoretical 
fiction, a transparently anthropomorphic projection onto nature that has close affinities (as Benjamin 
noted) with the activity of allegorical interpretation.  Astrology nevertheless takes the recognizably modern 
form of an explanatory theory – and, of course, many of the early modern astronomers, such as Kepler, 
were also believers in astrology.  Burton and his near-contemporary Thomas Browne (a trained 
physician) wrote at a transitional pre-Enlightenment moment when modern science and medicine were 
still in nascent form.110  The distinction between melancholy as the spiritual human condition and 
melancholia in the somatic (and later the pathological) sense is a line that was intentionally and playfully 
                                                   
109 In English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 1873, Vol. I (15). 
110 as is well documented in a number of recent studies.  See, for example, The Poetics of Melancholy in 
Early Modern England by Douglas Trevor and Melancholy Medicine and Religion in Early Modern 
England: Reading the “Anatomy of Melancholy” by Mary Ann Lund; and Thomas Browne and the Writing 
of Early Modern Science by Claire Preston. 
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blurred by Robert Burton and other early modern writers on melancholy.  And for Montaigne,111 as for the 
early modern humanists who experimented with skepticism as style, Democritus (traditionally known as 
the “laughing philosopher”) and Heracleitus (known as a misanthrope, a solitary wandered, named by his 
contemporaries  as  “the  weeping  philosopher”)  were  not  regarded  as  cosmologists  or  process 
philosophers or early theorists of melancholy, so much as representatives of possible world-views, 
temperamental  “types”  to which James  (in an equally playful spirit) would give such  labels as  “healthy-
minded”  and  “sick-souled.”    Burton,  indicating  his  choice  of  model,  jokingly  referred  to  himself  as 
“Democritus Junior.” 
The long conceptual history of melancholy also provides a vivid series of cases illustrating James 
and Nietzsche’s repeated claim (or reminder) that all theories – and particularly those theories that deal 
with the causes of the infinitely adaptable and irrational realm of human behavior – are , as we might now 
say, always-already expressions of other interests and are inseparable from idealizations.  Indeed, as 
Aristotle shows, any attempt to explain a phenomenon like the mystery of heroic greatness is nearly 
impossible to separate from the act of justifying and creating for the public imagination a new way of 
being heroic and great.  Marsilio Ficino’s revival of Aristotle’s concept of heroic melancholy, for example, 
would  bring  public  attention  to  an  emerging  “problem”  in  England  that  was  popularly  known  as  the 
“Elizabethan  malady,”  a  problem  that  had  gone  unrecognized until it suddenly reached epidemic 
proportions. La condition humaine, it seems, has an inherent and as yet unexplained tendency to take as 
many forms as a mutating virus.  Every historical explanation of melancholy tends to generate another 
manifestation, another problematic case, that is in need of explanation. 
The fragment known as “Problemata 30,” long attributed to Aristotle, occupies a special place in 
that history, not because it is the first speculation – it is far from the first – but because it has a special link 
with a modern concept melancholy by way  of Ficino’s  revival of Aristotle  in  the early Renaissance and 
what became known as the “great man” theory.   The original language of Aristotle’s speculation sounds 
recognizably modern in the way it poses a question in the form of a research project, a question whose 
articulation of a “problem” is meant to stimulate and guide future research.  “Why is it,” Aristotle asks, 
 
                                                   
111 See “Of Democritus and Heraclitus” in the Essays edited by Donald Frame. 
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that all those who have become eminent in philosophy or politics or poetry or the arts are 
clearly of a melancholic temperament, and some of them to such an extent as to be 
affected by diseases caused by black bile, as is said to have happened to Heracles 
among the heroes? 112 (in Radden 55) 
 
This is only a few hundred words shy of what might easily pass today as the abstract of a scientific 
research paper or prècis for a grant proposal. Aristotle wants to explain the correlation between visionary 
great men and the malady that afflicts such a statistically high number of them.  This is a specimen of 
what James called “retrospective thinking”: Aristotle begins with this observation, which he takes to be a 
given and well-known  fact, about those “who have become eminent.” More than two millennia later, the 
idea that there may be some link between illness and insight remains a truth universally acknowledged, 
even to the point of being a cliché.  It is also an unanswered question that neuroscientists have begun to 
“explain,” the more counter-intuitive sounding the better, in light of newer theories and better instruments.  
The question itself, however, is a faintly absurd and loaded one, and that is probably more transparent to 
us than it was to Aristotle.  We can now see how the question projects an ideal at the same time as it 
frames and initiates a scientific-sounding, question-guided inquiry.  We may also smile to see statesmen 
(trained lawyers?) placed in the same generic category as philosophers and poets and all of these honest 
occupations compared to the heroic struggles of Heracles.  The lunatic, the lover, and the poet may be of 
imagination all compact, but they are also bound together in their imaginary identification of themselves 
as innovative outsiders struggling against the conventions of their culture.113  In his intrepid and always 
unpopular pursuit of truth and his battle against the comforting errors of the prevailing wisdom, the 
modern scientist would soon join the company of these exceptional individuals.  The modern scientist is 
actually put in the awkward position of having to allow for his own status as genius, the person who sees 
farther than others and is misunderstood, and in distinguishing between what is normal and what is 
pathological, between melancholia and melancholy, the scientist does not recuse himself as arbiter.   
                                                   
112 In spite of the reference to black bile, it is not clear whether Aristotle was familiar with the Hippocratic 
theory of humors. 
113 This anticipates our own broadly defined concept of revolutionary, creative, innovative and 
entrepreneurial genius.  One example of this broad concept is the January, 2013 TIME magazine special 
publication, TIME Secrets of Genius: Discovering the Nature of Brilliance, where the images of Steve 
Jobs, Shakespeare, tennis player Serena Williams, and Albert Einstein appear side by side on the cover.   
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1.  Freud, James, and Woolf: Three Modernist Manifestos on Melancholy 
This gives us some historical and cultural context for William James’s lifelong critique of science 
and its explanatory paradigm that rigs the game in favor of questions that are amenable to research and 
are phrased and prioritized as questions within that very paradigm. Empiricists are capable “dogmatiz[ing] 
like infallible popes,” and this is not simply a matter of a temperamental quality correlating with a  larger 
demographic. There is a cause and a reason.  The dogma of nineteenth-century positivist empiricism was 
the malady  of  James’s  time,  and  (as  James  noted)  its  dominant  secular  religion.  James  thus  sounds 
“modern”  in  a  different  way.    As  a  critic  of  positivist  science,  James asks whether a research project 
paradigm of open-ended questions and problems (such as we find in Aristotle) might become a dogma 
and  a  source  of  blindness. We might  contrast  Aristotle’s  modern-sounding question, a question that 
defines a research project, with James’s inverted emphasis on how we respond to the questions posed to 
us by the world.  James is one of the first to note the paradox that the more we try to cleanse our 
knowledge  of  human  interests  and  biases  in  the  interest  of  “objectivity,”  the more anthropocentric our 
entire enterprise becomes.  James is as keen of a psychologist-critic of modern science as is Nietzsche.  
Consider the well-known  essay  “What  is  an  Emotion?”  of  1884,  an  early  attempt  to  develop  a  “less 
objectionable” empiricism, and a manifesto-like defense of the “aesthetic sphere of the mind” against the 
imperialism of reductive science.  The wonderfully ironic opening of “What is an Emotion?” is pure James 
and is worth quoting in its entirety: 
 
The physiologists who, during the past few years, have been so industriously exploring 
the functions of the brain, have limited their attempts at explanation to its cognitive and 
volitional performances.114 Dividing the brain into sensorial and motor centres, they have 
found their division to be exactly paralleled by the analysis made by empirical 
psychology, of the perceptive and volitional parts of the mind into their simplest elements. 
                                                   
114 James make some odd, but I think significant, choice of words here: the attempts at explanation are 
“performances,” not  just manifestations, and  the  “volitional” suggests a  rational  choice paradigm of the 
kind  he  will  critique  later  in  “Will  to  Believe”  when  he  addresses  the  question  of  whether  believing 
something can be thought of as a volitional act. 
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But the aesthetic sphere of the mind, its longings, its pleasures and pains, and its 
emotions, have been so ignored in all these researches that one is tempted to suppose 
that if either Dr. Ferrier or Dr. Munk were asked for a theory in brain-terms of the latter 
mental facts, they might both reply, either that they had as yet bestowed no thought upon 
the subject, or that they had found it so difficult to make distinct hypotheses, that the 
matter lay for them among the problems of the future, only to be taken up after the 
simpler ones of the present should have been definitively solved. (188) 
 
James takes the scientific form of a question and spins it around so that it becomes a hypothetical query 
posed to the scientist: How would you respond if asked, right now, for a theory to explain X?  Although 
James diagnoses this as a systemic error that defines a given method, we might read this as a simple 
case of mistaking the map for the terrain: Scientists who posit a distinction tend to find their division “to be 
exactly paralleled”  in what  they  take  to be  the  independent data.  But the  larger problem  is quite clear. 
The open-ended procedure that defines and guides our inquiry can come to replace the actual objects 
under study.    In  the  later essay  “The Will  to Believe” James writes  in a similar vein  that  “th[e] very  law 
which the logicians [i.e., the empirical scientist’s logic of verification] would impose upon us ... is based on 
nothing but their natural wish to exclude all elements for which they in their professional quality of 
logicians can find no use” (204).   This is the utility-value logic of instrumental reason, a logic that rigs the 
game in favor of instrumental control and understands the world only in terms of its amenability to the 
narrowly defined interests of current research projects. The objectivity of science is one that defines 
ahead of time the choice of objects to study – the  objects  that  are  “real”  only  insofar  as  they  become 
legible as promising research projects.  And in place of Descartes’s reflexive “clear and distinct ideas,” we 
have the more social activity of constructing “distinct hypotheses.” James is a psychologist as well as a 
sociologist of science; he is more fundamentally concerned with the question of how industrious activity 
can come to constitute meaningful projects than he is in the more incidental biases that arise, for 
example, in corporate or government-financed research.   
What James diagnoses as a systemic problem is thus the basis for a systematic procedure.  We 
also  see  a  psychological  profile  of  the  “industrious”  scientist  as  one  who  accepts  the  impossibility  of 
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possessing objective meaning, the impossibility of knowing things as they really are along with any 
knowledge of their true causes, but who has the courage to prioritize and tackle all of those problems 
which are currently amenable to explanation (setting aside other problems for the future). The 
unquestioning faith in this problem-solving paradigm, its open-ended and future-directed work-ethic that 
binds a community  in a shared endeavor, can be understood as  the scientist’s version of  the Serenity 
Prayer:  “God grant me the serenity to postpone for the future those things I cannot currently explain; the 
focused attention upon those problems I can (currently) address; and the wisdom to know the difference 
between (and not to confuse) my problem-solving research interests and any dogmatic claims about the 
way  the  world  really  is  or  the  actual  underlying  causes  of  any  phenomena.”    The  positivist  notion  of 
“progress” is a social and cultural teleology, a procedural complexification calling forth ever-new research 
and efforts to radically rethink.  Positivism makes science a problem-solving activity, a social practice.  
And it is a very effective way of keeping people busy with the sense that they are part of a shared project. 
As I hope to show, James’s critique of this explanatory model and of the epistemic values behind 
it  is  far  more  incisive  than  his  rather  vague  defense  of  “aesthetic  emotions”  as  a  special  category  of 
emotions. It is not that positivist science ignores emotions and what James called our “passional natures”; 
in fact, positivism depends on means-ends projects that give our purposive drives practical goals to 
pursue (reason, Hume famously declared, should be the “slave of the passions”).  The truly problematic 
cases are those emotions (like melancholy) that do not fit within the logic of instrumental reason and do 
not present themselves as opportunities with respect to our problem-solving interests.  The primary target 
of James’s critique in “What is an Emotion?” is not theoretical abstraction per se or philosophical “systems 
of thought” (against which James’s entire career, Alfred North Whitehead claimed, was one long protest), 
but rather the abstract and open-ended procedures that are the unspoken faith of the positivist scientist.  
With its demand for the eternal recurrence of ever new theories to replace old ones, positivist science is 
anti-system with a vengeance.  This, then, is the blindness produced by positivist instrumental reason, the 
blindness of the Baconian faith in “power as knowledge,” an inversion of Bacon’s scientiae potentia est, 
the blind activity that forms the basis of a form of a radical antifoundationalism in which pragmatism finds 
both a parallel effort and a vigorous challenger.   
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James’s  subtle  irony  and  colloquial  manner,  his  aversion to Nietzschean hyperbole and his 
refusal to appeal to a grand metanarrative of disenchantment, makes it easy for us to overlook the 
historical import of what James is diagnosing here.  Max Weber’s well-known term the “disenchantment of 
modernity”  is  a  more dramatically historicized (and more Nietzschean-sounding)  version  of  James’s 
critique.  The  “ephemeralization”115 of knowledge, the planned obsolescence of all theories, the 
subjectivizing of all value claims, along with the blind faith in complexification as an open-ended research 
project – all are hallmarks of the positivist science that Max Weber identified as the culmination of the 
disenchantment of modernity. In his classic 1919 essay “Science as Vocation,” Weber shows himself an 
heir to Nietzsche when he characterizes modern science as a nihilistic enterprise defined by a procedure 
in which every scientific  theory must  “ask  to be surpassed and made obsolete”  in a process  “that  is  in 
principle ad infinitum” (in Gerth and Mills 138).   Reflections on the value commitments of positivism itself 
cannot, by definition, take place within a nihilistic framework that dogmatically assumes a sharp division 
between fact and value and rejects any basis or justification for value.  Weber sees this inability to reflect 
on questions of meaning as a serious problem. “For it  is simply not self-evident that something which is 
subject to such a law [a procedural law]  is  in  itself  meaningful  and  rational,” Weber  observes.    “Why 
should one do something which in reality never comes to an end and never can?” (ibid) The end toward 
which all of this blindly self-deconstructing  activity  tends  is  the  “Götterdämmerung of all evaluative 
perspectives,” including (of course) its own (“Objectivity” 86). 
As I have already tried to argue, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of this 
disenchantment narrative as a context for understanding the modernist moment.  Here is another well-
known account of positivist nihilism in the context of Weberian disenchantment, as articulated by Theodor 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer in Dialectic of Enlightenment, what is perhaps the definitive account of 
disenchantment:116 
                                                   
115 I  borrow  the metaphor  of  “ephemeralization”  from R. Buckminster Fuller, who first coined the term.  
Fuller defined ephemeralization as the ability of technological advancement to do "more and more with 
less and less until eventually you can do everything with nothing."  It is hard to imagine a more concise 
expression of the dialectical relationship between the nihilism of instrumental reason and meliorism as it 




or enlightenment per se but rather the positivist version of enlightenment as instrumental reason.  
 132 
 
Mythology itself set in motion the endless process of enlightenment by which, with 
ineluctable necessity, every definite theoretical view is subjected to the annihilating 
criticism that it is only a belief, until even the concepts of mind, truth, and, indeed, 
enlightenment itself have been reduced to animistic magic. (7) 
 
It is only a belief, and the processes by which we justify and (inevitably) refute those beliefs are more 
important than the beliefs themselves, which come and go like our always-provisional theories.  
Positivism subjects all belief to this suspicion; it is a paranoid and frenetic style of critical thinking become 
an end in itself.  Adorno and Horkheimer characterize enlightenment, the unending battle against 
darkness of mythic superstition, in psychic terms as a manifestation of mythic fear: enlightenment is 
“mythic fear radicalized” (11).  Elsewhere, Adorno and Horkheimer capture the paradox in their aphoristic 
claim that “myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to myth” (15).  Positivism is, above 
all, a way of dealing with a crisis of value and meaning, a solution that is premised on a vision of a fallen 
world whose only meaning is the meaning we give to it. The disenchantment of nature is a constitutive 
act, something that is done to nature and to ourselves as part of nature, a ritual renunciation that must be 
repeated like the process of mourning but that is still premised on a claim about a certain kind of activity 
as the ultimate source of meaning.  According to Adorno, positivism is the logical and radical outcome of 
a model of science that was set into motion by Francis Bacon’s founding myth of enlightenment, in which 
instrumental reason and procedural methods are given a primary role.  “The true end, scope, or office of 
knowledge,” Bacon wrote, “is in effecting and working, and in discovery of particulars not revealed before, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Adorno’s  critique  of  enlightenment  was  concerned  with  what  Roger  Foster  calls  “the twin errors of 
irrationalism and positivism.”   
Alkis Kontos gives a concise and elegant definition of positivism as a nihilistic form of 
instrumental reason in his contribution to the 1994 volume The Barbarism of Reason: Max Weber and the 
Twilight of Enlightenment (Horowitz and Maley, eds.): 
 
The force behind disenchantment is rationality, or, more precisely, rationalization. Rationality, 
unlike reason, is concerned with means, not ends; it is the human ability to calculate, to 
effectively reach desired goals. It emanates from purposive practical human activity. It  is this-
worldly in origin. It has infinite applicability and an extraordinary expansiveness under certain 
circumstances. Indeed, it can be quite imperial. It transforms what it touches and, finally, it 
destroys the means-ends nexus. (230)  
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for the better endowment and help of man’s life.”117  So there is the value of new discovery (understood 
instrumentally, in terms of technological utility and creative innovation) and meliorism (what would 
manifest itself, in the nineteenth century, as the positivist myth of social progress).  This radicalized myth 
of enlightenment idealizes human-centered methods and procedures, that which is amenable to 
quantification, that which is useful, and (above all) the open-ended process of inquiry that keeps 
researchers occupied and industrious. Adorno and Horkheimer also note the parallel between Baconian 
instrumental reason and the disenchanted works-based Protestantism of Martin Luther, who compared 
“knowledge that tendeth but to satisfaction” to a “courtesan.”  
And as James saw, there is a more specific blindness that derives from the methods of positivist 
science when they are brought to bear in the study of human behavior. Problems become amenable to 
research only when they can be formulated in terms of reasons and rational choice type motivations that 
already match its disenchanted model of instrumental reason (reasons, as opposed to the causes of 
human behavior). Another development in the period in which James wrote was the moment when 
positivism began to dissolve the myth of causality itself and replace the vague notion of explanation with 
problem-solving procedures.  By this time, the model of positivist science (as formulated by Ernst Mach, 
for example) had gone some way toward debunking the anthropocentric myth of a projected “cause.”   
The conflation of reasons and causes (which James addresses directly in Lecture Two of Varieties of 
Religious Experience) is a signature positivist take on the Aristotelian explanation/justification ambiguity. 
But in psychology, this conflation means that in place of cause, we have motivational reasons.  The 
positivist research project paradigm thus determines the form of the questions we are allowed to ask, and 
it  is  possible  to  find  them  “exactly  paralleled.”    Positivism  in  the  realm  of  psychology presupposes a 
distinction between behavior that may be understood in rational choice terms (or as the passions that 
drive instrumental projects) and the “aesthetic sphere of the mind” to which everything else gets relegated 
as arbitrary, subjective, and emotive.  Even the early James cannot find a way out of that methodological 
dualism  in his early work on psychology, in the very process of trying to challenge it on the theoretical 
                                                   
117 In the fragment titled “Valerius Terminus” (reprinted in Vickers). 
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level. In his adoption of a provisional methodological dualism in Principles of Psychology, the early James 
is to some extent held captive by the “picture” of positivist science.118  
This context may shed some light on the question of why James, in the course of rejecting the 
reductive tendencies of what he called “medical materialism,” respond with the seemingly reductive move 
of  emphasizing  how  emotions  like  fear  are  in  fact  responses  to  bodily  change  and  arguing  how  “our 
mental  life  is knit up  in our corporeal  frame.”  “What  is an Emotion” may be  read as a manifesto and a 
critique, but it is also well-known for proposing a hypothesis – the James-Lange hypothesis – purporting 
to explain how emotions are “caused.” James was an empirical scientist himself, a pioneer in the science 
of psychology, and we might well ask whether James is calling for a new theory to account for the 
neglected  and marginalized  “sphere”  of  “aesthetic  emotions.”  Note  the  way  James  treats  these  case 
studies  as  “data”  and  evidence,  what  he  would  later  call  “documents  humain.”   Case studies are 
presented not as illustrations of concepts or as new cases to be explained or classified as pathological – 
and the way he treats these cases as particulars gives us some reason to think of James’s approach as 
more  “literary”  than  scientific.    His  culminating  example  in  “What  is  an  Emotion?”  is  not  fear,  but 
anhedonia, a term James picks up from his contemporary Theodule Ribot, and which James defines thus 
in the “Sick Soul” chapter of Varieties of Religious Experience: 
 
One can distinguish many kinds of pathological depression. Sometimes it is mere passive 
joylessness and dreariness, discouragement, dejection, lack of taste and zest and spring. 
Professor Ribot has proposed the name anhedonia to designate this condition. "The state 
of anhedonia, if I may coin a new word to pair off with analgesia," [Ribot] writes, "has 
been very little studied, but it exists." 
  
The strategy James adopts as early as  “What is an Emotion?” is simply to draw attention to the existence 
possible forms of experience that elude the “system” of explanatory paradigms. But as I hope show later, 
James’s own way of doing science, based on his presentational approach to documents humain as the 
given, and not his hypothesis, is actually demonstrates an alternative to the science he critiques. And he 
                                                   
118 See, for example, Chapter 3 of Gerald Myer’s William James: His Life and Thought. 
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makes a case not for aesthetic emotions as a special realm, but for an aesthetic (or literary) approach to 
studying the human activities of coping, adapting, and making meaning.  In “What is an Emotion?”, James 
implicitly argues for an aesthetic attention to particulars that is completely different from the conceptual 
thinking of instrumental reason.  What is demonstrated in James’s documentary approach, and what his 
close reader (and sympathetic critic) Ludwig Wittgenstein makes far more explicit, is the power of the 
mode of description rather than explanation, simply a new kind of attention to particular cases and to the 
manner by which states manifest themselves.  This makes psychology necessarily descriptive, not 
illustrative of larger concepts or explanatory theories.  I will try  to  show  that  what  is most  “literary”  in 
James is not to be found his style of polemical argument, but rather in his manner of dealing with these 
documents humain as articulations of “lifeworlds,” rather than as texts with a meaning to interpret or as 
symptomatic of some underlying diagnostic complex.  What is important is how James treats this case as 
establishing a new and valid form of experience, not the way in which he employs it as an illustration or 
treats at as a problem to solve or account for theoretically.   
 
In  this  chapter,  I want  to  consider  James’s  concept  of melancholy  alongside  the much better-
known early theory of melancholia, the one Freud elaborated in his  1917  essay  “Mourning  and 
Melancholia.”  As a work of scientific literature, Freud’s essay is a striking contrast to James’s chapter on 
the  “Sick  Soul.”    In  addition  to  offering  an  alternative  and  vaguely  “agreeable”  image  of  modernism, 
James can seem to  represent  a  specific  theoretical  alternative  to  Freud’s  psychoanalysis  (as  Sylvan 
Tomkins invoked James as an exemplar, and a foil, in the course of developing his explicitly non-
Freudian concept of affect).  I do not want to focus on theoretical differences here, in part because I do 
not think James developed a theory or an alternative account at all.  Melancholy nevertheless occupied a 
special place in the thinking of Freud, as it did for James.119  But the differences between their 
understanding of the research methods and aims of psychology itself offer an interesting contrast.  James 
showed that our needs, desires, and hopes underlie our beliefs; Freud the theoretical scientist attempted 
to explain those desires, hopes, and desires as having a logic of their own and a hidden meaning to 
                                                   




interpret.  While James was rejecting the idea that psychology could be a science at all, Freud was 
beginning his career-long  struggle  to  establish  psychoanalysis  as  a  respectable  science.    “On 
Transience”  documents  one  stage in that struggle, and it  is  Freud’s  articulation  of  his  faith  in  the 
procedures of positivist science that I will try top read from a Jamesian perspective.  I want to suggest that 
“On Transience”  is, among other  things, an advertisement  for  the kind of positivist scientist that James 
criticized in “The Will to Believe” and elsewhere.   
Freud wrote three related meditations on general themes relating to loss in 1915, all of them in 
some way personal and two of them written in the genre of the personal essay.  In addition to the well-
known “Mourning and Melancholia” (published in 1917 but written in 1915), there is the brief essay  “On 
Transience,” and  the  relatively obscure but  lengthy essay  “Thoughts  for  the Times on War and Death.”  
All three pieces elaborate on the basic theory that Freud had begun to develop years earlier in 
unpublished manuscripts  as  early  as  1895.      “On  Transience,”  the  essay  I  will  focus  on  here,  was  a 
commissioned piece that appeared as part of a collection of commemorative and patriotic essays on 
Goethe bringing together various reflections on the future of European culture at a time when that culture 
was in the process of destroying itself. Freud was therefore addressing a much wider audience than in 
“Mourning  and Melancholia”,  not only the layperson but humanists and scientists, a group of gathered 
professionals from both sides of the aisle.  Because it was a commissioned piece with an explicit 
purpose,  “On Transience”  also  addresses  some  larger  questions  in  its  unusual  combination of topical 
specificity (the response to World War I) and philosophical meditations (on attitudes toward loss).  In “On 
Transience,”  Freud  responds  to  the  urgent  “questions”  of  the  day:  Is there something fundamentally 
wrong with the values of a culture that tends to self destruction?  If this culture is in the process of 
annihilating itself, then how do we pick up the pieces and move on?  Which pieces do we pick up? 
The essay itself is belletristic in genre and adopts familiar literary conventions.  Freud builds his 
argument around an anecdote that unfolds against the backdrop of a pastoral setting, and he frames the 
dialogue in a way that is reminiscent of the eclogue. Freud recalls an afternoon just before the war when 
he went for a walk through a “smiling countryside” in the company of “a taciturn friend and of a young but 
already  famous poet” (305). The already famous poet is almost certainly Rainer Maria Rilke, with whom 
Freud was well acquainted. The identity of the “taciturn friend,” also unnamed, is probably the philosopher 
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Lou Andreas Salomé, who had been romantically involved with both Freud and Rilke (and, decades 
earlier, Nietzsche felt an unrequited love for her).  Freud notes how artists apprehend and value objects 
through the imagined idea of their loss.  He reports that while on their walk together, his poet friend 
(Rilke) had confessed that he was unable to enjoy the scene because he could not help but think of its 
future  loss and  that all of  this beauty was  “fated  to extinction.” The anecdotal scene thus serves as an 
important dramatic frame for Freud’s argument, which involves a staging of two different responses to the  
“proneness to decay of all that is beautiful and perfect” (305). 
Part  of  the  polemical  aim  of  “On Transience”  is  to  argue  simultaneously for the wider cultural 
value  of  the method  of  science  and  for  what  James might have  described  as  the  scientist’s  “healthy-
minded” attitude toward  the  fact  (or what Freud sometimes calls  the  “idea”) of  transience as one of  the 
redeeming values of a self-destructing Western culture, as one part of that culture worth preserving. The 
essay is addressed to a wide audience, offering encouragement to those who were deeply invested (both 
professionally and spiritually) in the values of the civilization that was now destroying itself. In  “On 
Transience,” we see Freud trying to defend the power of a healthy-minded scientific view of transience as 
opposed to the artist’s (the artist here being Rilke) – in effect, an argument for seeing the failure of a set 
of cultural values as an opportunity for carrying on those same nihilistic values. In offering a 
demonstration  of  the  scientific  values  for  which  Freud  argues,  “On  Transience”  is  far  more  than 
symptomatic of those values. These are values Freud is explicitly trying to advertise.  And he presents his 
own developing theory of melancholy as a case study in how a scientific theory (his own) gets developed 
and revised on its path to inevitable abandonment.  His pathological distinction between mourning and 
melancholia, and his foregrounding of the tentativeness of the theory and unresolved problems and 
questions, are thus closely intertwined with the “healthy” attitude he is advertising. 
 
So why give “On Transience,” a slight three-page essay, such close attention compared with the 
more historically and  theoretically significant  “Mourning and Melancholia”?   Why does a commissioned 
piece, a piece intended for a specific audience and written in response to a specific moment of historical 
crisis, merit so much attention apart from its personal and biographical significance for Freud?  Matthew 
Von Unwerth’s 300-page monograph is entirely devoted to this three-page essay, and Stanley Cavell has 
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gone so far as to suggest that “On Transience” is an even more important document than “Mourning and 
Melancholia” in terms of its philosophical and experimental implications (“Finding as Founding” 116).   
Perhaps the first thing to note is that Freud sounds remarkably optimistic in “On Transience,” an 
essay written at a time in history and at a moment in his personal life when he had every reason to 
despair.  Freud’s two sons were fighting in the war; the future of the stable Hapsburg Empire was unclear; 
he had no patients and little source of income; and psychoanalysis, his livelihood and claim to fame, had 
a far from secure status as a science and a respectable discipline.  We might expect to see evidence of 
this personal despair and insecurity, either on the surface or barely beneath the surface.  But we can say 
with some confidence that there is no contradiction or subtext to interpret in the psychoanalytical sense: 
Freud sincerely believed in the scientific attitude and approach as the healthier response to the cultural 
crisis.  
We can easily give a Weberian account of the obsolescence  of  Freud’s  own  theory,  and  the 
unusual  place  occupied  by  Freud’s  theory  in  the  history  of  the  concept  of  melancholy.    It  is  both  a 
watershed moment, a revolution within the history of the concept of melancholy, as well as the moment 
when the concept would be replaced (or displaced) by a more medicalized and scientific notion of clinical 
depression.  Freud’s theory thus stands as the culmination of a long tradition of thought, as well marking 
the end of that tradition.120  This fact of obsolescence is actually an important part of Freud’s own concept 
of melancholy versus mourning, and the model of science within which he theorizes the distinction. There 
is something else more clearly on display in “On Transience” as a rhetorical performance and a bid for the 
recognition of psychoanalysis. In order for Freud to argue for the scientific status of psychoanalysis, he 
must  (to  borrow  Weber’s  language)  show  that  its  achievements  “ask  to  be  surpassed  and  made 
obsolete.”  “On Transience” represents, among other things, a tactical move in Freud’s (ironic) bid to win 
recognition for psychoanalysis as a science (which involved identifying with the scientist as a more radical 
version of artistic genius).121 “On Transience” thus tells us as much about Freud’s more general concept 
of science as it does about his scientific concept of melancholy. And that concept of science involves a 
nihilistic embrace of its own obsolescence.  
                                                   
120 See  Jennifer  Raden  (24)  on  Kraepelin’s  influential  textbook,  and  its  reduction  of  melancholia  to 
depression in its 1913 edition – in effect, making melancholia an obsolete concept 
121 For an historical account of Freud’s effort to fashion psychoanalysis as a science, see Sander Gilman 
The Case of Sigmund Freud: Medicine and Identity at the Fin de Siècle. 
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“On Transience” goes beyond Freud’s well-known invocation of art to illustrate theoretical ideas to 
tell  us more  about  Freud’s  concept  of  the  function  of  art  as  a  separate  and  autonomous  realm.   “On 
Transience” stages  a  version  of  what  C.P.  Snow  would  later  call  the  “Two  Cultures”  debate.  “On 
Transience” thus sheds some important light on Freud’s strange attitude toward art vis a vis science (the 
scientific approach toward ‘”aesthetic emotions” and the more general contrast between art and science). 
There  is  the  odd  situation,  long  noted,  of  Freud’s  ambivalent  and  reluctant  appeal  to  literature  in  the 
development of his theories.122 Freud characterizes artists such as Dostoevsky and Sophocles (and 
literary philosophers like Nietzsche) as identifying areas of the unconscious that Freud and other 
scientists would pursue as research questions.  A scientific hypothesis is an inspired guess, and gift of 
the muse, and there is likewise no telling where a fruitful scientific research project might originate.  But 
Freud also maintained an ongoing ambivalence toward artists, at one point dismissing artists as 
“daydreamers.”   Freud once wrote  to his wife  that  “there  is a general enmity between artists and those 
engaged  in  the  details  of  scientific  work.”    In  “On Transience,”  this  ambivalence  finds  expression  in  a 
polemical form: he is talking about the cultural value of art, not just the serendipitous value of artists, like 
Dostoevsky, who discover territories that the psychologist would map out in more detail and who thus 
complement the work of the scientist.   
I  have  already  noted  some  the  reasons  for  treating  “On  Transience”  as  a  work  of  literature.  
Matthew von Unwerth (in his 2004 book, Freud’s Requiem) is among the latest of critics to suggest that 
the walk recounted in the essay did not happen.  And so it is fiction on one level (in the sense that it is not 
an accurate account of what actually happened) and it is literary in the sense of projecting  ideals.  “On 
Transience” is thus typical of Freud’s other famous case studies: they are accounts of real conversations 
mixed up with fantasies and speculations.  But apart from its obvious belletristic genre, “On Transience” 
itself asks to be read as a work of literature in another sense.  More than an argument in favor of the 
scientific view of the poetic passing away of all things, Freud tries to make a case for the scientific 
imagination of disaster in contrast to the poet’s imaginative response.  Science, in effect, makes pastoral 
poetry obsolete. Freud’s essay is literary in the way it projects and tests out ideals by poetic and rhetorical 
means, in much the same way Matthew Arnold does in poems such as “To Marguerite” (which is easy to 
                                                   
122 For  Freud’s  ambivalence  toward  the  arts,  see  for  example  Hugh  Haughton’s  introduction  to  the 
Penguin Classics edition of Freud’s essay on “The Uncanny.” 
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read as a typically Victorian illustration of the self-deluding projections of the Lacanian imaginary).123  As a 
literary  performance,  “On  Transience”  stages  a  bid  for  recognition  that follows a rhetorically similar 
strategy that we find in an Arnold poem. It can thus take its place alongside the poems of Arnold as a 
virtual textbook case illustrating the cultural values that were the target of modernists generally, as I will 
try to show in my reading of Virginia Woolf later in the chapter. 
 
With their genuinely compelling (if logically dubious) moral arguments, Freud and William Clifford 
(James’s  polemical  opponent,  and  an  earlier  advocate  for  the  values Freud  aligned himself with) went 
some way toward setting the terms of the problem to which James and Nietzsche had to respond.  
Nietzsche recognized the full extent of the problem first and most clearly, James more gradually.   If we 
are going to understand modernism, then we need to appreciate how it challenged dominant epistemic 
values and gave art a central place in the response to cultural crisis that Freud argued science is better 
position  to address.   But positivism, Freud’s proposed solution, appeared  to many modernists  to be an 
intensified form of the problem.  I have already looked at one such counter-strategy  in  “What  is  an 
Emotion?”,  which  involves  the  problematic  strategy  of  defending  “aesthetic  emotions”  as  a  separate 
realm. Later in this chapter, I will look later at the more  overtly  polemical  “Will  to  Believe,”  which 
addresses some of the issues more directly but is in some respects an even more problematic response. 
One contemporary symptom of the dilemma facing James may be found in psychologist Wilhelm 
Wundt’s early  response to Principles of Psychology.   Wundt praised James’s  text as  “literature”  -- “it  is 
beautiful,”  but  it  is  “not  science.”    This  is  the  kind  of  assessment we would  expect  from a  culture  that 
offers up a limited choice between being “a technician or a dreamer,” as Adorno phrases the dilemma in 
his “Essay as Form,” a culture in which there is a sharp dividing line between imaginative literature that 
expresses a view of the world as colored by subjective feeling, and the heroic endeavor of experimental 
science engaged in the perpetual project of revising or revolutionizing our understanding of the objective 
world (152).  As we have seen, James had deep reservations about whether psychology could have the 
status of a science.  But he would also have rejected any characterization of his own work as “literary” in 
the sense that Wundt probably meant.  
                                                   
123 See, for example, Charles Altieri’s reading in The Particulars of Rapture or Carol Christ’s earlier study. 
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What is at stake here are the possible strategies available to us allowing us to argue for 
alternatives – any alternatives – to the dominance of epistemic values, whose strategy is to relegate 
anything that does not conform to its values to the realm of the subjective, the beautiful, the merely 
literary.  This represents a challenge within a disenchanted context, because we need to argue for the 
autonomy of art from those interests, but at the same time conceive of it as a challenge to those values.  
It  is  therefore  somewhat  strange  that  Freudian  psychoanalysis  and  Freud’s  theoretical  concept  of 
melancholy should be among our only resources for resisting what we see as problematic tendencies in 
disenchanted culture.  Today, the distinction between mourning and melancholia survives chiefly in the 
humanities; in psychology, melancholy has been more or less replaced by the concept of clinical 
depression.  Melancholy today has become something of a “junk” concept, from a scientific point of view, 
sharing the fate of the once-popular concept of hysteria.  Like hysteria, the term “melancholy” has been 
absorbed  in  the  vernacular  and  now  circulates  as  a  cliché;  it  is  “fossil  science,”  to  adapt  Emerson’s 
term.124  In retrospect, it is quite easy to criticize Freud’s scientific claims and to identify the personal and 
cultural biases informing his “objective” research; but it  is not so easy to critique the model of theorizing 
and explanation that remains in place as the framework for our own thinking.  There is thus something 
ironic in the insistence of certain critics in the humanities (Julia Kristeva, for example, or Richard 
Wollheim) who seek to defend and preserve a Freudian perspective on melancholy and various other 
disorders as a resistance to cognitivism (an explanatory paradigm) and the reductive medicalization of 
psychiatric conditions.  We might contrast Richard Wollheim’s  stated  project  of  “re-psychologizing the 
emotions” along Freudian lines, in response to the dominance of the cognitivist paradigm in psychology, 
with  Isabelle  Stengers’  comment  that  James  wanted  to  “depsychologize  experience.”    How  can  we 
reconcile these two projects?  The answer, I think, is that they cannot be reconciled.   
This chapter will review some different attempts to establish an outsider status that challenge 
disenchanted values – and this assumes, as Nietzsche did, that nihilism is here to stay and that we 
cannot go back and “re-enchant” nature by appealing to older myths or by rebuilding on new foundational 
absolutes.  I want to look at why these polemical strategies (including James’s early attempt to show how 
certain emotions elude scientific explanation) do not succeed in the necessary task of establishing new 
                                                   
124 “Language is fossil poetry,” as Emerson puts it in his essay “The Poet.” 
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values that fundamentally challenge the values of positivist science itself and its power to marginalize and 
compartmentalize certain forms of experience, just as Wundt consigned James’s writing to the expressive 




The  first  thing  to  note  about  Freud’s  essay  on ways  of  responding  to  loss  is  that  it  bears  the 
peculiar title “On Transience” – not “On Loss” or “On Ways of Dealing with Loss.”  As a companion piece 
to “mourning and Melancholia,” “On Transience” raises more questions than it answers. The shorter piece 
both undermines and complicates the theory-in-the-works.  But this seems to be Freud’s intent.  His own 
self-conscious efforts to problematize a tentative theory serve the purpose of advertising the scientific 
method and attitude whose superiority he wants to demonstrate.  The theoretical challenges that get 
foregrounded sometimes exhibit misconceptions and confusions that are more fundamental than Freud 
seems to realize.  Freud makes some oddly arbitrary distinctions and at the same time ignores and fails to 
make some rather obvious distinctions.  Because the raison d’etre of the commissioned essay is to give 
general readers cause for hope in a time of upheaval (and specifically, to offer a vision of renewed faith in 
the culture that produced this catastrophe), Freud must take seriously his broad definition of the range of 
objects we may  lose  and whose  loss we may  be  called  upon  to mourn.    “Mourning  and Melancholia” 
states that melancholy can be a response to the loss of a person, an object, or an idea. “On Transience” 
deals more specifically with the pain of saying “farewell to an idea” – namely, the loss of faith in Western 
culture and its ideals.  And there is one ideal that Freud wants to retain from Western culture: the ideal of 
the Enlightenment scientist’s healthy response to the disenchantment of nature, to the idea of  transience 
as the fundamental “fact” (or idea, as Freud ambiguously puts it elsewhere) on which positivist science is 
based.  Freud hopes that we can take the scientist’s view of transience as our model  for  responding to 
the war, viewing it as a reminder and an opportunity to rebuild and to move forward with an even firmer 
resolve.  And after that process of mourning is over, he confidently assures his readers, it “will be found 
that our high opinion of the riches of civilization has lost nothing from our discovery of their fragility.  We 
shall build up again all that the war has destroyed.”   So  the crisis  of disillusionment  for Freud  is not a 
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refutation of the values of Enlightenment culture; it is a call for us to rebuild “on firmer ground.”  Freud has 
a polemical antagonist, however, with a different and competing model for dealing with loss and 
rebuilding for the future.  It is the artist.  
One of the more interesting features of “On Transience” is that Freud’s conflation of loss with lack 
(a view of transience more generally) explicitly complicates and challenges the theory he develops in 
“Mourning  and  Melancholia.”    The  scientific  opposition  between  mourning/melancholia  along  with  his 
advertisement of the methods and ideals behind the scientific approach to transience becomes a 
distinction between two orientations (or total reactions upon life), not pathological in nature.  But he 
continues, nevertheless, to “diagnose” the poet’s attitude in the very terms he is trying to defend. Freud 
had acknowledged the puzzle of pre-emptive mourning. There is little basis, one might suppose, for 
distinguishing between mourning and melancholia if neither is a response to a determinate  loss.    “On 
Transience” is interesting in part because it shows how Freud is forced to make some crucial 
equivocations in the process of expanding his notion of loss to include the idea of transience.  I want to 
look more closely at some of these conflations and equivocations. Instead of examining the psychology 
underlying this conflation of natural and man-made loss, Freud himself proceeds to commit something 
like  this  category  error  of  conflating  “natural”  transience  and  specifically  man-made catastrophes and 
losses such as the war. The conflation of natural and man made, but more importantly the conflation of 
pathology with a world view – what Wittgenstein would call conceptual and factual claims, or criteria for 
meaning and what are taken to be symptoms – is a key strategic move for Freud.   This allows him to 
devote his energies to the task of staging science and its pursuit of truth as a form of heroic melancholy 
that is preferrable to the poet’s regressive melancholy. 




of the voice of protest against this fact: 
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No! it is impossible that all this loveliness of Nature and Art, of the world of our sensations 
and of the world outside, will really fade away into nothing. It would be too senseless and 
too presumptuous to believe it. Somehow or other this loveliness must be able to persist 
and to escape all the powers of destruction. (305) 
 
But such a demand for immortality, Freud cautions us, is merely a product of our wishes; “what is painful 
may  none  the  less  be  true.”    And  so  Freud  responds  to  this  young poet by offering a third possible 
response to the painful truth of extinction. Freud confesses that he could not argue with the claim that all 
things must pass, including what is beautiful and perfect. That is an established truth. But he does take 
issue with the pessimistic poet’s view that the transience of what is beautiful involves any loss of its worth.  
And this leads us to a third view, with which he identifies and for which he wants to argue: that of the 
scientist. 
Freud’s  attempt  to  understand  responses  to  the  war  and  what  Pound  called  a  “botched 
civilization”  (the  “thousand books”  for  which  a  “myriad”  had  already  died  by  the summer  of  1915)  also 
places the war in a narrative that is at odds with the way it was understood by modernists (poets 
included).  We soon realize that the war is merely the occasion for more general reflections on the nature 
of loss – hence,  the  appropriateness  of  the  pastoral  eclogue  framing  Freud.    “On  Transience”  is  an 
occasional piece, and the occasion is the war.  The conversation took place prior to the war; Freud is now 
writing from a later perspective, in 1915. This allows Freud to equivocate somewhat.  He criticizes Rilke 
for seeing the present in the light of future loss, for mourning prematurely in anticipation of the actual loss 
of the war.  But that is more or less what Freud himself will go on to do, though with a different motivation .  
If Freud wants to understand melancholy as a response to loss, and to understand the scientist’s versus 
the artist’s  response to this loss of an abstract idea, then he fails to explain what it was that modernist 
artists (and even Nietzsche, a inspiration for Freud as he was for Weber) were responding to before the 
loss of the war.  For Freud, the catastrophe of the war gives the cultural crisis an “object-cause” (or allows 
us to project a cause, as Lacan would put it).  The occasion for this reminiscence, Freud tells us, is that 
the conversation took place the summer before the war – which  “robbed  the world  of  its  beauty”  and 
“tarnished the lofty impartiality of science.”  It also showed us the ephemerality of those things that were 
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regarded as changeless.  According to Freud, the poet’s mourning of loss prior to that loss (in the war) is 
pathological. And so Freud argues that there are two responses to the traumatic losses of the war, but 
only after the cause has been located and a narrative established.   By Freud’s logic, Rilke and the large 
number of modernist writers who were responding before 1914 to what they saw as a crisis in their 
culture (and that includes Nietzsche, not to mention the presciently elegiac pre-war poetry of A.E. 
Housman and Thomas Hardy) were technically in “premature mourning.”   This is not, however, the line 
that Freud takes – the notion of  a  “sadness without cause” being, after all,  a problem which scientists 
(and psychoanalysis as a science) are still working hard to solve. Freud criticizes the artist for the 
“cheating” strategy of conflating loss and absence, of anticipatory mourning.  But we soon witness Freud 
the scientist doing the same thing.  He views objects through their imagined (future) loss just as much as 
the artist does. As we shall see, the “illogic” of anticipatory mourning is the basis of the healthy scientist’s 
own world view. 
Freud’s  mourning-based positivism is a procedural pursuit of truth that finds an almost exact 
parallel (or model) in economics and sociology (the quantitative discipline that positivism helped to define 
in the early nineteenth century).  “Transience value,” Freud writes, “is scarcity value in time. Limitation in 
the  possibility  of  an  enjoyment  raises  the  value  of  the  enjoyment”125 (305). The economic metaphors 
reflect Freud’s proceduralist positivism.  If objects in a disenchanted world do not have intrinsic value, if  
they have only the value we give to them, then the concept of exchange value naturally replaces any 
notion of intrinsic value (and we might take note of the parallel replacement of natural causes by the 
rational-choice discourse of reasons and motivations).  “When [mourning] has renounced everything that 
has been lost,” Freud tells us, “then it has consumed itself, and our libido is once more free (in so far as 
we are still young and active) to replace the lost objects by fresh ones equally or still more precious” 
(306).  The problem of value, for Freud, thus gets converted into economic terms.  The model replacing of 
lost “objects” (meaning also ideas and ideals) gets translated into a model of how theories get replaced, a 
model which involves a planned and built-in obsolescence.  All theories are provisional, everything is 
                                                   
125 Though  I  do  not  have  space  to  do  so  here,  it  would  be  interesting  to  compare  Freud’s  economic 
metaphors, as a running motif throughout his work, with the “cash value” and business-world metaphors 
that James was fond of employing on occasion in his advertisements for pragmatist thinking.  As we saw 
in Chapter Two, Jonathan Levin felt the need to defend James from charges of his ideological complicity 
with industrial capitalism (based partly on James’s own penchant for such metaphors).  
 146 
open to revision.  Mourning may come to a “spontaneous” end, but the nihilistic process of  renunciation 
and reinvestment never comes to an end; the model of scientific theorizing that embraces the procedural 
transience of a theory (like a work of art) is an open-ended procedure that requires a repeated process of 
mourning. 
Once Freud has established that the process of mourning is an essential component of the 
healthy-minded proceduralism of  scientific  inquiry  itself,  and  he  has  thus  already  “accounted  for”  the 
poet’s melancholy as pathological by virtue of its incommensurability with the scientific method, Freud can 
then go on to play the role of the scientist and begin to treat the artist as a  “problematic” and vaguely 
pathological case: 
 
These considerations appeared to me incontestable; but I noticed that I had made no 
impression either upon the poet or upon my friend. My failure led me to infer that some 
powerful emotional factor was at work which was disturbing their judgement, and I 
believed later that I had discovered what it was. What spoilt their enjoyment of beauty 
must have been a revolt in their minds against mourning. The idea that all this beauty 
was transient was giving these two sensitive minds a foretaste of mourning over its 
decease; and, since the mind instinctively recoils from anything that is painful, they felt 
their enjoyment of beauty interfered with by thoughts of its transience. (306) 
 
It is hard to know where to begin in responding to Freud’s benighted account and what is almost certainly 
a gross misreading of his companions and their stubborn refusal to acknowledge (let alone contest) that 
which is incontestable; one can also easily imagine how Nietzsche would respond  to  Freud’s  view  of 
nature as an accessory for our enjoyment and his casual claim about the mind’s instinctive “recoil” from 
“anything painful.”  Freud’s purpose here, of course, is not simply to analyze Rilke and Lou Salomé. His 
staging of the scientist’s heroically unbiased scientific inquiry (“what is true may nevertheless be painful”) 
reads as almost a caricature of the disengenuous “open inquiry” model of science.  At this mid-point in the 
essay, having established the healthy-minded point of view, we are invited to approach a “problem” from 
the point of view that recognizes it only as a problem or a pathology.  Freud wants to dramatize his own 
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process of scientific thinking, what he “was led to infer” in response to the failure of his view to make an 
impression on his friends (which is a rather transparent way of highlighting their failure to be receptive to 
the voice of reason). What Freud  infers  is  the presence of some “emotional  factor”  – that is to say, an 
irrational factor – which was disturbing their judgement.  He speculates, moreover, that their view must be 
a purely subjective and infantile response, “a  revolt  in  their minds  against mourning”  – but, of course, 
Freud has already defined his own view as a healthy-minded one based on the process of mourning.  
And so the revolt “against mourning” means here a regressive and reactionary stance  – the melancholy 
poet is cast as something of the philistine who resists (pathologically resists) all that is progressive and 
experimental. Freud thus presents the scientist as the one who is radically forward-looking, and the artist 
who is regressive (a “revolt against mourning” implies a resistance to progress). 
Freud performs all of this question-begging inference without, it seems, the slightest trace of self 
awareness or irony.  But the most telling equivocation comes when Freud assumes the role of the 
poet/visionary, a panoramic eschatological vision of future catastrophe where Freud, paradoxically, most 
clearly manifests the anthropocentric bias at the heart of positivism and its social-procedural notion of 
scientific objectivity as a value: 
 
A flower that blossoms only for a single night does not seem to us on that account less 
lovely. Nor can I understand any better why the beauty and perfection of a work of art or 
of an intellectual achievement should lose its worth because of its temporal limitation. A 
time may indeed come when the pictures and statues which we admire to-day will 
crumble to dust, or a race of men may follow us who no longer understand the works of 
our poets and thinkers, or a geological epoch may even arrive when all animate life upon 
the earth ceases; but since the value of all this beauty and perfection is determined only 
by its significance for our own emotional lives, it has no need to survive us and is 
therefore independent of absolute duration. (307) 
 




versus unhealthy response to loss.  Freud does give a place to the projective imagination, and (as we 
see) he embarks on a poetic flight himself.  Like Aristotle, he speaks of the visions and monumental 
creations of  “great men,”  the works of our poets and  thinkers  that may not be understood by others or 
appreciated by future generations.   The argument here assumes the disenchantment of nature: nature 
has no intrinsic value except the value it has for us, for “our own emotional lives.”  In an earlier passage, 
Freud offered as a consolation a variation on “man is the measure of all things”: “As regards the beauty of 
Nature,” Freud points out, “each time it is destroyed by winter it comes again next year, so that in relation 
to the length of our lives it can in fact be regarded as eternal.“  So while we cannot derive an ought from 
an is (a cornerstone of disenchanted thinking),  we  can  and must  come  up  with  a  “form  of  life”  that 
responds adequately and heroically to what is taken to be the human condition (no longer melancholia, 
but melancholy).  Indeed, it is our duty to stay active and engaged in shared projects, to be carefully 
distinguished from private ones. 
Freud gives one final demonstration of this healthy-minded process of inquiry, in a passage 
where he takes pains to emphasize the tentative and speculative nature of his theory-in-progress and 
draws attention to the contingent and transient character of his own theorizing, to its own planned and 
imminent obsolescence.   This, as I have tried to show, is the cornerstone of Freud’s advertisement for 
the  scientist’s  healthy-minded view.  And this uncertainty forces us to revise our understanding of 
melancholy versus mourning in the broader sense (as a response to the loss of an idea). Mourning over 
the loss of something we have loved, Freud explains, is a common experience, a process that the layman 
regards as commonplace and self-evident.  “But to psychologists, mourning is a great riddle.”126  Freud, 
like the poet reading to his friends a few lines of a poem in progress, then gives a brief exposition of his 
as-yet-unpublished theory in progress. He highlights one problem that his theory leaves unresolved: the 
question of why the detachment of libido from its objects should be such a painful process.  With regard 
to that question, Freud shifts to the first-person plural pronoun to report that “we have not hitherto been 
able  to  frame  any  hypothesis  [that  would]  account  for  it.”    Almost  needless  to  say,  this  represents  a 
problem for future researchers to tackle.  And the underlying explanation will no doubt be more complex 
                                                   
126 In Freud’s original, it is not a mystery (Geheimnis), but a riddle (Rätsel). 
 149 
than we realize, those complexities in turn revealing new unresolved problems which future research will 
inherit.  The pattern is a familiar one, and we see how Freud identifies and frames the problem  as a 
particular kind of problem.  And the problem Freud chooses to highlight is actually, as I think is now clear, 
the least of the problems with Freud’s theorizing.  The real problem – one which he oddly ignores in the 
space of this demonstration piece – has to do with the logic of anticipatory loss, with the conflation of 
actual and determinate loss with the idea of transience.  This is a constitutive blindness for Freud, 
however, and the model of doing science that Freud has just advertised almost guarantees that we will 
seek to explain melancholia according to the metaphor of divestment and re-investment of libido, and 
speak of the value of objects (the way we appraise the value and promise of research projects, for 
example) in terms of instrumental value within the cultural marketplace as it is understood by the scientist.  
The  “demand  for  immortality” Freud writes,  “is  a product of  our wishes  too unmistakable  to  lay 
claim  to  reality: what  is painful may none  the  less be  true.”      In a disenchanted culture,  the  impossible 
“demand  for  immortality”  is  replaced  by  the  demand  for  social  recognition. There is an important 
biographical and interpersonal dimension to Freud’s bid for the recognition of psychoanalysis that makes 
“On  Transience”  read  even  more  like  a  work  of  literature.    The  two  “sensitive  minds”  who  were  his 
companions were Rilke and Lou Salomé, and Freud was at the time still competing for the unrequited 
affections of Salomé.  As we have seen, Freud presents himself as the noble and lucid visionary, the 
skeptical scientist as the heroic genius who sees farther than others, and in the passage where he 
addresses the “layperson”  it  is hard not to think of his “taciturn friend”  – Lou Salomé – as the imagined 
addressee.  Freud had only recently experienced the personal loss of a theory he particularly cherished: 
the discovery that his theory about Da Vinci’s unconscious and repressed thematic obsessions had been 
based  on  a  factual  error,  a  mistranslation  of  a  key  word  in  Da  Vinci’s  writings.    He  confessed  his 
disappointment  in  a  letter  to  Salomé.    The  Da  Vinci  study  of  1910,  Freud’s  pioneering  foray  into 
psychoanalytic literary criticism, was a work in which Freud had invested a great deal and to which he 
gave an importance that now seems difficult to comprehend.  In a letter to Salomé, he described the 
essay  as  the  “only  beautiful  thing  I  have  ever  written.”   This  biographical  context  does  not  “explain” 
Freud’s strategy in “On Transience,” but it is one key to understanding the wider cultural context in which 
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Freud’s  literary  performance  reads  as  a  symptom.127 "But  finally,”  Freud  intimated  to  Salomé,  “the 
decision prevailed to struggle through alone, as far as one still has a miserable shred of solitude left."  
What is painful may nevertheless be true. 
 
Malcolm Bowie reads “On Transience” as a key to understanding Freud’s concept of science, and 
he finds the essay a useful way of bringing out the difference between Freud’s and Lacan’s concepts of 
psychoanalysis as a theoretical science.  Bowie sees Freud’s eschatological vision of future catastrophe 
as more than a poetic flourish.  The vision of ultimate catastrophe, the “truth of extinction,” is a premise on 
which  the  scientific  imagination,  as  Freud  understands  it,  is  based.    “But  before  he  presses  ahead  in 
imagination to the worst, to the ending of days,” Bowie writes, “the objects of the world are perfectly st ill 
and available for inspection.  For Freud, as for Leonardo, the individual bloom could be described in the 
multitude of its individual parts and its power of cohension” (9).  Freud has an analogous view of theories 
as works of art.  Theories are testaments to the coherence and meaning that the creative mind (the 
scientist’s as well as the artist’s) confers upon an otherwise meaningless universe.  Our knowledge of a 
theory’s eventual refutation and replacement will actually intensify our sense of its value as a testament to 
the synthetic powers of the theory-forming imagination, much in the same way as our knowledge of the 
eventual loss of the rose intensifies our appreciation of its current beauty. Bowie  then contrasts Lacan’s 
and Freud’s concepts of scientific theorizing.  Lacan rejects the idea of wholeness and coherence as a 
property of objects, and Bowie calls Lacan’s approach to theorizing an attempt to “write transience back 
into the psychoanalytic account of the human mind.”   
I  see  Freud’s  essay  as illuminating and illustrative for different reasons, however. “On 
Transience”  is,  among  things,  a  virtual  textbook  demonstration  of  Lacan’s  Imaginary  order  and mirror 
stage.  Lou Salomé plays the third-party role of the silent auditor in this triangular menage.   Freud’s self-
                                                   
127 And it is symptomatic of values, including the ideal of the scientist as the misunderstood renegade-
hero, that continue to thrive in our own time.  In  his  2006  review  of  Matthew  Von  Unwerth’s  Freud’s 
Requiem, Hanif Kureishi concludes with an eloquent flourish making a case for the belated recognition of 
Freud’s importance as measured not by the truth of his scientific claims (which a century of criticism has 
turned into a crumbled “edifice”), but rather by virtue of the  future research he has stimulated: “At a time 
when Freud's irrelevance is gleefully celebrated, von Unwerth illustrates the truth of Trilling's remark that 
Freud is ‘a quarry not an edifice’  - that, far from having been dismissed, his work continues to generate 
new work, like a burst of fresh associations. There are few, if any, brain scientists or behavioural 
therapists of whom this can be said.”  If only Lou Salomé had known... 
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ennobling and simultaneously self-abasing bid for recognition illustrates, in a microcosm, the psychic 
economy of Victorian culture.  And it has an almost exact parallel in Woolf’s modernist critique of a culture 
trapped within that imaginary realm in the triangular relationship that Woolf dramatizes in To the 
Lighthouse between the characters of Lily Briscoe, the young aspiring scholar Charles Tansley, and the 
melancholy  Victorian  Mr.  Ramsay  (a  character  based  on Woolf’s  father,  Leslie Stephen).  In To the 
Lighthouse, Lily Briscoe plays something close to the role of the “taciturn” Lou Salomé.128 Mr. Ramsay is 
Woolf’s  portrait  not  only  of  her  father,  but  of  a  type  of  emotionally  needy Victorian melancholic whose 
“demands for sympathy can never be met,” as Woolf puts it in her 1926 essay “On Being Ill” (9-12).   
 
 
3.  Virginia Woolf: On Gloomy Egoists and the Need for Atmosphere 
 “On Being Ill” was composed the same year Woolf was finishing work on To the Lighthouse, and 
it may be read as a gloss on the novel – among  other  things,  placing  the  celebrated  “Time  Passes” 
section of To the Lighthouse in a perhaps new light.  The essay, which I will look at later in this section, 
presents  an  extended meditation  on  the  relation  between  “illness”  (which Woolf vaguely employs as a 
cognate term for melancholy) and the power and consolations of the poet’s vision of the world.  Among 
other things, though, Woolf’s meditation has the effect of complicating our reading of the poetic language 
we read “Time Passes.”129  Consider, for example, the following central passage in “Time Passes”: 
 
At that season those who had gone down to pace the beach and ask of the sea and sky 
what message they reported or what vision they affirmed had to consider among the 
usual tokens of divine bounty—the sunset on the sea, the pallor of dawn, the moon rising, 
fishing-boats against the moon, and children making mud pies or pelting each other with 
handfuls of grass, something out of harmony with this jocundity and this serenity. There 
was the silent apparition of an ashen-coloured ship for instance, come, gone; there was a 
                                                   
128 Lou Salome, according to most accounts, including Nietzsche’s, was in fact a memorably stimulating 
conversationalist  and  anything  but  “taciturn”  (although we may  guess  at  the  reasons  for  her  reticence 
when confronted with Freud’s incomprehension).   
129 See, for example, the Cambridge Companion to Virginia Woolf, page 59, for an account of the genesis 
of  the  “Time  Passes”  section,  Woolf’s  misgivings  about  its  language,  and  the  revisions  she  made 
following the publication of a French translation of the section (as a stand-alone text) in 1926. 
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purplish stain upon the bland surface of the sea as if something had boiled and bled, 
invisibly, beneath. This intrusion into a scene calculated to stir the most sublime 
reflections and lead to the most comfortable conclusions stayed their pacing. It was 
difficult blandly to overlook them; to abolish their significance in the landscape; to 
continue, as one walked by the sea, to marvel how beauty outside mirrored beauty within. 
     Did Nature supplement what man advanced? Did she complete what he began? With 
equal complacence she saw his misery, his meanness, and his torture. That dream, of 
sharing, completing, of finding in solitude on the beach an answer, was then but a 
reflection in a mirror, and the mirror itself was but the surface glassiness which forms in 
quiescence when the nobler powers sleep beneath? Impatient, despairing yet loth to go 
(for beauty offers her lures, has her consolations), to pace the beach was impossible; 
contemplation was unendurable; the mirror was broken. 
     [Mr. Carmichael brought out a volume of poems that spring, which had an unexpected 
success. The war, people said, had revived their interest in poetry.]130 
 
On the surface, this response  to  the  losses  may  seem  perfectly  in  the  spirit  of  Freud’s  disenchanted 
argument for how to make sense of the fact of transience.  We might even set the disenchanted vision 
presented  here  alongside Freud’s  own  poetic  vision  of  disaster  in  “On Transience.”   We  can  say  with 
some confidence that the renewed interest in poetry, matter-of-factly noted in the bracketed aside, was 
probably not an interest in poems like The Waste Land (“I had not thought death had undone so many”) 
or  Hugh  Selwyn  Mauberly’s  lament  over  the  “myriad  that  had  died,”  or  even  poetically  experimental 
novels like Jacob’s Room with a miniscule initial print-run.  Mr. Carmichael’s poems are probably closer in 
genre to the elegiac and pastoral poetry of A. E. Housman and Wilfred Owen, for which indeed there was 
a renewed interest  (especially  for  older  volumes  like  Housman’s  A Shropshire Lad, which appeared 
decades before  the war and only  later  found  its elegiac  “subject matter.”    It  is a prime example of  the 
regressive anticipatory mourning that Freud attributed to the melancholy poet).  And there is certainly no 
need to revive an interest in poetry in a member of the reading public like Mr. Ramsay, who exhibited an 
                                                   
130 Brackets are in the original, of course. 
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interest in poetry prior to all this; as we saw in the first part of the novel, he finds sustenance in habitually 
quoting to himself fragments of poetry, such as Cowper’s “we perish, each alone.”  So do we read irony 
into the bracketed comment above?  Does it register a turn away from the consolations of nature and 
“beauty,”  to  the consolations of a poeticized nature of trees in bloom? Is the war the cause of this 
disillusionment with nature and at the same time the cause of the boom in popularity of poems that 
somehow appeal differently to nature?  Of the quite different-sounding poetic language that appears 
outside  the  bracketed  comments  in  “Time Passes,”  we might well  ask:   Who is talking here?131  The 
walker on the beach is clearly Mr. Ramsay, as we have been informed earlier in the section, and these 
are presumably his private meditations as he goes on his walks.  There is another level of distanced 
commentary in the recurring parenthetic refrains – “beauty offers her lures, has her consolations” – which 
are clearly ironic and closer in tone to the language of the bracketed comments that appear throughout 
the section.   
Does this present a narrative of personal and cultural disenchantment, or is it a portrait of an 
already disenchanted Victorian thinking that has to re-stage for itself this “break up,” this failed appeal to 
nature?  In  Matthew  Arnold’s  “Dover  Beach,”  the  “mirror”  of  nature  shatters  so  that  the  speaker  can 
contemplate the fragments – the pebbles whose random jostling on the shore echoes the later metaphor 
of the ignorant armies that clash by night: 
Listen! you hear the grating roar 
Of pebbles which the waves draw back, and fling, 
At their return, up the high strand, 
Begin, and cease, and then again begin, 
With tremulous cadence slow, and bring 
The eternal note of sadness in. 
Arnold’s speaker stages this scene of disillusionment for himself, but the staging requires the indifference 
of nature (which, like Thomas Hardy’s non-existent God, has to be invoked as an addressee) as well as 
the real or imagined presence of a third-party auditor (“Listen!” he calls to this unnamed person, after he 
has invited her to look out the window with him a few lines earlier).  This is a hallmark strategy of Arnold’s 




love poems, and to our ears a rather transparent one in its bid for sympathy.  We see a similar strategy 
employed, for example, in the well-known  poem  “Isolation:  To Margeurite,”  the  title  of  which  is  itself  a 
symptom of  the paradox of which Arnold himself may not have been  fully aware: a  “break-up” poem  in 
which the speaker draws upon his feelings of isolation in a desperate attempt to construct an imaginary 
identity for himself as isolated (to “prove [this truth]” and “make thine own: / 'Thou hast been, shalt be, art, 
alone.'”), a strategy that depends ironically upon an eleborate series of appeals to imagined third parties – 
including a projected image of the ex-lover and an imagined identification with a world indifferent to 
human  interests and populated by  “unmating things.”132  As a portrait of a mind in mourning, we might 
                                                   
132 Arnold seems to have had a hard time finding closure for this strategy: He has a lot to say in his 
isolation, about his isolation, as he gradually establishes an attitude and works out an identity for himself.  
In  “To Margeurite: Continued,” Arnold continues his meditation in four additional stanzas that serve as 
something of an “addendum” to “Isolation”: 
 
Yes! in the sea of life enisled, 
With echoing straits between us thrown, 
Dotting the shoreless watery wild, 
 
We mortal millions live alone. 
The islands feel the enclasping flow, 
And then their endless bounds they know. 
 
But when the moon their hollows lights, 
And they are swept by balms of spring, 
And in their glens, on starry nights, 
The nightingales divinely sing; 
And lovely notes, from shore to shore, 
Across the sounds and channels pour— 
 
Oh! then a longing like despair 
Is to their farthest caverns sent; 
For surely once, they feel, we were 
Parts of a single continent! 
Now round us spreads the watery plain— 
Oh might our marges meet again! 
 
Who order'd, that their longing's fire 
Should be, as soon as kindled, cool'd? 
Who renders vain their deep desire?— 
A God, a God their severance ruled! 
And bade betwixt their shores to be 
The unplumb'd, salt, estranging sea. 
 
Arnold’s  elaborate  Victorian  imaginary  is  in  man  ways  an archetypal and representative.  The best 
reading of the poem, in this regard, is by Charles Altieri (in The Particulars of Rapture), who sums up the 




of the third-party auditor; it is a meditation on what happens when we can no longer adopt the strategy of 
appealing to the fact of transience and the truth of existence as sources of consolation once we 
experience the loss of the necessary third component in this rhetorical triangle.  The melancholy Victorian 
can still recuperate his time-tested strategy; but what Mr. Ramsay and Arnold demonstrate is the extent to 
which that strategy involves an imaginary theater.   They are both  “gloomy egoists”133 trapped in a self-
sustaining psychic economy in which the demand for sympathy, as Woolf puts it, can never be met.  
While  she  was  composing  “Time  Passes”  in  the  summer  of  1926, Woolf  privately  expressed 
reservations about  the  language  being  excessively  “poetic”  and Victorian-sounding, indicating perhaps 
the fear of entering into the emotional world of her father and adopting his language without the proper 
distance from it.  The bracketed asides that famously appear throughout the section are abrupt markers 
of the ironic distance she wanted to maintain.  But it is the language, above all, that Woolf gets right in her 
portrait.  In her account of the rhythms of a soul in conversation with itself, Woolf gives us an anatomy of 
a period-specific  disenchanted melancholy  as  vivid  as  “Love Song  of  J.  Alfred Prufrock.”   What Woolf 
                                                                                                                                                                    
to Arnold’s own assessment of his significance.    In a  letter of 1869, Arnold predicted  that his  time will 
come by virtue of his poems’ failure to achieve a certain level of greatness: 
 
My poems represent, on the whole, the main movement of mind of the last quarter of a 
century, and thus they will probably have their day as people become conscious to 
themselves of what that movement of mind is, and interested in the literary productions 
which reflect it. It might be fairly urged that I have less poetical sentiment than Tennyson 
and less intellectual vigour and abundance than Browning; yet because I have perhaps 
more of a fusion of the two than either of them, and have more regularly applied that 
fusion to the main line of modern development, I am likely enough to have my turn as 




For instance, on the very day on which I write this page, the post brings me some 
aphorisms from a worldly-wise old friend in Heidelberg which may serve as a good 
contemporaneous expression of Epicureanism: "By the word 'happiness' every human 
being understands something different. It is a phantom pursued only by weaker minds. 
The wise man is satisfied with the more modest but much more definite term 
contentment. What education should chiefly aim at is to save us from a discontented life. 
Health is one favoring condition, but by no means an indispensable one, of contentment. 
Woman's heart and love are a shrewd device of Nature, a trap which she sets for the 
average man, to force him into working. But the wise man will always prefer work chosen 
by himself." (Varieties 135) 
 
133 I borrow this term  from  the  title of Eleanor Sickels’ 1932 study The Gloomy Egoist, an obscure but 
wonderfully insightful study that I came across by accident in the course of researching this project. 
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described as her therapeutic “exorcising” of the ghost of her father involved working through the language 
of her father and the needs that it staged for itself.  As she composed “Time Passes,” it inevitably became 
more of a representative portrait of a entire period and of a period-specific sensibility that had been lost.  
If this section of the novel captures a particular response to the catastrophe of war and loss of a world, 
then it becomes clear that modernists like Woolf were responding to the loss of a culture that was quite 
different from the one Freud seems to have had in mind. There is no way of knowing what Rilke actually 
said to Freud on their walk, or whether indeed that walk in the countryside really ever took place.  But we 
can easily imagine a modernist artist’s typical objection to Freud’s limited and somewhat quaint motive of 
the private “enjoyment” of nature.  We can easily imagine Rilke thinking little of the picturesque value of 
the landscape as an Arnoldian correlate to the “vanity of human wishes.”  It  is not nature itself that has 
suddenly lost its value; it has already been drained of its intrinsic value in a disenchanted culture (as 
Freud’s positivism, for example, demonstrates).  What has been lost is the conventional appeal to nature 
in its role as an imaginary source of consolation.  Modernists like Woolf, we might say, were disillusioned 
with the identity-forming strategies of disenchanted thinking itself, a total reaction upon life that was also, 
among other things, a powerful mode of consolation and an effective means of securing an image for an 
otherwise insecure and insubstantial self.  Woolf, like many others of her generation, was in search of an 
entirely new way of relating to the world that did not revert to earlier Romantic notions of natural fact as 
both  a  source  and  “mirror”  of  human  values  (which  were  tenuous  notions,  even  for  Wordsworth’s 
generation).  The post-lapsarian demand for recognition, replacing what Freud dismissed as the “demand 
for immortality,” generated a psychic economy that Virginia Woolf, no less than William James, felt was a 
dead-end and a cultural source of blindness – not to mention the cause of insufferably talk-filled walks 
through the countryside with companions who seemed most interested in eliciting compliments for their 
boots (as Mr. Ramsay demands of Lily Briscoe) and encouragement for continuing in their work (as Freud 
demands of Lou Salomé). 
 
In  contrast  with  the  ambivalently  voiced  poetry  that Woolf  holds  at  an  arm’s  length  in  “Time 
Passes,” we find on the first page of “On Being Ill” an exuberantly playful and parodic brand of language. 
Sounding somewhat like the scientist locating an unexplored area for future research, Woolf begins her 
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essay by complaining that very little has been written about the subject of illness. This claim, of course, is 
far from true, as her densely allusive opening makes clear.  The first sentence alone is a virtual catalog 
and whirlwind tour of motifs found throughout the history of writing on the subject of melancholy:  
 
Considering how common illness is, how tremendous the spiritual change that it brings, 
how astonishing, when the lights of health go down, the undiscovered countries that are 
then disclosed, what wastes and deserts of the soul a slight attack of influenza brings to 
view, what precipices and lawns sprinkled with bright flowers a little rise of temperature 
reveals, what ancient and obdurate oaks are uprooted in us by the act of sickness, how 
we go down into the pit of death and feel the waters of annihilation close above our 
heads and wake thinking to find ourselves in the presence of the angels and the harpers 
when we have a tooth out and come to the surface in the dentist's arm-chair and confuse 
his "Rinse the mouth--rinse the mouth" with the greeting of the Deity stooping from the 
floor of Heaven to welcome us--when we think of this, as we are so frequently forced to 
think of it, it becomes strange indeed that illness has not taken its place with love and 
battle and jealousy among the prime themes of literature. Novels, one would have 
thought, would have been devoted to influenza; epic poems to typhoid; odes to 
pneumonia; lyrics to toothache. (3) 
 
We  see  here  are  allusions  to  Hamlet’s  “undiscovered  country,”  and  everywhere  – particularly in the 
playfully ambiguous handling of the somatic/spiritual theme – we find the voice and the characteristic 
approach  of  Robert  Burton.    In Woolf’s  essay,  all  of these allusions unfold in a single, uninterrupted 
opening sentence that gives us taste of the wild, rollercoaster style that lies ahead of us.134  
The essay is, among other things, a parody of what James called the reductive reign of “medical 
materialism.”   At the same time, it is also an argument emphasizing what James called the extent to 
which  “our mental  life  is knit up with our corporeal  frame”  (“What  is an Emotion” 201).     The object  of 
Woolf’s criticism, however, is literature as well as science. In a passage reminiscent of James’s opening 
                                                   
134 A 28-page essay that, in the Paris Press edition, consists of only ten paragraphs, many of them 




which the soul looks straight and clear, and, save for one or two passions such as desire and greed, is 
null, and negligible and non-existent”  (4). This  is  a puzzling claim, as we have  already noted.   But we 
eventually learn that Woolf is complaining of a specific kind of literature – plot-driven realist fiction, which 
includes what we might call psychological realism.135  What we need as a supplement to the mind-body 
dualism  of  conventional  storytelling, Woolf  argues,  is  a  “robust  philosophy,”  a  “reason  rooted in the 
bowels of the earth” (5). 
 
The essay lends itself to a biographical reading, and its is easy to paraphrase as a playful but at 
bottom earnest defense of illness as a source of creativity. The phantasmagorical experiences and bouts 
of depression that Woolf describes are largely drawn from her own experience, which is often a harrowing 
one.  The line between fancy and hallucination for Woolf was a finely drawn and perilous one.  (She had 
suffered a severe breakdown as recently as 1926; in an earlier bout, she recalled hearing birds speak in 
Greek.  As is well known, Woolf based the character of Mr. Ramsay on her father, the archetypal 
Victorian Leslie Stephen, who positioned himself ambiguously as a scholar and public intellectual, 
something of a blend of Matthew Arnold and William Clifford, and bearing perhaps a little resemblance to 
another fictional character, George Eliot’s Casaubon, who in his career could not quite get to “Q” let alone 
“R.”  It is easy to read the essay as a parallel defense of what the artist does with her “illness,” in contrast 
to  the  heroic melancholy  of  her  industrious  father.    “On Being  Ill” demonstrates  quite  clearly  the  close 
proximity of  the artist’s melancholy  to  the stoically  resigned and self-protective strategy of Mr. Ramsay: 
they both demand sympathy, and they both thrive on the imaginary pleasures afforded by solitude. Woolf 
opens with a brush-stroke of irony: “Wonderful to relate, poets have found religion in nature; people live in 
the country to learn virtue from plants.  It  is in their indifference that they are comforting.” And she then 
                                                   
135 See  page  19,  where  she  writes:  “Illness  makes  us  disinclined  for  the  long  campaigns  that  prose 
exacts: The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire is not the book for influenza, nor The Golden Bowl, 




Woolf casts her argument as a defense of illness in contrast with what she calls the “army of the 
upright,” aligning herself (as William James does) with the “sick-souled” as against the “healthy-minded.”  
Here is an example of the pleasures and epiphanies that we are given access to when we join this band 
of conscientious objectors that station themselves at the margins of “normal” society:  
 
Now, lying recumbent, staring straight up, the sky is discovered to be something so 
different from this that really it is a little shocking. This then has been going on all the time 
without our knowing it!—this incessant making up of shapes and casting them down, this 
buffeting of clouds together, and drawing vast trains of ships and wagons from North to 
South, this incessant ringing up and down of curtains of light and shade, this interminable 
experiment with gold shafts and blue shadows, with veiling the sun and unveiling it, with 
making rock ramparts and wafting them away—this endless activity, with the waste of 
Heaven knows how many million horse power of energy, has been left to work its will 
year in year out. The fact seems to call for comment and indeed for censure. Ought not 
some one to write to The Times? Use should be made of it. One should not let this 
gigantic cinema play perpetually to an empty house. (13-14) 
 
Melancholy writing, as Woolf imagines it elsewhere in the essay, will probably “be something laughable” 
(7).  This example that Woolf offers of an “epiphany” experienced by the ill person is whimsical in tone, 
but it is also (for some readers) faintly embarrassing; as readers, we might tend to sympathize with the 
reaction of the hypothetical pedestrians who Woolf imagines “would be impeded and disconcerted by a 
public sky-gazer”  seen  lying  on  her  back  in  the middle  of  a  city  sidewalk  (13).   What  do we make  of 
Woolf’s irony here?  The entire essay is playful and arch in its humor, but its irony may be more unstable 
and thorough-going than is generally recognized.  At least one critic137 has reacted negatively to Woolf’s 
                                                   
136 This, I would argue, reads more like an argument for Eliotic impersonality and for literature as an 
“escape from personality,” and more specifically from the self-centered neediness of the melancholic. 
137 Judith Shulevitz, in a review from which I will quote later in this chapter.  
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celebration of illness as coming dangerously close to exemplifying what Susan Sontag (in her 1978 essay 
on illness) called the nineteenth-century  “cult  of  being  interesting.”    So  the  question  about  how Woolf 
pitches her  irony  in  “On Being  Ill”  is closely  tied  to  the way we  interpret  the essay as a critique and as 
making any claims at all – essentially, the question of how seriously we are to take the essay as a whole.  
It is, after all, an essay, a critique perhaps but one complicated by a playful testing out of many possible 
orientations and responses.138 
As critics have noted, there is a neat contrast between Woolf’s “defense” of illness and Charlotte 
Perkins  Gilman’s  well-known  critique  of  the  same  medical  culture  in  her  short  story  “The  Yellow 
Wallpaper.” Woolf and Gilman were both prescribed “rest cures” as the standard-issue treatment for their 
“feminine”  bouts  of  depression.  Both authors critique the psychiatric practice of their time (and the 
patriarchal culture) that established this double standard for diagnosing melancholia in women as 
opposed to men. Gilman’s essay “Why I Wrote ‘The Yellow Wallpaper,’” which gives a brief account of the 
actual events fictionalized in the story, concludes with a celebration of the “work cure” that sounds like the 
opposite  of Woolf’s  ironic  stance.139  Gilman, by contrast, seems to advocate work and the healthy-
minded industriousness of the “army of the upright”: 
 
Then, using the remnants of intelligence that remained, and helped by a wise friend, I 
cast the noted specialist's advice to the winds and went to work again--work, the normal 
life of every human being; work, in which is joy and growth and service, without which 
                                                   
138 Notes from Sick Rooms written by her mother, Julia Stephen, in 1883, is one of the many books on 
illness that Woolf claims do not exist ... and it sounds at times remarkably similar to Woolf’s ironic voice.  
We see the same arch humor here, the hyperbole, and more parody of scientific language as a mode of 
attention to problems, a parody of her father’s Victorian scientism from her mother’s point of view:  
 
Among the number of small evils which haunt illness, the greatest, in the misery it can 
cause, though the smallest in size, is crumbs. The origin of most things has been decided 
on, but the origin of crumbs in bed has never excited sufficient attention among the 
scientific world, though it is a problem which has tormented many a weary sufferer. 
 
139 We  might  even  draw  a  comparison  between  Woolf’s  example  of  fancy  – her immersion in the 
mutability and play of changing cloud formations – and  the  “hallucinations”  Gilman’s  semi-fictional 
character experiences as she stares at the wallpaper in her room. 
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one is a pauper and a parasite--ultimately recovering some measure of power.  [italics 
added]140 (46) 
 
The problem, or rather difference from Woolf,  is not the paean to “work” per se (writing of course could 
also be a form of work, and that is likely what Gilman had in mind); the problem has more to do with the 
Victorian language in which Gilman couches her advocacy, language that is hard to distinguish from the 
voice of Leslie Stephen or Mr. Ramsay. If they are read as polemicists, then neither Woolf nor Gilman, 
however, represents an adequate as a response to the underlying values of the culture for which Freud 
argues in “On Transience.” 
Even  if  we  do  not  read  large  stretches  of Woolf’s  essay  (such  as  the  cloud-watching passage 
quoted) as ironic in quite the thorough-going way that I am suggesting – and most readers, it seems, do 
not read it that way – then problems still emerge with Woolf’s argument in “On Being Ill,” insofar of course 
as we read it as a polemic or manifesto.  Woolf implies that melancholy writing will necessarily be 
experimental writing.  But she also gives us a vague and problematic vision of what that writing is 
supposed to do.  Is it merely expression as diversion, an outlet for keeping busy, one of many means of 
“killing the serpent of time”?141  If there is an existing form of writing that historically deserves the label of 
“melancholy” writing, then it is the essay as form. In “On Being Ill,” Woolf writes that the fluid form of the 
discursive essay is the kind of literature the ill person wants to read, as opposed to the plot “structures” of 
large realist fiction.  We might even contrast the essay with the closed symmetrical structure of To the 
                                                   
140  Here  is  Gilman’s  account  of  the  events  leading  up  to  her  prescribed  “rest  cure,”  in  the 
passage that precedes her celebration of the “work cure”: 
For many years I suffered from a severe and continuous nervous breakdown tending to 
melancholia--and beyond. During about the third year of this trouble I went, in devout 
faith and some faint stir of hope, to a noted specialist in nervous diseases, the best 
known in the country. This wise man put me to bed and applied the rest cure, to which a 
still-good physique responded so promptly that he concluded there was nothing much the 
matter with me, and sent me home with solemn advice to "live as domestic a life as far as 
possible," to "have but two hours' intellectual life a day," and "never to touch pen, brush, 
or pencil again" as long as I lived. This was in 1887.  I went home and obeyed those 
directions for some three months, and came so near the borderline of utter mental ruin 
that I could see over.  (46) 
 
141 ...to quote from Charles Lamb, one of Woolf’s models of essay writing and whom Woolf admired for 
successfully overcoming his illness by transmuting it into an expressive activity. 
 162 
Lighthouse, which famously concludes with a synthesizing and private gesture:  “I have had my vision,” 
Lily Briscoe declares once she has finished her painting.   It must be acknowledged, however, that the 
tongue-in-cheek  polemical  portions  of  her  essay  do  not  make  an  entirely  compelling  case.    Woolf’s 
impressionism (illustrated by the cloud-watching episode) does not succeed in converting facts into 
possibilities; she turns facts into impressions and possibilities into bed-ridden fantasies.  The real issue, 
though, is the privacy of the visions and the failure to make a case for the “general validity” of an illness, 
such as the case philosopher Merleau-Ponty  makes  for  Cezanne’s  artistic  transformation  of  his 
“schizothymia.”142  In a 2006 review of the reprinted edition of “On Being Ill,” critic Ruth Franklin captures 
the basic inadequacy with the vaguely impressionistic aesthetic that Woolf seems to celebrate as an 
alternative to the healthy-minded values of the “army of the upright”: 
 
And yet the consolations of creation are also considered. When Woolf imagines beauty in 
a frozen-over garden, even after the death of the sun—There, thrusting its head up 
undaunted in the starlight, the rose will flower, the crocus will bloom — it seems less a 
triumph of nature than of art.   
 
                                                   
142 In  his  classic  essay  “Cezanne’s  Doubt,”  Merleau-Ponty  diagnoses  Cezanne  with  “schizothymia,”  a 
disorder that involves the flattening or waning of affect, and in the course of his exploration of the 
relationship between illness and creativity he gives an exemplary account of the way melancholy 
functions as a mode of abstraction in modernist aesthetics.  
Merleau-Ponty  is  sympathetic  to  psychoanalytic  explanations  of  artists’  attempts  to  overcome 
problems  (such  as  Freud’s  study  of  Da  Vinci),  so  long  as  these  efforts  were  recognized  as  having  a 
potentially wider cultural validity and the illness “becomes a general possibility of human existence.”    ”It 
is quite possible that, on the basis of his nervous weaknesses, Cézanne conceived a form of art which is 
valid for everyone. Left to himself, he could look at nature as only a human being can.”  While an artist’s 
life does not explain his work, the two are still connected. "The truth is that this work to be done called for 
this life" (284). Merleau-Ponty continues: 
 
There is a rapport between Cézanne's schizoid temperament and his work because the 
work reveals a metaphysical sense of the disease: a way of seeing the world reduced to 
the totality of frozen appearances, with all expressive values suspended. Thus the illness 
ceases to be an absurd fact and a fate and becomes a general possibility of human 
existence. It becomes so when this existence bravely faces one of its paradoxes, the 
phenomenon of expression.  (284-285)  
 
The flattening and waning of affect is, in fact, fundamental to Merleau-Ponty’s  s  entire  concept  of 
phenomenology – the aim of which, he says, is to “slacken the intentional threads which attach us to the 





from Mr. Ramsay’s consoling walks on the beach or from Freud’s “enjoyment” of nature.  On this reading, 
Woolf’s essay comes off as more of an argument for the fancy rather than the power of the imagination.  
What Woolf offers is a testament to the power of a sensibility to imagine and project value, rather than 
create or discover it – involving a notion of art as subjective consolation for the indifference of the world, 
which we can only passively contemplate and treat as the raw material for our fancy.  Woolf offers private 
consolation  in  the  form of  “enjoying”  the passing sensations  to which one  is  receptive.    It  is a  passive 
enjoyment of the flux of things, a celebration of private aesthetic vision that invokes visions of future 
catastrophe and is premised on the same fact/value nihilism that we see in Freud.  Woolf’s conscientious 
objector does little more than passively watch these shapes (the clouds) take form.  It may be marvelous, 
but all one can do is marvel at it.  Nature is still fallen and disenchanted, and the triumph of artistic form is 
also entirely subjective. It is beautiful; but it is just literature.  
 To anatomize a problem, then, is not necessarily to solve it or to locate a viable alternative 
strategy.    I  would  argue,  however,  that  “On  Being  Ill”  goes  even  farther  than  To the Lighthouse in 
imagining an alternative to the disenchanted values that she captures so well in her portrait of Mr. 
Ramsay.  But we must direct our attention to what I see as the most remarkable (and somewhat 
neglected) passage in Woolf’s essay: the long digression that brings the essay to a close, and which is 
signalled by an abrupt (and self-referencing) shift in language.  After a brief mention of Shakespeare, 
Woolf interrupts her own train of thought:  “But enough of Shakespeare – let us turn to Augustus Hare.  
There are people who say that even illness does not warrant these transitions...”  (23).  And so we are 
asked to turn our attention to the eccentric Victorian writer Augustus Hare, author of a number of fact-
filled volumes detailing the history of his own family (some of them involving ghosts of family members as 
characters).143  Hare, Woolf tells us, is at the opposite pole from “great writers” such as Shakespeare (but 
also avoids the worst category of “mediocre writers”). Woolf picks up, seemingly at random, The Story of 
Two Noble Lives.  
 
                                                   
143 Woolf, it seems, was drawn for similar reasons to the writing of Sir John Evelyn, an eccentric 
contemporary of Samuel Pepys, whose diaries are famous for lacking any sense of drama or atmosphere 
or surprise.  See “Rambling Round Evelyn” in The Common Reader, volume 1. 
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There, as so often in these fat volumes, we flounder and threaten to sink in a plethora of 
aunts and uncles. We have to remind ourselves that there is such a thing as atmosphere; 
that the masters themselves often keep us waiting intolerably while they prepare our 
minds for whatever it may be – the surprise, or the lack of surprise. (24) 
 
Without  “atmosphere,”  however,  we  drown  in  a  “plethora  of  aunts  and  uncles”  (24).    Woolf  brings 
atmosphere to this potentially overwhelming array of details by picking among them and re-telling Hare’s 
story, by navigating her way through these absurdly disconnected and various facts with as little care for 
proper transitions as the author himself apparently felt.  The “atmosphere” Woolf has in mind here is not 
scenic at all; it is an abstract and form-giving atmosphere in active dialogue with shifting moods and 
whims and desires. Like the great masters, Hare “takes his time; the charm steals upon us imperceptibly; 
by degrees we become almost one of the family, yet not quite, for the sense of our oddity of it all 
remains...”  (24). This is the last time Woolf employs a “we” in the essay.  Almost imperceptibly, we then 
enter into a “shaggy dog” re-telling mode as the voice addressing us promptly disappears into the text: 
 
for the sense of our oddity of it all remains, and [we] share the family dismay when Lord 
Stuart leaves the room – there was a ball going forward – and is next heard of in Iceland.  
Parties, he said, bored him – such were English aristocrats before marriage with intellect 
had adulterated the fine singularity of their minds.  Parties bore them; they are off to 
Iceland.  Then Beckford’s mania  for castle building attacked him; he must  lift a French 
chateau  across  the  channel,  and  erect  pinnacles  and  towers  to  use  as  servants’ 
bedrooms at vast expense, upon the borders of a crumbling cliff, too, so that housemaids 
saw their brooms swimming down the Solent, and Lady Stuart was much distressed, but 
made the best of it and began, like the high-born lady she was, planting evergreens in the 
face of ruin. (24-25) 
 
And so on, continuously, for three more pages (uninterrupted by paragraph breaks).  Like the great 
masters, as she noted earlier, Woolf can forget us (the readers) because her writing here – which 
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consists of the activities of selective summarizing and paraphrase – so closely models a kind of active 
reading.  It is the essayist’s imagination that “catches fire on what others have already done,” as Adorno 
puts it in “The Essay as Form” (152). This final passage demonstrates why it is that so much melancholy 
writing, as a form of forgetting, will never be about melancholy as a subject.  It is forgetfulness not in the 
sense of abandonment, but rather in the way it focuses on its own act of articulation.144  Above all, this 
concluding digression demonstrates the essential absurdity of fact and the way active articulation of facts 
creates “atmosphere.”  Melancholy writing of this kind (and we will see more like it in the writing of Robert 
Walser) demands much more than passive submission to shifting moods, more than brooding 
contemplation over the “mystic” qualities of words as artifacts.  Such writing needs to find a way to create 
value  (form,  or  “atmosphere”)  in  the  act  of  re-telling, in the act of articulation itself.  If we want to find 
evidence  of Nietzsche’s  impact  on  a  generation’s  concept  of  art,  we  could  do worse  than  turn  to  this 
obscure passage that re-tells the work of an obscure fourth-rate writer with no particular audience in 
mind. 
 
* *  * 
I  have  one  final  observation  to  make  on Woolf’s  account  of  melancholy  writing  as  experimental 
writing.    “On Being  Ill” was a commissioned piece  for  T.S. Eliot’s new  journal The Criterion, and Woolf 
biographer Hermione Lee goes so far as to read the essay as a thinly veiled personal plea to her famous 
editor, also a personal friend, to be more sensitive to his mentally unstable wife.145   Such biographical 
interpretations, however well-founded, often come at the cost of dissociating Woolf from the concerns that 
identify her as a modernist writer.  I think there are more important affinities between Eliot and Woolf, as 
well as important divergences.  Compare, for example, Woolf’s call for a newly sensual language with the 
proto-modernist qualities that Eliot praises in the English Metaphysical poets. Eliot’s manifesto highlights 
the way Metaphysical poets produced uncanny new associations; Eliot quotes specific lines and 
juxtapositions, such as Donne’s “bracelet of bright hair about the bone,” and (based on these examples) 
he concludes his essay with a thought experiment juxtaposing the smell of cooking with the experience of 
                                                   
144 As Robert Walser put it: “The lively is always more contemplative than what is dead and sad.” 
145 This melodramatic biographical reading bears a problematic realtion to reality. In fact, Woolf herself 
expressed little sympathy for Vivienne Eliot and as she suffered from her illness; in fact she could be cruel 
toward her (once rather uncharitably describing Eliot’s wife as “a bag of ferrets tied around his neck”). 
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reading Spinoza as an example of how poetry creates new affective complexes.   In “On Being Ill,” Woolf 
considers – and then sets aside and seems to reject – what she characterizes as the auditory materialist 
imagination of Mallarmé and the French Symbolists and their search for idiosyncratic words and images 
that has a precedent (as Eliot recognized) in English Metaphysical poetry.  “In health,” Woolf observes, 
“meaning  has  encroached  upon  sound”  and  “words  seem  to  possess  a  mystic  quality  ... 
Incomprehensibility has an enormous  power  over  us  in  illness.”    The  kind  of  writing  that  appeals  to 
readers in an ill state of mind (and her emphasis at this point is on illness as it manifests itself in the 
reader) will probably seem laughable to most healthy-minded readers, but it will be above all 
“incomprehensible”  to  those  who  demand  that  language  communicate  rather  than  somehow  embody 
meaning.  Elaborating on a claim she began to make early in her essay, Woolf claims once more that we 
need “a new language ... more primitive, more sensual, more obscene.”  But now Woolf seems to change 
her mind.  What we really need, she suggests, is something more than this sensual and 
incomprehensible  language; what we need above all, she claims,  is  “a new hierarchy of passions;  love 
must be deposed in favor of a temperature of 104 ... sleeplessness [must] play the part of a villain” (7).  
Illness itself must become a mode of intentionality, a mode of creating meaning and satisfying our 
compositional need for “atmosphere.” 
If we are looking for a more explicit manifesto for melancholy writing, rather than a sample of what it 
looks like, then we might turn to Woolf’s 1929 essay on Thomas Browne, which reads as something of a 
complement  to Eliot’s classic 1921 modernist manifesto on  the English Metaphysical Poets (which, like 
Woolf’s  essay  on  Browne,  was  actually  a  review  of  a  newly  published  anthology).  Samuel  Johnson’s 
famous complaint about  “images yoked by  violence  together”  is  exactly  the uncanny disjunctive effects 
that appealed to Eliot and other modernists. Johnson had a similar criticism of Browne’s disjunctive style: 
“His style  is,  indeed, a  tissue of many  languages; a mixture of heterogeneous words, brought  together 
from distant regions, with terms originally appropriated to one art, and drawn by violence into the service 
of  another.”  Eliot, in his essay, draws attention to exactly these features as a resource for modernist 
poetry,  which  must  be  “difficult”  in  order  to  comprehend  and  respond  adequately  to  the  complexity, 
variousness, and industriousness of modern life.   
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Woolf, however, has a quite different take on the demands that modernist writing must face.  In her 
essay on Thomas Browne, she praises Browne for his uncanny images and idiosyncratic associations, 
but she cautions us to look beyond these local effects when reading his essays146: 
 
A bold and prodigious appetite for the drums and tramplings of language is balanced by 
the most exquisite sense of mysterious affinities between ghosts and roses. But these 
dissections are futile enough, and indeed by drawing attention to the technical side of Sir 
Thomas’s  art  do  him  some disservice.  In  books  as  in  people,  graces  and  charms  are 
delightful for the moment but become insipid unless they are felt to be part of some 
general energy or quality of character. (369) 
 
Woolf is drawing our attention here to the active and purposive play of the intelligence that creates 
“atmosphere” through the compositional energies of articulation and the “quality of character” it manifests.  
The evidence of a compositional  intelligence  in  the act of  “assaying” and articulating  itself  – this, Woolf 
argues, is what matters in Browne, not the local idiosyncrasies of style or the uncanny effects of odd 
images and juxtapositions.  The parts need to be understood in the context of a whole – not an organic, 
closed whole, but within the larger context of what the essay composes for consciousness. “Paragraphs 
are emotional,” as Gertrude Stein claimed, while sentences are not.  Woolf’s rather Nietzschean account 
of Browne’s peculiar force of imagination might also be interpreted as a more general challenge to avant-
garde poetics (such as Surrealism) that focus on uncanny effects and on locally disjunctive formal 
features that Eliot praises in Metaphysical Poetry.147   
 
 
4.  The Right to Romance and the Will to Believe 
                                                   
146 In The Case of Wagner,  one  of  his  final  works,  Nietzsche  writes  that  “[t]he  sign  of  every  literary 
decadence:  That  life  no  longer  dwells  in  the  whole”  (p.  626)  Nietzsche  admits,  moreover,  that  he  is 







the 1896 essay “The Will to Believe,” whose central argument has long been regarded as problematic at 
best (and with which James himself, it seems, felt dissatisfied).  The earlier essay had ended by declaring 
that the argument for the “priority of bodily symptoms” in any account of the emotions had the benefit of 
demonstrating  “the  ease  with  which  we  formulate  by  its  means  pathological  cases  and  normal  cases 
under  a  common  scheme.”   We might  read  this  as  an unorthodox  argument  for  a  version  of Occam’s 
Razor.  Later, in Varieties of Religious Experience, James gives a defense of “illness” from the “robust” 
type of the healthy-minded positivist: 
 
Few of us are not in some way infirm, or even diseased; and our very infirmities help us 
unexpectedly. In the psychopathic temperament we have the emotionality which is the 
sine qua non of moral perception; we have the intensity and tendency to emphasis which 
are the essence of practical moral vigor [...] What, then, is more natural than that this 
temperament should introduce one to regions of religious truth, to corners of the 
universe, which your robust Philistine type of nervous system, forever offering its biceps 
to be felt, thumping its breast, and thanking Heaven that it hasn't a single morbid fibre in 




adjective  “robustious”)  in  his  critique/portrait  of  William  Clifford,  mathematician and late nineteenth-
century spokesperson for the scientific method. It is not just Clifford who is the object of James’s critique, 
(he mentions Clough and Huxley as well) but he has come to stand for James’s polemical opponent in the 
anthologies, somewhat the way Thomas Huxley and Bishop Wilberforce will always be paired as stock 
representatives of  their  respective  “views”  (as  if  they were captains of  a debating  team).   The question 
James  asks  in  “Will  to Believe,”  however,  is more  a  reflective  one  than an epistemological or even a 
psychological one:  Why is it that healthy-minded empiricists like Clifford and Huxley feel so strongly in 
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the procedure of socially justified belief as a consolation?   And by the time James comes around to 
quoting the poetic lines from Clough: “It fortifies my soul to know / That, though I perish, Truth is so” (the 
language  here  quite  close  to William  Cowper’s  “we  perish,  each  alone”)  we  see  clearly  how,  as  with 
Freud, the sentimentality of positivist nihilism blends easily into an Arnoldian poetic voice.  James also 
opens and closes his essay with extended passages quoted from the inspirational writings of FitzJames 
Stephen, who happens to have been Virginia Woolf’s uncle. 
James begins his critique of the verificationist procedures by which one justifies belief with a 
unorthodox opening move.  He suggests that belief, including the empirically justified belief of the 
scientist, is more like faith than we would care to admit, and he considers as an example of justifying 
one’s belief, the risk-analysis logic of Pascal’s wager. He transfers Pascal’s logic to the realm of scientific 
hypotheses, which he defines in broadly pragmatic terms.  James distinguishes between two types of 
hypotheses. There  are  “live options,”  in which our belief would make a real imagined difference in our 
lives;  and  there  are  “dead  options,”  in  which  “no  tendency  to  act  on  it  exists  in  us  to  any  degree” 
(Pragmatism and other Essays 199)  In one of many passages in James that anticipate Wittgenstein, 
James asks whether it even makes sense to talk about beliefs as having the form of a propositional 
attitude (like a desiring something) or as taking an object (which raises the question of whether believe in 
something can be thought of as a volitional act).  James looks at believing as a “language game,” and he 
literally  adopts  the  metaphor  of  the  gaming  table  (Pascal’s  wager)  as  a  possible  way  of  reframing 
empiricism and justified belief in terms of action.   
One possible response to William Clifford’s strictures on justified belief would be to argue for an 
indifference to questions of belief and to questions of morality and measurable social utility.  Instead of 
quoting Fitzjames Stephen at length, we might draw on the wisdom of another Victorian, Lewis Carroll,  
and his White Queen who could believe as many as six impossible things at the same time (all before 
breakfast).148  But that is not the path James takes in “Will to Believe.”  James, the admiring heir to Mill, 
                                                   
148 In The Robber, Walser’s narrator seems  to share James’s skepticism with  regard  to  the  therapeutic 
practices  of  “mind-cure”  specialists  and  their  investment  in  the  power  of  belief,  which  leads  to  what 
Walser’s narrator calls “a perfectly simple, paltry condition of the soul.”  Unlike the James of “The Will to 
Believe,” Walser (or his narrator, at least) takes a much more Nietzschean stance toward the concept of 
belief  itself:  “for  one  achieves  nothing  by  it,  absolutely  nothing,  nothing  at  all.  One  just  sits  there  and 
believes. Like a person mechanically knitting a sock.” (qtd. in The Tanners 27).  
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still plays by the logic of the justified belief game and argues instead for something like a right to believe 
in the absence of evidence, for a distinction between different kinds of situations in which we are forced 
(or not forced) to make a decision to believe in something in the absence of evidence.  At this point, he is 
looking for a less objectionable empiricism and method of justifying beliefs, more along the lines of 
Pascal’s wager, and not a radical alternative to all talk of belief and any concern of justifying one’s beliefs 
to others or to one’s self.  So in spite of the sharp psychological diagnosis of the problem with epistemic 
values, it is important to recognize that James is still playing by the rules of this game.   For even the most 
sympathetic readers, the response to James’s argument is the same as the typical response to Pascal’s 
argument that James describes.  As James puts it, “you probably feel that when religious faith expresses 
itself thus, in the language of the gaming table, it  is put to its last trumps” (ibid 201).   But that does not 
mean “The Will to Believe” is without value as a critique of positivism.  What the essay does most clearly, 
I think, is to demonstrate the problematic strategy of arguing for a right to believe, and to make clear the 
need for a Nietzschean approach to the crisis of epistemic culture. 
James  would  have  had  little  trouble  taking  apart  Freud’s  explanatory  hypotheses  put  forth  in 
“Mourning  and  Melancholia,”  but  he  does  have  real  trouble  with  the  ethical  argument  of  Clifford  for 
adopting the values of science. On his own terms, William Clifford is a rather formidable representative of 
the disenchanted verificationist values he advocates, because he understands them more clearly in 
ethical and social terms and in terms of a clean distinction between individual rights versus public 
obligations.  This comes rather close to James’s own pluralistic sentiments (which he derives in part from 
Mill).    James  diagnoses  the  positivist’s  fear  of  error  as,  at  bottom,  a  fear  of  truth.    But  the motivating 
concern, for positivism, is not fear of truth but the incommensurability of perspectives and fear of people 
not being able to communicate with one another. Freud would also, of course, identify modern science as 
a  cultural remedy for human narcissism.  In 1872, when Nietzsche was only beginning his career, William 
Clifford had written that “the subject of science is the human universe, that is to say, everything that is, or 
has been, or may be related to man” (9).  Clifford  argues that scientific rationality can never pu rge itself 
of what he calls “imagery borrowed from human life.” Clifford recognizes that all scientific theorizing is a 
reflection of interests and should not seek to purge knowledge of narcissistic anthropocentrism. Clifford’s 
perspectivism recognizes the impossibility of purging science of all human interests implies, and that is 
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why he argues that we should fall back on procedural a sensu communis based upon intersubjective 
verifiability.  Like John Stuart Mill, Clifford distinguishes between the private self and what Clifford calls 
the “tribal self” and its duties to the community of which it is a part.  Clifford, as much as Matthew Arnold 
and (later) Freud, argues for a certain culture as an ersatz secular religion and a stay against “anarchy.” 
This is what James is up against, and we get little indication of that from the lines he selectively 
quotes from Clifford.  But the problems with James’s position are clear enough.  James wants to argue 
from an ethical point of view that individuals have a right to believe according to their intuitions in the 
absence of evidence.  However, this ethical distinction between private and public projects (which 
obviously  owes  something  to  Mill)  is  just  where  Clifford  has  the  advantage.    If  we  adopt  Clifford’s 
distinction between the private and public (or “tribal”) self, then we could argue that individuals do have 
that right, just so long as we do not call  it a “belief.” (Richard Rorty makes essentially this argument, as 
we shall see.)  Clifford argues that our duty is not  to  some  foundationalist  “truth”  conceived  as 
independent of human wishes; he argues, rather, that we have a duty to others not to believe without 
evidence, because that would betray a sort of social pact. For Clifford, then, it is OK to have religious 
faith, so long as it is understood as meeting private emotional needs and not as a public assertion of 
belief.   It is important to note that what Clifford argues for is a duty not to objective evidence, but our 
ethical obligation to others in our community, our duty to play our role in a social pact of intersubjective 
verifiability.  The betrayal is not to truth, but to other people and to a social pact. It is also a betrayal of the 
agreement to separate the private project of wishes and desires from the public project of justified belief. 
The requirement that any hypothesis has to be verifiable is a procedural criterion, a procedure that binds 
a community and to which we adhere as a member of this community. For Clifford, it is ethically wrong to 
believe without evidence. The issue, then, is not truth versus error, but public versus private projects.   
It is important, then, to acknowledge what is not radical in James’s thinking, particularly his early 
thinking. We are accustomed to talking about James as an anti-foundationalist, as rejecting a 
correspondence theory of truth.  But Clifford, like Freud and like many positivists, assumes a 
conventionalist  notion  of  scientific  theorizing  and  Clifford’s  positivist  empiricism  is  quite  explicit  in  its 
recognition that it is impossible to purge our theories of human interests – in other words, Clifford 
assumes along with the pragmatist that theories are instrumental and should be assessed not in terms of 
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their “fidelity” to  reality or even in terms of evidence, but  in terms of how well they “work.”   Positivism is 
independent of philosophical skepticism, as James notes, because it has found a way to convert this 
“nervousness” about truth into a method that replaces the search for objective truth.  
James later expressed  his  regret  over  the  title  “Will  to  Believe”  (perhaps  because  of  the 




experiences is an  ethical  strategy  that  fails  here.    We  might  say  that  James’s  preoccupation  with 
philosophical abstractions distracts him from considering the real problem of positivism as a religion, as 
an anti-philosophical form of nihilism. “Science herself,” James points out, alluding once again to Pascal,  
 
consults her heart when she lays it down on that the infinite ascertainment of fact and 
correction of false belief are the supreme goods for man. Challenge the statement, and 
science can only repeat it oracularly, or else prove it by showing that such ascertainment 
and  correction  bring man  all  sorts  of  other  goods  which man’s  heart  in  turn  declares. 
(Pragmatism and Other Writings 212) 
 
This is all well and good, and James draws attention (as he has elsewhere) to the values that always 
underlie so-called “objective” pursuits.  However, James’s demand here, that science must show how its 
love of technique that replaces the love of truth “bring[s] all sorts of other goods,” comes quite close to his 
own meliorist pragmatism.  This is what Freud and Clifford aim to do in their moral arguments for science, 
and they arguably do a better job than James does (at this point in his thinking, at least).  On the level of 
argument,  then,  “The Will  to Believe” must be counted a  failure.  But it is an illustrative and instructive 
failure, making clear  the  limitations of  taking Mill as one’s model  for an ethical argument  (for a  right to 
believe) in response to the moral arguments of a Clifford or a Freud.   Nietzsche, in short, was right in his 
                                                   
149 James was witness to the rapid spread of Nietzsche’s reputation in the 1890s (what was essentially 
his posthumous reputation). 
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refusal to engage these moral arguments on their own ground and to emphasize, as he did repeatedly, 
the incompatibility of social and moral standards with the more fundamental will to power.  
 
Later philosophers have subsequently attempted to re-frame James’s critique so as to shore up 
his argument, or to imagine an entirely different argument in the same spirit and with the same thrust.  
Richard Rorty, a neo-pragmatist, seeks to overcome the problem of belief simply by dissolving the 
problem itself.  What James should have argued for, Rorty claims, is a “right to romance” (96).  In what 
Rorty  calls  his  own  “quasi-Jamesian position,” based  on Rorty’s  liberal-pragmatist  values  of  “irony  and 
solidarity,”  we  see  something  like  a  latter-day version of the private self as distinct from what Clifford 
called the “tribal self” (91).  It  is remarkably easy for Rorty to pick up on this Mill-side of James so as to 
make what is essentially an antifoundationalist version of Clifford’s argument (which, as I have noted, is 
already in an  important sense antifoundationalist).   Rorty’s advice  to James  is:  “Do not worry  too much 
about whether what you have is a belief, a desire, or a mood.  Just insofar as such states as hope, love, 
and faith promote only such private projects, you need not worry about whether you have a right to have 
them”  (91).  Rorty thus takes the Mill influence seriously and translates James into those terms, seeing 
this as James’s real intention.  According to Rorty, there is simply no need to argue on epistemological 
grounds for a right to something that is purely private and (by definition) poses no challenge to the values 
and standards that define the public sphere. Rorty in effect relegates the “aesthetic sphere” to the realm 
of private projects.    And  we  might  note,  incidentally,  that  Rorty’s  public/private  version  of  anti-
foundationalism is one that does not escape epistemic values: 
 
When philosophy goes anti-foundationalist,  the  notion  of  “source  of  evidence”  gets 
replaced by that of “consensus about what would count as evidence.”  So objectivity as 
intersubjectivity replaces objectivity as fidelity to something nonhuman. The question “Is 
there any evidence for p?”  gets  replaced  by  the  question  “Is  there  any  way  of  getting 
consensus on what would count in favor of p?” (91) 
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Rorty’s  attempt  to  reformulate  James’s  argument  thus does  a  good  job  of making  the positivist’s  case 
even more clear.  But Rorty’s neo-positivist “private projects” argument fails to take seriously the problem 
of nihilism, the crisis of value, to which positivist values were meant to be a solution.  Pascal’s appeal to 
the heart which has reasons of its own does not address the crisis of value and the disenchantment of 
modernity; rather, it is an early symptom of the crisis as a conceptual divide between value and 
preference, fact and feeling. 
And  so  James’s  confrontation with Clifford,  like Woolf’s  portrait  of Ramsay,  tells  us  something 
about the nature of the epistemic values that modernists were facing.  I suggest that “The Will to Believe” 
actually demonstrates why we need a Nietzschean argument in place of Mill (or Rorty).150  James’s own 
strategy  in  the  following years,  in  response  to his perceived  failure  in  “Will  to Believe,” was  to  relax his 
concern over the right to believe and  to move some way  toward Nietzsche’s position.     And in spite of 
James’s continued emphasis on the singularity of  individual experience, he cannot argue (as Rorty and 
Clifford do) for an ethical separation of public and private projects.  For James, what we need is not a 
private project so much as an external object, something that has the “sound of reality” (as he puts it later 
in  the  “Sick  Soul”  chapter),  something transpersonally available around which we can form our 
meaningful projects.  One area where James and Freud do overlap is in their concept of “morbid” as that 
which is not in some way intersubjectively shareable as an equivalent to what Eliot called an “objective 
correlative.”151  In Varieties of Religious Experience, James declares his method in the quiet but 
momentous move.  “Because these  are  private  experiences,”  he  writes,  “I will make  use  of  documents 
humains.”    And  he  does.  These  personal  testaments  are  not  relegated  to  the merely  expressive  and 
subjective; they are treated as establishing valid forms of life.  In the course of demonstrating this method, 
                                                   
150 As  another  possible  response  to  Clifford,  James might  have  appealed  instead  to  Mill’s  critique  of 
Carlyle. Mill simply asked why there should be  “any  virtue  in  industry.”    In a notorious essay written  in 
1849, Carlyle had written in support of forced labor on plantations in Jamaica (following the abolition of 
slavery), arguing for the moral virtues of forced work over the free-market forces of supply and demand.  
In celebrating the virtues of duty and forced labor and the hierarchical control of the “captains of industry,” 
Carlyle was attacking the “dismal science” of  laissez faire economics and not (as is sometimes thought) 
invoking it as a justification for a harshly pragmatic economic policy:   “the Social Science ... which finds 
the secret of this Universe in supply and demand and reduces the duty of human governors to that of 
letting men alone … is not a gay science … it is a … quite abject and distressing one; [it is] ... the dismal 
science.”  
151 See Gerald Myers 228 for more on James’s definition of  “morbid” as emotion that obstructs thought, 
action, and/or communication.  Myers does not make this point, but the criterion of communicability 
seems to anticipate some of Wittgenstein’s later concerns. 
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James develops a different and much stronger case for the autonomy of aesthetic practices that model a 
certain kind of attention to fact as an alternative  to  “facts”  in  the epistemic sense and as an alternative 
and compelling source of value. 
 
Coda 
In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer take note of positivist nihilism’s immunity to 
refutation by means of rational argument.  “No matter what myths are invoked against it,” they write, “by 
being used as arguments they are made to acknowledge the very principle of corrosive rationality of 
which  enlightenment  stands  accused.    Enlightenment  is  totalitarian”  (4).   Any new myth will either be 
instantly refuted qua myth, or subsumed within the self-annihilating logic of positivism and go the way of 
any scientific theory.  This observation also echoes something of the spirit behind Francis Bacon’s call for 
the  constant  work  of  rejecting  “any  plausible,  delectable,  reverend  or  admired  discourse, or any 
satisfactory arguments” in favor of “effecting and working.”  This comes close, I believe, to explaining the 
failure of James’s argument in “Will to Believe.”  I have been trying to show what a formidable opponent 
positivism was, that the epistemic values and dissociation of sensibility that generate the two distinct 
cultures actually encompasses both cultures (science and art), and why the problem of disenchantment 
demanded either a radically new empiricism or an entirely new concept of the aesthetic as a genuinely 
autonomous realm.  The problem for art is its relevance within a disenchanted culture, where it is 
relegated to a symbiotic relationship with epistemic values and is therefore as powerless to challenge the 
dominance of that culture as it is to re-enchant a world of meaningless facts in a way that goes beyond 
merely projecting subjective values onto the world or making use of facts as the material for private 
fantasies.  
The figure of Nietzsche has hovered in the background throughout this chapter, as a reminder of 
the problem we face and as exerting critical pressure on our possible solutions.152 Nietzsche shows that if 
we want to make a claim for the power of art as an alternative to these values, then we need to look at 
                                                   
152 It is interesting to note that Nietzsche himself flirted with a version of positivism in the early 1880s, 
during a period in which he was one corner of a love triangle that involved none other than Lou Andréas 
Salome (who chose marriage with Nietzsche’s friend, the philosopher Paul Ree).  The three posed for a 
humorously staged photo in which Nietzsche is shown pulling a chariot driven by Salome (an allusion to 
Plato’s chariot allegory in Phaedrus).   
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some other ways in which aesthetic articulation can discover those new values rather than simply give 
individuals the “freedom” to pursue values that are made available by and fully comprehended within that 
culture (which also offers the irony needed as a resource to cope with this disenchanted state of affairs).  
In order to read Nietzsche the proto-modernist, however, we still need to look beyond the postmodern 
Nietzsche that (like all misreadings) tells us something about the values and interests of a certain 
historical moment.  As a postmodern thinker, Rorty brings out the tension between the ideal of living one’s 
life as a work of art, an aestheticism which owes at least something to Nietzsche,153 and the modernist 
search for transpersonal qualities of the object that might force us to change our lives.  (“Du muss dein 
Leben  anderen,”  as  Rilke  famously  put  it  in  “Archaic  Torso  of  Apollo”  – not  the  injunction:  “you  must 
pursue  a  project  that  is  personally  meaningful  and  gives  you  pleasure”).  Like  his  “quasi-Jamesian” 
position, Rorty gives us a postmodern Nietzsche freed from modernist drama and hang-ups.   
Julia Kristeva is another contemporary philosopher who has re-purposed Nietzsche for a 
postmodern account of melancholy overcome and transformed. In Black Sun: Depression and 
Melancholia, Kristeva argues that while it manifests itself differently in every epoch, melancholy is still in 
some sense  “transhistorical.”   Modernist melancholy was generated by a sense of crisis over meaning.  
We have now, apparently, moved beyond that moment: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
[melancholy] writing is today confronted with the postmodern challenge ... the point now 
is  to see  in  the  ‘malady of grief’ only one moment of  the narrative synthesis capable of 
sweeping along in its complex whirlwind philosophical meditations as well as erotic 
protections or entertaining pleasures. (258) 
 
Apart from the allusion to Nietzsche (“eternal return”), this picks up the language of Nietzsche as free play 
among signs, but with little sense of what Nietzsche recognized was at stake. She writes of melancholy 
itself as having a cyclical dynamic that generates new forms of expressive writing. Melancholy writes 
itself.    The  “challenge,”  according  to Kristeva,  is merely  to  recognize grief as only one moment in the 
natural cycle of seasonal alternation.  Here is her account of the enjoyment of the pleasures afforded by 
                                                   
153 Nietzsche: Life as Literature by Alexander Nehamas is perhaps the most influential and representative 
interpretation along these lines. 
 177 
this  new  “amatory  world”  that  comes  to  the  surface  once  we  submit  to  the  dissolving  force  of  shifting 
moods: 
 
Following the winter of discontent comes the artifice of seeming; following the whiteness 
of boredom, the heartening distraction of parody. And vice versa. Truth, in short, makes 
its way amid the shimmering of artificial amenities as well as asserting itself in painful 
mirror images.  Does not the wonderment of psychic life after all stem from those 
alternations of protections and downfalls, smiles and tears, sunshine and melancholia?  
(259) 
 
It is all part of life’s rich pageant, we might be tempted to say in ironic paraphrase. Or, in a different mood, 




account of the history of melancholy writing offers little hope, beyond therapeutic private projects, of 
altering the currents of history, or at least challenging the interests and values that have come to 
dominate at a given moment.  Her own version of Nietzsche, moreover, now seems symptomatic of a 
moment in the past.  The Nietzsche who called for the active creation of world-transforming values, the 
active  embrace  of  one’s  fate  and  not  just  submission  to  passing  moods,  is  nowhere  to  be  found  in 
postmodern  accounts  like  Rorty’s  or  Kristeva’s.    In  our  “post-postmodern”  period, we might view the 
interest in the Lacanian Real and so-called Return of the Real – the critical interest, for example, in affect 
as  “pre-coded, pre-subjective  force”154 – as motivated in part by a dissatisfaction with the inadequacy 
(political and ethical) of the kind of postmodern aestheticism that Kristeva and Rorty and Nehamas 
outline.  Our moment also makes clear (as has a century of Nietzsche scholarship) the eternally recurring 
need to re-visit Nietzsche and read him in relation to the problems he diagnosed and the experimental 
artistic endeavors he inspired.  In the following chapters, I will look at some modernist attempts to 
                                                   
154 Brian Massumi’s definition in Parables for the Virtual. 
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overcome epistemic values, in addition to Nietzsche’s, with particular attention to one mode of writing  – 











Only as an aesthetic phenomenon are existence and the world justified. 
 
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy  
 
 





When he suggested that William James would have done better  to  affirm  a  “right  to  romance” 
instead of a right or a will to believe, Richard Rorty echoed a criticism he had made decades earlier in his 
review of Stanley Cavell’s Claim of Reason.    Rorty’s chief complaint was  that Cavell had  failed  (in  the 
first half of  the book, at  least)  to  “take us  from epistemology  to  romance”  (“Cavell on Skepticism” 185).   
On both occasions, Rorty alludes to the memorable line with which Ralph Waldo Emerson concludes his 
1842  essay  “Experience,”  the  line  that  appears  above  as  one of two epigraphs to this chapter.  The 
second epigraph from Nietzsche, one of Emerson’s earliest and most avid readers, echoes the same line 
and is most likely alludes to it.  Cavell would respond to Rorty’s criticism by pursuing a path in his thinking 
that had begun to take in the early 1970s. Over the following decades, Cavell would write a series of 
essays that read Emerson in connection with European thinkers like Nietzsche and Wittgenstein.  Cavell’s 
reading of Emerson was one philosopher’s attempt to overcome the mind-forged manacles of philosophy 
and its self-conscious preoccupations by following the example of experimental writing and taking one 
writer in particular as a model.  Cavell was not the first philosopher for whom Emerson played this role; 
there are numerous lines throughout Nietzsche, in addition to the one quoted above, that Cavell identifies 
as “transfigurations” of earlier lines written by Emerson.  
In Chapter Two, I looked at some attempts to “overcome epistemology,” the branch of philosophy 
that has been the foundation, or preoccupation, of the entire enterprise of philosophy itself since at least 
the time of Plato.  In this chapter, I want to read Emerson’s “Experience” as an important document in this 
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effort to overcome epistemology, as well as an important document in the conceptual history of 
melancholy.  From its opening sentence, coming to us in a voice which sounds like an abstract 
disquisition as well as a bewildered call from out of the wilderness – the essay opens with the starkly 
posed  question,  “Where  do  we  find  ourselves?”  – to the famous concluding line, on the ideal of 
transforming genius into practical power, “Experience” attempts to take us from epistemology to romance: 
from the world as knowable and as an independent source of value, to a radical nihilism that has located 
another source of power and another measure of value. Emerson is explicit about this conversion 
experience.    “I  am  ready  to  die  out  of  nature,”  he  declares,  “and  be  born  again  into  this  new  yet 
unapproachable America I have found in the West” (485).    The question is how Emerson gets us there, 
and why there would be such a need to bring about a transvaluation of values in ourselves as well as in 
the culture in which we find ourselves.155  I will argue that there is an important connection between 
Emerson’s project of  overcoming epistemology and his  transformation of  the concept of melancholy. 156  
The  radical  implications of Emerson’s essay  are easy  to miss, however, particularly  if we  try  to  read  it 
from a perspective defined by the kinds of philosophical concerns that Emerson tries so hard to replace.  
The essay is notoriously complex and challenging from an interpretive standpoint.   We face not 
only the question of how (or whether) Emerson effects a break from his earlier views, but must also 
determine the extent to which the essay ought to be read as philosophy or as literature (or as an attempt, 
as it was for Nietzsche and later for Cavell, to make literary performance take the place of traditional 
philosophical discourse).  There is also the interpretive dilemma regarding its status as a personal essay 
– more specifically, the question of how we are supposed to interpret (and place within the context of the 
                                                   
155 A number of critics emphasize the therapeutic side of Emerson in relation to his role as a critic of the 
dominant culture, which contrasts somewhat with the stereotypical image of Emerson as the purveyor of 
a self-help philosophy (what we might call today the “Secret”) for how to live one’s life.  Lawrence Buell, 
critic and Emerson biographer, was quoted in the Boston Globe as saying:  “If you’re  looking  for strong 
guidance, look elsewhere. But if you’re looking for the courage to maintain sanity and resolution when the 
rest of society seems to have gone mad, Emerson may be your man.”   
156 In his essay “Finding as Founding,” Cavell claims that in the earlier essay  “Nature” (1836), Emerson 
still  sees a possibility of  refuting skepticism, while  in  “Experience,” Emerson  recognizes  that skepticism 
can only be  “converted  into a method.”  (In  “Declining Decline,” Cavell makes almost an  identical claim 
about the difference between Wittgenstein’s early and later philosophy.)  Emerson does not address the 
problem of  philosophical  skepticism,  as  such,  at  any  point  in  “Experience.”  And while  I  think Cavell  is 
correct in reading the essay in a philosophical context, I will read philosophical skepticism in the wider 
and also more personal sense of “melancholy,” which Emerson explicitly calls (in the opening paragraph 
of “Experience”) the “noonday demon.”  I thus want to place Emerson’s essay in both historical contexts, 
the question of overcoming skepticism within the larger discourse on melancholy. 
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rest of the essay) the highly personal but passing reference to the death of Emerson’s two-year-old son.  I 
want to focus on one question in particular: How this most radical essay of Emerson’s anticipates what 
Steven Meyer calls  “the writing methods of  the early  twentieth century”  (emphasis added).   The way to 
answer this question, I believe, is to highlight (as I will begin to do here) the significance of Emerson for 
the later thought of Nietzsche.  I want to give special attention to the Nietzsche connection, because onI 
want to arrive at some account  of  how Emerson’s  concept  of melancholy  (his  development  of  a  post-
melancholy thought) translates across the Atlantic and anticipates the experimental writing of the early 
twentieth-century avant garde.  As I hope to show, this is not a simple story of overcoming epistemology 
in the sense of liberating oneself from the philosophical hang-ups that Rorty and others attribute to a 
European tradition of thinking.    
Beginning with the famous Harvard Divinity School address, the document that Oliver Wendell 
Holmes,  Sr.  called  America’s  “intellectual  Declaration  of  Independence,”  there  is  much  throughout 
Emerson’s career that explicitly calls for (or at least entertains the possibility of) a complete liberation from 
the dead-weight of the Old World and its manufactured problems, a release from the oppressive burden 
of history itself and from the pressure within any culture (new or old) to conform to established standards.  
This  “aversion  to  conformity”157 gives  to  all  of  Emerson’s  writing  its ministerial  and  therapeutic aim of 
showing others how to make an individual journey from illness into health, a recovery that makes possible 
the metaphorical “forgetting of a continent” (as Apollinaire would later put it).  I want to focus here on a 







The intellectual life may be kept clean and healthful, if man will live the life of nature, and 
not import into his mind difficulties which are none of his. No man need be perplexed in 
                                                   
157 “The virtue most in request in society is conformity. Self-reliance is its aversion.” (“Self-Reliance”) 
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his speculations. Let him do and say what strictly belongs to him, and, though very 
ignorant of books, his nature shall not yield him any intellectual obstructions and doubts. 
Our young people are diseased with the theological problems of original sin, origin of evil, 
predestination, and the like. These never presented a practical difficulty to any man, - 
never darkened across any man's road, who did not go out of his way to seek them. 
These are the soul's mumps, and measles, and whooping-coughs, and those who have 
not caught them cannot describe their health or prescribe the cure.  A simple mind will 
not know these enemies. It is quite another thing that he should be able to give account 
of his faith, and expound to another the theory of his self-union and freedom. This 
requires rare gifts. Yet, without this self-knowledge, there may be a sylvan strength and 
integrity in that which he is. "A few strong instincts and a few plain rules" suffice us. 
(Essays and Letters 314). 
 
In this early essay, the “cure” he entertains is to “live the life of nature” – a residual romantic ideal.  Nature 
is not a  “friend” who never betrays the heart who loves her.  But it can still serve as a model  for living, 
even if we do not aspire to live in complete harmony with nature.  The idea of nature as source of value 
and as a model for living an authentic life is still entertained as a possibility here – albeit an extremely 
tenuous  one.    A  simple mind will  not  know  these  “enemies,”  but  that  is  only  due  to  the  blessing  of  a 
limited experience.  Most of us, however, are not leech gatherers; we read poems about people who lead 
simple lives close to the earth. We see some hints of the aboriginal/aristocratic fantasies here that we will 
see later in Emerson. If we do attain a post-lapsarian self-consciousness, what Hegel called “the unhappy 
consciousness,”  then  it  is  still  possible  to  develop  a  “new  theory  of  self-union  and  freedom.”  Note, 




unnatural and imported, a contemplative brooding upon man-made problems, a symptom of the unhappy 
consciousness. Emerson characterizes philosophical problems as  (to borrow Witthgenstein’s phrase) a 
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“bewitchment  of  our  intelligence”  by  means  of  thought  itself  (or  human  language).158  But Emerson 
understands that life’s difficulties, however unreal, are also necessary limitations to embrace and convert 
into opportunities for realizing one’s power in relation to the world.  We thus see intimations of Nietzsche’s 
amor fati, and we also get a sense of how the fatalistic embrace of obstacles might work within a self-




with Nietzschean themes, and the thematic concerns (not to mention intertextual relations) between 
Nietzsche  and Emerson  are  often  so  tightly  integrated  as  to  be more  than question  of  “influence.”    At 
times, Nietzsche reads almost like a gloss upon Emerson. 
 The  “measles and mumps” being  “ministerial  to a higher good” seems to anticipate Nietzsche’s 
well-known  boast  that  “what  does  not  kill  me  only  makes me  stronger.”    But  Emerson  considers the 
possibility that not being aware of these difficulties, not being an unhappy consciousness and instead 
being a simple soul, is a possibility. Naïve and sentimental pastoral, etc.. The contrast between “what is 
known from experience,” etc. is just as complex as the contrast between health/illness and culture/nature 
are already complex, as is the notion of what Schiller called naïve and sentimental pastoral.  These two 
notions  would  also  become  important  to  Nietzsche’s  distinction  between  Apollonian  and Dionysian.  
Realizing the power of genius in this self-reflexive way is what Nietzsche would call the activity of 
Selbstgestaltung – giving  form  to one’s self, which  requires a constant  tension between  the Apollonian 
creative giving of form to and the Dionysian force that exceeds and unmakes established forms – or what 
Emerson in “Experience” calls simply the interplay between “power” and “form” (481). 
We also see in this passage the earliest hints of a transition from Romantic appeal to nature to a 
radically self-reflexive nihilism – the strength and integrity in that which he is, which modulates from the 
ideal of self-reliance  to  what  Emerson  calls  (once  again,  in  “Experience”)  the  ideal  of  “self-trust”  and 
appealing  to  one’s  “own  facts.”  In  “Experience,”  Emerson  rephrases  this  question  of why  we make  an 
                                                   
158 Elsewhere in “Experience, Emerson writes that “the whole frame of things preaches indifferency.  Do 
not craze yourself with thinking, but go about your business anywhere.  Life is not intellectual or critical, 
but sturdy.” 
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effort to import and manufacture difficulties that are not natural and not real, to the wider question of why 
it  is human nature  to  “court suffering”  to win a  sense of reality as well as a sense of nature as having 
objective value.  And the new source of value comes not from “the way of nature” (where he declares that 
“all things preach indifferency”) and reformulate self-reliance and self-union into the self-reflexive activity 
of “the world exists to realize the practical power of genius...”.  In the passage above, Emerson sounds as 
if he is counseling “young people” on how to avoid despair induced by skepticism (“doubts”, etc.).  One of 
the  epistemological  questions  that  is  raised  by  “Experience”  is  how, if Emerson abandons the idea of 
nature as a source of value, we might think of the relationship between skepticism and naturalism.159 The 
possibility  of  some  form of  naturalism also  raises  questions  about what Emerson  famously  called  “the 
method of nature” and how it might serve as a model for experimental writing, if not necessarily a model 
for living one’s life.   
 
The complex relationship between Emerson and Nietzsche demands a book-length treatment, 
not a brief chapter.160  I am primarily interested here in  the  way  Emerson,  and  Nietzsche’s 
“transfiguration” of Emerson’s thought, prefigures experimental modernist writing.  One curious obstacle 
to this endeavor is the standard account of modernism put forth by recent Emerson critics, who (like Rorty 
in his reading of Nietzsche) tend either to ignore or downplay the crisis narrative and the sense of specific 
cultural problems that motivated these experiments.  As Richard Rorty illustrates, part of what we 
overcome is the modernist drama of the overcoming itself – the original stakes involved in overcoming 
epistemology, and the challenge of finding other values to take its place. These various readings by 
Emersonian critics, for all their emphasis on context and contingency, also ignore the period-specific 
context that would explain why artists would want to engage in experimental writing in the first place and 
develop such methods (apart from the will to innovate and make it new).  In one of the founding texts of 
recent Emersonian criticism, Poirier goes so far as to characterize modernism itself as little more than a 
                                                   
159 See  Chapter  One  of  Paul  Grimstad’s  recent  Experience and Experimental Writing: Literary 
Pragmatism from Emerson to the Jameses, which argues that naturalism is an alternative to skepticism.  
Grimstad highlights the passage in “Experience” where Emerson writes that “the world itself is a bubble of 
skepticism”  and  thus  seems  to  suggest  some  form of  naturalism as  an  alternative  to  skepticism.   My 
reading of the essay sees Emerson seeking a quite different alternative, one that clearly anticipates 
Nietzsche’s aestheticism. 
160 To date, there have been two major book-length studies on the relationship (Stack, and more recently 
Mikics). 
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self-serving public relations move devised by American poets (the chief engineers being T.S. Eliot and 
Pound) who  fall outside the tradition of Emerson’s truly innovative and American model of experimental 
writing.161  Emerson, the avant-gardist avant la lettre, thus renders almost unnecessary the very idea of a 
historically specific avant-garde.  Emerson,  of  course,  speaks  metaphorically  of  a  ”new  yet 
unapproachable America,” and this can give us license to treat European artists and thinkers as (at best) 
engaged in a parallel development or manifesting indirectly the influence of the sage of Concord.  The 
Emersonian critical paradigm also tends to treat these American artists as disciples and heirs who simply 
elaborate on Emerson’s radical and experimental thought in a programmatic way (rather than conducting 
real experiments of their own based on different programs).  The same canon of almost exclusively 
American writers reappears in the chapter titles of various studies, and it easy to read these writers as 
elaborating  on  Emerson’s  thought  as  establishing  not  only  a  declaration  of  independence  but  also 
something of a charter statement for more than a century of experimental activity.162 
I believe reading Emerson this way tends to obscure what is truly radical in his thought and what 
connects him with the avant-garde practices he is said to anticipate. It is true that Emerson appealed to 
Nietzsche in part because he promised a way out of European problems and what Nietzsche called 
“cloudy, moist, melancholy old Europe.”   Emerson appealed  to Nietzsche because he showed him  the 
way to overcome the weight of history and culture in Europe.  But we should not forget the context that 
explains why such aspirations would have had the appeal they did for Nietzsche and for his 
contemporaries. I  therefore  want  to  argue  that  Emerson’s  transformation  of  melancholy  is  best 
understood within a European context (rather than as an escape from European problems).   In Chapter 
Five, I will try to show how Nietzsche is in many respects the ultimate Emersonian, and also one way of 
appreciating Emerson’s historical connection with avant-garde writing practices (in Europe, as well as in 
America).  Nietzsche is a European thinker who adapts Emerson’s thought, rather than simply elaborating 
on it, in an effort to deal with cultural problems that Emerson either did not fully appreciate or were to 
                                                   
161 See Chapter Two of The Renewal of Literature, titled “Modernism and its Difficulties.” 
162 In  addition  to  Poirier’s Renewal of Literature and  Grimstad’s  recent  study,  the  long  list might  also 
include Jonathan Levin’s Poetics of Transition (which I discuss in Chapter Two), Steven Myer’s Irresistible 
Dictation: Gertrude Stein and the Correlations of Writing and Science; and Joan Richardson’s A Natural 
History of Pragmatism: The Fact of Feeling.  Stanley Cavell has distanced himself from pragmatist and 
radical empiricist readings, but his influence on recent Emersonian criticism of all stripes is nevertheless 
pervasive. 
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become far more acute only in the final decades of the nineteenth century. In recent years, Nietzsche’s 
debt to Emerson has received some new scholarly attention and is now more widely acknowledged and 
understood.163 But the connection is all too often discussed in terms of Emerson’s influence on Nietzsche 
or as an early anticipation of his later thinking.  I want to look specifically at how Nietzsche developed and 
altered Emerson’s  thinking  to  effect  a  break  from  the  problems  he  understood  to  be  culturally 
symptomatic. 
The disenchantment of modernity is an important world-historical context for reading Emerson, 
and it is an assumed though mostly unexamined context for Emersonian critics.  Poirier notes that 
Emerson’s  dream  of  genius  is  “to  know  a  world  without  knowing  it  as  a  text”  (Renewal 210).  This 
suggests  a  parallel  with  Benjamin’s  account  of Baroque allegory and his description of Baroque 
melancholy (“mournfulness,” or Trauer) as the “sensibility in which feeling revives the empty world in the 
form of  a mask,  in order  to  take a puzzling pleasure  in  its sight”  (qtd.  in Pensky 90).    In  “Experience,” 
Emerson will deal more directly with  this  “puzzle” of  taking pleasure  in a vision  of  the world  as  text  or 
mask, as well as the peculiar strategy of seeking to “revive the empty world” through the courting of pain 
and immersing oneself in a melancholy contemplation of the idea of loss.  Joan Richardson is a recent 
Emersonian critic who emphatically reads Emerson as “carrying out the Protestant project,” thus reading 
him  in  a  European  context,  though  not  within  Benjamin’s  or  Weber’s  disenchanted  narrative. “The 
continuing  work  of  the  Reformation,”  Richardson  writes,  “required  ongoing  iconoclasm,  getting  rid  of 
verbal icons still remaining after the destruction of idols and graven images” (112).  And Richardson, like 
many other Emersonian critics, reads this continuing work in exceptionalist terms, as a distinctly American 
project, claiming that those who made the journey and arrived in the strange New World – what Emerson 
called  “this  new,  yet  unapproachable  America”  – were forced by this new context to deal with the 
experience of becoming “lost among signs” as the “prerequisite to reform” (ix).    
In  contrast  with  these  exceptionalist  accounts,  I  will  argue  that  “Experience”  occupies  an 
important place within the much wider history of transformations of melancholy and within European 
narrative of the disenchantment of modernity.  Emerson should be read as a part of that history, not as an 
                                                   
163 See, for example, the special Emerson/Nietzsche issue of ESQ: A Journal of the American 
Renaissance (Volume 43, nos. 1-4, 1997) which contains contributions from many of the leading scholars 
who began to study the connection in the 1990s (around the time when George Stack’s first book-length 
study of Nietzsche and Emerson appeared). 
 187 
exception to it, and nowhere is Emerson’s relation to the European context more clear than in his attempt 
to overcome the problem of a disenchanted melancholy by transforming it into a method.  There are two 
specific European contexts  I want  to highlight  in which  the significance of Emerson’s  transformation  of 
melancholy appears most clearly.  One important context in which to read Emerson is within the early 
modern history of melancholy and a narrative of the disenchantment of modernity (a modernist narrative, 
not a specifically Weberian one).  The other important context is to read Emerson as overcoming the 
epistemic values in Wordsworthian Romanticism and as developing (long before Nietzsche) a post-
romantic aesthetic.  And the best way to do that is to read “Experience” alongside one of the archetypal 
documents of Romanticism that outlines one disenchanted narrative of loss and recovery. 
 
 
1.  Emerson’s “Experience” as a Post-Romantic Text  
As many critics have noted, Emerson’s mid-period essay (first published in 1842) represents a 
major turning point in his thought and also reflects (and refers to) a traumatic event that was a turning 
point  in Emerson’s personal  life.    In a brief but memorable passage of  the essay, Emerson  relates his 
personal response to the death of his two-year-old son, Waldo.  From a biographical point of view, then, it 
invites comparison with Wordsworth’s “Elegiac Stanzas,” a meditation written in response to the death of 
Wordsworth’s  brother,  the  middle-period  poem  that  is  often  seen  as  a  turning  point  in Wordsworth’s 
career and (by some) as a renunciation of his earlier poetics that marks the beginning of the “slow, sad 
music  of  infirmity”  of  Wordsworth’s  later  poetry.    This  is  an  oversimplified  reading,  of  course,  and 
Wordsworth’s “Intimations” ode has also been (mis)read as a disillusionment and turning point, the later 
“Elegiac Stanzas” having the advantage of a specific life-crisis around which to construct such a reading.  
Emerson’s essay invites a similarly narrow biographical interpretation.  In order to highlight what makes 
“Experience” such an important turning point in the development of a post-Romantic aesthetic, I want to 
contrast two concepts of melancholy by reading Emerson’s essay alongside a different Wordsworth text -- 
the well-known passage in Book VI of Prelude that narrates Wordsworth’s failed experience of crossing 
the Alps without even realizing it (as his guide informs him): 
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Imagination— here the Power so called 
Through sad incompetence of human speech, 
That awful Power rose from the mind's abyss 
Like an unfathered vapour that enwraps, 
At once, some lonely traveller. I was lost; (lines 591-595) 
 
This experience of disappointment over his failure to experience, and his reflection upon the disparity 
between what he imagines and what he actually sees, leads Wordsworth to a strange version of one of 
his many hymns to the power of the imagination and to the capacity of the mind to communicate with 
nature (this is all taken from the later and somewhat revised 1850 edition): 
 
The melancholy slackening that ensued 
Upon those tidings by the peasant given 
Was soon dislodged. Downwards we hurried fast, 
And, with the half-shaped road which we had missed,         
Entered a narrow chasm. The brook and road 
Were fellow-travellers in this gloomy strait, 
And with them did we journey several hours 
At a slow pace. The immeasurable height 
Of woods decaying, never to be decayed, 
The stationary blasts of waterfalls... 
Tumult and peace, the darkness and the light-- 
Were all like workings of one mind, the features 
Of the same face, blossoms upon one tree; 
 Characters of the great Apocalypse, 
 The types and symbols of Eternity, 
 Of first, and last, and midst, and without end. (lines 619-640) 
 
 189 
This entire episode in the Prelude – a celebration of the imagination that takes flight from a failure of the 
imagination -- has long puzzled critics.  One critic has called it a  “logical failure”  (Miall 87).  In fact, it  is 
very much in the pattern of Wordsworth’s cycle of expectation and disappointment – our contact with the 
life of things is a function of their alienation from us and our disappointment.   In this passage, we thus 
see the dialectical recuperation of things in their radical otherness, as well as an odd celebration – and 
what  seems  to  many  a  contradictory  and  “illogical”  celebration  – of the power of the imagination to 
commune with things as the symbolic testimony of this power. In the poem, the slowness and the 
melancholy slackening allow the poet to recover his contact with natural objects and thus gives a new 
spin  to  the  famous  phrase  (from  “Lines  Composed  Above  Tintern  Abbey”)  on  seeing  “into  the  life  of 
things”  [my  italics].    Idealism and  realism are  thus  two  sides  of  the  same  coin,  both manifestations  of 
epistemic values.   Wordsworth stages a disconnect between the imagination and fact so as to recuperate 
the relationship, thus demonstrating the relationship between idealism and realism as twin manifestations 
of epistemic values. So Wordsworth entertains a melancholy method of recovering meaning dialectically, 
on the road to the object as disclosed  through  an  uncanny  encounter  (akin  to  Benjamin’s  “profane 
illumination”).  Wordsworth goes from seeing into the life of things and from a proto-Proustian project of 
emotion recovered and memory regained in tranquility, to something more like a proto-Surrealist recovery 
of things in their uncanny alterity – as nature morte.   A  “melancholy  slackening”  of  the  subjective  will 
makes possible the lyric subject’s uncanny encounter with things, as well as allowing us to recuperate our 
imaginative power to commune with them.   
Many critics have  found Wordsworth’s strategy more  than a  little suspect, but one could hardly 
imagine a more vivid illustration of the Romantic celebration of the power of imagination.  But there is also 
a hint of Benjamin’s materialist  recuperative method here. We might  recall Wordsworth’s odd  lament  in 
the preface to Lyrical Ballads that  the  poet  must  give  pleasure  to  his  readers  and  “except  this  one 
restriction, there is no object standing between the Poet and the image of things.”    One natural question 
to  ask  about  this  dialectic  of  expectation  and  disappointment  is  whether Wordsworth  “engineers”  this 
failure, or at least welcomes it as an occasion for communing with nature.  If we cannot will our own 
epiphanies, then we can still engineer sublime failures of the imagination so as to recuperate a sense of 
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the alterity of nature as meaningless but objective fact.  This is a curious reversal of the Romantic view of 
nature as a source of value and as having a special correspondence with the power of imagination.   
Critic Charles Altieri draws special attention to this passage of the Prelude as an illustration of 
how “value for the Romantics was conceived as an extension of fact and hence a fulfillment of epistemic 
culture rather than a challenge  to  its  authority”  (Stevens 14).  As  I  hope  to  show,  Emerson’s  essay 
outlines a model of responding to epistemic disenchantment that has far more profound implications.  
Emerson overcomes romanticism by rejecting its remaining epistemic aspirations (the idea that the “facts” 
of nature can be the source and foundation for value).  Instead  of  leading  to  the  “slow,  sad music  of 
infirmity,”  Emerson’s  essay  offers  a  blueprint  for  a  new  form of  post-Romantic heroic melancholy that 
Nietzsche would later popularize as an important model for the perpetual revolution of the modernist 
avant-garde.  Harold Bloom famously claimed that Emerson did not have Wordsworth’s patience and had 
no interest in waiting passively the epiphanic visions to come; instead, Emerson wanted to force these 
epiphanies  to occur  through  the subject’s active  interrogation of  the object world.   Bloom  is not entirely 
correct, however, in his contrast between Emerson and Wordsworth.  Emerson’s ideal is not the “flash-of-
lightning faith” in the epiphany at all; his desire is to maintain what he calls a “continuous daylight.”164  The 
phenomenon of the conversion, a type of experience to which Emerson gave a central place, is therefore 
not to be equated with the profane illumination of the epiphany.  He is, moreover, quite explicit in 
“Experience”  in  declaring  the  impossibility  of  an  unmediated  knowledge  of  things  as  they  really  are 
(noumena,  as  distinct  from  phenomena).    By  the  time  we  come  to  “Experience,”  Emerson has 
fundamentally rejected Wordsworth’s desire for empirical fact, as well as the Wordsworthian celebration 
of the imagination as a power of communing with the things of the world, the power to apprehend things – 
rocks, and stones, and trees – in their material otherness and in light of their radical indifference to our 
interests. The famous passage from Wordsworth thus illustrates two approaches that Emerson will reject: 
a celebration of the power of the imagination (idealism), and a realism of the material object with which 
we may restore an unmediated contact.  We will now look at how Emerson charts a different path down 
the mountain. 
 





The first  sentence  we  read  in  “Experience”  is  a  Cartesian-sounding question that has the 
disarming effect of seeming to come from nowhere: “Where do we find ourselves?”  We become lost in 
the company of Wordsworth; in Emerson, we are lost from the beginning.  All the reader encounters is 
this disembodied voice, and we face an urgent but unanswerable question even before we find an 
opportunity to ask who is talking, before we to orient ourselves as readers in relation to the voice of our 
interlocuter.  There is no narrative framework, no visible scene into which we are thrown.  We are then 
given some narrative context, though a meager dose of it.  And it is all hypothetical context. We are told, 
in a paratactic sequence of descriptions,  to  imagine  that we  find ourselves  “on a stair;  there are stairs 
below us, which we seem to have ascended; there are stairs above us, many a one, which go upward 
and out of sight.”    Just  as we  begin  to  get  our  bearings  in  this  surreal  but  hypothetical  vision, we  are 
informed that this dreamlike scene is one in which we have somehow awakened to find ourselves. There 
is no view to take in from these abstract and unnatural heights, only a sense of our basic coordinates and 
a vague sense of having ascended to a position on these stairs.  And even these basic coordinates do 
not station us very securely as participants in what has now become a thought experiment.  We are on a 
stair, one of a mere succession of stairs with no visible end and no beginning.  Nor can we extrapolate 
with any certainty a trajectory or intended goal from an internal sense of momentum or from preceding 
steps that we can trace; we only “seem” to have ascended.    
 The language then modulates to a more conventional and “grounded” mode of address: that of 
the philosophical disquisition.  Adopting the voice of the moraliste and observer of customs, Emerson 
begins to speculate on the nature of the human longing for touchstones of reality, observing the odd way 
in which grief and suffering are  “courted”  in  the  interests of a philosophical  realism as well  as  idealism 
(loss and distance serving to intensify the sense of depth and meaning): 
 
People grieve and bemoan themselves, but it is not half so bad with them as they say. 
There are moods in which we court suffering, in the hope that here, at least, we shall find 
reality, sharp peaks and edges of truth. But it turns out to be scene-painting and 
counterfeit. The only thing grief has taught me, is to know how shallow it is. That, like all 
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the rest, plays about the surface, and never introduces me into the reality, for contact with 
which, we would even pay the costly price of sons and lovers. Was it Boscovich who 
found out that bodies never come in contact? Well, souls never touch their objects.  An 
innavigable sea washes with silent waves between us and the things we aim at and 
converse with. Grief too will make us idealists. (472-73) 
 
The casually interjected question (consider what happens tonally if we change to: “Was it not Boscovich 
who found…?”) affirms that we are reading an essay, a loosely discursive mode far from the tonal range 
of  Wordsworth’s  language.  But  Emerson’s  paragraph  is  anything  but  unstructured:  it  performs an 
astonishing amount of thematic exposition within the space of a brief passage.  These are themes that 
will be developed later in the essay.  The paragraph establishes, among other things, that Emerson is 
dealing with distance and loss in the sense of “object relations” more generally – the possibility of “souls”  
coming into contact with each other, as well as making contact with the “things we aim at and converse 
with.”  Emerson opens the paragraph with another gesture characteristic of the essay mode, once again 
in the voice of the moraliste of  manners  and  customs:  “[w]hat  opium  is  instilled  into  all  disaster!”   
Emerson here identifies both idealism and realism – the longing for contact with reality, for the “image of 
things,” and the notion that such unmediated contact with the true “image of things” is possible – as twin 
philosophical illusions. “Grief too will make us idealists us,” he writes, and the “too” should be read as well 
as realists.  Both philosophical orientations manifest an epistemic desire for the real that Emerson 
suggests is fundamentally misguided.  
In this early passage, coming only three paragraphs into the essay, we get our first hints of 
unsettling speculations about (for example) the “price” we are willing to pay  – a son or a lover – for an 
authentic experience and for something that will bring us closer to “reality.”  But this still does not prepare 
us for the sudden and startling reference to the recent loss of his two-year-old son Waldo in the following 
paragraph (a disclosure that is tucked away within the paragraph, without even a break for a new 
paragraph that would draw attention to its significance): 
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In the death of my son, now more than two years ago, I seem to have lost a beautiful 
estate, — no more. I cannot get it nearer to me. If tomorrow I should be informed of the 
bankruptcy of my principal debtors, the loss of my property would be a great 
inconvenience to me, perhaps, for many years; but it would leave me as it found me, — 
neither better nor worse. So is it with this calamity: it does not touch me: some thing 
which I fancied was a part of me, which could not be torn away without tearing me, nor 
enlarged without enriching me, falls off from me, and leaves no scar. It was caduceous. I 
grieve that grief can teach me nothing, nor carry me one step into real nature.  (473) 
 
If  critics  are  puzzled  by  Wordsworth’s  logic  of  a  staged  failure  of  the  imagination  as  a  pretext  for 
celebrating the power of the imagination, then the source of puzzlement in “Experience”  – what puts off 
many readers, in fact – is this notoriously sudden and almost casual mention made of the recent loss of a 
son (who is not mentioned again in the essay) that appears so incongruously in the context of scattered 
musings on philosophical questions.  Equally disconcerting is the way Emerson characterizes this 
profound loss by appealing to scientific metaphors analogies to economic investment and the loss of an 
“estate.”   When Freud declares that “transience value is scarcity value over time,” he is making aclaim in 
the course of elaborating a general theory, and so the analogy is therefore acceptable. Freud is not 
writing about the loss of a two-year-old boy.  But when Emerson confesses his grief over the fact that 
grief can teach him nothing, and when he suggests that such knowledge and such contact with reality is 
something  “we  would  even  pay  the  costly  price  of  sons  and  lovers,”  then  the  effect  is  obviously  quite 
different. 
In contrast to Wordsworth, Emerson does not narrate his experience of this loss or stage for us 
his disappointment.  Rather, he imagines a hypothetical response to an imagined situation:  “If tomorrow I 
should be informed...”  Emerson is concerned here with how we view loss and find meaning in it; his aim 
is not to represent the experience of loss but to reflect on how we find meaning in loss.  Note also the 
complicated way in which Emerson relates his personal experience of loss (his own inability to find the 
contact with reality he is looking for) by analogy with other people’s experiences – the question being not 
whether  the  responses of other people’s  responses  to  loss  are sincere or whether  they pretend  to  feel 
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more sadness than there is cause to experience.  This is not a question of authentic feeling, of accurately 
representing deep feelings; the problem is with our notion of authenticity itself, with the opposition 
between  “surface” and  reality  – seeing into the life of things by means of death and the experience of 
loss.  Emerson grieves that grief can teach him nothing – which would otherwise come close to sounding 
like an arrogant boast, if Emerson were critiquing the sincerity of his feeling as compared with the feelings 
of others (as he did at the beginning of this paragraph).   But Emerson is personal in just the right places: 
“I cannot get it nearer to me.”  In context, this is a poignant statement of his desire to have contact with 
his son as well as the admission of its impossibility.  He cannot do it, and he submits that there is a 
problem, a more general problem, with wanting to.  What seems to be a casual exploitation of the 
personal experience of the loss of his son is actually part of a more general critique of the way we court 
suffering and exploit distance and loss – what will make idealists and realists of us all. 
The reader may begin to suspect whether Emerson is invoking the loss of his son as a mere 
pretext for philosophizing on loss.  But the timing of this personal revelation is everything here.  In the 
long passage leading up to his first mention of the loss of his son, Emerson questions our self-deceiving 
search for meaning in loss. One of the philosophical questions he addresses is how our feeling that there 
is meaning in loss and distance, our idealizing of deep authentic feeling itself, is itself an exploitative 
move  and  “scene-painting  and  counterfeit.”    Emerson  alternates  carefully  between  relating  a  personal 
experience and offering general speculations about human nature.  The successful balancing of these 
two tasks (and I think it is handled plausibly and successfully) depends on the precise timing of the 
alternation, and on  the decision  to abandon  the  topic of Waldo’s death at  the moment  it has  raised  the 
questions it is intended to raise.  The “most unhandsome part of our condition,” as Emerson puts it,  is not 
the fact that we must lose what we love, but rather the fact that we actively “court loss” and feel the need 
to interpret and attribute meaning to loss.  The irony, as Emerson appreciates, is that the reality of things 
slips away from us the more we desire contact and seek to exploit that distance as a license for 
imaginative indulgence: 
 
I take this evanescence and lubricity of all objects, which lets them slip through our 
fingers then when we clutch hardest, to be the most unhandsome part of our condition.  
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Nature does not like to be observed, and likes that we should be her fools and playmates. 
We may have the sphere for our cricket-ball, but not a berry for our philosophy. Direct 
strokes she never gave us power to make; all our blows glance, all our hits are accidents. 
Our relations to each other are oblique and casual.  (473) 
 
The “casualness” is clearly a pun, and we might also note Emerson’s casually dismissive attitude toward 
certain questions.  We see an explicit grappling with a epistemic problem: “We have learned that we do 
not see directly, but mediately, and that we have no means of correcting these colored and distorting 
lenses which we are, or of computing the amount of their errors. Perhaps these subject-lenses have a 
creative power; perhaps  there  are  no  objects.”    Perhaps, perhaps: Emerson dismisses these 
philosophical concerns, this philosophical skepticism, as a pointless exercise – he seems to be asking, do 
these philosophical questions really matter?  What he really dismisses is not the memory of his son, but 
the obsessive (and epistemic) desire to represent what cannot be represented, or (as a condition of 
experience) what cannot even be experienced directly.  There is another pun here, or at least an 
ambiguity, that will be developed as a motif in the essay, and that is the shift from “relations” to objects to 
our relations to each other (in the sense of “our friends and relations.”)   Emerson’s ideal of individual self-
reliance  in  “Experience,” we  shall  see,  is  a  radically  self-reflexive solipsism that rigorously rejects any 
notion of recognition by, or sympathy, for other people.  And Emerson, like Nietzsche, conceives of this 
dependent  “relation  to  others”  in  epistemic  terms.  Later  in  the  essay,  he  uses  “relative”  in  the  spatial 
sense of a frame of reference, declaring that “the  great  and  crescive  self,  rooted  in  absolute  nature, 
supplants all relative existence.” 
 I want to suggest that “Experience” goes far beyond Wordsworth and really does “challenge the 
authority of epistemic culture.”  Note  that Emerson  is  going  beyond  Freud  in  rejecting  both  the  poet’s 
indulgence  in melancholy as  a way of communing with  reality  as well  as  the  “paltry empiricism” of  the 
scientist.  Both seek to interpret meaning, both want to explain surface in terms of depth, both want to see 
the general in the particular. Note his rejection of the epistemic values underlying both imagination and 
science.  But the problem is not just scientific models of explanation, but with the desire to explain at all.  
We are also talking about explanation, interpretation, and knowing the world more generally.  Note the 
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passages in which Emerson rejects theorizing and the reading of meaning into signs (like phrenology).  
Signs are taken for wonders.  This suggests a more general problem with interpreting meaning, with 
viewing the world as text.  Emerson rejects the synthetic powers of the imagination as well as the 
empirical scientist’s interpretations of “fact.” 
The point here  is not  that  “the absence of  the  imagination must  also be  imagined,” as Wallace 
Stevens famously wrote, which may easily be interpreted as following a familiar Romantic negative 
dialectic and a pretext for another Wordsworthian celebration of the imagination.  What we face, rather, is 
the necessity of willing and holding hard to the poverty that forces the imagination to recognize the way 
the world resist our designs.  For Emerson, it is impossible to imagine the world as seen without us – 
imagination of this kind (“imaging”) is an illusion.   The challenge for Emerson, as I hope to show, is how 
we find some way to acknowledge the pressure of reality, some constraints, without making it the real 
source or test of value in the epistemic sense. “Nature and literature,” Emerson laments, “are subjective 
phenomena; every evil and every good thing is a shadow which we cast” (487).  So what is left then, we 
might wonder, once we have cast off both empirical science and the imagination, the philosophical 
abstraction as well as the sensuous and material reality of nature?  “The great and crescive self” is still 
“rooted  in  absolute  nature,”  but  the  crescive  self  and  its  own  activity  of  transforming  transience  into  a 
power in relation to the world are taken as the primary source of value (487).   The question then 
becomes how value derives from the process of engaging the world and articulating oneself, and what 
kinds of activity we are talking about.  And if we are looking in Emerson for a model of modernist 
experimental writing, then we need to know what role the experimental activity of aesthetic articulation 
has in this new process of value creation. 
If there is a central “topic” to be found in “Experience,” it  is the concept mood and its relation to 
individual temperament.  It  is in “Experience,” for example, that we find the well-known conceit on mood 
being the beads and temperament the iron wire on which the beads slide.  Here, quoted in full, is perhaps 
the key passage on mood and temperament: 
 
Dream delivers us to dream, and there is no end to illusion. Life is a train of moods like a 
string of beads, and, as we pass through them, they prove to be many-colored lenses 
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which paint the world their own hue, and each shows only what lies in its focus. From the 
mountain you see the mountain. We animate what we can, and we see only what we 
animate. Nature and books belong to the eyes that see them. It depends on the mood of 
the man, whether he shall see the sunset or the fine poem.  There are always sunsets, 
and there is always genius; but only a few hours so serene that we can relish nature or 
criticism. The more or less depends on structure or temperament. Temperament is the 
iron wire on which the beads are strung. Of what use is fortune or talent to a cold and 
defective nature?  (473-74) 
 
What is the relation between mood and temperament, the one a perspective that distorts our perception 
of the world and the other a means of dissolving the subject position itself as our vantage point on the 
world?165  Temperament here is analogous to epistemic perspective (always limited, always biased, 
always subjective – and that applies to the poet’s point of view, as well as the scientist’s).  Mood is the 
solvent  that  helps  us  overcome  our  temperamental  limitations;  it  “dissolves  personality.”     We  cannot 
know the world apart from our limited perspectives, which are a function of our shifting moods and given 
temperaments; “from the mountain we see the mountain.”  Imagination is “scene painting and counterfeit.”  
Note the emphasis above on visual perspective above – the sunset we see, the book – bringing to mind, 
and perhaps an intended allusion to, Galileo’s declaration that “nature is a book open for all to read.”  We 
cannot experience mood directly, and temperament is a perspectival limitation.  The problem is not 
representing grief per se, but the way mood and temperament challenge representational values more 
generally.  
Here, then, is one way of answering the traditional question of what the central essay is really 
“about.”  The  two  ways  of  understanding  the  world  (through  feeling  and  through intellect) are both 
dismissed as limited perspectives.  The question about locating a center in the essay is not a question 
about place of Emerson’s personal loss and grief in relation to the rest of the essay, but rather about the 
relation of grief as one example of a mood that can be experienced (though not directly).  “I grieve that 
grief can teach me nothing,” but for Emerson mood or temperament have no power to “teach” us anything 
                                                   
165 See Branka Arsiç On Leaving, pp 135-43, 296-303, 138-39 for a detailed account of the changing 
concepts of mood and temperament in Emerson. 
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about the world; they have only the power to dissolve and reconstitute worlds for us.  “Our moods do not 
agree  with  one  another,”  and  the  fact  that moods  occur  to  us  gives  them  (for  Emerson)  an  objective 
status that replaces the fixation on objective knowledge of reality that haunts the philosophical skeptic.  
But our job then is not to submit to them passively, but rather to use them to dissolve personality (mood 
dissolves temperamental limitations – note the shift from the wire metaphor to the even more abstract 
axis in the later passage.)  We must rely on our positional axis, and we do not even have the vertical 
coordinates of the stairs by which we can take our bearings relative to the world (much less treat it as any 
kind of absolute frame of reference).  In Chapter Five, I will look in more detail at how Emerson’s concept 
of mood (elaborated in a non-theoretical, non-doctrinal  way  in  “Experience”)  gets  translated  into 
Nietzsche’s Selbstgestaltung and his concept of aesthetic articulation as value creation.  
I would go further and say that the fundamental problem for Emerson is not our inability to 
experience grief, or to experience the truth of things by way of grief; the problem is with the epistemic 
notion of experience itself.  Mood becomes important because it is inimical to experience, because it 
disarms our epistemic interest  in  “deep meaning”  or  “authentic  contact.”    In  effect,  Emerson wants  to 
effect a transvaluation of values by converting an epistemic sense of transience into the force of 
transition.  The danger here of conflating transition with transience is great.  Emerson is not making a 
Heraclitean claim about the transience of the things of this world so much as he is noting how all of our 
knowledge  claims  are  functions  of  mood/temp.    “Experience”  thus  demonstrates  the  inadequacy of 
experience in the epistemic sense – the inadequacy of both immediate fact and immediate feeling – and 
affirms the primacy of mood and temperament.  The problem is not with the representability of grief, but 
with the impossibility of representing mood more generally.  Mood and temperament are primary, not the 
experience they frame.  And if mood is primary and cannot be represented, then representation (and the 
epistemic notion of the real as what can be represented) ought to be abandoned.   Emerson investigates 
the connection between feeling a loss and knowing the world through loss (which is reflected in the two-
parts of the essay).  One response is to treat loss and death and transience themselves as touchstones 
for the real: “Nothing is left us now but death.  We look to that with a grim satisfaction, saying, there at 
least is reality that will not dodge us.”  But this is one of many positions that Emerson rejects.  Emerson 
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gives an anatomy of melancholy here as the fundamentally epistemic temptation to equate reality with the 
pain of loss: reality is what hurts. 
We thus see the central place of mood as an abstract force, a force abstracted from “matter,”  a 
disembodied Cartesian force  that  has  no  “location”  and  replaces  the  disengaged  subject  with  a 
disengaged force – a force of dissolution: “Where do we find ourselves?”  is also an ambiguously worded 
practical question about how we find our selves placed at any moment if our relation to the world (and our 
selves) is a function of these changing moods. In place of the objective “force” of nature, Emerson sees 
practical value in subjective mood as a solvent and a catalyst within a program of self-formation.    The 
objectivity of mood, as something that happens to us and effects a transformation of the frame that 
conditions our experience, thus comes to replace the longing for the hard reality of the material world as a 
reliable (but in fact always unreliable) test of reality. The opposition between experience and meaning 
gets replaced in Emerson by an opposition between experience and the framing of experience.  And the 
framing of experience takes primacy over what we experience in the world – which, as Emerson 
repeatedly  reminds us  in  “Experience,”  is always colored by our mood and our  temperament.   Richard 
Poirier’s  remark  that Emerson’s dream of genius  is  “to know a world without knowing  it as a  text” may 
point to a parallel with Benjamin’s project.  But Emerson’s comment that he would like to know the world  if 
that were possible sounds like the voice of someone who has simply renounced the skeptic’s concern for 
knowledge – or, as Stanley Cavell suggests, someone who has converted skepticism into a method.  This 
is  the Emerson whom Nietzsche praised  as  “contain[ing] so much skepsis, so many  ‘possibilities,’  that 
even virtue achieves  esprit  in  his  writings”  (Basic Writings 795).  The conversion of skepticism into a 
method involves converting fact into possibility. 
Here is a summing up of these themes and a concise articulation of what I take to be the radically 
anti-epistemic position of “Experience”: 
 
It is very unhappy, but too late to be helped, the discovery we have made that we exist. 
That discovery is called the Fall of Man. Ever afterwards we suspect our instruments. We 
have learned that we do not see directly, but mediately, and that we have no means of 
correcting these colored and distorting lenses which we are, or of computing the amount 
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of their errors. Perhaps these subject-lenses have a creative power; perhaps there are no 
objects. Once we lived in what we saw; now, the rapaciousness of this new power, which 
threatens to absorb all things, engages us. Nature, art, persons, letters, religions, objects, 
successively tumble in, and God is but one of its ideas. Nature and literature are 
subjective phenomena; every evil and every good thing is a shadow which we cast.  
(487) 
 
This is one of the most Nietzschean-sounding passages in all of Emerson and one to which we ought to 
pay  particular  attention  before  looking  at what Nietzsche  “does” with Emerson.   Once  again,  Emerson 
repeats  the  observation  that  nature  and  literature  are  projective  fictions,  both  “subjective  phenomena.”  
But Emerson anticipates Nietzsche most clearly here in sounding a note of urgency and even a sense of 
ominousness about the threat of nihilism, and what Nietzsche would describe as the “terrible demands” it 
places on us. What  “new  power”  is  this  that  Emerson  identifies?    Here  it  is  characterized  as  a  force 
unleashed, as something inimical and indifferent to our interests. Nihilism is a discovery that is “too  late to 
be helped,” and now it represents a challenge we must face. Emerson deserves the title of the first post-
romantic (something often said of Nietzsche) in part because he is the first to fully appreciate the threat of 
nihilism and one of the first to recognize disenchanted science (the “paltry empiricism” of his day) and the 
Romantic concept of the imagination as twin manifestations of the disenchantment of modernity, and to 
conclude that neither was up to the challenge of dealing with the deep crisis of value and meaning in 
Western culture.   
 
3.  On Two Freudian Readings of “Experience” 
Any  reader  of  “Experience”  is  forced  at  some  point  (usually  very  early  on,  as  the  passage  in 
question appears early in the essay) to address a basic and troubling question: How do we reconcile the 
personal component of the essay, the death of Emerson’s son, with its more general significance?  Is the 
essay  “about”  grieving  loss,  or  about  overcoming  epistemology?    Among  critics,  there  is  general 
agreement about the basic form of the essay:  The first part of the essay demonstrates the failure of felt 
experience, and the second demonstrates the failure to understand experience intellectually. These are 
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both questions of contact with or access to “reality,” and are thus ep istemic in nature.  Both deal with the 
values of knowing the world. Many critics have been puzzled over why Emerson abandons the subject of 
Waldo completely in the second half of the essay, and by the fact that Waldo seems to be subsumed 
within a larger argument.  One simple response would be to point out that there is no larger argument in 
the essay.  Emerson considers and abandons a variety of possibilities in a discursive, essayistic way.  
There is no obvious “climax” to the essay, no dramatic arc, no elegiac working through.  Emerson thus 
escapes the traditional problem that has always attached to the elegy of making a personal loss (the 
death of someone) the occasion of a public ritual of mourning and a dialectical affirmation of larger 
powers renewed or  awakened  (which  we  see  in  Wordsworth’s  affirmation  of  the  power  of  the 
imagination).   Emerson makes different “use” of this experience, as we have seen, by meditating on the 
failure to experience loss itself and the failure of grief to teach him anything, and the consequent 
impossibility to construct any recovery narrative from what he is unable to experience.  “Experience” can 
be read as either an experimental elegy of some kind, or (just as plausibly) as the ultimate anti-elegy.  I 
want to look at two of  the  most  influential  readings  of  “Experience”  in  recent  decades,  both  of  which 
characterize the process of Emerson’s concept of experimental writing (as well as his own writing)  within 
the very different framework of Freud’s mourning/melancholia distinction.   I want to suggest that the ease 
with which critics invoke the Freudian framework not only fails to appreciate the full implications of 
Emerson’s concept of melancholy for experimental writing, but is also a sign of the continued dominance 
of the epistemic culture whose values Emerson (and Nietzsche) sought to replace. 
 
Sharon Cameron is one critic who argues that the figure of little Waldo is at the center of the 
essay, that remains a presence throughout the essay even when he is no longer explicitly mentioned, and 
that his abandonment as a topic within the larger structure of the essay is evidence of a new mode of 
representing grief and a new form of elegiac mourning.   The confusion over the central subject of the 
essay, Cameron observes, has led critics  to  downplay  the  loss  of  Emerson’s  son  and  its  importance 
within the essay: “If [critics] do see the death of the child as central,” she writes, “they have viewed it as 
the first of a number of phenomena to which Emerson has an equally contingent relation rather than 
understanding  its generative  connection  to  all  else  that  follows”  (31).   Cameron wants  us  to  recognize 
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how this personal loss has a “generative connection to all else that follows,” and she reads the essay as 
modeling a new kind of elegiac mourning of loss that finds a new way to represent grief by means of its 
discursive process.  Cameron flatly states that “’Experience’ is an elegy, an essay whose primary task is 
its work of mourning” (25).    
The new form of elegy she has in mind, however, depends on a Freudian model of mourning 
loss.   Cameron makes  a  point  of  emphasizing  that Emerson’s  radical  innovation  here  is  to  develop  a 
healthy-minded process of mourning as an alternative to melancholy.  The model of writing designed to 
facilitate this process of mourning is the elegy.  Cameron argues that the elegiac in Emerson “has a logic 
of its own – not one of working through (not one of synthesis) and not one of explicit conflict” (17).   She 
then distinguishes this open-ended concept of mourning from what has been thought of (since Freud) as 
the  failure  or  refusal  to mourn:    “It may seem along  the way  as  if  I  am describing, or as  if Emerson  is 
portraying,  a  condition  of  ‘melancholia.’    Instead,  I  argue,  he  is  creating  a  powerful  and  systematic 
representation  of  grief”  (17).    And  while  she  acknowledges  that  the  “Freudian  explanation  might  be 
inadequate” because “the work of mourning needs to be repeated” and it is a continual process without 
closure, Cameron states in unequivocal terms that her own “understanding of the process of mourning in 
the essay depends on a Freudian model.”  
This experimental notion of the mourning process may seem like somewhat odd move in the 
context of recent criticism, since a melancholy refusal to mourn within the Freudian model (as we saw in 
Chapter One) has invited a range of critics to reconceive melancholy as the rejection of the closure and 
“synthesis”  and  the  demand  for  conformity  associated  with  the  mourning  process.    Cameron 
characterizes this Emersonian process of mourning as open-ended, but she does so by redefining 
mourning as a repeatable and never-ending process – a mandate for healthy living.  Elegiac writing, then, 
becomes a form of open-ended experimental writing.  This is a natural way to characterize what Emerson 
so clearly envisions as an ideal of process writing; it also accounts for some of the discursive processes 
that structure “Experience,” including what appears to be the casual abandonment of topics (such as the 
fleeting mention of Waldo’s death).    There are serious problems, though, if we want to treat Cameron’s 
notion of elegiac process as an alternative to epistemic values, unless we make the mourning process of 




writes, “but health of body consists in circulation, and sanity of mind in variety or facility of association. We 
need change of objects”  (Essays 476).   But Cameron’s experimental version of  elegiac mourning as a 
repeatable and open-ended process is also quite close to Freud the scientist’s healthy-minded embrace 
of transience in favor of a proceduralism that is based on a reality principle – not a “love of the real,” but a 
commitment to what Weber characterized as an open-ended nihilistic process.   As we saw in Chapter 
Three, epistemic values are entirely compatible with non-foundational procedures, such as the positivist’s 
progressive model of theoretical change as planned obsolescence.  
Cameron  writes  that  the  “Freudian  explanation  might  be  inadequate”  because  “the  work  o f 
mourning needs  to be  repeated.” This  is crucial qualification.  As we have already seen, this is exactly 
Freud’s defense of the open-ended procedure of science, not as a response to any specific loss but as 
what James would call a “total reaction upon the world” – to a disenchanted world, in which we have gain 
the idea of objective facts but lose the idea of nature as a source of value.  The healthy-minded scientific 
world-view that Freud advertises is one that embraces transience as a mandate for adopting an open-
ended procedure of inquiry that is premised on the planned obsolesence of all theories whose passing, 
like all things in the world, we are called upon to mourn in the interest of progress.  When we make 
mourning a repeatable and therefore open-ended process (as Cameron wants to do), then we begin to 
collapse the formal distinction between mourning and melancholy and begin to see them as two possible 
responses  to  the  disenchantment  of  modernity  and  to  the  fact  of  transience.    Emerson’s  “healthy” 
response to disenchantment, however, is quite different from Freud’s embrace of change in the name of 
the procedural values of positivist science – a social contract that Emerson would likely have considered 
another example of a “paltry empiricism.”  The most serious problem with Cameron’s reading, then, is that 
her emphasis on the private project of elegiac mourning comes at the cost of obscuring the radical 
implications of Emerson’s much larger aim of replacing the value of both a knowable world as well as  the 
pursuit of that knowledge in the form of a standardized procedure (the positivist’s standard of verifiability, 
for  example).   Cameron’s elegiac  “logic” makes writing  itself a generic procedural activity, a  repeatable 
ritual with pre-established aims, rather than a space in which new values can be created through the 
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process of articulation.  It is Nietzsche, in other words, who most clearly sees in “Experience” a powerful 
way of dealing with the cultural crisis of nihilism and the problem of value.  
 One other way to address Cameron’s concern about acknowledging the significance of the loss of 
Emerson’s  son  would  be  to  read  “Experience”  in  relation  to  a  different  model  of  experimental  writing 
whose with historical ties – not as the genre of elegiac mourning, but to read the essay itself.  Cameron’s 
basic challenge, one that she does not acknowledge, is to reconcile the open and discursive 
experimentality of the essay as a mode of writing with the closed ritual form of the elegy as genre.  In the 
introduction, I  looked briefly at the importance of Montaigne’s essays as a model, for both Emerson and 
Nietzsche, of self-articulation as a non-epistemic source of value.166 In “Experience” he declares that he 
will no longer read Montaigne for the matter of his writing but instead try to adopt his method.   Elegiac 
writing may have a logic of its own, as Cameron asserts.  But the early modern essay, conceived as a 
response  to  an  earlier  crisis  of  value,  follows  its  own  peculiar  logic.    There  is  a  reason  for Emerson’s 
adoption of Montaigne’s essay as his chosen mode of writing.  We can also respond to Cameron’s claim 
that  the  loss  of  his  son  has  a  “generative  relation”  to  everything  else  in Emerson’s  essay  by  quoting 
Montaigne’s on  the death of his close  friend, Étienne de La Boétie, as an account of the genesis and 
motivation for his own project: “he alone possessed my true image, and he took it away with him. That is 
why I—myself—interpret myself, with such care.”   
 
Cameron wants  to  reclaim “Experience”  from philosophical readings and understand its radical 
implications within more of a literary context, and not necessarily in connection with the “writing methods 
of the twentieth century,” but as experimenting with a new form of literary elegy in the unlikely mode of  the 
essay. Cavell answers in a very different way than Cameron does the question of what role art and 
literature are to play in this experimental endeavor.  It is not the elegy but writing as exemplary 
overcoming – the  “work”  of mourning. Perhaps  the most  important articulation of what Cavell calls his 
“moral perfectionist” reading of Emerson may be found in Cavell’s essay, “Aversive Thinking: Emersonian 
Representations  in Heidegger  and Nietzsche” which  (as  the  title  indicates)  invokes  a  number  of  other 
philosophers in a reading of Emerson.  Cavell understands the process of mourning in a quite different 
                                                   




art thus becomes a therapeutic enactment of treating oneself as well  as  one’s  worldly  attachments  as 
“caduceous.”      There  is  an  abandonment  of  acquired  selfhood,  and  that  requires  the  constant work  of 
mourning old attachments and old identities so as to make possible new ones.  The essay becomes the 
arena for staging  the  “melodrama”  of  writing  oneself.  Cavell’s  account makes  essay  writing  a  form  of 
“writing the self” – but a writing of the self that requires the melodrama of constant interpretation of the 
self performed.  This also requires the imagining of an interlocutor (Cavell invokes Wittgenstein).  The 
fundamental problem, of course, is that interpretation (the interpreted image of the self) comes to replace 
the activity of articulation.  The essay becomes a means of self-knowledge, rather than a source of new 
values that overcome the desire for knowledge. Emerson writes that he is “very content with knowing, if 
only  I  could  know”  (491).  The  problem,  for  Emerson,  is  that  knowing  is  an  all-too-easy mode of 
satisfaction leading either to delusion or to nihilistic despair.  For Cavell, the question of what the essay is 
“about” is less important than the question of how the text “works on” the reader and how it wants us to 
conceive of the process of writing as a working upon and working toward.  Cavell has expressed doubts 
about other critics’ attempts to cast Emerson as a pragmatist or a proto-pragmatist. In his essay, “What’s 
the Use of Calling Emerson a Pragmatist?”, Cavell asks how pragmatist texts “work” on their readers, with 
the implication that pragmatist criticism (preoccupied as it has been with process metaphysics and the 
possibility of a radical empiricism) has failed to acknowledge as the central question the work that writing 
does.  
While Cavell’s response to pragmatist critical orthodoxy is a much-needed critique, there are also 
serious problems with his moral perfectionist reading of Emerson.  One problem is that Cavell’s appeal to 
Freudian self-interpretation  runs  directly  counter  to  the  surface  metaphors,  and  the  rejection  of  “deep 
meaning,”  that  we find throughout Emerson and Nietzsche.  While Emerson does speak of the 
transformation of genius  into practical power  as  “work,” he  is  also  very  explicit  (as  is Nietzsche) about 
avoiding the concern for interpreting deeper meaning, appearance and reality.  An emphasis on “surface” 
(“We live amid surfaces, and the true art of life is to skate well on them”)  implies that there is no place for 
the melodrama of discovering hidden depths, whether we conceive this as self-discovery or self-creation 
(Cavell’s moral perfectionism thus demonstrates how antifoundational philosophy can still remain in thrall 
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to epistemic values).  And so there is a real problem of making Nietzsche – and, I would argue, Emerson 
– compatible with Freud in the performative self-interpretive sense, as well as giving a role to the process 
of mourning in experimental writing. 
  Cavell also emphasizes the importance, in this project of performing the self, of “making oneself 
intelligible” to others in a social relation (hence, Cavell’s appeal to Wittgenstein) (Conditions 46).  These 
are incompatible thinkers brought together, but Cavell at least recognizes some of the pressures and 
parameter  that  make  this  program  of  overcoming  a  challenge.      Cavell’s  appeal  to  Nietzsche  and 
Wittgenstein (and Heidegger) also suggests that these are problems that Emerson did not fully recognize 
himself. The need to represent oneself to others in dialogue is not to be found in Emerson, who is quite 
explicit in his embrace of solipsism and our inability to know others and to relate ourselves to others (and 
that is one reason for highlighting the “relational” theme in “Experience”).  
Cavell’s concept of “moral perfectionism,” which joins Nietzsche with Emerson and conceives of 
philosophy as a conduct of life, is based on what he calls (picking up a phrase from Emerson) the motive 
of  “aversive  thinking.”    Cavell  writes  that  “In  moral  perfectionism,  as  represented  in  Emerson  and 
Nietzsche,  we  are  invited  to  a  position  that  is  structurally  one  of  martyrdom”167 (56).   Aversion and 
transgression, of course, can easily become programmatic ends in themselves, sustaining a perpetual 
self image of the heroic outsider to culture.  Cameron, incidentally, echoes these melodramatic terms 
(perhaps  echoing  Cavell)  the  “constant martyrdom  of  the  self.”    But  for  Nietzsche,  the  challenge  was 
doing this without assuming the cultural pose and attitude of the martyr with its counterfeit satisfactions 
(and what Nietzsche calls “counterfeit heroism”).  The problem for Nietzsche becomes how to develop a 
transgressive performative aesthetic without this heroic imaging of the self as the martyr who courts 
suffering and engages in melodramatic struggle – hence, Ecce Homo is an experiment in what Henry 
Staten calls the “exploding hero.”   In the next chapter, I want to look at the danger of taking aversion to 
conformity and mobility as values in themselves, as inadequate responses to the problem of creating new 
value.  I will look more at this contradiction in the next section in my reading of what is perhaps the most 
self-conscious example of performative writing – Ecce Homo – that makes clear what is at stake in how 
we conceive of this experimental endeavor. 




CODA:  Emerson and the Work that Writing Does 
In this chapter, I have tried to read “Experience” as a post-Romantic manifesto and show how it 
enacts and envisions a break from the epistemic values of Wordsworthian romanticism – how Emerson 
takes us (or at least attempts to take us) from epistemology to romance.  The final question I want to 
address is how Emerson’s concept of melancholy and his radically reflexive practice of converting genius 
into practical power – the value-creating activity for which “the world exists” – might  be translated into the 
practice of experimental writing.  What function does writing have in effecting this conversion, and what 
kind of process is writing supposed to model?  If we “live among surfaces” and the “art of life is to skate 
well on them,” then does Emerson ask us to abandon writing altogether and pursue romance as a way of 
living one’s life as art?    
Emerson himself gives us something of a key to understanding the stylistic features of his 
abstract essayism168: “Illusion, Temperament, Succession, Surface, Surprise, Reality, Subjectiveness,  -- 
these are the threads on the loom of time, these are the lords of life” (490-91). “Reality,” for Emerson, is 
only  one  “thread”  among  others.  Emerson is thus quite clear in making large claims, and this is a 
climactic summation in Experience.  Hence, the aphoristic, discontinuous, paratactic style of Emerson’s 
writing:  a  succession  of  “surprising”  sentences.  There  is  also  Emerson’s  “freeze  frame  baroque,”  as 
Sontag  characterized  Walter  Benjamin’s  sentences,  Emerson’s  lapidary  and  discontinuous  style  that 
makes stepwise progress but refuses to take flight or move toward climaxes.  A number of passages in 
Emerson read like an array of “ejecta”; his sentences are themselves “caduceous” and fall away from him.  
Consider the freeze-frame baroque structure of the language in the passage which I analyzed earlier: 
                                                   
168 Emerson gave his ten "Laws of Writing" to his young correspondent, George Woodbury, in 1860.  
1) Write not at all unless you have something new. 
2) Write it, and not before, behind, and about it. 
3) Have nothing of the plan visible—nor firstly, secondly, or thirdly. Show the body, not the ligaments. 
4) Do no violence to words. Use them etymologically. 
5) Don't quite satisfy the reader. A little guessing does him no harm, so I would assist him with no 
connections. If you can see how the harness fits, he can. 
6) Start with no skeleton or plan. Knock away all scaffolding. 
7) Speak in your own natural way. 
8) Avoid adjectives. Let the noun do the work. 
9) Out of your own self should come your theme. 
10) Only read to start your own team. 
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Dream delivers us to dream, and there is no end to illusion. Life is a train of moods like a 
string of beads, and, as we pass through them, they prove to be many-colored lenses 
which paint the world their own hue, and each shows only what lies in its focus. From the 
mountain you see the mountain. We animate what we can, and we see only what we 
animate. Nature and books belong to the eyes that see them. It depends on the mood of 
the man, whether he shall see the sunset or the fine poem.  (473-74) 
 
Here is a specimen of a style in which sentences do not entail one another in the conventional sense. 169  
One sentence does not  “deliver us”  to  the next,  in  the sense of  logically entailing  it.    The conventional 
transitions between them have been carefully severed, though there are links. (The verb “see”  laces its 
way like a motif through the final sentences.)  When we expect to find a transitional pronoun or phrase at 
the beginning of a sentence, we are often thrown off and disappointed in our demand for easy continuity: 
what “it” is that “depends on the mood of the man” refers not to any antecedent in the sentence we have 
just read, but has a proleptic function fully contained within the sentence we have not yet finished reading.  
On a first glance, all of these sentences read like a string of aphorisms; they proceed like a train of 
passing and discrete moods that “do not agree with one another.” 
There are a few other more general features that we might note in Emerson’s essay writing as we 
encounter it in “Experience.”  First, it is “must be abstract.”  For the most part, Emerson’s imagery is not 
natural; the metaphoric dimension of his writing is at the extreme opposite of picturesque. Emerson is 
almost metaphysical in its conceits.  There are steps, platforms, circles, spheres.  The essay “Nature” is 
one of Emerson’s earliest works; but in no sense can we call the later Emerson of “Experience” a “nature 
poet.”  Indeed,  it  is  striking  how  little  natural  imagery  – or any imagery at all – we are given in 
“Experience.”  As  John  Updike  observes,  “the  terrain  to  which  [Emerson’s]  auditors  are  released  is 
dauntingly  featureless.”    Following  this program, Emerson’s  post-romantic essayism must therefore be 
abstract and reflexive (not picturesque), and this requires a Cartesian stripping away of images and 
involving a radically reflexive turn.   Emerson rejects the “matter” of Montaigne and declares that he will 
                                                   
169 It should be noted, as well, that the language of this particular passage owes something to the 
aphoristic cadences of the book of Ecclesiastes. 
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only  follow  his  “method”:    Emerson  commences  with  an  essentially  Cartesian  project,  but rejects the 
epistemic cogito (one radically reflexive method) in favor of another reflexive method – Montaigne’s 
essaysim  as  philosophical  skepticism  converted  to  a  method  and  a  style.    Emerson’s  writing  is  still 
Cartesian, though, in its abstractness – a quality that Emerson does not include in his list but exemplifies 
throughout  his  writing  in  “Experience.”    The  essay  is  abstract  and  difficult in the modern sense; it 
embodies  the  kind  of  “difficulty”  that  T.S.  Eliot  argues  (in  his  essay  on  the  Metaphysical poets) is 
necessary to comprehend the variety and complexity of the modern world.   
Emerson’s  “dissociative method,” Sharon Cameron writes,  “reflects  the self’s  relation  to  its own 
divergent  claims”  (Impersonality 55).  In  Emerson’s  essays,  Cameron  also  notes,  “contradictory 




and unemotional; his paragraphs do not build to climaxes in a hypotactic manner, and his paragraphs are 
not noticeably more “emotional” in contrast with his “unemotional” sentences (as Gertrude Stein claimed 
paragraphs were in relation to sentences).  Instead, we find a good deal of juxtapositional structuring, 
stepwise movement, and qualification of earlier sentences separated by some distance from one another.  
His lines are aphoristic and quotable, even ruin-like, but they qualify each other in subtle and complex 
ways, connecting and interlocking with each other in a spatial more than a musical or cumulative sense. 




“Experience”  that culminates  in  the  famous final line on transforming genius into practical power, a line 
that lends itself (as so much in Emerson does) to aphoristic quotation but reads quite differently when 
qualified by context:  
 
                                                   
170 Cameron alludes to a very differently phrased line in Emerson’s “Intellect”: “Silence is a solvent that 
destroys personality, and gives us leave to be great and universal.” 
 210 
I observe that in the history of mankind there is never a solitary example of success,—
taking their own tests of success. I say this polemically, or in reply to the inquiry, Why not 
realize your world? But far be from me the despair which prejudges the law by a paltry 
empiricism;—since there never was a right endeavor but it succeeded. Patience and 
patience, we shall win at the last. We must be very suspicious of the deceptions of the 
element of time. It takes a good deal of time to eat or to sleep, or to earn a hundred 
dollars, and a very little time to entertain a hope and an insight which becomes the light of 
our life. We dress our garden, eat our dinners, discuss the household with our wives, and 
these things make no impression, are forgotten next week; but, in the solitude to which 
every man is always returning, he has a sanity and revelations which in his passage into 
new worlds he will carry with him. Never mind the ridicule, never mind the defeat; up 
again, old heart!—it seems to say,—there is victory yet for all justice; and the true 
romance which the world exists to realize will be the transformation of genius into 
practical power. (491-2) 
 
The sentence quoted at the head of this chapter now reads, in context, as the culminating move of a 
curious logic that moves by a stepwise acknowledgment of limits that establish parameters for a given 
project.  This is not “romance” as a liberation from constraints, but what Emerson describes (in one of the 
only natural metaphors he employs in “Experience”) as a “holding fast to the rocks” of objective obstacles 
that make our responsive movements and maneuvers meaningful.  Emerson’s polemical response to the 
question  “Why  not  realize  your  world?”  and  to  the  notion  that  pragmatic  success  in  these  arbitrarily 
pursued projects is somehow a test of value, can also be read as a pre-emptive critique of later versions 
of pragmatism (including, perhaps, Rorty’s cheerful neo-pragmatism).  This, Emerson seems to say, is 
what  “romance”  cannot be. As we will see in the next chapter, this experimental activity premised on 
fatalism, an amor fati as method, would become a model of experimental value  creation  for Emerson’s 
most important reader. 
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Chapter  Five:  Nietzsche’s  Nostalgia  for  the  Future  and  James’s 
Philosophy of “As If” 
 
Neither in the theoretic nor in the practical sphere do we care for, or go for help to, those who have no head for risks, or 
sense for living on the perilous edge. Our religious life lies more, our practical life lies less, than it used to, on the perilous 
edge. But just as our courage is so often a reflex of another's courage, so our faith is apt to be a faith in some one else's 
faith. We draw new life from the heroic example. The prophet has drunk more deeply than anyone of the cup of bitterness, 
but his countenance is so unshaken and he speaks such mighty words of cheer that his will becomes our will, and our life 
is kindled at his own. 
 
William James, “The Will” (Principles of Psychology 26) 
 
 
Nietzsche  once  called  Schopenhauer  his  most  important  “philosophical  educator.”  But  it  was 
Emerson who was Nietzsche’s most  important guide in showing him the way to transform and overcome 
philosophy itself while at the same time pointing Nietzsche away from Schopenhauer and toward a new 
concept of art.171  What Emerson made clear was the need for a new concept of art as having a function 
within the world, not as an anodyne or a consolation for the shortcomings of life.  In Emerson’s impact on 
Nietzsche, we may locate the beginnings of what would become the avant-garde anti-art aesthetic. The 
problem with the existence Hamlet is that it can become an art object for our passive contemplation, a 
canonical work that people admire but which no longer shocks or moves with the exemplary force of its 
genius.    Emerson  writes  of  the  “immobility  and  absence  of  elasticity  which  we  find  in  the arts” 
(“Experience”  477).   However  vaguely,  Emerson  nevertheless  charges  creative writing with the task of 
remaking itself into some form of a via activa, rather than a via contemplativa.  Emerson freed Nietzsche 
from Schopenhauer, but that leads to a new and newly demanding set of questions about just how to 
reconceive the function of art. We see in Emerson and Nietzsche a joint conceptual rebirth of philosophy 
and art, which, at times, sounds like an art-as-life  aestheticism and a program  for  living one’s life as a 
                                                   
171 David Mikics  argues  that  it  was Emerson  who  helped Nietzsche  “overcome”  the  early  influence  of 
Schopenhauer (15-16).    If  this  is  true,  then  Emerson  complicates  our  understanding  of  Nietzsche’s 
aestheticism, or  at  least  forces  us  to  distinguish  between  Nietzsche’s  early  and  late  concpets  of  the 
aesthetic. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche reflects on his first published book, Beyond Good and Evil, where he 
elaborates an earlier Schopenhauer-inspired aestheticism.  Nietzsche writes that the earlier book “smells 
offensively  Hegelian  and  the  cadaverous  perfume  of  Schopenhauer  sticks  to  a  few  formulas”  (Basic 
Writings 726) 
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work of art.172  We can quote from Emerson a number of lines that sound like manifestos for an art-as-life 
aestheticism, and often (moreover) sound like an anticipation of the (late) Rimbaud who made the radical 
move of abandoning poetry altogether. “Life is a surface,” Emerson tells us, “and the trick is skating well”; 
“The way of life is wonderful; it is by abandonment”; and we are at one point advised to live our life “in the 
strong  present  tense.”    There  are  many  such  aphorisms,  and  they  often have a one-to-one 
correspondence with similar lines in Nietzsche (what Stanley Cavell called “transfigurings” of Emerson).173   
It  has  long  been  a  commonplace  to  think  of  Nietzsche’s  anti-philosophy as a rejection of the 
abstractions of philosophical idealism and a demand for a philosophy that will help us to live our life to the 
fullest, which is close in spirit to the more traditional concept of philosophy as the art of how to live one’s 
life  (or,  alternately,  Montaigne’s  learning  how  to  die).   But as we have seen, neither Nietzsche nor 
Emerson really gives us much in the way of practical advice for changing our lives.  Nowhere does 
Emerson tell us we should live our life as if it were a work of art.  Nietzsche and Emerson both spend 
more time in the peculiar effort of making it clear to us what this new concept of aesthetic value creation 
cannot be in practice.  Their alternatives to conventional notions of art are not ways of living one’s life, but 
rather ways of creating and testing out new values by which to live one’s life.  For Nietzsche, it is art that 
represents a space for realizing an alternative to the values of instrumental reason and the Will to Truth.  
Better than any other reader of Emerson, it is Nietzsche who helps us to clarify how aesthetic practice 
can realize “practical power” as a challenge to (and substitute for) a culturally dominant Will to Truth 
Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo, the text I will focus upon in this chapter, opens with the stated mission of 
“confront[ing] humanity with the most difficult demand ever made of it”174 (Basic Writings 673)175 What is 
this “difficult demand” whose reality and urgency Nietzsche wants us to recognize?  How does Nietzsche 
                                                   
172 The key anti-art passage in “Experience” may be found on pages 476-477. 
173 Another manifestation of what we might call an anti-art aesthetic is one that involves some brand of 
process philosophy, an art that models itself and understands its function by appeal to some metaphysics 
of Becoming.  A central problem with this concept of art as modeling process, a problem I touched on in 
Chapter Two, is the question of how to reconcile the value-creating process of aesthetic articulation with a 
metaphysical notion of transitional process itself as having an intrinsic value as a model for artistic 
experiment.  See Sharon  Cameron’s  “Emerson’s  Impersonal”  (page  6f)  for  a  good  summary  of 
Emersonian notions of the function of writing as performing and realizing genius as “vehicular, transitive, 
mobile” (Richard Poirier’s characterization). 
174 The syntax “made of it” echoes James’s “questions put to us.”  (The original reads:  mit der schwersten 
Forderung andie Menschheit herantreten muss.) 
175 All references to Ecce Homo made hereafter will be to the text as it appears in The Basic Writings of 
Friedrich Nietzsche (Walter Kaufmann, translator). 
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recognize these demands, and why does he see writing as a problem, in ways that Emerson does not?  
Was Nietzsche simply manufacturing problems for himself, as Emerson (and perhaps Nietzsche himself) 
might have viewed his arduously elaborated philosophy of simply saying “yes” to life?  One answer would 
be to say that Nietzsche was more radical than Emerson in taking nihilism to its consequences and 
understanding it in a cultural and historical sense.  One could also point out that Emerson simply 
bypassed these problems that preoccupied Nietzsche, on account of his appeal to the concept of the 
Oversoul (a concept for which Nietzsche had no use at all).  Or, we might suggest that Emerson most 
clearly points the way to Nietzsche “Experience” pursued the implications of nihilistic thinking as far as he 
ever would and that Nietzsche spent virtually his entire life exploring the implications of the radical 
nihilism considered in “Experience.”  
My concern here is not whether Nietzsche misread Emerson, or who is the more radical thinker.  I 
am primarily interested in how Nietzsche turned Emersonian thought into a particular concept of writing 
as a challenge to philosophical (epistemic) values, as a way of overcoming epistemology. The problems 
as Nietzsche conceived them are important here because they provide a direct link to modernist writing.  
In this chapter, then, I want to look at how Nietzsche develops Emerson’s thinking about melancholy, and 
the conversion of skepticism into a method, so that we can appreciate the role that Nietzsche plays as the 
missing link to the writing methods of experimental modernism.  In order for us to go from Emerson to 
modernist experimental writing, we need to see writing itself as a problem the way Nietzsche did, and we 
need to recognize what is special about the concept of articulation itself as a mode of value creation. The 
demand we are made to confront in Nietzsche is not primarily the question of how to conduct one’s life 
through action or how to inspire others to take action in their lives; what Nietzsche shows us, as both a 
problem and a challenge, is the difficult task of establishing values through the reflexive processes of 
articulation.  Nietzsche helps us to focus our attention not only on how the practice of philosophy gets 
replaced by aesthetic practices, but also on  the question of how Emerson’s program  for  living (or what 
often sounds like such a program) becomes translated into questions about aesthetic practices.   I want to 
read Ecce Homo as  a  culminating  text  in Nietzsche’s  brief  but  intense  career,  as  a  breakthrough  the 
moment when Nietzsche abandons the project of idealizing heroic types and models of living 
(Zarathustra) and writes with the purpose of demonstrating how the process articulation itself as a source 
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(an alternative source) of exemplary value. 
Finally, I will turn my attention briefly to William James’s response to Nietzsche through Emerson.  
The irony in James’s misreading of Nietzsche is that both (as I hope is quite clear by now) owe a great 
deal of their thinking to the example and influence of Emerson.  The importance of Emerson, in both 
cases, can hardly be overestimated, and his role has received something like the critical attention it 
deserves in recent decades.   But the study of influence of Emerson must also be looked at carefully, 
because what is most interesting in James and Nietzsche is how they react differently to Emerson (and 
independently  of  one  another).    It  is not  just what Cavell  called  “transfigurations”  of  Emerson manifest 
themselves in the language Nietzsche employs in particular lines, but rather the more general concept of 
the role of writing.  They are not disciples of Emerson, but develop his thought and take it in two different 
directions that tell us something about possible modernisms.  
 
1. “These Bleak Rocks”: Emerson’s Objectivity 
As I tried to show in Chapter Three, any effort to replace epistemic (representational) values with 
a fundamentally different source of value would require some new and radically non-epistemic concepts 
of “fact” and “object.”  “Trust your own facts” Emerson advises us in “Experience” (490).  The challenge, in 
other words, is how to retain a notion of the object or objective force or objective fact, but without making 
an ontological claim of any kind.  The way they deal with this challenge accounts for a curious running 
theme and central feature of Nietzsche and Emerson – what we might call the paradox of an 
“experimental fatalism.” 
As we also saw in Chapter Three, one problem with the “paltry” empiricist notion of objectivity is 
that it demands a “changing of objects” (as Emerson puts it) in accordance with an arbitrary verificationist 
(and research project) procedure that is designed to choose new objects for study based on those 
predefined interests.176  The problem, then, is how we can become responsive to the world (though not 
necessarily know the world) in a way that does not simply reflect our interests and mirror our intentions.  
And if we want to locate value in processes of articulation, then we can formulate the problem as the 
                                                   
176 James’s pragmatist definition of  truth  (in  the 1907 essay Pragmatism) as  anything  that  “excites our 
interest” also raises the question of how we can be responsive to the  “genius of  reality” if that reality is 
always a function of our excited interests. 
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question: How do we have a concrete sense of obstacles to navigate, that are not “objects” in the sense 
of “goals,” that do not imply narratives of striving or struggle; and how do we have a notion of objective 
fact that is independent of subjective intention as well as epistemic concerns over accuracy and 
authenticity?    
There were a number of ways to approach the problem.  As heirs to Emerson, James and 
Nietzsche decided early on (independently of each other) that the crisis of a disenchanted epistemic 
culture demanded in response nothing less than a “new hierarchy of the passions” (as Woolf would put it).   
The  dominant  “intellectualism”  of  instrumental  reason,  encompassing  both  empiricism and  rationalism, 
needed to be demoted and replaced by the reflexive value of experiencing oneself think and feeling 
oneself think. “Thoughts are the shadows of our feelings,” Nietzsche claims in The Gay Science, because 
thoughts  alone  are  “always  darker,  emptier,  and  simpler.”177 The  “dilemma of  determinism,”  as  James 
called it, was about accounts of human behavior that failed to acknowledge the full range of human 
motivations – hence, Nietzsche’s ambivalence toward Darwinian explanations of purposive behavior.178   
                                                   
177 This early passage comes from Human, All Too Human and  appears  as  the  “aphorism” Nietzsche 
titled “On the Chemistry of Concepts and Sensations”: 
 
All we need, something which can be given us only now, with the various sciences at 
their present level of achievement, is a chemistry of moral, religious, aesthetic ideas and 
feelings, a chemistry of all those impulses that we ourselves experience in the great and 
small interactions of culture and society, indeed even in solitude. What if this chemistry 
might end with the conclusion that, even here, the most glorious colors are extracted from 
base, even despised substances? Are there many who will want to pursue such 
investigations? Mankind loves to put the questions of origin and beginnings out of mind: 
must one not be almost inhuman to feel in himself the opposite inclination? 
 
This passage occurs following Nietzsche’s observation that “all problems of philosophy… pose the same 
question as they did two thousand years ago: how can something originate out of its opposite? [maybe 
quote  some of  his  examples]    So  this  is not  about determining  “origins”  in  the explanatory  sense,  but 
about becoming conscious of the psychological (and not dialectical) origins of our healthy reactions upon 
life in something more complicated than binary concepts like health versus illness.  Nietzsche, of course, 
would continue to develop this health/illness dialectic in Ecce Homo with a rhetoric of inverting values, 
which (as we will see) is at odds with this notion of a “chemistry of all [these] impulses.” 
 
178 On  Nietzsche’s  complex  and  ambivalent relation to Darwinian thought, see Nietzsche’s  New 
Darwinism by John Richardson. See also Varieties of Religious Experience Lecture 1 (Religion and 
Neurology”)  for  James’s  discussion of the confusion of causal explanation with what philosopher John 
MacDowell would later call the “the space of reasons.”  The dilemma James writes of should therefore not 




As a first attempt at establishing a new hierarchy, or simply shaking up an old one, we thus see 
early attempts to blend or invert (or  “problematize”) the somatic and the spiritual, efforts that (in spite of 
their inadequacy) nevertheless place James and Nietzsche squarely within the early modern humoral 
discourse on melancholy.  This explains their flirtation with reductive materialism and biological 
determinism, all of which  is best understood as a  “strategic  intervention”  in a cultural crisis. Although it 
may sound odd coming from James and Nietzsche, these are attempts to reinstate some notion of an 
external object or fact to which we respond non-instrumentally, which can provoke a change in what 
James called a “a man’s whole scale of values and system of ideas.”  In early James, there is an appeal 
to bodily states as primary cause/stimulus (the James-Lange hypothesis).    Nietzsche’s  flirtation  with 
biological determinism persists in his more therapeutic appeal to “illness” as bodily  instinct (the antidote to 
attitudes constructed around beliefs and self-interpretation). When Nietzsche  refers  to  “illness,” even  in 
his final work, it is often a cognate term for the body itself: “The unconscious disguise of physiological 
needs  under  the  cloaks  of  the  objective,  ideal,  purely  spiritual  goes  to  frightening  lengths,”  Nietzsche 
observes, “and often I have asked myself whether,  taking a large view, philosophy has not been merely 
an interpretation of the body and a misunderstanding of the body.“ 179 Like Woolf’s complaint that illness 
has never received proper treatment as a subject in literature, this is more of a provocation than a claim 
about historical neglect.   In fact, Woolf might have quoted long passages from Nietzsche, who devotes a 
good deal of space to sometimes detailed discussions of physical illness and the body.180 In Anatomy of 
Melancholy, Robert Burton wrote at length on  the  “rectification  of  the  body,”  and Nietzsche  can  sound 
very much like Burton when he obsesses over dietary habits, the proper cultivation of the body – intended 
not as self-help  advice  for  the  reader,  but  as  a  call  to  heed  the  limits  of  one’s  body  as a stimulus for 
creativity and refelctive self-awareness (not to be confused with a subjective self-consciousness).  The 
revival of the medieval “objective” humors that is in tension with the post-Ficino notion of melancholy as a 
subjective state that colors the world of the subject and implies a different notion of art as the expression 
of a subjective state.  
                                                   
179 Preface to The Gay Science. 
180 See, for example, the extended passage on healthy dietary practices that appears in the section of 
Ecce Homo titled “Why I Am So Clever” (694-99). 
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They entertain non-intentional states and notions of physical cause (even biological determinism) 
as having an objective force that “startles us out of our propriety” as Emerson puts it, and challenges our 
habits of feeling and perceiving that always shape our experience of the world.  But this is little more than 
a provocation, an inversion of the hierarchy. The basic problem with these early attempts is that James 
and Nietzsche are simply short-circuiting the epistemic space of reasons, inverting the body/mind 
dualism, by appealing  to  the  “fact”  of sensation or mood  (for example).   They are still  working within a 
dualistic framework and have not fully escaped from it.  In Principles of Psychology, for example, James 
still worked within what was an essentially a dualistic mind-body methodological framework.  Nietzsche 
could simply appeal to Spinoza and his theory of affects; he was not particularly interested, it seems, in 
the latest scientific findings in neurology or regarding the physiological basis of pathological states.   
Among affects, there were many possible alternatives for bypassing the space of reasons and 
replacing it with a stimulus-cause: sensations, passions, moods. Sensation, though, was already the 
province of Humean empiricism and implied a passive receptivity; and passions were already an essential 
component of Cartesian instrumental reason. That left moods. Like passions, moods are totalizing forces 
that subsume agency and make subjective intentions seem disconnected from more objective 
manifestations of intentionality.181  Moods are like passions in one other important respect: Neither gives 
a central place to attitudes and attitude-forming beliefs.182 “Our moods do not believe in one another,” as 
Emerson famously noted.  Moods come over us, we are driven by passions.183 And so mood and 
temperament would have a special appeal for modernist thinkers who were seeking to models that would 
dissolve, or at least loosen the grip that instrumental reason had upon European culture.184    
But as Nietzsche recognized, our submission to these forces comes at a heavy price.  We must 
sacrifice a sense of our agency: we are all receptivity185 when it comes to the blooming, buzzing world of 
sensations; we can become slaves to our passions and desires; and we are stationed as cloud gazers 
with respect to the mental weather of our ever shifting moods.  These affective orientations can “dissolve 
                                                   
181 See, for example, Ruth Leys’ critique of recent affect theory and its neglect of intentionality. 
182 See Richard Wollheim pp. 76-77 for an account of emotion as inseparable from the process of forming 
attitudes.  
183 See, for example, Philip Fisher’s impassioned defense of the passions in The Vehement Passions. 




personality” at the same time they render the subject passive.  In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche makes a point of 
describing his philosophy as “Dionysian” and not “Heracleitian,” and the “decisive feature” of a Dionysian 
philosophy, he tells us, is “the affirmation of passing away and destroying” (729 [italics in original]).  The 
German  word  for  subjective  “mood”  is  Stimmung,  which  can  also  refer  to  external  “atmosphere.” 
Stimmung can also have the more active meaning of  “attunement to.”  The challenge is how to convert 
the objectivity of ephemeral moods, which are subjective but occur to us, into some kind of power, 
something other than passive submission or an affirmation of destruction that was something other 
acquiescing to the process of self-erasure and the dissolution of personality.186 The process of 
attunement represented an alternative space for the exercise of agency.  The primary question for 
Nietzsche, however, is not what we became attuned to “in the world,” but rather how the reflexive process 
of becoming attuned created a new  sense  of  one’s  power  in  the  world.    That  is why Emerson’s  self-
reflexive Cartesian method came to replace the interest in the reductive science of bodily causes (for 
Nietzsche, much earlier than for James).  
 
* * * 
Emerson’s  concepts  of  mood  and  temperament are far from theoretical in spirit, nor are they 
elaborated in anything like a theoretical context.  They function as “nodes” within a program built around 
the negotiation of constraints and parameters. Consider one of the most remarkable passages in 
“Experience,”  where  the  strenuous  syntax  of  the  language  itself  seems  to  navigate  its way  around  the 
parameters it lays down: 
 
[W]e cannot say too little of our constitutional necessity of seeing things under private 
aspects, or saturated with our humors.187 And yet is the God the native of these bleak 
rocks. That need makes in morals the capital virtue of self-trust. We must hold hard to 
                                                   
186 Also  note  that  James’s  active  total  reaction  upon life (an ambiguous preposition, suggesting 
“contemplation”) – not a passive reaction to life or to one’s own shifting moods. 
187 The allusion  to  “humors”  is one of numerous allusions  in  “Experience”  to  the historical discourse on 
melancholy. 
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this poverty, however scandalous,188 and by more vigorous self-recoveries, after the 
sallies of action, possess our axis more firmly.  The life of truth is cold and so far 
mournful; but it is not the slave of tears, contritions and perturbations. It does not attempt 
another's work, nor adopt another's facts. It is a main lesson of wisdom to know your own 
from another's. (489-90) 
 
Here, as elsewhere, Emerson gives us another of his emphatic and repeated reminders that we cannot 
know anything for certain, that there is no such thing as an unclouded and unmediated vision of the world 
as  it  “really  is,”  that  we  can  never  penetrate into the heart of things.189 This is a constant refrain in 
“Experience,” a radical skepticism to which he holds fast and to which he clings with an almost dogmatic 
fervor,  the  fact  of  the  human  condition  of which we  “cannot  say  too  little.”   Why,  then,  is Emerson so 
insistent on taking note of the limitations of our possible knowledge, so relentless in drawing out the 
implications of a radical subjectivism and an almost dogmatic-sounding solipsism?  The answer, I think, is 
to be found not in what Emerson affirms but in the method he elaborates.  These regular affirmations of a 
skeptical lack of faith are spread out on the landscape, like trail markers or cairns190; they establish 
“boundary conditions” for a fatalism as method which requires (among other things) that we “hold hard to 
[the] poverty” of the fact of our unknowing. 
So much of the grammatical structure in this passage determines points of reference in relative 
terms – “this poverty,” “that need,” “our axis,” “your own facts from another’s.”  There is also evidence of a 
carefully crafted syntactic ambiguity. “That need” – the need that makes the value and virtue of “self-trust” 
– refers to the necessity of seeing things according to our limited perspective, an antecedent which lies 
                                                   
188 Here is James in Varieties:  “It  is  notorious  that  facts  are  compatible  with  opposite  emotional 
comments, since the same fact will inspire entirely different feelings in different persons, and at different 
times in the same person; and there is no rationally deducible connection between any outer fact and the 
sentiments  it may  happen  to  provoke.” Without mentioning him  by  name, this is a concise account of 
Descartes’s starting point. 
189 Emerson  gave  a  pithy  (though  somewhat  cryptic  definition  of  skepticism as  “unbelief  in  cause  and 
effect”  (in  his  essay  “Worship”).    See,  for  example,  Joseph  Urbas’s  recent  work  on  Emerson  and 
skepticism.  Urbas gives a good philosophical account that treats Emerson as a philosopher, and so he is 
guided by interests that are somewhat different from mine.  What I want to look at here is how we get a 
notion of objectivity that serves as the parameters for a certain kind of experimental writing.  See also the 
more contextual reading in Jessica Berry’s “The Pyrrohnian Revival in Montaigne and Nietzsche.” 
190 The image of these “bleak rocks” is so lacking in metaphorical context that we do not even know if we 
are navigating dire straits at sea or are meant to imagine them as rock formations on the surface of the 
land. 
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embedded within a sentence that is not the one that immediately precedes the demonstrative pronoun.  
Emerson’s writing typically forces us to read back recursively, retracing paths as if we were performing a 
heuristic Ariadne’s thread algorithm.  Details of phrasing and word order also seem important here.  We 
might take note of the decision to refer not to “truth,” but to the “life of truth”  – the life lived in pursuit of 
truth.   And it is not “so far cold and mournful”; it is so far mournful, but cold it is and cold it must be.  
Cold and hard.  Hardness, the hardness of Dürer’s stone, is one important physical quality in an 
otherwise abstract, even mathematical (and largely image-free) poetic language.  “And yet is the God the 
native of these bleak rocks”: The fatalism of acknowledged limitations is the necessary stimulus for “more 
vigorous self-recoveries,  after  the  sallies  of  action,” which  allows  us  to  “possess  our  axis more  firmly.” 
There is a obvious and pronounced sense of agency; this is clearly an active recovery of oneself, not a 
passive receptivity to a transformative event (a conversion experience). Curiously, there is nothing of 
substance, no core of a self,  to  “possess”: We possess our axis, taking command of a new positioning 
that gives us a sense of how we are oriented in relation to the world, which is not to be confused with the 
vantage point it offers for seeing the world.  Emerson rigorously avoids the ocularcentrism of the scenic 
method;  orientations  trump  perspectives  and  “counterfeit  scene  painting.”    But while Emerson rejects 
Cartesian  ocularcentrism,  he  retains  Descartes’s  self-reflexive and abstracting methods, but without 
epistemic foundational certainty or representational images – without visually “clear and distinct ideas” as 
our test of what to “trust.”    
“Self trust” is not be confused with the earlier and better-known concept of “self-reliance.”  And so 
we encounter an important-sounding new distinction  in Emerson’s  thought.  We then  read more on  the 
importance of  “knowing one’s  own  facts”  from another’s.   We  learn  that self-trust is not necessarily an 
aversion to societal conventions (the aversion to conformity that we readily associate with self-reliance).  
Continuing in a vein that clearly anticipates Nietzsche, Emerson presents his method as an alternative to, 
and at the same time expressing an aversion to, a particular culture of melancholy nihilism: 
 
I have learned that I cannot dispose of other people's facts; but I possess such a key to 
my own as persuades me, against all their denials, that they also have a key to theirs. A 
sympathetic person is placed in the dilemma of a swimmer among drowning men, who all 
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catch at him, and if he give so much as a leg or a finger they will drown him. They wish to 
be saved from the mischiefs of their vices, but not from their vices. Charity would be 
wasted on this poor waiting on the symptoms. A wise and hardy physician will say, Come 
out of that, as the first condition of advice.  (490) 
 
This language of this passage is more immediately recognizable as Nietzschean in its concerns. The 
imagery of swimmers drowning is uncannily prescient of Woolf’s Mr. Ramsay – but of course, Emerson 
probably had in mind the same eighteenth-century precedents that Mr. Ramsay was fond of quoting 
(William Cowper’s  “we  perish,  each alone”).  If  Arnold  represents  the  “general  drift  of  his  time”  (as  he 
describes himself at one point), then Emerson represents a vigorous counter-current.  And an 
extraordinarily prescient one, not only in his anticipation of this general tendency, but also in the specific 
ways  in which he cuts it off at the pass in his uncanny anticipation of Arnold’s “Sea of Faith” metaphor.  
We  can  read  this  as  the  “wise  and  hardy  physician’s”  response  to  the  self-absorbed melancholy of 
Matthew Arnold and to Mr. Ramsay: “come out of that!” (or “come off it!” as we might put it today).  
The intersubjective need for recognition is understood here as an epistemic problem. “Well, souls 
never touch their objects,” Emerson observes in a somewhat ironic (“Yes, Virginia...”) and conversational 
tone. “An innavigable sea washes with silent waves between us and the things we aim at and converse 
with.”  It is a diagnoses of the situation that provides Matthew Arnold with the subject matter of his poems, 
and at the same time it is a radically different response to it.  In a later passage, Emerson writes that 
“there  will  be  the  same  gulf  between  every  me  and  thee  as  between  the  original  and  the  picture.”  
Emerson understands the connection between the “melancholy, long, withdrawing roar”  of Arnold’s Sea 
of Faith and the plea to “let us be true to one another,” the infinite (and imperial) demand for recognition 
that  never  be  fulfilled,  just  as  he  understands  the  problem  of  what  Cavell  calls  the  “imperative  of 
representing one’s self to others,” as merely the flip side of the fixation on accurate representations of the 
(inner and outer) world. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche asks a rhetorical question, followed by an aphoristic 
insight: “Is Hamlet understood? Not doubt, [but] certainty is what drives one insane” (Basic Writings 702 
[italics in original]). 
 222 
Arnold’s self-imposed solitude and self-ennobling resignation will not suffice. They are attitudes 
constructed in response to nihilism; what we need in response to nihilism is a rigorous method and a 
keen sense of what will not suffice.  Our perception of the world is threatened, Emerson suggests, as well 
as our relations with other perceivers; no adequate “solution” exists to what philosophers refer to as the 
“the  problem  of  other  minds.”    And  if  we try to convey these facts to others, if we try to represent 
ourselves, then we run up against the problem of constructing imaginary images for the self. We produce 
images of the self-isolating and self-ennobling hero, and we generate a demand for recognition and 
sympathy which (as we have seen) can never be met.191  We sooner or later end up with the desperate 
pathos  of  “let  us be  true  to  one  another”  (and we  become accessories  to  this  theatrical  self-ennobling 
strategy).  The “life of truth” is a way of being true to ourselves, not the imaginary appeal to others which 
is always accompanied the possessive demand that they be true to us.   
 Emerson offers a lucid diagnosis a culture in need of new models.  But he gives us more than 
that.    “The way  out  of  it”  is to hold fast to the virtue of self-trust and pursue a rigorously self-reflexive 
fatalism, treating our limitations as primary, as a fate to embrace and as the “object” around which we can 
engage ourselves in relation to the world and perform our vigorous self recoveries.  Emerson’s solution, 
as I suggested earlier, is in essential respects Cartesian.  Emerson’s self-trust (which involves trusting 
“one’s own  facts”) is something more than self-reliant individualism.   It  is closer  to Descartes’s ideal of 
“self-responsibility.”192   So while Emerson declares that there must be a constant “change of objects” and 
we must let go of the demand for images and the demand for real contact, he urges us to “hold hard to 
this  poverty”  and  to  “these  rocks”  as  a  notion  of objective constraint.  The program is fundamentally 
abstract and reflexive; it has more to do with the subject taking his own perspective as objective constrain 
than it does with “object relations” in the ontological sense. What we want is not individual self-reliance in 
the face of nihilism, but reflexive self-trust as a full embrace of nihilism.  Emersonian “facts” are redefined 
in self-reflexive terms: the value is in “our”  facts over which we  take ownership,  in the way we “possess 
our axis more firmly.”  We see this theme of Cartesian self-responsibility theme taken up by Nietzsche, 
who asks us to try out new orientations and then “take command” (with that metaphor) and ownership of 
                                                   
191 “The invalid’s demand for sympathy can never be met,” as Woolf writes in “On Being Ill” (8-9). 
192 Emerson is not the only philosopher to make a paradoxical appeal to the Cartesian ideal of self-
responsibility in an effort to overcome epistemology.  See, for example, Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations.  
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2.  How Emerson Works Upon Nietzsche 
Here is a typically rhapsodic passage in which Nietzsche idealizes a form of heroism by laying 
down parameters:193  
 
The soul that has the longest ladder and reaches down deepest – the most 
comprehensive soul, which can run and stray and roam farthest within itself; the most 
necessary soul that plunges joyously into chance; the soul that, having being, dives into 
becoming; the soul that has but wants to want and will; and the soul that flees itself and 
catches up with itself in the widest circles...  (Basic Writings 761) 
 
We should first note the clear allusion to Emerson’s famous metaphor of the circles (in his essay of that 
title).  This is Nietzsche in heroic idealizing mode, even though he idealizes heroic qualities (of an ideal 
“soul”) that are hard to attribute to any imaginable hero.  What kind of ministerial purpose does this have?  
While rhapsodic in form, its aim seems to be to contemplate ideals that may not be realizable even in 
principle.  
The above passage is a catalog of familiar Nietzschean themes, and it should be noted how 
Nietzsche (like James) develops what are recognizably Emersonian lines of thought.  Note, for example, 
the theme of fatalism, of set parameters, of freedom and necessity: the circles bound us, but they are 
widening circles.  We can also see a profoundly self-reflexive notion of power and heroism.  It is the 
exemplary individual who can “run and stray and roam within itself.” [italics added]  Finally, we might note 
the odd and metaphysically charged combination of depth and surface imagery – the widening circles and 
fleeing soul, the depths into which we plunge.  There is an even more explicit fatalism than we see in 
Emerson.  Nietzsche writes of “the most necessary soul,” the soul that relinquishes its will and exerts it at 
                                                   
193 quoted in Ecce Homo (Basic Writings 761); but originally appearing in the earlier Also Sprach 
Zarathustra. 
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the same time. In spite of his occasional predator versus prey rhetoric, Nietzsche’s  heroism  is 
Emersonian in its radical self-reflexivity. Nietzsche is interested in a attaining a reflexive sense of power, 
not a power over others.  
There is also evidence here of yet another Emersonian inheritance, already familiar to us: the 
ideal of a telos without purpose (or a purposiveness without purpose or goal).  It is important for both 
Emerson and Nietzsche to act without any goal in mind, to have purposive behavior without knowing the 
purpose – not self-annihilation and redemption, but a necessary self-forgetting.  As Emerson wrote, “the 
one thing which we seek with insatiable desire is to forget ourselves, to be surprised out of our propriety, 
to lose our sempiternal memory, and to do something without knowing how or why; in short, to draw a 
new circle … The way of life is wonderful: it is by abandonment.” (“Circles”)  We find out who we become 
after the fact.  There are numerous quotable lines from Nietzsche in this spirit: “The end of a melody is 




conversion narrative.  A way of life by abandonment becomes important for Nietzsche because it allows 
the subject to establish values after the fact (that is to say, as a result of the powers manifest through 
articulation).  The subject identifies himself as the executor of the order only after the order has been 
executed.  There  is  also  a  curious  reflexive  ambiguity  in Nietzsche’s German  term for the goal of this 
performative behavior by which he defines  the aesthetic:  “Selbstgestaltung”  – which  translates  to  “self-




We see how Nietzsche effects a conversion of a philosophical paradox into an aesthetic 
challenge (and how he thus takes us beyond Emerson).  The  paradoxes  at  the  heart  of  Nietzsche’s 
experimental writing are aesthetic, not metaphysical.  His ultimate aim is to make aesthetic articulation 
replace the practice of philosophy itself. For Nietzsche, the challenge is not metaphysical but aesthetic – 
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which is why Ecce Homo passage alludes not to a definition of God but to a confessional mode of writing.   
When we convert an epistemic notion of “fact” into a non-epistemic concept, we also resolve (or, rather, 
dissolve) two well-known philosophical paradoxes associated with Nietzsche and Emerson, and we do so 
by converting them into aesthetic challenges: 1) the paradox of an experimental fatalism; and 2) the 
philosophical question of how a self that dissolves and abandons itself can exist to experience its own 
reconstitution as new.  But as the passage above makes clear, the philosophical paradox of fatalism is 
thus resolved by converting it into an aesthetic challenge, treating the facts of one’s life, one’s perspective 
formed by one’s experience  to date, as a  limitation  to  transgress.   In section 188 of Beyond Good and 
Evil, Nietzsche explicitly conceives of this project by analogy with the artist’s working with materials:  
 
Every artist knows how far from the feeling of letting himself go his "most natural" 
condition is – the free ordering, setting, disposing, shaping in moments of "inspiration" – 
and  how strictly and subtly he obeys thousand-fold laws precisely then, laws that 
precisely on account of their hardness and determination defy all formulation through 
concepts (even the firmest concept is, compared with them, not free of fluctuation, 
multiplicity, ambiguity.)  (Basic Writings 290-91) 
 
Aesthetic  “facts”  as  constraints  and  stimuli  are  contrasted  here  with  the  softness  (“infirmity”)  of 
concepts.194  Nietzsche also contrasts artistic objectivity with the objectivity of science. In English, 
Bestimmtheit may also be  rendered as  “decisiveness”  (auf Grun ihrer Härte und Bestimmtheit spotten). 
Note the qualitative contrast between firmness (festeste) and hardness, which may even be an intentional 
allusion to Emerson’s aim of “possess[ing] our axis more  firmly.” This is not a manifesto  for  “art as  life,” 
the free realization of (private) projects.  Rather, there is an emphasis on the “ordering, setting, disposing, 
shaping”  in  moments  of  “inspiration”  (sorted  out  within a typically Nietzschean proliferation of scare 
quotes).  What becomes exemplary here is the concrete workedness that  is  evidence  of  the  artist’s 
grappling with the material.   
                                                   
194 In his later summary of his own Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, Wittgenstein calls logic “crystalline ... 
the hardest thing there is” (Philosophical Investigations 97). 
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With regard to fatalism, we might still ask how a transvaluation of values is possible at all if 
temperament is both primary and constitutes a fixed and limited perspective on the world.  In other words, 
how do we get from critical accounts of temperaments as determining our relation to the world – 
perspectivism as solipsism, temperament as an iron wire and a kind of “fate” – to the experimental project 
of envisioning alternatives to those limited perspectives, to the project of re-envisioning the world at the 
same time as we remake ourselves?  And how do we recognize the need for transcending given 
orientations, let alone assess their relative advantages, in the absence of a privileged perspective?    This 
is what critics have long recognized in Nietzsche’s philosophy as the paradox of fatalism and perfectionist 
self-creation.  Ecce Homo has the curiously worded subtitle: “How One Becomes What One Is” (Wie man 
wird, was man ist). [italics added in English translation]  But if we regard this paradox from a non-
philosophical point of view, then it becomes apparent that Nietzsche wants to treat the stable sense of 
self as a limitation and as a challenge to overcome, on a par with the materials that the artist works with 
and which provide the necessary stimulus for the creative act. Nietzsche’s  fatalistic language is not the 
philosophical discourse involved with questions of determinism and free will, but proceeds rather by way 
of analogy with the creative artist who treats obstacles and material constraints as a stimulus for creation.  
Nietzsche wants to treat temperament (and illness) as a given but also as a stimulus for the work of 
Selbsgestaltung, the continual process of giving form to oneself and to creating the values that compose 
a world for us.  Ecce Homo is a bold experiment in replacing philosophical concerns (and the Will to 
Truth) with self-articulation as a radically new source of value.   The artist’s freedom is in many respects 
the antithesis of an art-as-life aestheticism and the “romance” of pursuing private projects. 
 
*** 
We are well on our way to Ecce Homo, which is in many respects the culmination of Emerson’s  
most radical ideas, the work in which Nietzsche demonstrates how to embrace fatalism as part of a model 
of experimental writing (the “facts” of one’s life).  Ecce Homo as an experiment in heroic articulation of the 
self as the articulation of new values (incommensurate with epistemic values):  The passage quoted 
above appears again in Ecce Homo, which  has  a  very  different  ministerial  purpose  than  Emerson’s 
writing.  He literally treats himself as a text, his work to date as the “facts” that define who he is.  He is 
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performing the process of Selbstgestaltung.   It is literally an experiment in writing the self and treating the 
self as a text – treating the facts of one’s life as a limitation and a stimulus for further self-articulation (so 
the values that come from articulation actually trump the value of any program for living that is articulated 
and any specific ideals envisioned – an extraordinarily difficult demand that Nietzsche places on himself,  
from a writer who wants his writing to have an effect on people and to possess world-historical import.  Do 
not follow the example of my life, he seems to say, but pay attention to the process of articulation itself  -- 
become self-reflexively aware, just as Nietzsche models for us an attention to what might otherwise 
sound like a neurotic obsession with the state of his own body and with highly idiosyncratic habits 
associated  with  his  personal  health.    “I  am  one  thing,  my  writing  is  another.”    But  even  that  caveat 
demands an even finer distinction that he wants us to observe in the writing:  In my writing, do not pay 
attention to what I say but rather to the manner in whichand the process by which the utterance takes 
shape.  
Nietzsche takes on the two literary genres most historically connected with representational 
epistemic values: 1) Augustine’s “recovery from illness” narrative of the confession; and 2) Socrates’ (or, 
rather, Plato’s) apologia with its rhetorical appeal for recognition that that aims to explain one’s actions 
(and  the motives  for  one’s  actions)  to  others  and always  runs  the  risk of slipping  into self-rationalizing 
mode.  By taking on the apologia, Nietzsche enters directly into the “space of reasons” – enemy territory, 
so to speak, for representational and self-narrative values.  As established genres of writing, the 
confession and the apologia manifest the imaginary dimension of epistemic values in the sense that they 
are both defined by the task of creating narratives for an idealized self.  The running joke, of course, is 
that Nietzsche quite consciously inverts and subverts these conventions. Answering the question of “How 
One Becomes What One  Is”  is  a way  of making  amor fati a means of imagining the self without self 




(which are literary challenges, not metaphysical paradoxes). “Facts” become material constraints, and the 
task of representing oneself, or anything else, becomes the task  of  making  one’s  articulation 
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representative – or  what  Wittgenstein  (in  a  very  different  context)  would  later  call  a  “perspicuous 
representation”  rather  than  a  faithful  or  accurate  one.    In Ecce Homo, we should also take note of an 
important shift from idealizing heroic figures (such as Zarathustra) to a focus on aesthetic articulation as a 
source of value.  There is some irony here: Ecce Homo quotes at length from Thus Spake Zarathustra, in 
part because the book had not been widely circulated at the time Nietzsche was writing.  Over the next 
two decades, it was actually Ecce Homo (published only in 1910, two decades after it was written) that 
would be overshadowed by the far more popular Thus Spake Zarathustra. 
I read Ecce Homo as the ultimate Emersonian text, even though there is nothing in it that sounds 
quite  like Emerson’s  voice.    At  the  same  time, however, what  is  perhaps  the  central  paradox  of  Ecce 
Homo also marks a point of divergence between Nietzsche and Emerson.   A central challenge for 
Nietzsche is the problem of making one’s act of self-representation a representative act of value creation 
for  others.   When Nietzsche declares  that  “I  am dynamite,” he means  the  example  of  his writing  itself 
should have that impact. There are early signs of this paradox of making one’s activity representative in 
Nietzsche when he is in idealizing mode: Zarathustra, the exemplary hero, must go up to the mountains 
and come down again and he must be misunderstood by his contemporaries.  The question is: Does 
Ecce Homo overcome this paradox or successfully do something with it? 
For Emerson, personality is an impediment to our contact with the energy and process that links 
us with others. Once we dissolve personality, we are “given leave to be great and universal”: “Mood is the 
solvent which dissolves personality and gives us leave to be great and universal.” Here is a key passage 
on solipsism, which culminates in a Donne-like metaphysical conceit (another pre-emptive response to 
Arnold’s sea of faith) 
 
The great and crescive self, rooted in absolute nature, supplants all relative existence 
and ruins the kingdom of mortal friendship and love. Marriage (in what is called the 
spiritual world) is impossible, because of the inequality between every subject and every 
object. The subject is the receiver of Godhead, and at every comparison must feel his 
being enhanced by that cryptic might.  Though not in energy, yet by presence, this 
magazine of substance cannot be otherwise than felt; nor can any force of intellect 
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attribute to the object the proper deity which sleeps or wakes forever in every subject. 
Never can love make consciousness and ascription equal in force. There will be the 
same gulf between every me and thee as between the original and the picture.  The 
universe is the bride of the soul. All private sympathy is partial. Two human beings are 
like globes, which can touch only in a point, and whilst they remain in contact, all other 
points of each of the spheres are inert; their turn must also come, and the longer a 
particular union lasts the more energy of appetency the parts not in union acquire.  (487) 
  
There is no need for us to represent ourselves to others if we believe that we are all points of light and 
assume that being a receiver of Godhead authenticates our project. This indicates a crucial difference 
between Emerson and Nietzsche (not to mention James, who also had reservations about the Oversoul).  
It is also a problematic premise of Emerson’s thinking; it is what Sharon Cameron has characterized as a 
version of  “liberal universalism”  (Impersonality 86).  Emerson could write, with  full confidence,  that  “no 
enterprise was ever a good one than it succeeded.”  
 The concept of the Oversoul demonstrates why aversion to conformity and transgression are not 
important for Emerson the way it is for Nietzsche:  Emerson essentially glosses over this problem of 
transgressive identity with his concept of the Oversoul.  If we have the concept of the Oversoul, then we 
simply have no need for a transgressive logic.  That is why Cavell needs to invoke Nietzsche along with 
Wittgenstein in making his version of Emersonian perfectionism a viable alternative: We have the need to 
transgress specific cultural values and  the need  to  relate ourselves  to others.      In one way, Emerson’s 
blithe indifference to established culture (rather than aversion to it) is a strength, because the self does 
not oppose society so much as replace it – in Quentin Anderson’s phrase, Emerson presents himself as 
the “divine child who eats up the world” (19).   
Here we arrive at what I would argue is a fundamentally important difference between Nietzsche 
and Emerson.  It is important, in part, because it touches on the practical problem (for writing) of how to 
make one’s  value-creating articulation exemplary and representative.   Being representative is not that 
easy  for  Nietzsche,  who  (to  a  greater  extent  than  Emerson)  wants  to  make  the  manner  of  one’s 
articulation  a  source  of  value.      Emerson’s  rejection  of  “counterfeit  scene  painting”  (in  “Experience”) 
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becomes,  in  Nietzsche  the  problem  of  appealing  to  established  models  of  heroism,  Emerson’s 
“Representative Men,” what Nietzsche calls “counterfeit great men.”  I will return to this problem later in 
the chapter, because Nietzsche’s own aversion to conformity leads to what I believe is one of the more 
serious failings of Ecce Homo as an experiment in modeling an “authentic” form of heroic value-creating 
activity. 
The time for a close reading of Ecce Homo is long overdue.  However, I do want to approach it 
with a sense of the enormous pressures on the writing to carry out the task of value-creation that 
Nietzsche wants the text to perform.   Ecce Homo is an experiment in making articulation itself the source 
of value and the means of being representative in the world-historical sense; but as we will see, this 




3.  A Close Reading of Two Passages in Ecce Homo   
The first thing that strikes the reader of Ecce Homo is probably its lack of decorum, as boastful 
section headings  (“Why  I Am So Clever,”  “Why  I am a Destiny,” etc.).   Nietzsche describes himself as 
“dynamite.”   What  I want  to  draw  attention  to, however, are those important passages in Ecce Homo 
where Nietzsche comes close to realizing his goal of not simply inverting values and the relation between 
means and ends, but instead attempts to blend them through the process of articulation, producing what 
we might call a miraculously unpremidated (or at least unanticipated) “incarnation” of new value.  I also 
want to show how this results in a special mode of writing and a different kind texture than the “explosive” 
and provocative aphorisms that we associate with Nietzsche (and  which  aim  “to  startle  us  out  of  our 
propriety,” as Emerson put it).   
Nietzsche opens Section One by declaring  (in a modest  tone)  that he  is  “experienced” when  it 
comes to the question of decadence and has a well-developed sense for discriminating between what is 
healthy and what is decadent.   “A long, all too long, series of years signifies recovery for me,” he writes. 
“Unfortunately,  it  also  signifies  relapse,  decay,  the  periodicity  of  a  kind  of  decadence”  (679).    This 
“periodicity” is what he calls the nervous circulaire of the mystic.  “Looking again from the fullness and self 
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assurance of a rich life down into the secret work of the instinct of decadence – in this I have had the 
longest training, my truest experience.” [italics added]  So the “truest experience,” in his judgment, is his 
realization that illness itself – the instinct of decadence – has created “the true present of those days in 
which everything in me became subtler – observation itself as well as all organs of observation.”   If the 
organs of observation change along with the power of observation itself, then temperament cannot be 
fate in the sense of a limit that one cannot transform.  Nietzsch replaces “experience” with a more subtle 
reflective sense of one’s power in relation to the world (orientation as a source of power).  Our sense of 
meaning and value, then, changes with the way we frame our experience (the “organs of observation”).   
As this passage makes clear, Nietzsche is describing a “self-recovery” that is the opposite of a sublime 
conversion experience, and also not to be confused with a “dark night of soul” dialectic of sickness/health; 
we are talking about the self-reflexive  “subtlety”  of  one’s  observations,  and  self-observations, as a 
replacement for the facts of one’s limited experience. 
Here we see a demonstration of  “Stimmung” as attunement.  The self-conscious intellect is no 
longer opposed to the realm of the affective and the subjective; the process of thinking is converted into 
an aesthetic experience, a complex process in which second-order reflection is woven – observation, 
along  with  the  “organs  of  observation.”      Nietzsche  continues:  “Even  that  filigree  art  of  grasping  and 
comprehending in general, those fingers for nuances, that psychology of ‘looking around the corner,’ and 
whatever else is characteristic of me, was learned only then…”.  The art of grasping and comprehending, 
the fine filigree work of making distinctions and clarifying, etc., gets transvalued here into a reflective 
power of feeling oneself thinking.    Even  the  will  to  truth,  the  activity  and  process  of  “grasping  and 
comprehending,”  suffers  a  sea  change  into  something  rich  and  strange.  (And  we  should  note the 
ambiguity of “comprehend,” which suggests not only “to understand” but “to take in”). 
 
Now for a close reading of the even more remarkable extended passage in Section Two.  “Apart 
from the  fact that I am decadent,” Nietzsche confesses at the beginning of Section Two, “I am also the 
opposite” (680).  In its intricately woven texture, and in its quiet and patient manner that is the opposite of 
“explosive,” the passage that follows is not entirely representative of the language of Ecce Homo; there is 
nothing aphoristic or provocative or outlandish, no trace of a sublime embrace of contradiction.  The 
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“proof”  of  his  assertion  comes,  rather,  through  slow  stages,  through  the  “fine  filigree  work”  of  its  own 
gradually unfolding process of logical demonstration (which pursues a logic of its own).  This is language 
that follows close to the surface; it is active and alert, and makes distinctions and clarifies by making clear 
in the process of clarification: 
 
My proof for this is, among other things, that I have always instinctively chosen the right 
means against wretched states; while the decadent typically chooses means that are 
disadvantageous for him.  As summa summarium, I was healthy; as an angle, as a 
specialty, I was a decadent.  The energy to choose absolute solitude and leave the life to 
which I had become accustomed; the insistence on not allowing myself any longer to be 
cared for, waited on, and doctored – that betrayed an absolute instinctive certainty about 
what was needed above all at that time.  I took myself in hand, I made myself healthy 
again: the condition for this – every physiologist would admit that – is that one be healthy 
at bottom. A typically morbid being cannot become healthy, much less make itself 
healthy.  For a typically healthy person, conversely, being sick can even become an 
energetic stimulus for life, for living more.  This, in fact, is how that long period of 
sickness appears to me now: as it were, I discovered life anew, including myself; I tasted 
all good and even little things, as others cannot easily taste them – I turned my will to 
health, to life, into a philosophy. 
 [...] 
Well, then, I am the opposite of a decadent, for I have just described myself. (680-81) 
 
Nietzsche is working his way through something here, and it has the vague sound of practical advice and 
“life  wisdom”  – but without really offering anything of that sort (the test of that would be to attempt a 
paraphrase of the passage in the form of practical advice). The entire passage culminates in a sentence 
that has the curious sound of both a quiet revelation as well as a quod erat demonstrandum affirming, 
almost mechanically, what is in any case (and in retrospect) logically necessary. At the end, he has not 
“described” himself; he has articulated the self he has been describing. 
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This is how Nietzsche foregrounds the value of articulation as a mode of non-representational 
description.  What is important here is his effort to articulate himself, not the accuracy or authenticity of 
the self-description.  The “truth” of what he has to say, on the level of assertion, is never anything more 
than a function of his perspective which is, in turn, a function of the health of his organs of observation” – 
the way things appeared to him then, versus the way things appear to him now.  He has described 
himself into being.  The passage is one of the most striking demonstrations in Nietzsche of how one 
becomes  “what  one  is”  by  identifying  with  and  taking  ownership  of  one’s  own  acts  (and  “facts”)  of 
articulation. 
 
* * * 
We are now in a position to revisit the passage we quoted at the beginning of Chapter Two and 
read it, in light of the preceding, as a succinct summing-up  of  Nietzsche’s  vision  of  the  kind  of 
experimental writing he wants to attempt: 
 
The entire surface of consciousness – consciousness is a surface – has to be kept clear 
of any of the great imperatives … In  the meantime  the organizing  idea destined to  rule 
grows and grows in the depths … Regarded from this side my life is simply wonderful... 
Order of rank among capacities; distance; the art of dividing without making inimical; 
mixing up nothing,  “reconciling” nothing; a  tremendous multiplicity which  is nonetheless 
the opposite of chaos – this has been the precondition, the protracted secret labor and 
artistic working of my instinct.  The magnitude of its higher protection was shown in the 
fact that I have at no time had the remotest idea what was growing within me – that all my 
abilities one day leapt forth suddenly ripe, in their final perfection … No trace of struggle 
can be discovered in my life, I am the opposite of a heroic nature.  To want something, to 
“strive”  after  something,  to  have  a  “goal,”  a  “wish”  in  view  – I know none of this from 
experience.  (65) 
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This passages encompasses a range of themes and concerns I have noted in the course of this chapter 
and in earlier chapters:  the distinction between wish versus will, contemplating the limits of experience as 
a form of amor fati, the ideal of a telos without purpose, the idealizing of surface over depth.  The 
passage can read like a program for a way of life by abandonment, but it is also articulating in the most 
precise  and  vigorous  way  what  these  efforts must  “be  kept  clear  of.” Nietzsche  is  exerting  his will  by 
qualifying and making it clear what he is not doing.   Much  like  the  syntax  of  Emerson’s  “bleak  rocks” 
passage we looked at earlier, this is the voice of someone who is taking control over his life by imagining 
distinctions and laying down parameters for himself.  The tone of this voice, moreover, is calm; there is no 





The placid and confident tone of this passage, what we might describe as the voice of a newly 
recovered convalescent,195 belies the pathos and drama of Ecce Homo as it actually carries out this 
program.   Having  no  trace  of  struggle  in  one’s  life  (and  fixing  on  that  as  an  ideal)  is  not  the same as 
avoiding all traces of struggle in his writing. On the whole, Ecce Homo is anything but a “calm” piece of 
reflective writing. Critic and translator Walter Kaufmann once compared Ecce Homo with the agitated and 
anguished brilliance of  the  late paintings of Van Gogh. And while Nietzsche’s writing  in Ecce Homo is 
certainly experimental, and it is without question one of the great works of world literature, it is not at all 
clear whether the writing meets all (or even most) of the demands that it sets out for itself. Let’s look more 
closely at the real contradictions that account for its exemplary failure. 
 
 
4. Ecce Homo and the Paralysis of Nietzsche’s “Exploding Hero” 
In  a now  classic  analysis, Derrida  ponders  a  stray  fragment  found  among Nietzsche’s writings 
that  reads  simply:  “I  have  forgotten  my  umbrella.”    Derrida’s  idiosyncratic  reading,  which  attempts  to 
                                                   




of Outsider Art. “We will never know  for sure what Nietzsche wanted to say or do when he noted these 
words,”  Derrida  concludes,  “nor  even  that  he  actually  wanted anything.”    Derrida  suggests  that  the 
indeterminacy  of  this  fragment  is  emblematic  of  Nietzsche’s  entire  body  of  work,  which  more  or  less 
dooms any effort to interpret what he writes or to derive from it any program for action.196  One does not 
have to accept Derrida’s broad claim in order to share these doubts as every reader of Nietzsche does at 
some point.  It is a sobering consideration for a philosopher whose destabilizing and self-undermining 
experiments nevertheless seem to be in the service of a transvaluation of values with explicit world-
historical implications (though one can always have doubts about this aim as well).  I want to take 
seriously this aim, without being able to “prove” it, because it is also the explicit aim of so many modernist 
artists of the following generation.  And because Ecce Homo is  arguably  Nietzsche’s  most  radically 
experimental work, and thus a model of how that project might be carried out through writing, I want to 
identify some of its failures and genuinely problematic contradictions, as measured against his stated 
goals (which is how I read the “no trace of struggle” passage quoted above).  
While Nietzsche celebrates appearances over deep reality, as in the passage above, he seems to 
exchange this distinction for a new set of binaries: the notion of authentic versus counterfeit, the pose 
versus  the  instinct.     Emerson’s appeal  to  “counterfeit scenery” becomes,  in Nietzsche,  the problem of 
appealing to what he calls  “counterfeit  great  men.”  Nietzsche  singles  out  Richard  Wagner  (not 
surprisingly) as well as the early nineteenth-century  iconic  figure of  Thomas Carlyle,  the  “counterfeiter” 
whose  “hero  worship”  he  has  repudiated  so  maliciously.”    “All  the  problems  of  politics, of social 
organization,”  Nietzsche  declares,  “have  been  falsified  through  and  through  because  one mistook  the 
most harmful men for great men.” (712). He once again attacks the “pathos of poses,” with more than a 
hint of a theological Bilderverbot197 that rejects the exemplary images of greatness that find currency 
within a culture and (and, according to Nietzsche, do harm).198  He states that he wants to be the 
“opposite  of  them”  – and that presumably means that Nietzsche aspires to be read differently, to be 
                                                   
196 In Derrida’s Spurs: Nietzsche’s Style (123f). 
197 The German word for a “prohibition on graven images,” or visual representations more generally, that 
one of course finds in various forms in Judaism, Islam, and (Protestant) Christianity.  
198 Nietzsche repeatedly employs the adjective pathetisch, which in German means histrionic, bombastic, 
in the theatrical sense (not in the narrow English sense of “pitiful”). 
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representative in a different way and not be “mistaken” for someone he is not.  Given his provocative lack 
of decorum, it might come as a surprise to readers when Nietzsche maintains that “there is not a moment 
in my life to which one could point to convict me of a presumptuous and pathetic posture.  The pathos of 
poses does not belong to greatness; whoever needs poses at all is false.”  
Nietzsche generally embraces antagonism as healthy; but the value of antagonism is often 
replaced in Ecce Homo by an aversion to conformity, a self-imposed mandate which constitutes a 
different ideal.  Nietzsche, the philosopher of ressentiment, contrasts himself with those “first men” in the 
following way:  “I do not even count them among men in general: for me they are the refuse of humanity, 
monsters of sickness and vengeful instincts; they are inhuman, disastrous, at bottom incurable, and 
revenge  themselves  on  life.”    Such  antagonism  laced  with  contempt  is  not  necessarily  a  serious 
contradiction  of Nietzsche’s  stated  ideals.  But  it might  lead  readers,  adopting  the  spirit  of Nietzsche’s 
discriminating mode, to make another distinction that Nietzsche seems to elide: the difference between a 
transvaluation of values and a simple inversion of values.  He writes of “Zarathustra, the first psychologist 
of the good, is – consequently – a  friend of evil” (786).  His insight into the good, he writes, made him 
shudder, and it was “from this aversion that he grew wings ‘to soar off into distant futures.’”  This poetic 
figure, we might also note, is a direct allusion to Dürer’s winged angel. This occasional tendency to  invert 
values places Nietzsche in the company of Lautréamont and those who idealize evil simply because it is 
the opposite of the good. We might read such passages the same way we respond to the over-the-top 
boastfulness of the section titles; but it is hardly an illustration of fatalism as distinct from attitudes, and as 
an attitude this flirtation with a sensational “cult of evil” is anything but a post-romantic. 
There are contradictions of a more serious kind in Ecce Homo. Nietzsche wants to create an 
open  “template”  for  values  as  yet  unrealized,  but  that  also  requires  the  positing  of  an  ideal  future 
audience who will understand the true meaning of the example he is trying to set.  The artist creates the 
values by which he will be judged, which in turn requires a self-imposed solitude in an effort to resist the 
(internalized) demand for current recognition  and  validation.    “I  am  solitude  become man,”  Nietzsche 
declares in the mock-prophetic tone of Thus Spake Zarathustra (Basic Writings 799 [from a rejected draft 
of Ecce Homo]).  Nietzsche elsewhere writes  that  “Suffering from solitude is also an objection – I have 
suffered only from ‘multitudes’” (714).  This, of course, invites a comparison with Whitman and his mode 
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(a  tactic most  explictly  stated  in  “Crossing Brooklyn  Ferry”)  of  addressing  imagined  crowds  of  people, 
present and future, in response to his despair over the distance between them: "Closer yet I approach 
you," Whitman writes with confidence; Nietzsche’s audience, by contrast, must remain at a distance (the 
idealized future of Emerson’s “new, yet unapproachable America” (“Experience” 485 [italics added]). 
Imagining a future audience, however, simply takes  the  problem  of  Lacan’s  imaginary  mirror 
stage – “to be is to imagine how oneself is perceived by a third party” – and transposes it to the form: “to 
be is to imagine oneself in relation to a future audience.”   Nietzsche,  like Whitman,  imagines  an  ideal 
audience in the future, but one that will follow his example precisely by not being a slavish follower 
(someone, in other words, who will resist the seductive pull of a charismatic voice describing itself as “a 
destiny”).  Ecce Homo ends with an extremely complex  ironic  gesture:  “Have  I  been  understood?”  
Nietzsche’s hero is a melancholy outsider who represents fate – a delayed awakening, for a select few, 
that is always in the future. He is lonely, but that loneliness remains (as it was for Zarathustra) a kind of 
validation of his genuine outsider status as well as his having seen farther than others. The fixation on the 
past gets converted into an idealism of  future possibility:  “My time will come ... will you be among the 
select  few who recognize this?” Nobody understands him now.  But history will vindicate him.  There is 
not necessarily anything wrong with this strategy, but we might at least take note of how far we have 
moved away from Emerson’s ideal of living in the “strong present tense.” 
The “pathos of poses” thus comes back with a vengeance. In addition to the pathos of delayed 
future understanding (the sentiment  that  “my  time will  come”),  Nietzsche’s  tactic  of  projecting  a  future 
audience generates what we might call the pathos of failed communication (based on the distance 
between what I mean versus how I am understood). Ecce Homo is an exercise in avoiding the pathos and 
sentimentality of transgressive heroism or the rejection of the world in the name of idealism.  What 
Nietzsche does, in effect, is simply transfer a contemptus mundi to an idealistic contempt for present 
humanity in the interests of addressing oneself to a more receptive ideal future audience.  We are made 
to  feel  “eager  for  better  things,”  in  the words  of Marsilio  Ficino,  whose Neoplatonic concept of heroic 
melancholy represents the kind of otherworldly idealism that Nietzsche so clearly wants to overcome.199  
                                                   
199 See Ecce Homo page 786. 
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Nietzsche seems to appreciate the trap, but that does little more than intensify the pathos. The 
conflict becomes internalized.200 "Under these circumstances,” he confesses, “I have a duty against which 
my habits, even more the pride of my instincts, revolt at bottom — namely, to say: Hear me! For I am 
such and such a person. Above all, do not mistake me for someone else!"   He makes a candid and 
rather startling appeal to “duty” here, an appeal to be recognized for what he really represents and who 
he really is.  The problem that Nietzsche seems to catch hold of here is the question of how can he (we) 
can avoid the pathos of unrealized potential as simply another version of the “buried self”   Nietzsche is 
grappling with this challenge as it confronts him; and although Nietzsche is not altogether successfully, 
Ecce Homo dramatizes that struggle in a concrete and situational way.  The absence of a grand narrative 
of overcoming adversity does not mean there is no struggle and no adversity to overcome.  
Inevitably, reader-response  paradoxes  emerge.    The  section  “Why  I Write Such Good Books” 
opens with a direct and unequivocal statement: “I am one  thing, my writings are another.”   Nietzsche’s 
anti-art stance seems to take the peculiar form.  It not only offends and meets with the incomprehension, 
it also at times embraces the fact of not being read at all.  At the beginning of the section on why he 
writes such good books, he declares “My triumph is precisely the opposite of Schopenhauer’s: I say, ‘non 
legor, non legar’”.    [I am not  read,  I will not be read]  (715). So what does this mean in a book that so 
explicitly aims to effect world-historical change?  Is he offering his life, rather than his writings as 
exemplary?  Or are we supposed to be paying attention to something else other than reading for 
meaning?  “I am not read,” however, suggests outsider status, not misinterpretation. 
Unlike the cryptic and perhaps uninterpretable jotted-down comment on forgetting an umbrella, 
Ecce Homo reflects almost obsessively on the question of its own exemplarity as a text.  Nietzsche does 
not want his readers to identify with him: “Above all, do not mistake me for someone else.”  This becomes 
a serious contradiction and a source of pathos and idealism – the kind that he wants to avoid.  And he 
ends with the question he interjects repeatedly in the closing pages of Ecce Homo:  “Have  I  been 
understood?”  This is an intensely complicated performative gesture, its complex irony testing the 
expressive limits of ironic discourse.   And it brings to a close one of the most remarkable experimental 
texts of early modernism.  
                                                   
200 We see particularly vivid evidence here supporting Freud’s famous claim that “Nietzsche developed a 
more penetrating knowledge of himself than any other man who ever lived." 
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This returns us to the central question of what experimental writing of this distinctly therapeutic 
kind is supposed to do, how  it supposed  to work upon  the  reader.   Nietzsche wrote  that  “The effect of 
works of art is to excite the state that creates art” (qtd. in Bull 31).  Once again, the problem with Hamlet 
is that it exists.  If the idea is to realize one’s own powers as an artist, and if not everyone can become an 
artist, as Nietzsche believes, then what?  Can that state be excited in everyone?  How is aesthetic 
articulation, and writing in particular, supposed to be exemplary?   Nietzsche writes in Beyond Good and 
Evil, sec. 260,  that  “[t]he noble  type of man experiences itself as determining values; it does not need 
approval; it  judges … it  is value-creating.”  This is not the legislative and judicial relationship of a bird of 
prey determining and judging what would make a good lunch.  It is an expression of what Emerson called 
self trust, rather the aloof and detached self-reliance of the aristocratic type (even though it often takes 
these forms metaphorically in Nietzsche and Emerson) We get also the problem that Nietzsche confronts 
much more directly, of how writing (specific acts of articulation, not just the generic practice of articulating 
oneself) becomes exemplary. Or, in the self-writing of Ecce Homo,  how  one’s  attempt  to  represent 
oneself become representative.   How is this noble type of man supposed to change the rest of the world 
– function as a “destiny” and as “dynamite”?  Are we all meant to aspire to the conditional of autonomous, 
value-determining nobility, a  “noble  type of man”  that means a permanently exclusive class  (visionaries 
like Ayn Rand’s highly influential Zarathustra-figure, John Galt, who demand to be misunderstood by the 
masses)?  (Nietzsche does not seem to think so: he often writes that the artists will always, as a structural 
necessity, be a select and elite class, set apart from the philistine herd, that one cannot have value 
creators who are not members of the elite “creative class.” 
Nietzsche addresses an ideal audience who will understand him the way others do not.  As 
readers reading in the present, what kind of audience are we supposed to identify ourselves with?  All of 
this raises questions about how this writing is supposed to “work upon” the reader.   Again, the question of 
how we are supposed to read this as practical advice.  Are we all supposed to become artists or at least 
imagine ourselves as artists?  Nietzsche obviously doesn’t think so; he explicitly declares that the artists 
will be among the permanently elite few (those who stand out from the herd of common men).  So how 
are they supposed to be exemplary to others?  Is the purpose of writing to expand the realm of the “elite” 
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or to seduce everyone into feeling as if they were among the chosen few?  Identifying onself as 
exceptional and misunderstood is not, after all, a very difficult demand to fulfill – the difficulty, as 
Nietzsche recognized, is how to avoid such identification and trafficking with enticing images for the self, 
with what is by definition a counterfeit greatness. 
An interesting take on this comes from critic Malcolm Bull, whose provocatively titled book Anti-
Nietzsche (expanded from his even more provocatively essay “Where is the Anti-Nietzsche?”) focuses on 
the literary question of “Nietzsche’s voice” as well as the question of how such an experimental work of 
literature is supposed to work upon readers.  In spite of occasionally dubious readings, Bull at least 
establishes in a refreshing way the need for an  “anti-Nietzsche.”   He begins by asking, from a reader-
response perspective, how we identify ourselves of reader we pointing out that Nietzsche’s readers are all 
too ready to be told that they are exceptional misfits and misunderstood, that their time will come.201 We 
have what Bull calls the option of “reading for victory” and the option of “reading like a loser” – two ways 
we might choose to read Nietzsche, two images of ourselves we might identify with.   As Bull notes, the 
only  way  to  be  a  “true” Nietzschean  is  to  reject  the values he expounds – and that means, above all, 
aesthetic  values. Hence,  we  get Malcolm Bull’s  “anti-Nietzsche”  who  (if  we  follow  the  reverse  logic  of 
Ecce Homo) is both a philistine and a masochist.202 It  is  interesting  that  “reading  like  a  loser”  (as  a 
modernist response to Nietzsche) entails a rejection of the premises of the avant garde and its creative-
destructive, innovation-driven, make-it-new ethic.  If we follow this logic through, then reading like a loser 
aligns the reader with an anti-anti-art stance.  
                                                   
201 Here is the text of the so-called  “Apple  manifesto,”  which  originally  appeared  in  an  advertising 




have no respect for the status quo. You can praise them, disagree with them, quote 
them, disbelieve  them, glorify or  vilify  them. About  the only  thing you can’t do  is ignore 
them. Because they change things. They invent. They imagine. They heal. They explore. 
They create. They inspire. They push the human race forward. Maybe they have to be 
crazy. How else can you stare at an empty canvas and see a work of art? Or sit in silence 
and hear a song that’s never been written? Or gaze at a red planet and see a laboratory 
on wheels? While some see them as the crazy ones, we see genius. Because the people 
who are crazy enough to think they can change the world, are the ones who do. 
 
202 It is essentially a version of the Liar Paradox – a paradox we might also attribute to Groucho Marx, 
who “did not want to be belong to any organization that would have him as a member.” 
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In my view, the reader-response dialectic that Bull identifies is ultimately a reductio ad absurdum 
of this way of framing the problem of the way writing works upon the reader.  Nevertheless, Bull raises 
some basic and (I think) important questions about the kinds of contradictions and textual instabilities that 
Nietzsche takes on.  Ecce Homo is  a  “limit  text”  in  much  the  same  way  Nietzsche  pursues  a  “limit 
philosophy”  (or  “anti-philosophy”).  We  also  see  something  approaching  a  schematic  outline  of  the 
transgressive, oppositional logic of the modernist avant-garde.  Nietzsche, however, was less interested 
in a programmatic aversion to conformity than in testing how far one could go with the dissolution of the 
specular self. Nietzsche takes this experiment perhaps as far as it can be taken. This transgressive logic, 
the binaries with their inversions, represents what I believe is a reductio ad absurdum of the transgressive 
logic of the avant-garde and its concept of art as performative, exemplary spectacle.  But while Ecce 
Homo dramatizes the limits of the transgressive model that Nietzsche’s other work would help to inspire, it 




For a self-styled prophet of a new age who asked followers to reject him so that they could 
heroically bring into existence the values by which they could be assessed, Nietzsche was also quite 
concerned – even obsessed – about possible future misreadings, about people misreading him, which is 
perhaps an unavoidable problem for someone who seeks to be an exemplary destiny without offering a 
fixed ideal or image of heroism with which to identify:   
 
The word “overman,” as the designation of a type of supreme achievement, as opposed 
to  “modern” men,  to  “good” men,  to Christians and other nihilists – a word that in the 
mouth of a Zarathustra, the annihilator of morality, becomes a very pensive word – has 
been understood almost everywhere with the utmost innocence in the sense of those 
very values whose opposite Zarathustra was meant to represent – that is an “idealistic” 
type of a higher kind of man, half “saint” and half “genius.” (Basic Writings 717) 
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Do not read me, Nietzsche seems to be saying, but if you do – try to interpret my meaning correctly.  
Zarathustra  “was meant  to  represent”  values  that were misinterpreted  as  designating  the  opposite  so-
called “modern” and “good” men.  The scare-quote-laced passage above, take from the closing pages of 
Ecce Homo, shows an even more intensely self-conscious effort to distance itself (himself) from the 
conventional and accepted meanings of words, the meanings given to them by the “herd.”  For Nietzsche, 
“Overman” was an  “ominous”  in part because he was keenly aware  that  the  response  to nihilism could 
take many different cultural forms.   
The value-creating response that Nietzsche demonstrates arguably fails on its own terms.  
Nietzsche, like Whitman, is always implying and envisioning something else, an unrealized future and a 
future audience that will realize the values by which the Overman, the ultimate outsider-artist, will 
ultimately be judged.  In Ecce Homo, however, the question of meaning that Nietzsche had hoped to 
overcome – along with distinctions between appearance and reality, surface versus depth – is simply 
transferred to Nietzsche himself: “Have I been understood?”  The unstable irony we find throughout Ecce 
Homo, particularly in its closing pages, makes this culminating question almost impossible to interpret 
with any confidence.  But even the effort and performance of sustaining this level of irony generates its 
own kind of  idealism.   It also generates a pathos, which derives  largely  from Nietzsche’s own  failure  to 
escape the idealism he had clearly wanted to escape (that intention, at least, is clear enough).  In this 
final work, assessing a life’s work, we find occasional traces of Prufrock:  “that is not what I meant to say, 
that  is not  it  at  all.“   Nietzsche’s  exploding hero  is  an  explosante fixe, or at least a prophetic mode of 
anticipatory heroism that shows distinct signs of paralysis.203 
In the end, the idealizing of exceptional heroism, and an exceptionalist longing for the New World 
that allows us to forget the old, produces an even more intense version of the pathos and idealism that 
Nietzsche had wanted to escape.    Nietzsche’  proto-avant-garde pathos finds a poignant echo in the 
famous  poem  “Toujours”  by  Guillaume  Apollinaire,  one  of  Nietzsche’s  most  important  readers  and 
“transmitters” in the following generation: 
                                                   
203 The term explosante-fixe (“fixed  explosion”)  alludes  to  the  final  line  of  André  Breton’s  1937  book 
L’Amour Fou (Mad Love) which concludes with a backward-looking revised and version of the concluding 
line of his earlier novel Nadja that expands upon and qualifies the earlier sentiment: "La beauté 
convulsive sera érotique-voilée, explosante-fixe, magique-circonstancielle, ou ne sera pas." [“Convulsive 




 Et tant d'univers s'oublient 
    Quels sont les grands oublieurs 
    Qui donc saura nous faire oublier telle ou telle partie du monde 
    Où est le Christophe Colomb à qui l'on devra l'oubli d'un continent 
 
    Perdre 
    Mais perdre vraiment 
    Pour laisser place à la trouvaille 
    Perdre 
    La vie pour trouver la Victoire 
 
And so many universes are forgotten  
Then who are the great forgetters  
And who will be able to make us forget this or that part of the world  
Who is the Christopher Columbus to whom we will owe the forgetting of a Continent                                
 
To lose  
But to lose truly                              
To make way for the windfall                             
To lose                              
Life in order to Triumph  
 
This is a virtual catalog of Nietzschean and Emersonian themes: the idealizing of Becoming, a vaguely 
triumphalist nostalgia for the future, a dream of rebirth by means of self-erasure. In its idealizing mode, 
there is a messianic charge that involves a passive awaiting of the sublime Event that will transform us 
and.  “I  am  ready  to  die  out  of  nature,”  Emerson  declares,  ”and  be  born  again  into  this  new  yet 
unapproachable  America.”    In  Apollinaire’s  poem,  we  see  distinct  traces  of  Emerson’s  way  of  life  by 
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abandonment, by way of Nietzsche.  But there are also ominous traces of a new spin on the ideal of self-
abandonment:  The longed-for loss is “the windfall” to which we “give way,” a larger world-historical force 
of Progress to which we yield and submit.   
As I have tried to suggest for the past two chapters, the real “American Nietzsche” (as the title of 
a recent study puts it204) is Emerson – or, we might  just  as well  say  that Nietzsche  is  the  “European 
Emerson.”   Nietzsche’s impact on American thought in the early decades of the twentieth century is the 
phenomenon of the re-birth of Emersonian thought in a new cultural and historical context. James, of 
course, might also lay claim to the title of the American Nietzsche, although (as we have seen) with a 
number qualifications.  James had the historical advantage of witnessing the earliest impact of Nietzsche 
in the 1890s.  Ironically, given their close affinity as heirs to Emerson, we find surprisingly few references 
to Nietzsche in James, and many of those references to Nietzsche are misreadings that seem based on a 
fundamental misunderstanding or lack familiarity.  At one point, James calls Nietzsche a morbid-minded 
“shrieking rat” and conflates him with Schopenhauer as examples of a European variety of self-absorbed, 
existential angst.  On another occasion, however, James mounts a defense of Nietzsche against another 
misreading.  In his  review  of Max Nordau’s  book Degeneration soon after its appearance in English in 
1895, James critiques Nordau’s perfectionist notion of “health” as “approximating a nullity.”205 And James 
takes  Nordau  to  task  for  “abusing”  Nietzsche  when  (in  Degeneration)  he  dismisses  Nietzsche’s 
philosophy as a symptom of cultural decadence.  This seems to revise or at least complicate what James 
has  to  say  about  Nietzsche  elsewhere.  James’s  critique  of  Nordau’s  healthy-minded pessimism as a 
“pathological document” of an “individual temperament” is actually (even though James probably did not 
fully appreciate it in 1895) a prescient diagnosis of a larger cultural discourse on decadence in the 1890s 
that was beginning to form around misreadings of Nietzsche.206 James’s  defense  of  Nietzsche  in 
response  to  Nordau’s  healthy-minded optimism is also a reminder that for James, as for Nietzsche, 
                                                   
204 American Nietzsche: A History of an Icon and His Ideas by Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen. 
205 See also Varieties of Religious Experience (24) for more of James on Nordau. 
206 It is important note, however, that the late nineteenth-century discourse on decadence predates 
Nietzsche, whose own interest in the idea of cultural decadence owes something to the work of the 
French critic Paul Bourget in the 1880s.  
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instinct and fatalism are primary and must be distinguished from the secondary attitudes of pessimism 
and optimism (which Nietzsche dismisses as equally decadent).207 
 
James’s  sharpest  response  to  Nietzsche,  in  fact,  may  be  found  in  his  response  to  Emerson.  
James may have misread Nietzsche partly out of lack of familiarity208; but he certainly does not misread 
Emerson.  James and Nietzsche were two of Emerson’s closest readers. As we have seen, there are as 
many transfigurings and allusions to Emerson in James as there is in Nietzsche.  And both knew how 




“Other world!  there  is no other world.” All God’s  life opens  into  the  individual particular, 
and  here  and now,  or  nowhere,  is  reality.  “The  present  hour  is  the  decisive  hour,  and 
every day is doomsday.” Such a conviction that Divinity is everywhere may easily make 
of one an optimist of the sentimental type that refuses to speak ill of anything. Emerson’s 
drastic perception of differences kept him at the opposite pole from this weakness. After 
you have seen men a few times, he could say, you find most of them as alike as their 
barns and pantries, and soon as musty and dreary. Never was such a fastidious lover of 
significance and distinction, and never an eye so keen for their discovery. His optimism 
had nothing in common with that indiscriminate hurrahing for the Universe with which 
Walt Whitman has made us familiar… (Pragmatism and Other Essays 312) 
 
There is nothing here that might not apply to Nietzsche as well; the Emerson that James describes above 
sounds strikingly similar to Nietzsche. There is full recognition here of Emerson’s programmatic contempt 
for what Nietzsche would call the “last man” (an attitude that may be found on occasion in James as well). 
James’s centennial address was written in 1902, after Nietzsche’s ideas had already spread in Europe, 
                                                   
207 In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche writes of Zarathustra that he “was the first to grasp that the optimist is just as 
decadent as the pessimist, and perhaps more harmful” (785). 
208 This was not due to a language barrier: James, in fact, was fluent in German and did not need to wait 
for the appearance of Nietzsche’s books in English translation. 
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and  in  the  year  in which  James’s Gifford  Lectures were  being  published  as  The Varieties of Religious 
Experience.  In Lecture 2 of Varieties,  James  contrasts  Emersonian  “optimism”  with  Buddhist 
“pessimism.”  In the centennial address, he makes it clear that Emerson’s optimism is of a special kind. 
For James, Emerson is an example of a life-affirming philosopher who (unlike Whitman) did not engage in 
mere optimism, or an “indiscriminate hurrahing for the Universe.”  One of James’s favorite “representative 
men” is Whitman, who served as recurring example of what James called the “healthy-minded” type.  The 
passage on Emerson above is important, because it clearly distinguishes between Emerson and Whitman 
as representing two different types of healthy-minded “hurrahing for the universe.  Emerson is neither an 
healthy-minded optimist nor a gloomy pessimist in the conventional sense; he is a healthy-minded fatalist.  
What James  is  identifying  in his profile of Emerson  is not  a philosophical position or an  “attitude”  (like 
Whitman’s), but  rather  forms of  life and strategy  for  avoiding despair and converting  the  recognition of 
nihilism into a form of power.   What James calls Emerson’s “here and now, or nowhere”  is a particular 
form of active nihilism, a healthy-minded response that is quite different from (but nevertheless stands in 
contrast to) Nordau’s ideal of health as “approximating a nullity.” 
  The  alternative  to  Whitman’s  egalitarian  optimism,  James  notes,  is  a  sharp  sense  of 
“discrimination.”  This has moral and ethical connotations of which was also quite aware.209  Elsewhere in 
his address, James mentions Emerson’s notoriously ambivalent response to the abolitionist movement.210 
Like Nietzsche, Emerson is not exactly a champion of egalitarian democratic values, nor does he endorse 
the “improvers  of  mankind”  of  whom Nietzsche  speaks  with  such  contempt.).  Note  James’s  keen 
                                                   
209 The  classic  (and much  disputed)  critique  of  Emerson’s  “discriminating”  individualism, mad  from an 
ethical and political vantage point, is Quentin Anderson’s The Imperial Self (an argument he would later 
revise and qualify in his Making Americans).  
210 Emerson’s comment on the abolition movement sounds the same tone that we encounter in a passage 
in  “Experience,” where Emerson dismisses  the social experiment of Brook Farm and  its  radical utopian 
aspirations:  
 
At Education-Farm, [Brook Farm] the noblest theory of life sat on the noblest figures of 
young men and maidens, quite powerless and melancholy  ... a political orator wittily 
compared our party promises to western roads, which opened stately enough, with 
planted trees on either side, to tempt the traveller, but soon became narrower and 
narrower, and ended in a squirrel track, and ran up a tree. (478)   
 
The relish with which Emerson, on more than one occasion, mocks the aspirations behind political reform 
demonstrates how an agreeable and homespun aversion to “theories of life” can lead one toward an aloof 
and unseemly political quietism, even toward a reactionary politics (though Emerson never goes quite 
that far). For a classic discussion of Emerson’s problematic politics, see George Kateb.    
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perception of  the paradoxes within Emerson’s  radical  individualism, his celebration of  “distinction” over 
conformity, and even the anti-democratic and aristophiliac tendency in Emerson with its paradoxical twin 
fantasies  of  an  “aboriginal”  and aristocratic exceptionalism.211 In  “Self Reliance,”  for example, Emerson 
writes of “the nonchalance of boys who are sure of a dinner, and would disdain as much as a lord to do or 
say  aught  to  conciliate  one,  is  the  healthy  attitude  of  human  nature.”212  As this profile of Emerson 
illustrates, we might say that James’s “drastic perception of differences” between temperaments and total 
reactions upon life, and his treatment of them as distinct land “live” options, is what sets him apart from 
both  Emerson  and  Nietzsche  and  their  programmatic  approach  to  a  particular  “way  of  life  by 
abandonment.”  It is a critical power, a sense of discrimination, and at the same time a visionary power of 
holding open future possibilities.   
It is only in Varieties of Religious Experience that we see a conscious distancing from both 
Emerson and Nietzsche.  James quotes at length from Emerson, offering him as an example of a “secu lar 
religion.”  It is here, in this passage, that James writes of the “thumping its breast and flexing its muscles,” 
which is the same language he uses to characterize the healthy-minded positivist (Varieties 36-38).  
Emerson is a central figure in Varieties of Religious Experience, and not simply one example among 
others of the healthy-minded type.  If James recognizes what sets Emerson apart from sentimental 
optimists, then why does he nevertheless classify him as a healthy-minded type and identify himself with 
the opposite type?   Is this a misreading, like James’s misreading of Nietzsche?  I do not think so.  James 
was quite familiar with Emerson.  And his recognition of the Emersonian religion, as well as his distancing 
from it, is a rather misunderstood part pf his thinking.  
And there is also the shadow of Emerson cast over James studies, in which James is either not 
as radical as his mentor (as Cavell claims) or is simply a disciple elaborating upon his thought (as 
                                                   
211 The examples are numerous.  There is the notorious passage in Emerson in which Emerson extends 
the “know your facts from others’” and asks why he should engage in charity, which is a version of what 
he says passage on not helping drowning swimmers.  During the Civil War, Emerson also anticipates 
Nietzsche’s glorification of the “warlike” and the Futurists’ more explicit talk of war as a cultural “hygiene”: 
"Civil war, national bankruptcy, or revolution,” Emerson writes in The Conduct of Life, are “more rich in the 
central tones than languid years of prosperity.” [p. 230 in older edition]  
212 In  a  sharply  worded  critique  of  Stein’s  wartime  book Wars I Have Seen, Djuna Barnes (perhaps 
unintentionally)  echoes  this  line  from Emerson:  “You do not feel that she [Stein] is ever really worried 
about the sorrows of the people. Her concerns at its highest pitch is a well-fed apprehension."  Stein, 
along with Alice Toklas, spent the war years in protected seclusion in Vichy France, devoting much of her 
time to collecting and translations the speeches of Marshal Petain. 
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numerous studies exemplify).  Joan Richardson, for example, begins her chapter on James in A Natural 
History of Pragmatism by telling the story of how Emerson, a friend of Henry James Sr., was present at 
the birth of William at blessed him.  This is an extreme example of the dominance of the Emersonian 
paradigm for reading James (and others). James wrote that some people are born with a corked bottle of 
champagne with their name inscribed on it; for many Emersonian critics, James was also born under the 
sign of Emerson.  Other Emersonian critics respond to this conflict simply by glossing over it. Steven 
Meyer, for example, merely points out how James fails to acknowledge Emerson’s genuine experiences 
of loss, in particular the biographical fact Emerson’s suffering over the death of his son.  Such literal and  
biographical readings simply miss the point of James’s discussion of the Sick Souled versus the Healthy 
Minded.  For James, moreover, Emerson was not simply an individual case, one example of a general 
universal temperament; rather, Emerson was responsible for the articulation of one compelling response 
to the challenge of nihilism (in ways that I have tried to outline in this chapter).  If we want to read James 
biographically,  the  there  is  a  generational  dimension  to  James’s  ambivalence  toward conversion 
experiences. Note in passing that the final passage in the Sick Soul is also “personal” in the sense that he 
responds to the Emersonian “Always convert!” thinking of his parents’ generation.213  It is a generational 
critique, not simply a misreading of Emerson.  It is in fact sharp and perceptive reading of Emersonian 
thought.  James was as averse to conversion narratives as he was to organized religion, and in this 
respect he fully shares Nietzsche’s sense of the problem.  
In Varieties of Religious Experience, the question for James is not acknowledging the “reality of 
evil,” but  the kind of meaning we give  to  these obstacles  that we  treat as  “realities.”  This includes the 
question of how these “difficulties” are projected obstacles or as challenges that are “ministerial to higher 
good.”   The  recognition of  the  “reality  of evil”  for James  is  thus not a  recognition of  the way  the world 
resists our projects, thus serving as a test of reality, but rather a recognition that the world exists in 
something other than an instrumental relation to us and that contain evils that are not simply opportunities 
that are “ministerial to higher good.” 
 
                                                   
213 note the allusion to his father. 
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There are important reasons for paying close attention to James’s philosophical divergence from 
Emerson and for taking issue with narrowly biographical readings.  Nietzsche and Emerson become the 
logic of the avant garde, what Cavell calls “aversive thinking.”  This passage from James Albrecht (as an 
example of this avant-garde reading): 
 
Emerson, Nietzsche, and James each  renounce  traditional  religion’s promise  of  certain 
meaning behind (and compensating for) the sufferings of our world, in favor of a view that 
accepts the limits and failures of material life as real and unrecoverable losses – losses 
that are meaningful, however, indeed necessary and beneficial, as occasions for human 
performance and power.  (147 [italics added]) 
 
Like much of Emersonian criticism, this is little more than Emerson’s philosophy paraphrased in a more 
amiable and domesticated academic prose.  Consider  Emerson’s  casual  (or  reticent?)  comment  in 
“Experience”: “We  thrive by casualties. Our chief experiences have been casual.” They have been our 
chief experiences because they are the bleak rocks around which we form our reactions upon life.  They 
are “ministerial to a higher good” and are the “measles and mumps of the soul.” This is the language of 
conversion.  Emerson writes that he rejects the matter of Montaigne in favor of his method; but 
Montaigne’s method  is  to pay close  attention  (reflective  and critical attention,  if not  “intellectual”)  to  the 
way  people  go  about  their  business.    Emerson  differs  from  James’s moralisme:  “The  whole  frame  of 
things preaches indifferency.  Do not craze yourself with thinking, but go about your business anywhere.  
Life is not intellectual or critical, but sturdy.”  However, James like Montaigne was interested in the way 
people go about their business.   
But not only are they occasions for human power; through Nietzsche in particular, they also give 
us a mandate for transgressive iconoclasm – and that is a particular way of life by abandonment. The 
question is what kind of power and what kind of performance we are talking about. The point here is not 
their realization of loss, their amor fati, but the particular and practical ways in which they embrace it and 
find a way to convert it into a “meaningful” opportunity for particular activity and the realization of a certain 
kind of power.  We might even say that the will to live and orient oneself meaningfully precedes the will to 
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“practical power” in these other senses.214  The fact that pragmatist criticism so often makes statements 
like this without concrete notions of what kind of power we are talking about suggests its limitations in 
offering an alternative to the epistemic values it critiques.    
 The problem, for James, is not “accepting the limits and failures of material life,” not the reality of 
evil and loss, but the way we develop ways of coping with and giving meaning to a world that lacks 
intrinsic meaning – how we adopt and adapt and develop possible responses to the questions posed to 
us by developing meaningful orientations and forms of life.   Viewing the fallen world as offering occasions 
for (displaying) human performance and power represents a distinct lifeworld that is just as “real” as the 
fundamental truth of extinction, the reality of “cosmic aloneness,” the reality of the unrecoverable losses, 
or anything else we choose to treat as an objective given.  Though it is at all an easy one, all James 
demands of us is that we recognize the reality of lifeworlds (total reactions upon life) as on the same par 
with everything else (along with the reality of transitions, etc.). 
 
*** 
If we encounter in Nietzsche and Emerson the paradox of an experimental fatalism, in James we 
must try to understand how his mode of description (in Varieties) can be experimental at all, let alone 
radical.   In Varieties, James claims  that  “morbid-mindedness”  is  the more comprehensive  and  ranges 
over, etc.. James’s melancholy allows him to see in melancholy a different kind of “power.”  And we can 
say  already  that  it  is  more  “comprehensive”  than  Nietzsche’s.    We  might  compare  James’s 
“comprehensive” with  Nietzsche’s  power  to  “comprehend,”  a  neat  parallel  to  the  power  to  make 
distinctions.  One demonstration of the power of James’s more comprehensive melancholy view, then, is 
that he is able to “comprehend” this healthy-minded view as a strategy for making meaning and as a life 
world, and to recognize its limitations.  This, again, is what allows us to think of James as a modernist 
critic  of  the  avant  garde.    Finally,  mention  Nietzsche’s  comment  that  Emerson  had  a  “skepsis  full  of 
possibilities” – that Emerson had this practical power and had helped him to cope and to find a way to a 
way.  In the next chapter, I will look at this “power” of recognizing possible lifeworlds, the “prescience” that 
comes with treating orientations as primary. In Chapter Two, I tried to argue for a reading of James that 
                                                   
214 Nietzsche: One would rather will nothing than not will at all” 
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does not identify him with any particular philosophy, any definition of the world.  In the next chapter, I will 
look at James’s argument for the power of a melancholy orientation on non-epistemic grounds. If we are 
going to  think of  the experimental  implications of James’s  “philosophy of  ‘if’”  (as Joan Richardson  titles 
one of her chapters,) then we need to combine it with a Jamesian sense of possible lifeworlds, or what we 







Epilogue:  After Nietzsche: Reading Robert Walser 
 
No sun, no culture, me, naked, on a high rock, no storms, not even a wave, no water, no wind, no streets, no banks, no 
money, no time, and no breath.  Then, at least, I should not be afraid any more.  No more fear and no more questions, 
and I should not be late any more, either. I could imagine that I was lying in bed, everlastingly in bed!  Perhaps that would 




I want to return briefly to the question I asked in my introduction: What does it mean to say (as 
Max Brod did) that “after Nietzsche, there had to be Walser”?   I first want to look at a passage in Walser’s 
late novel The Robber that contains an explicit reference to Nietzsche, and (indeed) one could make the 
case that the entire passage is an obliquely comic but at the same time rather profound meditation on 
Nietzschean themes.  The Robber is the only surviving novel from Walser’s late and intensely productive 
“pencil  period,”  work  composed  in  the  1920s  in  the  years  leading  up  to  his  institutional ization.  In its 
comically circuitous and nonlinear fashion, The Robber narrates the story of its central character (who is 
actually  the narrator himself)  in what might be described as a  “mock-saturnine” mode.  By comparison, 
Walser’s tonal complexity can make even Ecce Homo sound at times like the straightforward rhetoric of 
Cardinal Newman – this is a novel that begins, after all, with the line: “Edith loves him. More on this later.”  
Virginia Woolf speculated that the literature of illness (or the post-convalescent), that it will probably be 
“laughable.”  Walser certainly is that.  There are many possible adjectives to describe the complex tone 
and structure of The Robber, and “zany” must be included among them. 
We also encounter in The Robber something rarely found in Walser: a reference to a current 
event involving a contemporary public figure.  Alongside the mention of Nietzsche, Walser alludes to the 
famously melancholic statesman and writer Walther Rathenau, who served as Foreign Minister of 
Germany during the early years of the Weimar Republic, and who was assassinated on June 24,1922  by 
right-wing ultra-nationalists.215  The scene narrated in the novel takes place, presumably, in the days 
                                                   
215 Following his assassination, Rathenau was widely viewed as a heroic martyr for German democracy.  
Monuments were erected to his memory, streets in German cities named after him.  When the Nazis 
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immediately following the assassination when the news would have reached the attention of the general 
public.  Walser’s Robber hears news of the assassination while he is out in the countryside, far from the 
centers of commerce and politics and world-changing events.  The narrated episode is chiefly concerned 
with making sense of the Robber’s unusual response upon hearing the news.  Addressing the reader in 
the second-person, Walser’s narrator informs us of the context of the day’s earlier events leading up to 
the event of the Robber’s response – a response, incidentally, which has not yet been described for us.  
We must wait for the disclosure of that information; we are often made to wait in The Robber.   “First,” the 
narrator  declares,  “why  don’t  we  take  a  stroll  with  [the  Robber]  up  the  Gurten,  a  mountain  in  the 
immediate vicinity.  And I see no reason why we should not, up there in the mountain air, talk our fill of 
politics” (11).  But before we set out on this imagined stroll, the narrator reflects upon the personal health 
benefits of a well-oxygenated attentiveness:  “How alert we are, keeping watch  in all directions.   Some 
people might suppose this to be terribly exhausting, but just the opposite is true.  There is something 
wonderfully  refreshing  about  being  attentive,  whereas  inattentiveness  puts  one  to  sleep”  (11).  The 
mountain air and the concern with health and vigor are all familiar motifs in Nietzsche, and the entire 
comment  echoes  Nietzsche’s  self-reflexive  realization  that  “everything  in  me  became  subtler  – 
observation itself as well as all organs of observation.”  As the narrated account of the episode resumes, 
we  are  finally  told  what  the  Robber’s  response  was.  We  also  get  an  even  more  direct  allusion  to 
Nietzsche, to the image of Zarathustra descending from (here, “tripping down from”) his extended period 
solitude up in the mountains:216 
 
It’s  ten  in  the morning, he comes  tripping down  from  the  light green meadows back  to 
town, where a placard informs him of Rathenau’s murder, and what did this marvelous, 
weird scoundrel do now?  He clapped his hands, when he ought to have sunk to the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
came to power, however, there was a concerted effort to erase the name of Rathenau (who was also 
Jewish).  Monuments to Rathenau were destroyed, and in their place the Nazis erected monuments to his 
assassins (who were pardoned for their crime).  For more on Rathenau and Walser’s chance encounter 
with him, see Jochen Greven.  
216 In yet another complex allusion to Nietzsche, the narrator relates earlier in the passage that the 
Robber “had a masterful understanding of how to be unspeakably unhappy while listening to music, and 
since this presented a mortal danger for sensitive souls, a grammar school teacher was sent along with 




ground  in  horror  and  grief  at  this  shattering  announcement.    I’d  like  to  see  someone 
explain this hand-clapping to us. (11) 
 
The narrator himself then takes a crack at it, which sends him off on a circuitous and digressive endeavor 
at  “explaining”  the  response  of  his  alter  ego  – essentially playing the double role of inquisitor and 
advocate.  This hand-clapping response, the narrator speculates, is “perhaps related to a spoon.”  More 
on this later, apparently.  But first, a few more words from our narrator by way of digression.  In a delay 
tactic entirely typical of the book, we are first presented with a brief non-sequitur of a personal anecdote 
involving either the narrator or the Robber (one of many instances where the distinction is far from clear).  
We then return to the psychological inquiry into the circumstances that might account in some way for the 
Robber’s unconventional response to the news of Rathenau’s murder: 
 
This heavenly air on the mountain, the deep-breathing exercises in the fir forest, and then 
the additional pleasure of being able to read of a great man’s downfall at the hands of a 
few insignificant persons.  For is not, as Friedrich Nietzsche has pointed out, witnessing 
and participating vicariously in a tragedy a delight of the finest and highest order, an 
enrichment  of  life?  “Bravo!”  he  even  shouted,  on  top  of  everything  else,  and hereafter 
betook himself to a café. (11) 
 
Nearly a page after it was first mentioned, we return to the matter of the spoon and the spoon-licking 
episode.  The terse mention of this act is almost entirely obscured by the scene-painting and the overly 
devout pursuit of precision (a precision that slips into poetry and contains more than a hint of special 
pleading): 
  
You see, before he’d  resolved  to  climb  the  Gurten  – god of precision, give me the 
strength to recount everything down to the flyspecks – he licked, thinking himself her 
page boy,  the widow’s  little spoon.  In her kitchen  it was.  In  this kitchen  reigned a vast, 
splendid loneliness, a midsummer seclusion, and perhaps, the day before, the Robber 
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had seen, in the display window of a shop that sold books and art prints, a reproduction 
of the picture Le baiser derobé by Fragonard.  This painting can only have enraptured 
him.  It truly is, in fact, one of the most delightful pictures ever painted. (12) 
 
The spoon-licking, then, may be connected with the hand-clapping.  Once the spoon-licking is adduced 
as a possible factor, however, it is rapidly subsumed within yet another epicycle of causal explanation, 
folded into a further layer of context, as the narrator submits as evidence a hypothetical (imagined) 
encounter with a painting.  This “explanation” is elaborated with a curiously subjunctive mode of precision: 
perhaps he had seen a painting the day before that “can only have enraptured him.”  The syntax of the 
sentence – “In  her  kitchen  it  was”  – reflects both the care and the voyeuristic relish with which he 
reconstructs the hypothetical scene.217  Yes, in her kitchen, he seems to say with the speculative relish of 
the voyeur, that is where he must have seen it.  From the reconstructive language of the forensics 
investigator, the narrator modulates to the more freely speculative language that a prosecuting attorney 
might employ as he asks  the  jury  to  reconstruct  the  scene  of  a  crime  in  their  mind’s  eye.   Walser’s 
narrator, as is already clear, assumes the role of both prosecution and defense.  We, the readers, are 
asked to imagine the possible motives of the suspect as well as the atmospheric properties of the scene 
of the crime (the scene of the spoon-licking now taking the place of the hand-clapping as the “crime” to be 
explained).  But we are also asked to admit into the record, as evidence both circumstantial and 
extenuating, what appears  to  be  an  “objective”  value  judgment:    because, after all, it is in fact – as 
everyone knows – one of the most delightful pictures ever painted.  In other words, it is hard to imagine 
anyone who is not guilty of being “enraptured” by such a painting. 
We might pause here  to  consider  this passage  in  light  of Malcolm Bull’s  anti-Nietzsche as the 
adoption of a philistine attitude.  Should we read Walser here as offering a parody of Nietzschean 
aestheticism, as a parody of anti-art philistinism, or as a reveling in a certain kind of philistinism 
understood as a nose-thumbing, anti-art stance?  We cannot even begin to answer (or admit) such a 
question unless we acknowledge that the text is working on at least two levels of ironic detachment.  The 
narrator, like the Robber, seems to have a taste for scenic atmosphere (the “vast, splendid loneliness of 
                                                   
217 The English translation can, of course, easily reproduce the inverted syntax of the original German. 
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the  kitchen”)  as  well  as  a  “masterful  understanding”  of  how  to  be  “unspeakably  unhappy”  so  as  to 
intensify the pleasure he takes in this unhappiness.  He is unabashedly sentimental.  The aestheticism 
that Walser indulges in here has affinities with the philistinism of Leopold Bloom, for whom works of art – 
parts of the anatomy of sculpted figures – offer a stimulus for the erotic fantasies of the daydreamer.  The 
narrator  finds  the  painting  by  Fragonard  “delightful,”  it  seems,  because  its  subject  matter  suits  his 
fetishistic predilections. But we need to distinguish here, as we obviously do in the case of Joyce, 
between the theme level and the level of craft.  And there is ample evidence throughout this passage 
(and elsewhere in The Robber) of a seriously playful crafting of possible identifications, a conscious intent 
behind the intentionality that is modeled and the modes of desire that are entertained.  
As the kitchen scene continues, we then encounter yet another characteristically abrupt shift, with 
an oddly syllogistic-sounding demonstration of the logic of the fetish as a metonymic-chain of 
associations: 
 
And  now,  apart  from him,  there wasn’t  a  soul  in  the  kitchen. Beside the sink reposed, 
adream in its cup, the spoon the widow had used when she drank her coffee. “This little 
spoon has been placed by her in her mouth.  Her mouth is as lovely as a picture.  





rise to the level of explanation, let alone justification.  This transparent tactic thus undermines the value of 
this testimony (in spite of its effort to be candid and precise).  But while he attributes these thoughts to the 
Robber, the narrator himself is just as guilty of participating in this chain of pseudo-logical association that 
revels in the conflation of reasons with motives, a blurring that is facilitated by the projective mode of 
personification:  a  dreaming  spoon  at  rest  in  a  cup,  a  kitchen  in  which  there  “reigned  a  vast splendid 
loneliness.”   
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At this point, we have now followed the shaggy dog some distance in pursuit of an explanation for 
the hand-clapping.  The more dots that appear in this constellation of possible factors, the more difficult it 
is to connect them.  Does everything else about the woman become less lovely because of the chance 
encounter with the spoon?  Does the painting give him an analogy for the beauty of her mouth, which 
links with the spoon?218  This “almost comic” logic of juxtaposition is Walser’s version of Eliot’s reading of 
Spinoza juxtaposed with the smell of cooking,219 or Surrealism’s chance meeting of  a sewing machine 
and an umbrella: 
 
It’s  almost  comic,  this  juxtaposition  of  a  widow’s  household  utensils  and major  current  
events of historical significance.  On the one hand, a coffee cup episode, the actions of a 
page boy in sweet domesticity; on the other, a news item that sent quakes and tremblings 
throughout the civilized world.  (13) 
 
In a highly significant delay tactic and withholding of evidence, the narrator finally comes around to 
considering this chance event of possible relevance: the “confession” that Rathenau and the Robber had 
once met by chance in a public place, after which they spent an afternoon together discussing various 
shared interests:220  
 
To this we now add the following confession: Rathenau and the Robber were personally 
acquainted.  During their promenade, islands, poets, and so on were discussed, and now 
came this horrifying report, to which the Robber responded: ‘What a splendid way to end 
a career!’ Possibly, of course, he thought something else as well. But there was, above 
all,  something  we’ll  call  charming  in  the  way  he  stood  there  before  this  supremely 
                                                   
218 See Susan Bernofsky’s preface to The Robber, p. xi.  Bernofsky quotes from a very late story written in 
1932/33 called “The Girl,” which concludes with the following complex inversion of vehicle and tenor:  
“Small birds were trilling in the treetops, the sun shone down the avenue, people strolled 
to and fro, and water swam past the girl. 
 She was grateful to the sun, the twittering she found delightful, and the people she 
compared to the water that came and went.” 
 
219 The line appears in Eliot’s 1921 essay on the Metaphysical Poets. 
220 See Jochen Greven for more on Walser’s real-life encounter with Rathenau. 
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affecting notice, which, as it were, had something joyous and Greek about it, something 
of the vividness of ancient sagas. (13) 
 
This  touches  directly  upon  Nietzschean  themes,  and  even  goes  so  far  as  to  borrow  Nietzsche’s  own 
language. 
 We do not know the something else which he possibly thought as well, but we are informed by 
way of anecdote of his  fantasy of being  “girlishly” submissive.   We  then suddenly shift  to another  “fact” 
that is no longer presented, but seems another attempt to account for this Nietzschean exhiliration in 
terms of identifying with the opposite  of  “joyous”  tragic  failure  – namely,  a  giddy  and  “girlish” 
submissiveness: “Already in Berlin, the Robber had once behaved in a truly girlish manner.  This occurred 
at  a  gentlemen’s  social  gathering.”   He  then  recounts  the  incident  at  some  length,  at which point this 
whirlwind of a section (a densely packed two pages) comes to a close.   
The masochism or surrender theme deserves much more attention than I am able to devote to it 
here.  But I do want to suggest that Walser is at his most Nietzschean when he is exploring and trying out 
new affective orientations as potential sources of pleasure and power.  Like Nietzsche, Walser is less 
interested in the pleasure afforded by imaginary power relations (inverting and subverting roles in a 
psychic economy structured around a dominant/submissive dialectic) as he is in the testing out of forms 
of pleasure as forms of power.   
 
“Essay on Freedom” 
Next,  I want  to  look  at  one  of Walser’s most  explicitly  philosophical  (and Nietzschean-themed) 
pieces, the “Essay on Freedom” of 1928, an essay that further explores the theme of submissiveness.221  
This is a brief but important late piece, which I think demonstrates a clear link between Walser’s essayism 
and Nietzsche’s aesthetic concept of amor fati as a precondition for the creation of value.  What we read 
initially sounds like a quirky and quasi-dialectical meditation on freedom (perhaps even a conscious 
allusion to Hegel’s master/slave dialectic), but presented here in reflexive rather than psychological terms:  
                                                   




One should always be bowing inwardly to the pure image of freedom; there must be no 
pause in one’s respect for freedom, a respect which seems to bear a persistent relation 
to a kind of fear.  A remarkable thing here is that freedom sets out to be single, tolerates 
no other freedoms beside itself.  Although this can certainly be said with greater precision 
I quickly take occasion to insist that I am a person who tends to appear to himself more 
frail than perhaps he actually is.  (Selected Stories 181) 
 
As William James might put it, Walser’s first act of free will is to act as if there were free will.  But Walser 
does not stop there.  He embraces freedom as a test of his character and a paradoxical constraint upon 
his  freely  conceived  actions,  “allowing”  himself  to be  “positively  governed  by  freedom,  so  to  speak 
oppressed  by  it,  to  be  regulated  by  it  in  every  imaginable  way.”    Construed  in  this  paradoxical  way, 
“freedom”  begins  to  sound  like  a  synonym  for  the  “terrible  demand”  of  Nietzschean  nihilism. Walser 
personifies and objectifies freedom, contemplating freedom as a necessary stimulus and constraint for his 
own contemplative activity.  In that way, contemplation gets converted into an active and value-creating 
mode of  articulation.   Walser considers  “with a humility which cannot of course be free from decorous 
irony, the droll possibility that, within freedom, puzzles are thinkable” (182).  Not solvable, but thinkable: 
puzzles that come into view as obstacles to navigate, objective stimuli the response to which allows for 
the active exercise of subjective agency.  He then relates the story of returning home one day from a 
journey (perhaps one of the long walks Walser liked to take) and seeing from a distance what appear to 
be two people, a man and a woman, looking down at him from the window of his room.  The two parties 
gaze at each other for a long time, but when he goes up to his room he finds nobody there. “For a time,” 
Walser writes, “I do not sense my own person either, I am pure independence, which is not in  every way 
quite what it ought to be, and I ask myself if I am free” (182). 
The “Essay on Freedom” ends with a syntactically odd sentence whose self-permissions formed 
around a self-imposed mandate for precision, is a vivid example of the powers realized through self-
reflexive articulation:  
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I hope I may be believed if I permit myself to say that freedom is difficult and produces 
difficulties, with which phrase perhaps there sprang from my mouth an insight the 
expression of which could be accomplished by none but a connoisseur and gourmet of 
freedom who notes and cherishes all of the unfreedoms internal to freedom. (183) 
 
There is a quiet sense of discovery and self-surprise here, and he once again assumes a disengaged 
stance toward his own body (a phrase “sprang from [his] mouth”).   But I want to draw special attention 
here to the oddly baroque syntax of this sentence, with its nested qualifications and self reflexive 
contortions.  The filigree work of the syntax performs a definite function, I think, that is quite different from 
the pleasures of merely circulating among the elaborate arabesques of decorum.  The writer does not 
convey an insight; he arrives at an insight, the expression of which could only be accomplished by 
someone who, we might say, is a connoisseur of what is made possible by his own acts of articulation.  
This  is  Nietzsche’s  quod erat demonstrandum that paradoxically discovers what it set out to prove, 
arriving at a proof in the filigree work of its own demonstration. We might compare this, for example, with 




On Two Readings of Walser: Benjamin and Sebald 
Reading Walser  “after  Nietzsche”  does  make  a  real  difference,  I  would  argue,  in  the  way  we 
interpret his writing.  In “Le Promeneur Solitaire,” his 1998 essay on Walser, W.G. Sebald speculates that 
“it must have occurred to [Walser] on more than one occasion that the looming threat of impending 
darkness enabled him at times to arrive at an acuity of observation and precision of formulation which is 
unattainable from a state of perfect health” (28).  Walser may or may not have seen farther or with 
precision than others, but I think he is guided by interests besides lucidity and precision per se.  I think it 
is more accurate to say that Walser treats the demand for precision, often in Walser an explicitly self-
imposed demand, as the basis of a method, not as a means of seeing more clearly into the life of things. 
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Walter Benjamin’s reading of Walser, in his much earlier essay of 1929, further complicates our 
way of reading Walser.  Perhaps Benjamin is even challenging some of his own assumptions.  Benjamin 
wrote his essay on Walser the year he was admitted to Waldau.  It is a short essay, and one might wish it 
were longer, or at least as long as his more fully developed treatments of Proust and Kafka.  But in its 
brief space, Benjamin makes a series of assays at understanding the puzzle that is Robert Walser.  
Benjamin flirts with the idea of reading Walser as an outsider artist,222 a provocation from the periphery 
simply by virtue of positioning himself at the periphery, someone who chooses to be minor writer, a 
writer’s writer, standing apart from the “imperialist” aspirations of great and important writers like Thomas 
Mann,  who  wrote  on  large  themes  in  large  forms.  Few  people  understand  the  “minor  genre”  of  the 
ephemeral feuilleton,  Benjamin  writes,  or  “realize  how  many  butterflies of hope are repelled by the 
insolent, rocklike façade of so-called great literature, seeking refuge instead in its unpretentious calyxes” 
(109).  Benjamin then slips for a moment into the polemical mode of his “Leftist Melancholy” and attacks 
what he imagines to be one possible response of the reading public to writing such as Walser’s: “The first 
of impulse of their meager store of cultural knowledge – their sole asset in literary matters – tells them 
that what they regard as the complete insignificance of content has to be compensated for by their 
‘cultivated,’ ‘refined’ attention to form” (109).  Although it is not mentioned explicitly, this may also be read, 
at least in part, as a challenge to the pastoral gaze of Surrealism and its attention to formal features, as 
exemplified by the approach of Prinzhorn or Morgenthaler.   But Benjamin is not quite ready to exit the 
interpretive frame of Outsider Art paradigm completely.223  He latches on for a moment to the rumor that 
Walser never revised a sentence, a fact that might qualify him for entry into the exclusive realm of 
Outsider Artists.  The “chaotic scatteredness” of Walser’s writing, Benjamin suggests, is in fact a “sign of 
stamina” and purpose.  In the end, Benjamin abandons the notion of an authenticating absence of self-
conscious  style.  “What  we  find  in  Robert  Walser,”  he  writes,  “is  a  neglect  of  style  that  is  quite 
                                                   
222 In The Robber, Walser’s narrator  even addresses  the  reader  in a Jamesian voice:    “Don’t persist  in 
reading nothing but healthy books, acquaint yourselves also with so-called pathological literature, from 
which you may derive considerable edification. Healthy people should always, so to speak, take certain 
risks. For what other reason, blast and confound it, is a person healthy? Simply in order to stop living one 
day at the height of one’s health? A damned bleak fate” (59). 
223 It is Benjamin who also writes of Walser’s characters (which are most often first-person narrators) that 
they come from “insanity and nowhere else. They are figures who have left madness behind them, and 
this is why they are marked by such a consistently heartrending, inhuman superficiality. If we were to 
attempt to sum up in a single phrase the delightful yet also uncanny element in them, we would have to 
say: they have all been healed (112). 
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extraordinary  and  that  is  also  hard  to  define.”    In  a  Wittgensteinian  call  for  an  intentionality  without 
interpretable intent, Benjamin rejects the attempt to interpret “mysteries of [Walser’s] style” – the brooding 
fixation upon some underlying intention, conscious or not, that must be interpreted (along the lines of 
Freud’s reading of Da Vinci).   “For we are accustomed,” he continues, “to ponder the mysteries of style 
through the contemplation of more or less elaborate, fully intended works of art, whereas here we find 
ourselves confronted by a seemingly quite unintentional, but attractive, even fascinating linguistic 
wilderness.”  Benjamin then repeats his important qualification: “Seemingly unintentional, we said.  Critics 
have sometimes disagreed about whether this is really so.  But it is a fruitless quarrel, as we perceive 
when we recall Walser’s admission that he never corrected a single line in his writing.  We do not have to 
believe this, but we would be well advised to do so.  For we can set our minds at rest by realizing that to 
write yet never correct what has been written implies both the absence of intention as well as the most 
fully considered  intentionality.”224   While nothing in this passage lends itself to quotation in the form a 
back-cover  blurb  or  as  an  aphoristic  assessment,  I  think  these  are  nevertheless  Benjamin’s  most 
perceptive comments on Walser.  They also happen to be the most Nietzschean as well as the most 




an  extended  and  dramatized  “essay  on  freedom.”  “The  Walk”  concludes with an elegiac, country 
churchyard scene at end of day.  The narrator feels weary after a long and physically taxing walk, and it is 
also beginning to get dark: these are the boundary conditions, bodily and atmospherically, that make 
possible his final vision.  He arrives at a quiet side road that runs under trees toward a lake.  He 
encounters the two ghostly figures once again.  This time, however, one of them is the image of a “weary 
                                                   
224 Although it is quite differently phrased, I take what Benjamin says here to be the underlying sentiment 
of  Adorno’s  comment  in  “Essay  as  Form”  that  essay  writing  “takes  the  matter  of  presentation  more 
seriously than do those procedures that separate out method from material and are indifferent to the way 
they represent their objectified contents. The how of expression should rescue, in precision, what the 
refusal to outline sacrifices” (160 [italics in original]).  Adorno then calls Benjamin an “unequaled master” 
of this form of essayism.   
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old forsaken man whom I had seen a few days before, lying on the ground in the forest.”  The other image 
is that of a beautiful girl: 
 
As I walked slowly onward, two human figures arose in my mind. Perhaps because of a 
certain general weariness, I thought of a beautiful girl, and of how alone I was in the wide 
world, and that this could not be quite right.  Self-reproof touched me from behind my back 
and stood before me in my way, and I had to struggle hard. (Selected Stories 105) 
 
Now he must struggle with memories and the threat of being overwhelmed by the sense of imagined 
possibilities and feelings of regret over things undone and things that were done and that caused harm to 
others.  It begins to rain, and the narrator suddenly feels impelled to search for flowers.  He notices 
schoolchildren gathered with their teacher for a outdoor botany lesson.  This observation sets him off to a 
“scientific”  observation  of  his  own melancholy  frame  of mind,  a  reflexive monitoring  of  changes  in  his 
mental weather that tests out (and takes command of) these subtle shifts in mood as they place him in 
relation  to  the  world  that  comes  into  view.    “As  I  looked  at  earth  and  air  and  sky,”  he  writes,  “the 
melancholy unquestioning thought came to me that I was a poor prisoner between heaven and earth, that 
all men were miserably imprisoned in this  way,  that  for  all  men”  (106).    His  provisional  imagining 
coalesces around and forms in response to this unquestioning thought, which functions as a stimulus only 
when it is provisionally allowed its dogmatic status as a “given.”  Then we get a sudden sh ift in voice, in 
quoted language, as the narrator launches into a meditation on transience: 
 
“So  then  everything,  everything,  all  this  rich  life,  the  friendly,  thoughtful  colors,  this 
delight, this joy and pleasure in life, all these human meanings, family, friend, and 
beloved, this bright, tender air full of divinely beautiful images, houses of fathers, houses 




These are thoughts,  just  thoughts,  entertained  provisionally;  he  is  less  interested  in  the  “truth  of 
extinction”  than  in where  this  language  takes  him  and what modes  of  consciousness  it  opens  up  and 
makes possible.  “For a long time,” he says, “I thought of this, and asked those people whom perhaps I 
might have injured to forgive me.  For a long time I lay there in unclear thought, until I remembered the 
girl again, who was so beautiful and  fresh with youth”  (107).   The narrator  thus becomes  the  forsaken 
man who lies on the ground, and the image of the man whom he had seen only a few days earlier 
becomes a proleptic vision of himself.  Did he actually see a man lying on the ground?  The line between 
what is recounted and what is imagined becomes blurred as the act of observing merges with the 
interests of imaginary identification. 
His unclear thoughts are resolved into clearer focus as he once again conjures the image of the 
girl and “vividly imagined how charming was her childish, pretty mouth, how pretty her cheeks.”  There is 
a subtle modulation here to a more elaborately narrative counterfactual mode, unfolding in a series of 
parallel  phrases:  “how charming was her childish, how I  had  asked.”      So  is  he  remembering or 
imagining?   Once again, it is hard to say.  We might at this point begin to wonder whether the girl really 
exists, or if the remembered scene of their parting is perhaps something we ought to class with the earlier 
encounter with the “giant” named Tomzcak, who is more likely hallucinated into existence as a projection 
of his  fears.  The “how”-governed descriptions of the girl’s lovely  features gradually expand into a more 
dramatic mode,  as  he  imagines  “how  I  had  asked  her  a  question  a  while  ago,  how  in  her  doubt  and 
disbelief her lovely eyes had looked away, and how she had said no when I asked her if she believed in 
my sincere  love, affection, surrender, and tenderness”  (107).   He  then entertains  the possibility  that he 
might “still have had time to convince her that I meant well with her, that her dear person was important to 
me, that I had many beautiful reasons for  wanting  to make  her  happy”  (107).  But  he  made  no  such 
attempt.  These final ruminations are laced with doubts, beliefs, reasons, beautiful reasons – which 
suggests that what we have just read is a grappling with the demon of skepticism at least as much as it is 
an expression of regret over a lost opportunity and a path not taken.  His imagining of possible reasons 
then takes a self-reflexive turn, as he focuses his attention on the present and ponders the reason for his 




myself, and the flowers fell out of my hands. I had risen up, to go home; for it was late 
now, and everything was dark. (107) 
 
Two things are anatomized here from a disengaged and de-psychologized point of view: the act of picking 
the flowers, and the fact of his sorrow (allegorized and externalized).  We then hear a double-voiced 
question (one of them enclosed in quotation marks) that the speaker addresses to himself – a 
therapeutically posed question that has the effect of grounding the speaker through a reflexive 
acknowledgment and attention to the fact of his own efforts made in response to a changing atmosphere.  
Inhibiting contemplative fantasy, holding it in check, makes possible a re-uptake of power that translates 
into an act that is decisive but at the same time non-volitional:  The flowers slip out of his hands at the 
same moment he takes up the reins to begin making his way home.  The drama that plays itself out in the 
final pages of the story involves a contemplation of possibilities placed in tension with (and intensified by) 
a felt need to justify belief, adduce reasons, resolve doubts.  Everything is finally under control: the crisis 
has been navigated, the threat contained and converted.225  The fact is that it is late, the sky has become 




I have had much less to say about Walser than I initially hoped.  I would happily abandon myself 
to page after page of close readings, of passages chosen almost at random, unconstrained by the 
exigencies of an argument or any imagined need to “place” the author or his work.  He is  an endlessly 
fascinating writer, a great walking companion; read him and enjoy.  What I have offered in the preceding 
                                                   
225 See Henri Michaux’s concept of art as “exorcism” that functions to “ward off the surrounding powers of 
the  hostile world”  In his preface to Ordeals and Exorcisms Michaux writes:  “But  it  is  hard  to  start  the 
motor – only near-despair will do the trick.”  The “warding off” of “surrounding powers,” or the managing of 
what  might  otherwise  be  an  overwhelming  experience,  comes  close  to  Aby  Warburg’s  “prophylactic” 
concept of the function of iconography (which I considered briefly in Chapter One).  In The Gay Science, 
Nietzsche writes that “without art we would be nothing but foreground and live entirely in the spell of that 





passages is obviously something more (or less) than an unobtrusive open invitation.  As this study draws 
to a close, I confess to feeling a residual need to justify my extended effort to argue, in such an indirect 
manner,  for  Walser’s  significance  within  a  context  that  might  still  seem  incongruous  and  perhaps 
inappropriate.  If Walser is a philosophical writer in the way I have presented him, then I hope it is clear by 
now that such a claim makes sense only in the context and limited company of “outsider philosophers” – 
distinctly modernist philosophers who emerged at a particular historical moment in the later stages of a 
disenchanted culture, philosophers for whom aesthetic and reflective practices represented a way out of 
the paralysis of a culture dominated by narrowly conceived philosophical values.  These are the 
philosophers who helped give birth to modernist literature, by giving literature itself a new sense of its own 
relevance and by charging it with the task of restoring a real sense of wonder and possibility to a 
disenchanted world.  In this newly imagined world, “puzzles become thinkable” in a new way: we are no 
longer trapped between the twin philosophical questions of whether the puzzle is in fact solvable or 
whether brooding upon the fragmentary pieces can somehow reveal their truth to us.   
Put simply, I see Walser as an example of a melancholy modernist who successfully converted 
philosophy into a form of modernist experimental art.  This is a rather large claim to make about a writer 
we like to think of as occupying a permanent place at the periphery, a “clairvoyant of the small.”  And in 
fact, I still harbor doubts as to whether a genuine need exists for constructing an argument of any kind 
around so spontaneous and unclassifiable a writer – a writer, moreover, who most likely could have cared 
less about being the occasion for an academic argument.  Am I “placing” Walser in what I take to be an 
important context, or am I simply evading my discomfort over discussing him in an academic context?  On 
occasion, I am haunted by the voice of Elias Canetti, who objected to the idea of academicizing Walser 
for the purpose of generating an industry of scholarly activity well in advance of the revival of interest in 
Walser.  “I ask myself,” Canetti wrote  in 1973,  “whether, among  those who build  their  leisurely, secure, 
dead regular academic life on that of a writer who had lived in misery and despair, there is one who is 
ashamed of himself.”   There are  indications here of a backlash against  reading Walser as an Outsider 
Artist, and at the same time an underlying desire to preserve his status as an outsider, someone who 
wrote for himself and for nobody else, an exceptional artist in need of protection from the voyeuristic gaze 
of the society from which he had removed himself on principle.  All of this testifies to how invested we 
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have become in the ideal of the authentic Outsider Artist.  It is hard to know how to respond critically to 
the “vested ideals” that manifest themselves in Canetti’s deeply felt protest.  Perhaps all I can do, in the 
end, is take comfort in the fact that Walser has been unusually fortunate in the care and quality of the 
criticism he has received (and extremely fortunate in his translators).226  Walser, it turns out, has been 
well served by the cottage industry of “Walser Studies.” 
My real concern is quite different from Canetti’s.  There are many possible claims to make  for the 
wider  dissemination  and  study  of Walser’s  work.    One  of  them,  I  believe,  is  that Walser  helps  us  to 
recognize the difference between experimental art that models a transgressive and oppositional stance 
and art that pursues the more therapeutic value of seeking and testing out alternatives.  It is here, I think, 
that we can begin to appreciate – even argue for – the general validity of Walser’s art.227  The Walser I 
love is an outsider artist who simply had no interest in the transgressive logic of the contemporary avant 
garde or its ethos of creative destruction and innovation for its own sake.  I have no qualms at all about 
drawing attention to this aspect of his work.  The values that Walser articulates and models for us, the 
work that his writing does, constitute a much-needed alternative to the values that dominate our own 
culture today.  The active nihilism of the avant-garde, the novelty of transgression that was so rapidly 
embraced by general public of the 1920s, has now become the dominant culture.  The rallying cry of the 
modernist  avant  garde  was  “make  it  new”;  the  corporate  motto  of  Facebook  – “move  fast  and  break 
things” – also captures the spirit of our creative-destructive culture.228 Our current cult of progress, our 
myth  of  the  “eternal  recurrence  of  the  new,”  manifests  itself  in  the  omnipresent  jargon  of  process, 
innovation, disruption, and (above all) the fetish of the game-changing “big idea,” which must always be 
                                                   
226 I can also point out that acclaimed Walser translator Susan Bernofsky is currently at work on an 
extended critical biography of Walser which promises to be an important contribution to Walser 
scholarship. 
227 Writing of Cezanne’s  “schizothymia”  (the pathological  “reduction of  the world  to  the  totality of  frozen 
appearances”) Merleau-Ponty  claims  that  the  art  that  results  from  this  illness  becomes  “valid  for 
everyone”  and  thereby  “ceases  being  an  absurd  fact  and  destiny  to  become  a  general  possibility  of 
human existence” (Merleau-Ponty Reader 71). 
228 I wish I could say that the academic profession today stands outside these dominant values.  Today, 
however,  the  “dead  regular”  academic  life  demands  a  constant  radical  rethinking,  a  repudiation  of  old 
paradigms making way for new ones, an unending process that “encourages new dialogue,” and (above 
all) research that demonstrates the need for further research. Of making many books there is no end.  
The values that sustain the business of academic inquiry are more often a symptom of the larger culture 
than a challenge to it.  In “The (Super)Naturalistic) Turn in Contemporary Theory,” Jason Bartulis writes: 
“How uncanny  to  find  the  language  of  change,  force,  and  progress  surfacing  in an  intellectual  domain 
whose defining critical gesture, for better or worse, have involved critiques of those very terms as they 
operate in liberal discourse and other Enlightenment ideologies.”   
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counter-intuitive, always an antidote to thinking too much – or even thinking at all.229  Ironically, many of 
these buzzword abstractions are recognizably distorted versions of concepts that are central to the 
thinking of Emerson, Nietzsche, and James.  In spite of its language of action and change, the dominant 
discourse is built around philosophical abstractions, and its key terms are a virtual catalog of 
philosophical themes touched upon in this study.  More  than  a  century  and  a  half  after  Emerson’s 
philosophical meditation on “Experience,” we see something like a cult surrounding a reified and glorified 
concept of experience.230 Paradoxically,  the  concept  of  “experience”  is  the  central  philosophical 
abstraction of our culture and our time.  I would therefore take issue with an observation made some 
years ago by the editor of a collection  of  critical  essays  on Walser,  who  writes  of Walser’s  “style”  in 
connection with the philosophy of William James: 
 
Walser renounces the transitions and 'epic connections' that irritate him in favor of an art 
that relies on juxtapositions rather than transitions. William James might be describing 
Walser's writings when he observes in 'The World of Pure Experience' that 'experience 
itself, taken at large, can grow by its edges.' If James expanded our conception of 
experience in philosophy, thereby helping to usher in the modernist breakthrough in 
English writing, Robert Walser accomplishes something similar in literature. (Harman 11) 
 
At one time, this claim would have seemed entirely plausible to me, or at least innocuous-sounding.  I 
would have been pleased to see Walser’s name mentioned alongside James and someone taking note of 
an important family resemblance.  Good enough.  But I hope it is clear by now that the connection 
between James and Walser, and the parallel between philosophy and modernist writing, is far more 
complicated and in some ways more mutually dependent.  James’s philosophical concept of experience 
is not necessarily his major contribution to modernist writing; in fact, like Emerson and Nietzsche, James 
                                                   
229 Malcolm Gladwell is responsible for some of the founding texts of this modern myth (all of them 
immensely popular and bestselling, spawning many similar titles and establishing the generic outlines of 
the TED talk):  The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (2000); Blink: The Power 
of Thinking Without Thinking (2005); and Outliers: The Story of Success (2008).  The titles of these now-
classic books have entered into the common vernacular, which is some indication of what can be called, 
without exaggeration, the global dominance of this new myth of progress.   
230 Erik Satie once called experience “a form of paralysis.”   
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clearly demonstrates the inadequacy of experience as a philosophical abstraction.231 Throughout this 
study, I have therefore tried to attend to the ways in which Nietzsche and James avoided such abstraction 
by exploring intermediate forms of agency, forms of what Benjamin called “the  most fully considered 
intentionality,” which these philosophers recognized as an alternative to philosophical abstractions in our 
culture that can all too easily function as a substitute for a genuine sense of agency and for the possible 
values that we might derive from that sense of power.   
It is therefore just as important, I think, to distinguish the proto-modernist thought of Nietzsche, 
James, and Emerson  from  the distorting  frame of our cultural moment as  it  is  to  “recover”  a writer  like 
Walser through close reading.  In a strange way, reading Walser as a test case for their efforts helps me 
to rescue them from misreadings to which they have been all too susceptible.  If I have succeeded at 
anything, then I hope to have given a context that sharpens our sense of just how difficult it  is to “come 
after Nietzsche.”  And, of course, I hope we can more fully appreciate what was achieved by those who 
were working (and creating) in response to such challenges.  I believe artists like Walser have the done 
the best job of rising to the challenge that Nietzsche and James outlined with such clarity and urgency.  In 
the end, perhaps the most radical claim to make for Walser is that he is an inexhaustibly fascinating and 
stimulating pleasure to read.  It is important to recognize what Walser models for us as a viable 
alternative to other activities in our culture that often betray a fundamental distrust of pleasure and a fear 
of freedom, which may have something to do with our incapacity to negotiate, or even acknowledge, what 
Walser called  (in  “Essay on Freedom”)  the  “unfreedoms  internal  to  freedom.”   These are  the  limits  that 
produce the concrete situations where we may articulate for ourselves a sense of purposiveness without 
feeling the need to envision goals or to give reasons. And these are the situations in which we are called 
upon test out our total reactions upon life so that they might come to represent new possibilities, new 
ways  of  life  with  perhaps  a more  general  validity.    “What wonder,”  as  James wrote,  “that these dumb 
responses should seem our deepest organs of communication with the nature of things.” 
But  let’s  not  allow  ourselves  to  get  too  carried  away  by  these  raptures  of  affirmation  and 
appreciation, lest we fall prey to an undiscriminating optimism and lose all sense of the hard facts the 
                                                   
231 See  Michel  Ter  Hark’s  “Wittgenstein  on  the  Experience  of  Meaning  and  Secondary  Use”  (in  the 
collection  edited  by  McGinn  and  Kuusela)  on  Wittgenstein’s  critique  of  James’s  empiricism  and 
specifically his rejection of James’s philosophical concept of “experience.”   
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concrete situations that we must hold in view with an effort of the imagination.  The houses of our 
imagination must already be occupied,232 our imagined gardens well-stocked with real toads.  And so I 
feel the need to plant stones in my otherwise unimpeded path, to convert Heidegger’s clearing233 into a 
navigable terrain, to embrace a fatalism that would permit to end this study on a more appropriately – and 
joyously – melancholy note.   
For there are definite limits to what I may permit myself to say about literature and philosophy, 
certain claims  regarding  their  “world-historical” significance  that  the  realities  of  our world simply will not 
allow.  In certain moods, I like to remind myself of Herman Hesse’s remark  (his own claim to back-cover 
blurb immortality) that if 100,000 people read Walser the world would be a better place.  It is certainly 
beautiful to think so; Hesse’s article of faith even has a prophetic, Nietzschean sound to it.  But I have no 
idea how to raise such a sentiment to the level of a defensible claim. 100,0000 readers is not very many 
readers, at least not from a global standpoint.  And if these are an elite and select few, they are not likely 
to be in positions of power.  It is hard to picture the attendees at the World Economic Forum meeting in 
Davos reading Walser between sessions.  I’d like to think of Walser as having no place at Davos, and I 
picture him while out on one of his mountain walks wearing a bemused smile as he passes by the 
spectacle.  But  I’m afraid  I can also  imagine him sweeping  the  floors and serving drinks – perhaps the 
only way he would be allowed entry within a closely monitered radius of security.  Walser did not stop 
writing when he entered the asylum at Waldau in 1929; he stopped when he was transferred to Herisau in 
1933, the fateful year when he lost all hope of being paid for work he submitted to German-language 
publications (which had all come under the control and watchful eyes of the Nazi Party).   He was 
responding the way we all do to circumstances beyond our control: first we do what we must, then what 
we can.  And then we play.  Or go for walks.  Resignation may bear a close resemblance to resolution, 
                                                   
232 In his long story “The Walk,” Walser’s narrator stops on the road to observe houses at a distance and 
imagines what it is like to live in houses that are already occupied, as opposed to those that are empty 
and waiting to be occupied. He observes that “it is unfortunately just the most beautiful houses which are 
occupied, and the person who looks for a dwelling to suit his presumptuous tastes has a difficult time, 
because  that  which  is  empty  and  available  is  often  frightful  and  inspires  horror.”    This  is  a  curious 
paradox: a present but imagined fact, the imagination formed around and in response to the constraint of 
something that is taken to be a given, inspires a sense of possibility in a way that idealized absence and 
distance cannot.  He contrasts this imaginative relation to fact with the idealism of a “presumptuous taste” 
that tries to match a reality to a preconceived ideal. 
 
233 Heidegger’s Lichtung, commonly  translated  as  “the Clearing”  but  sometimes  also  rendered  as  “the 
lighting.” 
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but one does not necessarily precede the other in a narrative of loss and recovery.  The truly decisive 
question upon which our recovery depends, as James and Nietzsche remind us, involves the choice 
between either a fatalistic resolve or a pathos of poses.  When asked why he no longer wrote while in the 
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